Khetro Mohan Chatterjee And Ors. Decree-Holders, v. Mohim Chandra Das Judgment Debtor, .

Carnduff, J.:— In the case out of which this Appeal arises, the Plaintiffs, the sole landlords, sued the Defendant for rent and obtained, on the 26th April, 1907, a consent decree for the amount claimed (Rs. 315), payable in five instalments, the last to be forthcoming in January 1911. On the 24th February, 1909, the Defendant paid the exact amount of the first three instalments together, and on the 6th April, 1911 the Plaintiffs applied for execution in respect of the balance. The application, which was thus made more than three years after the date of the decree, has been dismissed by both the Courts below as time-barred by Article 6, as amended, of the Third Schedule to the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885.

The Plaintiffs have now preferred this Second Appeal, and the first point taken on their behalf is that the article quoted has no application. In my view, however, this is not so. Read with sec. 184, the article provides, in these words, that “every application for the execution of a decree made under this Act in a suit between landlord and tenant to whom the provisions of this Act are applicable, and not being a decree for a sum of money exceeding Rs. 500, shall be made within three years from the date of the decree, and every such application made after the period of limitation so prescribed shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been pleaded”. That a decree for rent in a suit in which the parties are bound by the provisions of the Bsngal Tenancy Act, 1885, is a decree made under that Act was laid down by Petheram, C.J, and Beverley, J., in Baikuntha Nath v. Aghore Nath, and has, so far as I know, never been doubted save in the case—which is not the case here—of a co-sharer suing before the Act was amended in 1907. The provisions of the Act are admittedly applicable to the parties before us. Therefore the article applies: for the language is plain and refers to all decrees for rent in suits brought by the landlords against tenants as such where the parties are bound by the provisions of the Tenancy Act of 1885, and not by those of, for example, the Transfer of Property Act of 1882. This is in consonance with the views expressed by Mockerjee and Vincent, JJ., in Thakomoni v. Mohendra Nath, which I am disposed to follow rather than the latter ruling of Brett and Sharfuddin, JJ., in K.B Dutt v. Gosta Behary

But the next and remaining contention is that the Defendant, by consenting to a decree which expressly provided for a payment after the expiration of three years from its date, impliedly agreed to waive the special rule of three years' limitation and submit to a simple money decree and the ordinary rule of limitation. This at once raises the question whether the parties to a suit can contract them selves out of the law of limitation and extend the period prescribed thereby. I am of opinion that the reply to this question must be in the negative.

The principle (on which the Appellants rely) that any one may renounce the benefit of a right introduced in his own favour— quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto—is essentially restricted to legal provisions intended for the benefit of individuals, and does not apply to rules of law based, as are statutes of limitation, on public policy and general considerations. Nor (see Broom's Legal Maxims, Ed. 8, at page 551) does the maxim seem to be applicable where an express statutory direction enjoins compliance with certain conditions. Therefore, in Krish Kamal v. Huree Sardar, a Full Bench of this Court held that the fact of the decree-holder agreeing, as in this case, to accept payment of his decree by instalments and binding himself not to issue execution within a certain time, did not affect the question of limitation. “If,” observed Peacock, C.J, “a man having a cause of action against another… should say to that person ‘I will not sue you for 20 years,’ he would not acquire a right to sue after the period of limitation fixed by law:” Again in Lalla Ram Sahay v. Dodraj Mahto, Phear and Moriis, JJ., united in expressing a doubt whether in any case parties could by consent free themselves from, or remove their case out of, the statute of limitation. And, similarly, ??? and Maclean, JJ. in Nabar Narrya v. Dhan Mahomed, held that no conduct of the parties could in any way affect the period of limitation within which an agreement could have been made registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1877.

The result is that I would dismiss this Appeal.

Beachcroft, J.:— I agree.

Appeal dismissed.