Rajah Sahib Meharban... v. G. Venkata Subba Row...

Sankaran Nair, J.:— These are suits brought by a landlord for the recovery of rent from his tenants under section 189 of the Estates Land Act.

The question is whether the suits are barred by limitation. The District judge is of opinion they are barred. The landlord appeals.

Under section 210 every suit instituted after the period of limitation specified therefor in the schedule shall be dismissed. The period of limitation prescribed in the schedule is three years from the date refereed to therein. In these cases that period has expired. These suits therefore must be dismissed. But it is argued that, as the plaintiff was a minor when the rent fell due and the suit was brought within three years of the plaintiff attaining majority, the suit is not barred under section 7 of the Limitation Act and, though section 211 enacts that section 7 of the Limitation Act shall not apply to suits instituted under the Estates Land Act, we are bound to hold that, in the absence of express terms to that effect or necessary implication, this Act does not take away the right of action that has already accrued and, as the plaintiff was entitled to sue when the Act was passed, he is entitled to maintain the suit within the time he had before the passing of the Act.

The following cases are relied upon in support of this argument:—

Sundaramaiyah v. Muthu Ganapathigal(1), Ramakrishna Chetty v. Subbaraya Ayyar(2) and Munjhoori Bibi v. Akel Mahmud(3).

I agree that, if the words of a section admit of a construction that will not interfere with vested rights, that construction must be adopted. Here, however, we are dealing with an Act which is complete in itself, like the Bent Act which it repealed. See Kumara Akkappa Nayanim Bahadur v. Sithala Naidu. When an Act has got its own provisions as to limitation the general rules in the limitation Act do not apply, and it was held by the Calcutta High Court, in accordance with this principle enunciated in Kumara Akkappa Nayanim Bahadur v. Sithala Naidu, that section 7 of the Limitation Act does not apply to rent suits. See Girja Nath Roy Bahadur v. Patani Bibee.

Reading the sections of the Act, not only are the words quite clear, as I have pointed out; the policy also appears to be clear. The Legislature considered it is not desirable having regard to the relative position of zamindars and ryots, that questions between them should be kept open for long periods of time or that the resources of a ryot available for the current year's cultivation should be crippled with the obligation of discharging old arrears. The practical hardship is greater on the ryot than on the zamindar. Again in this Presidency the zamindaris of minors would be, as was in this case, under the Court of Wards and, if they were not able, or did not think it right to collect the rent from tenant, it was a sufficient reason to justify any legislature in concluding that the zamindar after he attains his age should not be allowed to harass the ryot. I would therefore confirm the decrees and dismiss all appeals with costs. But as my learned brother is of a different opinion, the decrees are confirmed and the Second Appeals dismissed with costs under flection 98; Civil Procedure Code.

Sadasiva Ayyar, J.:— The only question in these cases is whether a suit brought by a landlord after the passing of the Madras Estates Land Act for rent due for faslis which expired before the Act came into force is governed by the old rule of limitation provided for by the Limitation Act of 1877 or whether it was governed by the special rules of limitation mentioned in sections 210 and 211 of the Estates Land Act and in the schedule annexed to the said Act. If the old rules of limitation applied, the plaintiff, who was a minor till October 1905 when the cause of action arose for the greater portion of the claims in dispute in these suits, had three years by virtue of section 8 of the Limitation Act of 1877 from the cessation of minority to bring these suits. These suits brought in October 1909, just within three years of October 1906 are not, in that view, barred by limitation. But if the special rules mentioned in section 210 and 211 of the Estates Land Act applied, the plaintiff will be barred as section 211 expressly says that sections 7 and 8 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1877 shall not apply to the suits and applications mentioned in section 210 (which include-suits for rent). On the question whether the old rules of limitation or the new rules of limitation apply to claims for rent due for periods which had elapsed before the Estates Land Act came into force, when a suit is brought on those claims after the passing of the Estates Land Act, there was a conflict of opinion between Miller, J., and Abdur Rahim, J., in Subrahmaniya v. Muthu Ganapathigal. The same question arose in Ramakrishna Chetty v. Subbaraya Ayyar, before Benson and Sundara Ayyar, JJ., and the view of Miller, J., was upheld in this latter case. I am free to admit that, if it was a question of first impression, I would have followed the plain language of sections 210 and 211 of the Madras Estates Land Act and treated such suits also as barred by limitation. But having regard to the dicta of the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving and Lala Soni Ram v. Kanhaiya Lal(4) and the fact that a Divisional Bench of this Court has held otherwise in Ramakrishna Chetty v. Subbaraya Ayyar, I am inclined to follow the ruling of the said Divisional Bench. If the Divisional Bench ruling is to be so followed, the decree of the lower Courts should be reversed and the suits remanded for disposal of the issues other than the issue of limitation, which question of limitation has been considered by both Courts. I would pass the above order, costs hitherto abiding the result.