- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Fakir Chandra Dutta And Others v. Messrs Gisborne & Co
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit by the Plaintiffs-Respondents to enforce a mortgage-bond. The original mortgagors executed a usufructuary mortgage in 1875 in favour of the Plaintiffs (mortgagees), who were placed in possession and authorized to deduct certain charges (including hospital subscription, chowkidari wages and dak charges) from the mortgaged property's receipts; the mortgagors were to receive a residual sum (about Rs. 2,994) and a share of any enhanced rent. In 1884 the same mortgagee took a second mortgage by which out of the sum payable to the mortgagors the mortgagees were authorized to retain Rs. 2,520 in lieu of interest on the second mortgage debt.
The present suit seeks enforcement of the second mortgage (1884). In 1891 the Appellants-Defendants (Nos. 23, 24, 39 and 40) purchased the equity of redemption and thereby became entitled to the mortgaged property subject to the two mortgages. In their written statement the Appellants claimed a set-off (via an appended account) consisting of four items: (1) the mortgagor's share of enhanced rent, (2) a hospital subscription, (3) chowkidari wages and (4) dak charges. They contended these sums stood to the credit of the mortgagors and therefore to their credit upon purchasing the equity of redemption.
The Plaintiffs resisted the set-off on several grounds including (a) that the suit is based upon the second mortgage which makes no mention of those items, (b) the suit is not one for recovery of money within the meaning of section 111 of the Code of Civil Procedure because it is to enforce a mortgage and was brought after the limitation period for a personal decree, (c) certain payments (new cesses) were made without deduction from the mortgagors' share and could only be accounted for after expiry of the 34-year usufructuary term, and (d) accounting for an assigned annual payment (Rs. 200 to Balabhadra) would leave nothing for set-off.
The Court below disallowed the set-off on five grounds: (1) no Court-fee was paid as would be payable on a plaint in a cross-suit, (2) the money claimed was not an ascertained sum, (3) no accounts were claimable in this suit, (4) the mortgagee did not stipulate for taking any such account, and (5) the mortgage was an anomalous mortgage whose incidents are governed by the contract (section 98, Transfer of Property Act). The Appellants challenged each ground; the Plaintiffs relied on them and additionally argued that the claim did not arise out of the same transaction as the suit and thus was not maintainable even as an equitable set-off.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Court below was correct in rejecting the Defendants-Appellants' claim for set-off.
- Whether the present suit, being for enforcement of the second mortgage and brought after limitation for a personal decree, amounts to a "suit for recovery of money" within the meaning of section 111 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to permit set-off under that section.
- Whether an equitable set-off can be claimed where the counter-claim does not arise out of the same transaction as that upon which the suit is based.
- Whether a written statement in which a set-off is claimed must bear the Court-fee payable on a plaint (i.e., whether a plaint-level court-fee is required when set-off is asserted in the written statement).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- By purchasing the equity of redemption, the Appellants became entitled to the mortgagors' share of any enhanced rent (as found in prior litigation) and to their share of any subsequent enhancements.
- The Appellants asserted entitlement to the hospital subscription, chowkidari wages and dak charges which the mortgagees have not paid and which therefore stand to the mortgagors' credit and, after purchase, to the Appellants' credit.
- The Appellants challenged the five grounds given by the Court below for disallowing the set-off and questioned the correctness of each of those grounds.
Plaintiffs-Respondents' Arguments
- The suit is based upon the second mortgage of 1884 which does not make any mention of the items claimed as set-off (these items relate to the earlier 1875 mortgage).
- The suit is not a "suit for recovery of money" within section 111, CPC; it is to enforce a mortgage security and was filed after six years from the due date so a personal decree against the mortgagor is barred by limitation.
- Certain new cesses (road and public work cesses) have been paid by the mortgagees without deduction from the mortgagors' malikana/profit, and an account of such payments could only be taken after expiry of the 34-year usufructuary term; an assigned annual payment (Rs. 200 to Balabhadra) further reduces any credit.
- The Court below additionally relied on five procedural/accounting reasons for disallowing set-off: no Court-fee paid as for a cross-plaint, claimed money not ascertained, no accounts claimable in the suit, lack of stipulation by mortgagee for taking such accounts, and the anomalous nature of the mortgage governed by the parties' contract under section 98, Transfer of Property Act.
- Even if an equitable set-off is asserted, it is untenable because it does not arise out of the same transaction as the one on which the suit is based.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Stephen Clark v. Buthnavaloo | Equitable set-off can be claimed only when it arises out of the same transaction as that upon which the suit is based. | The Court referred to this case (along with others) to support the conclusion that an equitable set-off is permissible only where it arises from the same transaction; applied this principle to hold the present set-off did not arise out of the 1884 mortgage transaction. |
| Bhagabat Panda v. Bamdeh Panda | Equitable set-off can be claimed only when it arises out of the same transaction as that upon which the suit is based. | Relied upon as authority for the same principle; used to justify disallowing the set-off which arose from a separate (1875) mortgage transaction. |
| Chisholm v. Gopal Chandra Surma | Equitable set-off can be claimed only when it arises out of the same transaction as that upon which the suit is based. | Referred to in support of the view that equitable set-off requires identity of transaction; applied to find the Appellants' claim arose from an earlier, distinct mortgage. |
| Amirzama v. Nathu Mal | Held (by a High Court) that a written statement claiming set-off should be treated as requiring the Court-fee payable on a plaint (different High Court view). | Not accepted by Banerjee, J.; cited as authority representing a contrary view taken by some High Courts on the stamp/court-fee point, which the judge said he could not accept. |
| Bai Shri Majirajbai v. Narotam Hangovan | Held (by a High Court) that a written statement claiming set-off should attract the plaint court-fee (a different view on court-fee). | Not accepted by Banerjee, J.; cited as an instance of High Court decisions contrary to his view on the court-fee question. |
| Chennappa v. Raghunatha | Held (by a High Court) that a written statement with set-off requires plaint-equivalent court-fee (another contrary High Court view). | Cited as part of the contrasting authorities on the court-fee issue; Banerjee, J. expressly stated inability to accept that view. |
| Oriental Bank Corporation v. Wright | Principle regarding construing statutes that impose taxes: such statutes should not be construed to impose a tax unless clearly imposed by the Legislature. | Banerjee, J. cited this case to support the proposition that a court-fee (a tax on public justice) should not be imposed by construction where statutory language does not clearly require it. |
| Cox v. Rabbed | Principle regarding strict construction of statutes imposing taxes (as applied in Oriental Bank). | Cited with Oriental Bank to reinforce the view that court-fee should not be inferred by construction where statute does not expressly require it for a written statement claiming set-off. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court (Banerjee, J.) examined the multiple grounds argued by the Plaintiffs and the Court below, but concluded that one ground alone sufficed to dispose of the appeal: the set-off claim did not fall within section 111 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, insofar as it might be regarded as an equitable set-off, it did not arise out of the same transaction as that upon which the suit is based.
Step-by-step reasoning as set out in the opinion:
- Characterisation of the suit: The suit is an action to enforce a mortgage security based on the second mortgage of 1884. The right to sue for a personal decree (that is, a money decree against the mortgagor) was barred by limitation when the suit was filed. Consequently the suit is not a "suit for recovery of money" within the meaning of section 111, CPC.
- Consequence for statutory set-off: Because the suit does not fall within section 111, the statutory set-off contemplated by that section is not available to the defendants in this case.
- Equitable set-off doctrine: Even if the defendants' claim were treated as an equitable set-off, the Court held it to be untenable because equitable set-off is available only where the counter-claim arises out of the same transaction as that on which the suit is based. The Court cited authorities (Stephen Clark v. Buthnavaloo; Bhagabat Panda v. Bamdeh Panda; Chisholm v. Gopal Chandra Surma) supporting that principle.
- Application to the facts: The present suit is based on the 1884 mortgage and does not refer to the items (enhanced rent share, hospital subscription, chowkidari, dak charges) which the defendants sought to set off. Those items arise from the separate 1875 mortgage transaction. Thus the equitable set-off requirement of arising from the same transaction is not satisfied.
- Disposition of other grounds: Because the Court disposed of the matter on the above legal ground, it found it unnecessary to decide the other points relied on by the Court below (the five grounds listed by the Court below). The Court nevertheless expressed an opinion (obiter) on the separate question of whether a written statement claiming set-off must be stamped like a plaint.
- Obiter on court-fee/stamp duty: Banerjee, J. indicated that, on the language of section 111 and the Court Fees Act (section 6 and the schedules), a written statement in which a set-off is claimed is not to be equated to a plaint for purposes of attracting the court-fee payable on a plaint. He reasoned that section 111 speaks of the effect of a set-off being "the same effect as a claim in a cross-suit" to enable final judgment, but does not in terms make the written statement a plaint or require it to be stamped as such; further, the Court Fees Act lists documents that must bear court-fees and does not include a written statement asserting set-off among those documents. Applying the principle that a tax on public justice should not be imposed by construction except where clearly enacted, he concluded that a written statement claiming set-off need not bear the plaint court-fee.
- Acknowledgement of contrary authorities: The Judge noted that High Courts (Allahabad, Bombay and Madras) had taken a different view in specific cases (Amirzama v. Nathu Mal; Bai Shri Majirajbai v. Narotam Hangovan; Chennappa v. Raghunatha), but stated inability to accept that view. He cited authorities (Oriental Bank Corporation v. Wright; Cox v. Rabbed) for the strict construction principle on taxing provisions.
- Concurrence and reservation: Pargiter, J. agreed with the result and the principal reasoning (that the claim to set-off does not come within s.111) but expressly reserved his opinion on the court-fee/stamp point.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The Court held that the defendants' claim for set-off was rightly disallowed because it did not fall within section 111, CPC, and, as an equitable set-off, it did not arise out of the same transaction as that upon which the suit was based (the 1884 mortgage), the alleged set-off items arising from the 1875 mortgage.
Immediate consequences and allocation of costs:
- The appeal is dismissed with costs.
- "The Plaintiffs-Respondents are entitled to their costs. The Defendants-Respondents will bear their own costs." (as stated in the opinion).
Broader implications:
The Court's operative decision turns on the absence of a statutory right to set-off under section 111 (because the suit is not a suit for recovery of money) and on the settled equitable rule that equitable set-off requires the counter-claim to arise from the same transaction. The judgment contains an obiter view (rejected by some High Courts) that a written statement claiming set-off need not bear the court-fee chargeable on a plaint; one concurring judge expressly reserved judgment on that stamp/court-fee point. No further binding alteration of law beyond the Court's application of the above principles to the facts was made in the operative holding of this appeal.
This summary was prepared solely from the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that opinion.
Banerjee, J.:— In this appeal which arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiffs-Respondents to enforce a mortgage-bond, the only question raised on behalf of the Appellants-Defendants Nos. 23, 24, 39 and 40 who are the purchasers of the equity of redemption of the mortgagor is whether the Court below was right in rejecting the claim for set-off urged on behalf of the Defendants. The set-off claimed, as we gather from the account appended to the written statement consists of four items, namely, (1) amount due in the mortgagor's shave on account of enhanced rent, the share being specified, (2) certain hospital subscription, (3) chowkidari wages and (4) dak charges. And the way in which this claim is said to arise is as follows: The original mortgagors executed a usufructuary mortgage in favour of the Plaintiff in 1875 whereby the mortgagees, the present Plaintiffs, who were placed in possession of the mortgaged property and were authorized to deduct from the assets of the property which were fixed at seventeen thousand rupees yearly, certain charges which have to be paid, and amongst which were the hospital subscription, chowkidari wages and the dak charges, and from the balance, after retaining eleven thousand rupees in lieu of interest and in part satisfaction of the principal of the mortgage debt, there was left the sum of Rs. 2,994 to be paid to the mortgagors. There, was also a subscription that the mortgagors would be entitled to a certain share of the increase in the rent which may be effected. Then in 1884 a second mortgage was created in favour of the same mortgagee, whereby out of the amount of two thousand nine hundred and odd rupees payable to the mortgagors, the mortgagees were authorized to retain 2,520 rupees in lieu of interest on the second mortgage debt.
The present suit is brought for the enforcement of this second mortgage. But in the meantime, that is to say, in the year 1891 the Defendants-Appellants have by purchasing the equity of redemption of the mortgagors became entitled to the mortgaged property subject to the two mortgages in favour of the Plaintiffs. And the allegation of the Appellants in their defence was that they were entitled to their share of the enhanced rent as was found in the previous litigation, and to their share of subsequent enhancement that may have been effected and also to the hospital subscription, the chowkidari wages and the dak charges which the mortgagees have not to pay and which therefore are sums standing to the credit of the mortgagors, and now since the purchase of the equity of redemption by the Appellants, to the credit of the Appellants in the hands of the Plaintiffs.
The answer of the Plaintiffs to this claim for set-off is that it is not claimable in this suit which is based not upon the first mortgage, but upon the second which does not make any mention of those items, that it is not claimable for the further reason that the present suit is not one for recovery of money within the meaning of sec. 111 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but is a suit only to enforce a mortgage, the suit having been brought more than six years after the due date and all claim for a personal decree against the mortgagor having become barred.
It is further contended that as the mortgagees have been paying certain new cesses, namely, road and public work cesses without making any deduction in the malikana or profit reserved for the mortgagors under the terms of the mortgage of 1875, an account can be taken of such payment only after the expiry of the 34 years for which the usufructuary mortgage of 1875 was to last and no account is claimable before the expiry of that term. Moreover, it is argued that if that sum together with another sum of 200 rupees which has been assigned to one Balabhadra to be paid to him annually by the mortgagees be taken into account, there would be nothing left for the Appellants to claim by way of set-off. The Court below without going into the account has disallowed the claim for set-off, first, because no Court-fee was paid such as was payable upon a plaint in a cross-suit, if the claim for set-off had been made by way of a cross-suit; secondly, because the money in respect to which the set-off is claimed was not an ascertained sum; thirdly, because no accounts were claimable in this suit; fourthly, because the mortgagee does not stipulate for the taking of any such account, and, fifthly, because the mortgage is an anomalous mortgage and its incidents are to be regulated by the contract between the parties as provided under sec. 98 of the Transfer of Property Act.
The correctness of each of these five grounds is questioned by the learned vakil for the Appellants; whilst on the other hand the learned vakil for the Plaintiffs-Respondents relies upon each of them, and in addition urges a further ground that this suit not being a suit for recovery of money within the meaning of sec. 111, the set-off contemplated by that section cannot be claimed, and if it is claimed as equitable set-off, even then the claim is untenable by reason of its not arising out of the same transaction as the one upon which the suit is based.
We are of opinion that the last-mentioned ground urged on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Respondents furnished a sufficient answer to the claim for set-off. The suit is not one for recovery of money but is only one for the enforcement of a mortgage security, the right to sue for a personal decree being barred by limitation when the suit was brought. That being so, the case does not come under sec. 111 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and if the claim is to be regarded as one for equitable set-off, it is clearly open to the objection that it does not arise out of the same transaction as that upon which the present suit is based. That an equitable set-off can be claimed only when it arises out of the same transaction as that upon which the suit is based has been laid down in several cases of which we need refer only to Stephen Clark v. Buthnavaloo, Bhagabat Panda v. Bamdeh Panda, and Chisholm v. Gopal Chandra Surma. Now the transaction on which the present suit is based has reference dearly to the mortgage of 1884. It does not refer to any of the items in regard to which the claim is made. That claim is based upon the terms of the earlier mortgage of 1875 which was a separate transaction.
That being so, the claim for set-off has been rightly disallowed. In this view of the case it becomes unnecessary to discuss the other points raised. But as the question whether the Court-fee for a plaint was necessary to be paid by the Appellants-Defendants before their claim for set-off under sec. 111 could be entertained was discussed at some length in the arguments, I may, though not without some diffidence, say that question ought to be answered in the negative regard being had to the language of sec. 111, and to the absence of any express provision in the Court Fees Act requiring payment of the Court-fee for a plaint upon the written statement in which a set-off is claimed. I say I must speak with some diffidence because I find that the High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay and Madras have taken a different view of the matter, see the cases of Amirzama v. Nathu Mal, Bai Shri Majirajbai v. Narotam Hangovan, and Chennappa v. Raghunatha; with all respect for the learned Judges who decided those cases, I must say I am unable to accept the view they have taken. Sec. 111 merely says “such set-off shall have the same effect as a claim in a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce final judgment in the same suit both on the original and on the cross-claim.” It does not say that the written statement in which the set-off is claimed is to be treated as a plaint and to be stamped accordingly. It does not even refer to the written statement in so many words; but it only says “the set-off shall have the same effect as a plaint,” which to my mind, evidently means this, that it is not a plaint and it does not partake of the nature or the characteristic of a plaint. It is only for certain purposes to have the same effect as a plaint. A provision like that cannot be taken to mean that the written statement in which a set-off is claimed shall have to bear the Court-fee that is payable on a plaint. Turning to the Court Fees Act I find that all that is provided for there is that by sec. 6, the documents specified in Schs. I and II shall not be received or acted upon unless they bear the Court-fee payable. Amongst those documents the plaint is certainly one, but not the written statement in which a set-off is claimed nor is there any provision made requiring a written statement in which a set-off is claimed, to bear any stamp duty such a plaint is to bear.
In that state of the law, I think, it would be straining it a little too much to hold that a written statement in which a set-off is claimed, should have the Court-fee chargeable on a plaint in cross-suit. The Court-fee on a plaint is a tax on public justice; and no law imposing a tax should be construed so as to make persons liable for the tax unless such liability is clearly imposed by the Legislature. See the cases of Oriental Bank Corporation v. Wright(7) and Cox v. Rabbed(8).
As I have stated above, in the view that I take of the nature of the suit the claim for set-off has been rightly disallowed and this appeal must accordingly be dismissed with costs.
The Plaintiffs-Respondents are entitled to their costs. The Defendants-Respondents will bear their own costs.
Pargiter, J.:— I agree in the judgment that has been delivered except as regards the point whether a written statement should be stamped like a plaint. The appeal must fail on the ground that the claim to the set-off does not come within the words of sec. 111, and I prefer to reserve my opinion regarding the point of the stamp duty.
S.C.S
Appeal dismissed.
Alert