Sir Arnold White, C.J:— In this case one Kotamraju Yenkatrayadu has been convicted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate of the offence of forgery. He applies to this Court on a revision petition and asks that the conviction may be set aside on the ground that he has committed no offence in law.

The facts are not in dispute. They are fully set out by the Presidency Magistrate. So far as they are material to the question we have to decide, they may be briefly stated as follows:— The petitioner was desirous of being admitted as a candidate for the Matriculation examination of the University of Madras. The regulations of the University which provide for the holding of the examination and the admission of candidates thereto are contained in bye-laws 128 to 134. Bye-law 129 provides that, except in certain cases, a candidate for admission must forward to the Registrar what is known as an “attendance certificate.” bye-law 131, which provides for the excepted cases referred to in bye-law 129, provides that a candidate who produces a certificate from the headmaster of a recognised high school that he is of good character and has completed his twentieth year, shall be exempted from the production of the attendance certificate mentioned in bye-law 129.

In this case, the petitioner forwarded to the Registrar of the University a certificate that lie was of good character and. That be had completed his twentieth year. The certificate purported to be signed by the Rev. Dr. Wolff, who is a headmaster of a recognised high school. The certificate was not signed by Dr. Wolff. It is admitted that the petitioner fabricated the Signature of Dr. Wolff, that he forwarded the certificate to the Registrar, and that he did so for the purpose of being admitted to the examination.

The offence of forgery is defined in sections 463 and 464 of the Indian Penal Code. In order to constitute the offence, the document must he false in fact, it must have been made dishonestly or fraudulently within the meaning of these words as used in section 464, and it must have been made with one of the intents specified in section 463. There can be no question that the document in this case was false in fact. It has not been contended that it was made “dishonestly,” within the meaning of this word as used in section 464. It is only, therefore, necessary to consider the meaning of the word “dishonestly” in so far as it throws light on the meaning of the word “fraudulently”, with which, it is used in collocation. By section 24 “whoever does any thing with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is aid to do that thing dishonestly.” By section 23 “wrongful gain” is defined as “gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled”; and “wrongful loss” is defined as “the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled,” The doing of a thing fraudulently is defined by section 25: “A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud, but not otherwise.”

Possibly a distinction may be drawn between doing a thing “with intent…. that fraud may be committed” (section 463) and doing a thing “fraudulently” (section 464). Such a distinction seems to be recognised in section 239 of the Code. But to my mind no distinction can be drawn between doing a thing “with intent to commit a fraud” (section 463) and doing a thing “fraudulently” (section 464). Although the words “with intent to commit a fraud” are not expressly defined, I think they mean the same thing as “fraudulently”, i.e, to say, “with intent to defraud.” It follows that if it is established that a person does a thing “with intent to commit a fraud” he does it with one of the intents specified in section 463, and he also does it “fraudulently” within the meaning of section 464. It also follows, as it seems to me, that the offence is complete if a document, false in fact, is made with intent to commit a fraud, although it may not have been made with any one of the other intents specified in section 463.

I am of opinion that in the present case the petitioner made a false document with intent to defraud. I entirely agree with the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Empress v. Abbas Ali where it was held that an intended deprivation of property was not an essential element of an intention to defraud. In this case the earlier Calcutta case of Queen-Empress v. Haradhan was over-ruled and although the Chief Justice in giving the opinion of the Full Bench does not say so in so many words, I think it is clear that if the Full Bench had to answer the question whether, on the facts in Queen-Empress v. Haradhan the accused in that case had acted with intent to defraud, they would have answered it in the affirmative.

Intending to defraud means, of course, something more than deceiving. A tells B a lie and B believes him. B is deceived but it does not follow that A intended to defraud B. But, as it seems to me, if A tells B a lie intending that B should do something which A conceives to be to his own benefit or advantage, and which, if done, would he to the loss or detriment of B, A intends to defraud B. Sir James Stephen, in his ‘History of the Criminal Law of England,’ Vol. II, page 121, observes: “Whenever the words ‘fraud,’ or ‘intent to defraud,’ or ‘fraudulently’ occur in the definition of a crime, two elements at least are essential to the commission of the crime; namely, first, deceit or an intention to deceive, or in some cases, mere secrecy; and secondly, either actual injury, or possible injury, or an intent to expose some person either to actual injury or to a risk of possible injury by means of that deceit or secrecy.” “This intent,” he adds, “is very seldom the only, or the principal, intention entertained by the fraudulent person, whose principal object in nearly every case is his own advantage…. A practically conclusive test of the fraudulent character of a deception for criminal purposes is this: Did the author of the deceit derive any advantage from it which could not have been had if the truth had been known? If so it is hardly possible that the advantage should not have had an equivalent in loss or risk of loss to some one else, and, if so, there was fraud.” In his judgment in Queen-Empress v. Muhammad Saeed Khan*, J., after citing the above passage from Sir James Stephen's work, observes: “Where, therefore, there is an intention to deceive and by means of the deceit to obtain an advantage there is fraud, and if a document is fabricated with such intent, it is a forgery.” The Bombay High Court, in the case of Queen-Empress v. Vithal Narayan, which was followed by the Calcutta High Court, in Lolit Mohan Sarkar v. Queen-Empress accepted the interpretation of Le Blane, J., in Haycraft v. Creasy “by fraud is meant an intention to deceive whether it be from any expectation of advantage to the party himself or from ill-will is immaterial.”

It is not necessary to decide whether an intention to secure a benefit or advantage to the party deceiving by means of the deceit in itself constitutes an intention to defraud. I may observe, however, in this connection that by section 24 of the Code a person does a thing dishonestly who does it with the intention of causing wrongful gain or wrongful loss. It is not necessary that there should he an intention to cause both. On the analogy of this definition it might be said that either an intention to secure a benefit or advantage on the one hand, or to cause loss or detriment on the other, by means of deceit, is an intent to defraud.

I am of opinion that in the present case both elements are present, viz., an intention to secure a benefit or advantage to the party deceiving and an intention to cause loss or detriment to the other party.

The object which the petitioner had in view in making the false document was to get exemption from the production of an attendance certificate and to be admitted as a candidate for the examination. His intention was to pass the examination (for it cannot he presumed that he intended to fail) and his intention was to secure such advantages as are incidental to the position of a man who has passed the examination.

I do not see why all these intentions may not reasonably he inferred, but even if a narrower view be adopted, and the question of intention is limited to the direct result of the act of deceit, the petitioner intended, on the strength of the false document, to secure his registration as a candidate for the examination, and this itself would have been an advantage to him; at any rate, he cannot be heard to say it would not have been. As to the loss or detriment to the University, the University by their bye-laws prescribe certain qualifications for persons who desire to appear for the Matriculation examination. In the case of the candidates to whom bye-law 131 is applicable, who are known as “private candidates,” the University say in effect, “We make it a condition precedent to your obtaining the exemption for which you ask, and being allowed to appear for the examination, that we should have before us a certificate, signed by a responsible person, with means of knowledge, as to your respectability.” This, of course, is to protect the University against private candidates who are not respectable. If the candidate who fabricated the certificate did so with the intention that the University should take action on it, it seems to me it must be taken that he did so with the intention of causing loss or detriment to the University.

As I have stated, in my view, if a false document is made in fact and there is an intention to defraud, the requirements of the law are satisfied. But I may add that I am of opinion that in this case the petitioner made the false document with intent to support a “claim or title” within the meaning of these words as used in section 463. The University say: “If you satisfy us that you have complied with the requirements of bye-law 131 we will exempt you from the production of an attendance certificate and we will admit you to the examination.” The candidate says: “I have complied with these requirements, exempt me and admit me.” It is to be observed that, under bye-law 131, there is no discretion as to exemption when the certificate required by the bye-law is produced. The words are “shall be exempted from the production of the certificate of attendance required under bye-law 129.” I see no reason for limiting the word “claim,” as was the view of Mr. Justice Norris, to a claim with reference to property (see Queen-Empress v. Haradhan), or, as it was argued on behalf of the petitioner, it ought to be limited to a claim which is enforceable at law. I agree with the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Queen-Empress v. Soshi Bhushan*, that a claim to be admitted to a University examination is a claim within the meaning of section 463. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the candidate has no claim to be admitted to the examination, it seems to me clear that he has “a claim” to be exempted from the production of the attendance certificate, since the University, by their own bye-law give him the right to be exempted when certain conditions precedent are satisfied.

As regards the question of intent to defraud, the balanced authority appears to me to be in favour of the view which I have indicated. The case (Queen-Empress v. Soshi Bhushan*) may, no doubt, be distinguished on the facts, upon the ground that the false document in that case, if its falsity had not been discovered, would have enabled the party to attend a law class without paying the fees. Sir John Edge points this out in considering whether the document was made “dishonestly.” In dealing with the question whether it was made “fraudulently” the learned Judge says: “That document was further fraudulently made as having been made with the intention that the prisoner should, by the use of it, deceive a college authority and obtain admission to a second-year law class. Illustration (k) to section 464 of the Indian Penal Code shows that if A, without B's authority, writes a letter and signs it in B's name, certifying to A's character, intending thereby to obtain employment under Z, A commits forgery, inasmuch as he intended to deceive Z by the forged certificate and thereby to induce Z to enter into an implied or express contract of service. We can see no difference in principle between the case of a man making a false certificate in order to obtain employment and the case of a man making a false certificate in order to obtain admission to a law class. In each case the intention is to deceive another person, and thereby to obtain an advantage, or a privilege which, without such deception, could not have been obtained.” The Bombay High Court in Queen-Empress v. Ganesh Khanderao and Ganesh Daulat express the opinion that illustration (k) shows that the mere fabrication of a false certificate of character raises a presumption of fraud, and they seem to have been of opinion that the presumption arose independently of the question whether or not the object of the deception was to induce the party deceived to enter into a contract of service. It is not necessary to go as far as this, but as I have already pointed out, if the party who made the false document did so with an intent to defraud, he acted with one of those intents specified in section 463 (and that is enough) and also acted fraudulently.

In Empress v. Abbas Ali the certificate which was fabricated was a certificate which qualified a man to enter for an examination as a marine engineer.

In the English case of Regina v. Toshack the certificate which was fabricated was a certificate which qualified a man to go up for an examination as a master mariner. In both those cases the man who fabricated the certificate was held guilty of forgery.

The Calcutta case cannot he distinguished on the ground that the intent there was an intent “to enter into any express or implied contract” (I assume for the moment this would he a ground of distinction, though for the reasons I have stated I do not think it would he), for this was not the ground on which the decision was based. Again in the English case the indictment does not allege that the act was done with an intention to obtain employment as a master mariner, but with intent to deceive, injure, prejudice and defraud the said Corporation of Trinity House, the Corporation being the examining body in that case.

The argument that there was no intention to defraud in the case before us, because it did not follow that the petitioner would pass the examination would have been equally applicable in the two teases referred to. I do not find that it was ever advanced. I do not think that any valid distinction can be drawn between cases where the interests of the public might have been injuriously affected by the deceit and cases where they could not have been so affected. In the case reported in Weir's ‘Criminal Rulings,’ page 332, the Court did not attempt to define what constitutes “an intent to defraud.” They contented themselves by saying that it was not shown that the accused in that case acted with intent to defraud. On the facts of that case such an inference seems reasonable. Certain ryots wished to relinquish certain lands which stood in the names of their fathers. They were unable to find the karnam, and the accused in that case offered to prepare the necessary notices for them. In the notices he inserted the names of the fathers and added the countersignature of the karnam and the names of certain persons as attesting witnesses. There was certainly no forgery so far as the insertion of the fathers' names is concerned, since the pattas stood in their names. The counter-signature of the karnam was no doubt fabricated and the persons whose names were inserted as attesting witnesses had not in fact attested; but the report says that the countersignature of the karnam and the attesting witnesses was usual, but not compulsory. There is nothing to show that the lands could not have been relink quished without the countersignature of the karnam and the attestation of witnesses. The notices were no doubt false, but apparently the man who wrote them did not do so with the intention, on the strength of the false entries, of securing any benefit or advantage to himself or causing any loss or detriment to anybody else.

In the case of Queen-Empress v. Appasami A falsely represented himself to be B at a University examination, got a hall ticket under B's name, attended the examination, answered the questions set and headed and signed the papers with B's name. A was held to have been rightly convicted of forgery. The Court found that the intent on the part of A was two-fold, (1) to lead the University authorities to believe that the examination papers were answered by B, (2) to procure the grant of a certificate to the effect that B had passed the examination. The Judges do not say that the first and primary intention would not have been enough to meet the requirements of section 463. Supposing it had not been the practice of the Madras University to grant a testamur or certificate to those who passed the examination, but contented themselves with keeping a record, I venture to think the decision of Sir Arthur Collins and Mr. Justice Parker would have been the same. Further, if it was a legitimate inference in that case that A, by using B's name, endeavoured to procure the grant of a certificate that B had passed the examination, why should it not be a legitimate inference in the case before us that the petitioner by fabricating Dr. Wolff's name, intended in the event of his passing to procure the grant of a certificate to himself.

As regards the case of King-Emperor v. C. Srinivasan…(Petitioner) Accused.*, the learned Judges would appear to have decided the case rather with reference to the word “dishonestly” than with reference to “fraudulently.” With the greatest respect to these learned Judges, I find myself unable to agree with their decision.

I think the conviction was right and should be upheld. As regards the sentence taking into consideration all the circumstances, I think a less severe sentence than that which the learned Magistrate thought it his duty to pass, will meet the requirements of the case. For the sentence of four months' rigorous imprisonment I would substitute a sentence of six weeks' simple imprisonment.

Subrahmania Ayyar, J.:— The petitioner forwarded in the prescribed form to the Registrar of the Madras University an application to be registered as a candidate for the Matriculation examination that was held in December 1903. The application contained on the face of it a certificate purporting to be signed by the Rev. Dr. Wolff, Principal of the A.E.L.M College, Guntur, which ran as follows: “I hereby certify that the best of my know ledge and belief Kotamraju Venkatarayadu will have completed his 20th year before the 15th September 1903, and that be is of good character.” That certificate is spurious, the whole of the writing thereof, including the signature, being in the petitioner's hand. The petitioner was charged with forgery and using a forged document as genuine and was convicted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate and sentenced to four months' rigorous imprisonment.

In the circumstances of this case the point for determination reduces itself into whether, in concocting this paper, the petitioner acted “fraudulently” within the meaning of the provisions of the Code on the point. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that term should be understood as involving something affecting specific property or right only. But in Empress v. Abbas Ali, it was held by the hull Bench of the Calcutta High Court that deprivation of property, actual or intended, did not constitute an essential clement in regard to offences falling under sections 465 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. This decision, there can be no doubt, is perfectly sound, and the narrow construction suggested cannot be accepted. At the same time it is equally clear to my mind that the view that “fraudulently” implies nothing more than a deception intended to secure an advantage to the deceiver goes too far. The observations of Banerjee, J., in Queen-Empress v. Muhammad Saeed Khan, carefully read, lend no support to such a view, and that the learned Judge could not have intended to lay down any such broad proposition is manifest from the reference made by him to certain observations of Sir Fitz-James Stephen, which show, in a way absolutely unmistakeable, that the advantage sought to be gained by the deception should, to make it fraudulent, involve some distinct loss or detriment to another, or the likelihood of such loss or detriment, though, no doubt, it would ordinarily be so when an advantage would accrue to the deceiver. And the same eminent writer when dealing with the offence of forgery, remarks thus: “The meaning of the phrase (with intent to defraud) would be more exactly, though less neatly, expressed if it was with intent to deceive in such a manner as to expose any person to loss or risk of loss” (Stephen's ‘History of Criminal Law,’ ed. of 1883, Vol. Ill, page 187). To hold otherwise would he tantamount to saying that every deception effected by a spurious writing is fraudulent, and is, therefore, a forgery. Of course, 110 one has yet been so bold as to suggest such a definition of this well-known offence. It is impossible to conceive why the Legislature should have thought it fit to introduce the word “fraudulently” with such iteration when defining a “false document” in section 464, if it meant really to make every deception by writing that is not genuine, practised with intention to secure an advantage to the deceiver, ipso facto, a forgery. To have defined the offence in the latter way would have been far easier, and considering that the phrase “with intent to defraud” had again and again been the subject of discussion and consideration under the English Law, which our Code has followed (though not without improvements) in defining the offence, to accede to the view that a mere advantage to the deceiver amounts to fraud would really be to reject as mere surplusage what constitutes one of the essentials of the offence. I should not have thought it necessary to have so far dwelt upon this point but for the frequency with which the mere spuriousness of a document is confounded with the element of fraud required to make the writing the subject of the indictable offence of forgery, in spite of the pains taken by Judges and writers to accentuate the distinction between the two.

Bearing, then, that latter element in view, let us see how the present case stands with reference to the facts. Though the spurious paper referred to the age of the petitioner as well as to the matter of his character, yet the charge on which the petitioner was tried made mention only of the statement as to age, and, curiously enough, this statement was altogether ignored by the Magistrate he having rested the conviction on the statement in the paper as to the petitioner's character alone. The first point for consideration, therefore, is whether having regard to the matter so relied on, it can he held that the deceit intended to be practised by the petitioner was such as to expose the University, at whose instance the prosecution was launched, to “loss” or to the “risk of loss.” It is in relation to this aspect of the matter, I take it, that the Magistrate, in paragraph 10 of his judgment, introduced the words “at the expense of the University of Madras and to its detriment.” The Magistrate, however, has not explained what it was in his opinion that Constituted the “expense” or the “detriment”; nor did the learned Crown. Prosecutor attempt to throw any light on the subject in the argument before us. We were left to fill up this gap in the prosecution case as we best could. Mr. Patterson, the Registrar, suggested in his evidence that the detriment to the University was the loss of its “prestige,” in other words, of its reputation, of which the former its the consequence. Now it was not certainly a case of the University running the risk of being supposed to attach no importance to the character of its examinees, for it has erred at all in the matter, that could only have been in the other direction. Unlike its prototype, the London University, it insists on the production of a certificate oven by a candidate for the lowest of its examinations—the Matriculation. It further confines the class of persons from whom the candidates are to produce certificates, to members of the Senate, and heads of recognised educational institutions. Again, instead of following the negative form of certificate prescribed by the Allahabad University, viz., “I know nothing against the character of the abovenamed candidate which ought to debar him from Matriculation,” it requires the grantors of certificates to give a positive pledge as to the character of this class of young and immature persons, imposing thereby a duty not quite easy of fulfilment in strict consistency with the demands of truth and reminding one of the remark reported to have been made by the late Chief Justice of this Court on the occasion of the production of a certificate to the effect that an applicant for enrolment as a vakil—a young man of about 25—was a perfect gentleman, that he, the Chief Justice, should have thought no man of that age could by any one be pronounced with safety to be a perfect gentleman. So far as one can understand Mr. Patterson's suggestion, the risk can only be that the appearance at an examination of a candidate, without good character, as if he were one possessed of it, would tend to detract from the prestige of the University. If Mr. Patterson were right, it might as well he said that a theft or a burglary tends to destroy the reputation of him whose property is, or is attempted to be, stolen. The suggestion, to my mind, is altogether fanciful. It follows, therefore, that the conviction cannot he supported on the ground put forward by Mr. Patterson.

If I rightly understood the Crown Prosecutor, reliance was placed by him on Regina v. Toshack, and the similar Calcutta Full Bench case as an alternative ground for supporting the conviction. No doubt, they are instances in which risk of specific injury to specific persons was absent, and the conclusion that the spurious documents amounted to forgeries was, as I understand, the ratio decidendi of those cases, on the ground that general interest rendered it proper to hold that the fabrications there in question were indictable as forgeries, that is to say, the fabricator must, from that point of view, he held to have in the eye of the law committed the act with intent to defraud within the meaning of that term in the definition of forgery, as is to be gathered from the reasons assigned by Alderson, B., in the former case. Referring to the examination by the Trinity House the learned Baron says it was “a very important public duty,* important to owners of property of this description and important to the lives of those entrusted to their care, and if inefficient seamen and persons otherwise than of good character and conduct are appointed the unfortunate subordinates of the ship are often subjected to harsh and improper treatment (Regina v. Toshack).” Among the observations of Jardine, J., in Queen-Empress v. Ganesh Khanderao and Ganesh Dault, also relied on in the same connection, those respecting the duty of Courts to attend to the policy of the law in determining whether or not particular acts should he held to fall under the category of crimes, have not in the circumstances here a direct hearing on the aspect of the case under discussion. But more in point is Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines, Ltd., where the House of Lords, after a review of the authorities, lay down that public police is not a safe or trustworthy ground for legal decision. The Lord Chancellor, in the course of very strong observations on the view of Vaughan Williams, L.J, who had rested his decision on what he thought the interests of the State demanded, while fully recognising the propriety of the application by the Judges of established principles to new instances coming within the scope thereof, points out that no Court has power to invent a new head of public policy (see at pages 491 and 496). Bishop in his great work on ‘Criminal Law’ points out that the Judges in Regina v. Toshack, in deciding as they did, went to the “verge,” 3rd ed., Vol. II, section 503, and it would seem therefore that the principle of that decision ought not to be extended any further. Even if it were otherwise, it is impossible to see any analogy in substance between that and Empress v. Abbas Ali, on the one hand, and the present case on the other. For the risk of injury to life and property resulting from a person not possessing sufficient skill, training, etc., for exercising the calling of a master mariner, or of an engineer, being in charge of a ship or dangerous machinery, is so manifest and serious that no reasonable man can question its reality or gravity. But, surely, there is no comparison between such risk and the detriment supposed to accrue to the public from a candidate not of good character, appearing for the Matriculation examination as if he were possessed of such character, or from evasion of the conditions prescribed by the University as to pre-Matriculation studies, granting that the system in vogue as to that examination is flawless. How much less ground is there then for importing into the case any consideration of public requirement, having regard to the views authoritatively and quite recently expressed as to the deficiencies of the existing system. That the members of the University Commission condemn it is clear from their report. Its supposed special merit, viz., that the examination qualifies those who pass it for the lower ranks of the Government service, contributing as it does considerably to the finances of the University, is in the opinion of those members its chief defect requiring radical alteration (vide sections 160, 169 and 170 of their report), and that part of the system which relates to candidates in the position of the petitioner and known as private candidates, as obtaining in this and in the Bombay University, has been singled out for special animadversion and immediate abandonment (vide section 166). The very bye-law under which the petitioner applied for the examination affords an illustration of the justice of the criticism of the Commissioners, inasmuch as the exemption virtually provided for by it from the necessity of undergoing the prior instruction considered essential to fit a candidate for entering on the University course, is a departure dictated by reasons altogether unconnected with the University. Surely few will admit the expediency of enforcing, by the sanction of criminal punishment, rules relating to matters which have apparently not as not passed the stage of experiment, conducted with not very marked success by bodies themselves in the throes of changes and busy gathering the experience so much needed to enable them to mould, so far as is permitted by the no means favourable circumstances under which they have to work, a fairly good system of University education.

Apart from all this, there is the consideration that to make the words “fraudulently” or “with intent to commit fraud” cover acts such as this which have come to be spoken of as “examination malpractices” would be to subject youths guilty of such acts, while still juveniles in the strict sense of the term, to the contaminating influences of the prison fit only for hardened offenders. To save persons of such impressionable age from the degradation attendant upon their being brought to trial and punishment in the usual way, it has been found necessary in countries, where the matter has received that attention it deserves, to establish a new tribunal called the “Juvenile Court” (see Reports of the Mosely Education Commission to the United States, October—December, 1903, Truant and Reformatory schools, pages 360 to 375). Referring to this tribunal it is observed in the report cited: “An institution of scorn at its origin, it is to-day respected as the greatest moral force in nipping the germ of crime and in the promise of reducing the number of penal settlements which form the blight of every nation.” One of the features of this tribunal is that the public is not admitted while the Judge sits, a few seats only being provided at the hack of the hall for parents of the person under trial and the witnesses in the particular case. The trial itself aims at making the proceeding look like a private meeting for advice and exhortation, severe discipline being enforced only in cases calling for it. In pages 364 and 365 of the same report will he found an instructive account of other methods of such a Court, methods incapable of being brought in a line with the procedure of the ordinary tribunals. With such notable signs of the times before us one may well decline to invoke the argument of policy for the purpose of bringing within the clutches of the general criminal law the class of juvenile offenders referred to, in connection with delinquencies, the effect of which on the well-being of the community is so intangible.

I hold that the spurious document in question was not made fraudulently within the meaning of sections 464 and 463 of the Indian Penal Code. This conclusion is not, in my opinion, inconsistent with the actual decisions in the cases relied on by the prosecution. In Queen-Empress v. Soshi Bhushan* the facts established a dishonest intention within the meaning of the Code and the conviction was, therefore, right. In Queen-Empress v. Muhammad Saeed Khan, if the assumption there made by Banerjee, J., that the falsification of the character and the service roll to which the charge related would have effected other public servants injuriously be right, that certainly would distinguish that case from the present, since the suggestion of anything analogous to it in respect of other candidates could not he made hero without resorting to extravagant fiction totally inadmissible, at least in ‘the administration of the criminal law’. In Queen-Empress v. Ghanesh Khanderao and Ganesh Dault, the charge was under the latter part of section 182 of the Indian Penal Code, and the decision proceeds directly and expressly on the ground that no question of injury arose in the case. Queen-Empress v. Vithal Narayan, considered in the light of the comments made thereon by Jardinc, I., should he understood as capable of being rested on the ground that the entertainment of the party referred to in the case as Karkoon was so detrimental to public interests as to make the act fraudulent on the principle of Regina v. Toshack. In Queen-Empress v. Appasami the risk of loss was risk of loss of the property of the University, viz., the certificate to which the learned Judges in terms refer. Unlike this last case no intention as to what would have happened had the petitioner been registered, that is to say, as to whether he would have actually appeared at the examination) and if he did, as to what further advantage it would have been possible for him to seek or obtain, can rightly he attributed to the petitioner; and with reference to the rule that a man must he taken to intend the natural consequences of his act, all that can properly be said in regard to the petitioner is that in making the false certificate he only intended to be placed in a position that would enable him to appear at the examination, everything beyond it being too remote to be treated as the natural consequence of his act. The passage cited from Mayne's ‘Criminal law’ (edition 3, page 821) was, it appears to me, clearly not intended by the learned author to apply to such a case as the present. Were it otherwise, I must with all deference say I could not agree with him in the absence of anything in the passage to enable one to gather what could he the loss or the risk of loss in a case such as this.

I would, therefore, allow the petition, set aside the conviction and sentence, and direct the petitioner to be discharged.

Davies, J.:— The accused, in order to obtain admission as a candidate at the Matriculation examination of the Madras University in 1903, forwarded with his application to the Registrar a certificate regarding his character and age without which he would not have been admitted to the examination. That certificate purported to be signed by the Rev. Dr. Wolff. But it was not signed by that gentleman. The accused himself had written Dr. Wolff's signature. For this act and for nothing else (because it is not proved that the statements made in the certificate were in themselves false) the accused has been convicted of the offence of forgery as defined in section 463 of the Indian Penal Code. It is needless to say that to convict a person of a crime it must be strictly proved that it has been committed in law. It is not enough to show that he has been guilty of immoral or sinful conduct. Now, the essential element in the crime of forgery is the making of a “false document.” To constitute a document a “false document” within the meaning of section 464 of the Penal Code, it must he shown that it was made with such an intention as is implied in the term “fraudulently” or in the term “dishonestly.” These terms are defined, the former as implying an intention to defraud, and the latter as implying an intention to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another.

It is not shown that the accused had either of these intentions. His intention was, no doubt, to deceive the Registrar of the University into the belief that a certain gentleman had certified that he was a fit candidate for admission to the Matriculation examination. But a mere intention to deceive does not necessarily imply an intention to defraud or to cause wrongful loss to one person or wrongful gain to another. It was not alleged by the prosecution, and it was not found by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, that the accused had acted with the intention of causing wrongful loss to one person or wrongful gain to another, so that the accused did not act “dishonestly.” So the only question is: Did the accused act “fraudulently,” that is, with intent to defraud? Neither the Chief Presidency Magistrate in his judgment, nor the Crown Prosecutor in his argument before us, has shown in what way the accused intended to defraud, or in fact did defraud the University. A person to 1 defrauded must suffer some harm or damage or injury, and there is not a tittle of evidence that the Registrar as representing the University has suffered in any of these respects. The Chief Presidency Magistrate has found that the act of the accused was to the “detriment” of the University; but he does not explain of what that “detriment” consisted. I find it impossible to see in what way the University of Madras has been injuriously affected by the conduct of the accused. The University has been deprived of nothing. On the other hand, they have confiscated the examination fees of Rs. 14 paid by the accused without going to the expense of examining him and have thereby made a clear profit out of him. It is only the accused who has been damnified. In none of the cases cited before us are the facts on all fours with the facts in this case, except in the one case of Queen-Empress v. Haradhan where it was held that the offence of forgery had not been committed. That is the view I must take hero. I think I am correct in stating that in all the cases where convictions were held, the accused had obtained something that the Court considered to be of value.

The illustration (k) to section 464 of the Penal Code sets out the intention as one to “obtain employment.” That is, of course, a material or substantial advantage. But in this case the sole intention of the accused was to subject himself to the ordeal of an examination, which can hardly be deemed to be a thing of value and in which, if he had failed, it ended in nothing, and if he had passed, entitled him to a certificate, which certificate he would have obtained, not in consequence, be it observed, of the false writing but upon his own merits as an examinee. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the offence of forgery has not been committed and would reverse the conviction. In any case the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for four months should be reduced, as it seems to me unduly severe for a trick played by a youth of twenty who had already been disgraced and punished for his misconduct. I would reduce the term of imprisonment to that already suffered, namely, eleven days.

Benson, J.:— I have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned Chief Justice that the conviction is right and ought to be upheld. It is admitted that the accused himself wrote the certificate, which falsely purported to be signed by the Rev. Dr. Wolff, certifying the accused's age and character. It is also admitted that he sent it to the Registrar of the University, intending thereby to deceive the University authorities into the belief that he was qualified, in accordance with the bye-laws of the University, to appear for the Matriculation examination, whereas, in fact, he was not so qualified. The only question is whether this act of the accused was done “fraudulently” and “with intent to commit fraud” within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code. If the false certificate was written “fraudulently,” the accused made a “false document” as defined in section 464 of the Indian Penal Code, and if he made a false document “with intent to commit fraud” he was guilty of forgery as defined in section 463 of the Indian Penal Code, and was rightly convicted. The word “fraudulently” is defined in section 25 of the Code in the following way: “A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud, but not otherwise.” The word “defraud” is not defined in the Code and the meaning of the word “fraudulently” is thus left open to argument with reference to the meaning of the word “defraud.” The framers of the Code, conscious of the infinite diversity of fraud and of the protean forms it could assume, no doubt thought it best to attempt no more explicit definition but to leave it to the judicial consciousness of the Judge to determine in each case whether the act alleged was one done with intent to defraud or without such intent. It was argued before us that the word implies that some person has been or is to be deprived of something, and some of the other earlier decisions of the Indian Courts lend support to this view, but it has been unanimously negatived by a Full Bench of five Judges of the Calcutta High Court in the recent case of Empress v. Abbas Ali in which all the earlier cases were referred to in the argument. It is there pointed out that the word defraud” is of double meaning, in that it either may or may not imply deprivation, and that its meaning in the Code must he found by reference to the context in which the word “fraudulently” occurs in the Code. It is pointed out that in the definition of a false document the making of the document must be “dishonestly” or “fraudulently”; that “fraudulently” is therefore something different from “dishonestly,” but that “if it he held that fraudulently implies deprivation either actual or intended, then, apparently that word would perform no function which would not have been fully performed by the word ‘dishonestly,’ and its use would he mere surplusage.” In this connection I would refer to several sections of the Code (e.g, sections 261, 263, 264), in which the expression used is “Whoever fraudulently or with intent to cause loss”, etc. In these sections it is clear that “fraudulently” is not to be limited in its application to cases in which loss is caused. The learned Judges then go on to point out that there is even a stronger reason for their conclusions based on the terms of section 463 itself, ‘they say “section 463 defines the offence of forgery, and in so doing prescribes the intent necessary to that offence.” The words of the section are as follows: “Whoever makes any false document or part of a document with intent to cause damage or injury to the public, or to any person, to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud, or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.” The “section contemplates two classes of intents, and it is clear (especially if regard be had to the context) that it is not an essential quality of the fraud mentioned in the section that it should result in or aim at the deprivation of property. If this be so it cannot be supposed that the definition of a false document which is but a part of the definition of forgery requires as a condition of criminality an intent different in its quality and its aims from that prescribed by section 463.” To this reasoning I would add that a consideration of illustration (k) to section 464 necessarily leads to the same conclusion, and, in fact, actually covers the present case. In that illustration it is stated that it is forgery if A, without B's authority, writes a letter and signs it in B's name, certifying to A's character, intending thereby to obtain employment under Z. The obtaining of employment in this way does not necessarily deprive Z of anything or necessarily cause him any loss or injury, yet the Code declares that A's act is forgery. But to constitute forgery there must be a false document as defined in the Code, which implies that the document must be made “dishonestly or fraudulently”. It follows that the framers of the Code regarded the writing of such a letter as a fraudulent act though it did not necessarily involve any loss or injury or intended loss or injury to Z.

Those decisions, therefore, which proceed on the ground that an act is not fraudulent unless it causes or is intended to cause loss or injury to some one would seem to take too narrow a view of the meaning of the word “fraudulently” as used in the Code.

Can it be doubted for a moment that the act of the accused in the present case was at least as fraudulent as that of the person in illustration (k) who wrote the false character in order to obtain employment? To me it seems that it was every whit as fraudulent and even more deserving of repression under the penalties of the criminal law. No doubt a different view was taken by this Court in the case of King-Emperor v. C. Srinivasan…(Petitioner) Accused.* and in Queen-Empress v. Haradhan, but the latter has been over-ruled in the Full Bench case already referred to, and in the former no authorities are cited to support the view adopted. The decision seems to proceed on the ground that the word “fraudulently” bears the narrow construction contended for by the appellant's vakil in this case and which I have shown to be incorrect.

The act of the accused was undoubtedly fraudulent and a forgery in the popular acceptance of these terms and also in my opinion according to the strict letter and intention of the Indian Penal Code. The accused intended to deceive the University authorities into the belief that he was entitled in accordance with their bye-laws to appear for the Matriculation examination when, in fact, he was not so entitled, and thereby to gain an advantage for himself, viz., leave to appear for the examination, an advantage which be valued and would have purchased for a sum far above, let us say, Rs. 10. As Mr. Mayne remarks in dealing with similar cases:—“If then, it would have been an undoubted forgery if the document had been fabricated for the purpose of obtaining Rs. 10, how can it be less a forgery, because the object sought was something not measurable by money but of far greater value.” (Criminal Law of India, 1896 ed., page 757.)

I am of opinion that the act was fraudulent not merely by reason of the advantage which the accused intended to secure for himself by means of his deceit, but also by reason of the injury which must necessarily result to the University, and through it to the public from such acts if unrepressed. The University is injured, if, through the evasion of its bye laws, it is induced to declare that certain persons have fulfilled the conditions prescribed for Matriculation and are entitled to the benefits of Matriculation, when, in fact, they have not fulfilled those conditions, for the value of its examinations is depreciated in the eyes of the public if it is found that the certificate of the University that they have passed its examinations is no longer any guarantee that they have in truth fulfilled the conditions on which alone the University professes to certify them as passed, and to admit them to the benefits of Matriculation. It must not be forgotton that the Matriculation examination is one that qualifies those who pass it for a great number of appointments in the public service, and the public are liable to the gravest injury if, through deceit, the regulations made by Government and the University to secure a certain standard of qualifications in the servants of the State are rendered nugatory and futile. In the English case of Regina v. Toshack the certificate fabricated was one which enabled a man to go up for an examination as a master mariner, and the indictment alleged that the act was done with intent “to deceive, injure, prejudice and defraud the said Corporation of Trinity House,” which was the examining body in that case as the University is in this. In the Full Bench case of Empress v. Abbas Ali the spurious certificate was one regarding service and character which was required as a qualification precedent to the accused being admitted to an examination for a certificate of competency as an engine-driver of ocean-going steamers. In both these cases the accused was convicted of forgery, and I do not think that any valid distinction can he drawn between those cases and the present. If the validity of the conviction requires that there should he a risk of injury to the public in consequence of the accused being improperly admitted to the examination, it can hardly be contended that the risk of injury to the public from the introduction of men of no character into the public service is less than from admitting such men to be master mariners and engine-drivers. The extent to which malpractices like the present prevail may be indicated by the fact that in a single recent issue of the Fort St. George Gazette a notification was published in which over fifty candidates were prohibited for a longer or shorter time from appearing for the University examination in consequence of having been found guilty of sending in false certificates, or of making false statements, in order to induce the University to accept them as qualified candidates. Such a state of things indicates a standard of morality which if not reprobated by the better men among the educated classes must he fraught with danger to the public welfare. I think it is well that the law does stigmatize acts like that of the accused in this case as offences.

The Courts have ample power to graduate the punishment according to the true requirements of justice in each case. I concur with the learned Chief Justice in holding that in all the circumstances of this case the requirements of justice will be met by the reduced sentence proposed by him in lieu of that imposed by the Magistrate.

Boddam, J.:— As I entirely agree with the learned Chief Justice and with Mr. Justice Benson that the conviction is right and should be confirmed for the reasons stated by them in their respective judgments, it is not necessary that I should go over the same ground again. It is clear to me that the accused, by making and sending the spurious certificate, made and sent it with the intention of deceiving the University authorities. He further intended thereby to gain what he conceived to be an advantage to himself to the prejudice of the right of the University authorities to have a genuine and reliable certificate as to his age and character before permitting him to enter for the examination. He did it to support a claim or title to be permitted to enter for the examination, without in fact having any claim or title to do so under the bye-laws of the University, intending that the University authorities should be deceived by the belief that the spurious document which he had made and sent was a genuine and reliable certificate as to his age and character and that the requirements of the bye-laws of the University had been fully complied with in his case and the rights of the University thereby duly safeguarded. What he intended in making the document is proved by his sending it to the University authorities for the purpose of supporting his claim or title to enter for the examination. He, therefore, made a false document fraudulently; that is, with intent to commit fraud and not otherwise, and as he made it with intent to support a claim or title and with intent to commit fraud, he was properly convicted of forgery under section 473 of the Indian Penal Code. He also fraudulently used it as genuine and was, therefore, rightly convicted under section 471 of the Indian Penal Code. As regards the sentence I think in the circumstances of this case a sentence of six weeks' simple imprisonment will suffice.