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Sripati Sarkar v. Hari Kar
Rampini, C.J:— This is a Letters Patent appeal against a decision of Mr. Justice Geidt.
The appeal arises out of a suit for compensation for the illegal distress and the cutting and the carrying off of standing crops. Mr. Justice Geidt, relying on the decision of this Court in Mohesh Chandra Das v. Hari Kar, has held that the article of the Limitation Act applicable is Art. 36, and that the suit is accordingly barred as brought more than two years after the accrual of the cause of action.
On behalf of the Plaintiffs it has been contended that Mr. Justice Geidt's decision is wrong, and that the article applicable is not Art. 36 but some other article, allowing 3 years for the suit and that the case relied on by Mr. Justice Geidt is at variance with the Full Bench decision in Mungun Jha v. Dulhin Golab Koer.
I am unable, however, to see that Mr. Justice Geidt's judgment is wrong. I consider that the article of the Schedule to the Limitation Act applicable is Art. 36. I have always been of this opinion. See the Full Bench case above referred to and Surat Mondal v. Umar Haji(3).
The facts of the Full Bench case are different from those of the case of Mohesh Chandra Das v. Hari Kar. In the former case there seems to have been no illegal distress. In the latter case there was. Hence it does not appear that the decisions in the two cases are contradictory.
My learned brother considers that the article of the Limitation Act applicable is partly Art. 36 and partly Art. 49. I am unable to take this view, because it would seem to me that the acts of the Defendants did not amount to mere trespass on immovable property as provided for in Art. 39 but to “trespass” and “conversion” of immoveable property (not “moveable property,” to which Art. 49 applies), and that such acts of tort constitute “malfeasance” within the terms of Art. 36. There is no provision in the Letter's Patent for reference to a third Judge when there is a difference of opinion in a Letters Patent appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. This order governs the analogous appeals, which are also dismissed with costs.
Dosa, J.— This is an appeal in an action brought by the Plaintiff for compensation under the following circumstances:— In his plaint he alleged that the Defendant No. 1 set up the Defendant No. 8 as the landlord and the husband of Defendant No. 9 as the tenant with regard to his holding, and having obtained a process for distraint from the Court, caused the standing crops on his holding to be distrained and subsequently cut and removed them in collusion with the peon deputed by the Court to distrain the crops and that thereby he had sustained great loss. Among various other pleas which for the purposes of this appeal it is unnecessary to notice, the Defendant No. 1 raised the bar of limitation and denied the facts alleged by the Plaintiff. The Munsif found the allegations of the Plaintiff to be true and he overruled the plea of limitation on the ground that Art. 48 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act, which provides 3 years as the period of limitation for a suit of this kind, applied to the case and that as the suit had been brought within 3 years from the date of cutting the crops and the removal thereof from the holding (though more than 2 years after that date) it was within time. On appeal by the Defendants the learned Subordinate Judge concurred in the finding of the Munsif on the facts and with regard to the question of limitation, thus observed in his judgment: “In these cases persons having no concern with the lands yielding the crops in dispute are the tortfeasors, so Art. 39 appears to my mind to be applicable, and Arts. 48 and 49 may apply to the removal of the crop itself.” As three years' limitation is provided by each of these articles, he held that the suit was saved from limitation. On appeal by the Defendants to this Court the learned Judge who decided the appeal has, relying on the case of Mohesh Chandra Das v. Hari Kar, held that the suit fell within Art. 36 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act which allows 2 years for bringing such a suit and as it was brought more than 2 years after the date of the cutting and removal of the crops, he has held that the suit is barred by limitation. The Plaintiff has appealed from this judgment under sec. 15 of the Letters Patent. I think the view taken by the learned Judge of this Court is opposed to the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Mungun Jha v. Dulhin Golab Koer. I am of opinion that the view: taken by the learned Subordinate Judge on the question of limitation is correct. In the last mentioned case the Defendants under colour of an order of the Criminal Court had wrongfully cut and carried away standing crops from the Plaintiffs' land. Similarly in the present case the Defendant No. 1 who is a perfect stranger and not the landlord of the Plaintiff, had obtained an order for distraint in the name of a fictitious landlord against a fictitious tenant; and under colour of that order had caused the standing crops on the Plaintiffs' land to be distrained. This is not a case of illegal or irregular distress (which I understand to mean distress in contravention of the provisions of the law relating to distress) by the landlord but by a perfect stranger. When, therefore, the Defendants under colour of such an order for distraint, entered upon the land of the Plaintiff and cut the standing crops on it, they clearly committed a pure act of trespass upon his land and when they took away the crops after they had been severed from the land, they wrongfully took away “specific moveable property.” It appears to me, therefore, that the fact of the so-called distraint in this case makes no material difference, and it is to my mind indistinguishable from the Full Bench case at any rate so far as the ratio decidendi of that case is concerned, I do not think Art. 36 applies to this case. The words of that article in the first column are “for compensation for any mal-feasance, or mis-feasance or non-feasance independent of contract and not herein specially provided for.” I am inclined to think that the following passage in Stephen's Commentaries, 14 Ed., Vol. III, p. 384, furnishes a guide to the sense in which these words have been used in this article. That passage runs thus: “Personal actions are actions founded either on contracts or on torts; that is to say, they are either actions ex contractu or actions ex delicto; torts being wrongs independent of contract, and being either (1) non-feasances, or the omission of acts which a man was by law bound to do, or (2) mis-feasances, or the improper performance of lawful acts or (3) mal-feasances, or the commission of acts which were themselves unlawful.” This view gains support from the fact that in Art. 40 of Act IX of 1871 which has been re-enacted in Art. 36 of Act V of 1877, the words were “for compensation for any wrong, mal-feasance, non-feasance or mis-feasance, etc.” In the last-mentioned Act the expression “wrong” has been omitted on account of redundancy, the next succeeding words “malfeasance, non-feasance or mis-feasance,” taken together denoting the same idea, and covering the same ground as is done by the preceding generic word “wrong” and being in fact sub-divisions of the latter. There cannot, therefore, be Buy doubt that Art. 36 contemplates suits for compensation for all kinds of torts or wrongs except those for which special provision has been made by other articles in the same Act. Arts. 39 and 49 together with several other articles, to which it is not necessary to refer, fell within this exception; and for them a period of 3 years' limitation has been provided. In the same volume of the commentaries at p. 385, trespass is thus defined: “Trespass” where the Plaintiff claims damages for a trespass vi et armies, i.e, for an injury accompanied with actual force, i.e, wrongful entry upon land or a wrongful taking and keeping of personal chattels; “trover” where the wrongful taking being waived the Plaintiff claims damages for the wrongful keeping or “wrongful conversion.”
Trespass may be committed by an entry on another's land, i.e, (trespass quare clausum fregit) or by taking another's goods (trespass de bonis asportatis); conversion is an unauthorised act which deprives another of his goods, and the essence of the wrong is the dealing with the use and possession of the goods of another adversely to him and in a manner inconsistent with his right of dominion.
It seems to me, therefore, that Art. 39 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act corresponds to the first kind of trespass, Art. 48 and the first portion of Art. 49, which is “for other specific moveable property or for compensation for wrongfully taking or injuring the same,” correspond to the second kind of trespass, or asportation (Art. 48 relating to trespass or asportation where the owner has no knowledge of the person who has possession of the goods and the first portion of Art. 49 relating to trespass or asportation where he has such knowledge) and the second portion of Art. 49 corresponds to conversion.
If the Defendants after entering on the Plaintiffs' land had cut the standing crops and left them there, the wrong thus done would have been a trespass upon immovable property coming within Art. 39, the act of cutting the crops being an aggravation, of the wrong committed by the bare entry on the land and calling for substantial damages. By the act of cutting the crops a portion of immovable properly (standing crop before it is severed from the land being manifestly immovable property) is transmuted into specific movable property, the right to which is vested in the owner of the land, albeit the transmutation is effected by the act of the tortfeasor. Suppose the tortfeasor after he has cut the crops is prevented by the owner from taking it away and is expelled from the land, and a little while after, when the owner happens to be absent, a third person comes in and takes the crop away, the taking of the crop by the third person would, in that case, clearly amount to wrongfully taking away “specific moveable property.” Why should the removal of the crop by the tortfeasor himself, soon after he has cut the same, be any the less wrongful taking away of “specific moveable property?” Indeed, the character of moveable property is impressed on the crop the moment it is severed from the land. Why should the personnel, so to say, of the appropriator cause any difference in the character of the property? Why should the period of limitation in the former case be three years, and in the latter case two years? It is possible that the framers of Art. 49 had not in their minds the case now in hand, but that is no reason why we should not apply that article to it, if the ordinary and natural meaning of the words, used fairly, warrant its application. It seems to me, therefore, that the subsequent act of carrying away the severed crop is in the words of Art. 49, “wrongful taking away of specific movable property” and falls within the first portion of that article. It does not fall under Art. 48, because the owner has from the beginning knowledge of the person who has possession of the goods.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the suit falls partly under Art. 3 and partly under Art. 49 and 3 years being the period of limitation in each case, it is not barred by limitation.
For these reasons the appeal ought to be decreed, the judgment appealed against set aside and the judgment and decree of the Court of Appeal below restored.
I regret very much I am constrained to differ from the learned Chief Justice in this case.
Appeal dismissed.
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