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S. Krishna Patter v. Sinnaponnu

Madras High Court
Apr 17, 1914
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is the sole surviving male member of a joint Hindu family, and the respondents are widows of the appellant's paternal uncle, who was the family manager. The appellant claims title to certain family property through a Court sale held on 28th October 1902, executed under a money decree obtained against the late manager. The property was attached on or about 19th August 1902 prior to the sale. Respondent 1 contends that the property is subject to a charge for her maintenance created by a decree dated 19th September 1902 in a maintenance suit against her husband as manager. The appellant objected to attachment of the property on grounds including non-possession, non-binding nature of the decree on him, and that the property was sold free of encumbrances.

The appellant's objection to attachment was allowed on the ground that the attachment preceded the maintenance decree, thus prevailing over it. Subsequently, respondent 1 filed a suit seeking declaration that the appellant holds the property subject to her maintenance charge. The appeal arises from this third suit. The appellant relies on his sale certificate and a mortgage dated 8th May 1899, though the mortgage does not affect the primary question.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant's purchase of the property is subject to the maintenance charge created by respondent 1's decree.
  2. Whether the attachment of the property prior to the maintenance decree confers priority to the appellant's predecessor-in-title over respondent 1's charge.
  3. The nature and extent of a Hindu widow's right to maintenance as a charge on joint family property.
  4. Whether the maintenance charge can extend to the whole joint family property or only to the portion that would have belonged to the deceased husband's share.
  5. Whether defendant 2 was a necessary or proper party to the suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant claims title through a Court sale free from any encumbrance, arguing that the sale was executed pursuant to an attachment predating the maintenance decree.
  • He contends the maintenance decree is not binding on him and that he is not in possession of the deceased judgment-debtor's assets.
  • The appellant relies on Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, claiming he is a bona fide purchaser for consideration without notice of the maintenance charge.
  • He also relies on a mortgage dated 8th May 1899, asserting priority over the maintenance charge.
  • He argues that the maintenance charge should only apply to the portion of property that would have come to the deceased husband's share on partition.
  • The appellant contends the maintenance decree was fraudulently obtained and thus not binding.

Respondent 1's Arguments

  • Respondent 1 claims the property is subject to a maintenance charge created by a decree dated 19th September 1902.
  • She asserts that the appellant holds the property with the same limitations as her deceased husband’s charge.
  • Respondent 1 relies on established principles that a widow has a right to have the family property charged with her maintenance.
  • She contends that the decree creates a specific charge on the property which binds subsequent purchasers.
  • Respondent 1 argues that the property remains subject to her charge even though it passed through sale and repurchase within the joint family.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gokaldas Gopaldas v. Puranmal Premsukhdas Validity and precedence of mortgage over maintenance charge. Mortgage exists but does not affect the priority question between maintenance charge and sale.
Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai Nature of a Hindu widow's right to maintenance and charge on ancestral property. Provided foundational principles on widow's maintenance rights and binding effect of decrees creating charges.
Heera Lal v. Mt. Kausillah and Ramchandra v. Savitribai Recognition of widow's right to a charge on property. Supported the view that widow has a charge on property for maintenance.
Sham Lal v. Banna Maintenance charge binds property purchased by transferees without notice. Held maintenance charge liable on purchased property unless transfer satisfies a prior claim with precedence.
Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh Buyer at execution sale acquires right only to severance of share, not entire property. Recognized widow's entitlement to allotment in partition even after execution sale.
Jamiyatram Ramchandra v. Prabhudas Hathi Debts take precedence over maintenance charge; sons’ power to dispose of estate subject to maintenance liability. Confirmed sons’ power to dispose estate but with personal liability for maintenance.
Mangala Debi v. Dinanath Bose; Srimathi Bhagabati Dasi v. Kanailal Mitter; Gauri v. Chandramani Limits on alienation of family dwelling affecting widow's right of residence. Adopted view that adopted son cannot deprive adoptive mother of residence rights.
Kuloda Prosad Chatterjee v. Jogeshar Koer Transferees bound by maintenance decree even if mortgage executed after maintenance charge decree. Applied principle that purchaser takes property subject to maintenance charge if decree predates transfer.
Manika Gramani v. Ellappa Chetty; Dose Thimmanna Bhutta v. Krishna Tantri Mortgage pending suit may be subject to maintenance charge created subsequently. Mortgage held effectual only subject to maintenance charge.
Maina v. Bachchi Decree creating specific charge on property binds transferees for value without notice. Held maintenance decree created a specific charge binding on purchasers.
Sankaralinga Reddi v. Kandasami Thevan Attachment creates a charge on attached property but only in a limited sense. Attachment considered as custodia legis; property could be charged by subsequent decree.
Gur Dayal (Dependant) v. Kaunsila (Plaintiff) Maintenance charge may not prevail against creditors with prior claims. Held creditors with precedence may defeat maintenance charge.
Sidlingapa v. Sidava kom Sidlingapa; Bangaru Ammal v. Vijayamachi Reddiar Decree may be attacked on grounds of excessiveness or fraud by specific suit or issue. Appellant failed to prove fraud or excess; decree held binding.
Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma Reasonable portion of property to be charged for maintenance. Remarks adopted that charge ordinarily should not exceed deceased husband's share.
Subrayulu Chetty v. Kamalavalli Thayaramma Whole joint family property may be charged for widow's maintenance. Confirmed that charge on entire joint family property is permissible.
Soobul Chunder Law v. Russik Lal Mitter; Moti Lal v. Karrabuldin Attachment does not create right or title superior to maintenance charge decree. Attachment held not to confer superior title; sale subsequent to maintenance decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the competing claims of the appellant and respondent 1 regarding priority over the family property. The appellant's title arose from a Court sale executed pursuant to an attachment predating the maintenance decree, but the sale itself occurred after the decree. The Court analyzed the nature of a Hindu widow's right to maintenance, recognizing it as a charge on the family property that may crystallize into a specific charge upon decree.

The Court relied heavily on the principles laid down in Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai, and related cases, explaining that although a widow's right to maintenance is initially a claim, it may mature into a specific charge enforceable against purchasers, especially if the purchaser has notice or acts to defeat the widow's rights.

The Court considered the appellant's contention that the attachment prior to the maintenance decree gave his predecessor-in-title priority. It held that attachment merely placed the property in custodia legis and did not prevent the Court from creating a maintenance charge on the property by decree. The maintenance charge was presumed to take effect from the date of the decree, and the appellant's purchase, being subsequent to the decree, was subject to that charge unless he could establish rights as a creditor with priority or as a bona fide purchaser without notice under Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act.

It was further reasoned that the property, having remained within the family and having been sold and repurchased within it, continued to be subject to the widow's charge. The appellant failed to prove fraud or collusion in obtaining the maintenance decree, which was therefore binding on him. The Court rejected the limitation that the charge should only extend to the deceased husband's share, holding that the entire joint family property could be charged, provided the maintenance amount was reasonable.

The Court also found that defendant 2 was not a necessary or proper party to the suit and ordered omission of references to her rights in the decree under appeal.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed and the decree under appeal is confirmed with costs.

The Court held that the maintenance charge created by the decree dated 19th September 1902 is a specific charge binding on the property, including on the appellant as a successor in title. The appellant's purchase, though pursuant to an attachment predating the decree, was subsequent to the decree itself and thus subject to the maintenance charge. The widow's right to maintenance extends to the joint family property as a whole, not limited to the deceased husband's share, provided the amount is reasonable.

The Court emphasized caution in passing maintenance charges on whole joint family property, especially where not all members are parties to the suit. No new precedent was set beyond affirming established principles regarding Hindu widow's maintenance rights and the interplay between attachments, decrees, and subsequent transfers under the Transfer of Property Act.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Tyabji, J.:— The appellant is the sole surviving male member of a joint Hindu family. The respondents are widows of the appellant's paternal uncle, who was the manager of the family during his lifetime. I will refer to the parties as appellant and respondents throughout, and will include in the terms appellant, his predecessor in title, unless the appellant's predecessor in title has to be distinguished from the appellant.

2. The appellant claims to derive his title to the property mentioned in the plaint from a Court sale of the property which, it is common ground, originally belonged to a joint Hindu family. His contention is that he has purchased it free of any charge or encumbrance and is entitled to hold it so. The sale was held on 28th October 1902 in execution of a simple money-decree obtained in a suit (Original Suit No. 4 of 1900) against the late manager of the family. The property had been attached on or about 19th August 1902, though the sale did not take place till 28th October 1902. This was the earliest of the three suits which it is necessary to mention. Respondent 1 claims that the property is in the hands of the appellant, subject to a charge for her maintenance. The charge was created by a decree, dated 19th September 1902, in a suit by the respondent for maintenance (Original Suit No. 264 of 1902) which was instituted against her husband as such manager. This was the second of the three suits.

3. After obtaining the decree charging her maintenance on the family property respondent 1 applied for attachment of the property. The appellant then objected to the attachment on the following grounds: (sea Miscellaneous Petition No. 2934 of 1910):

“(1) That he is not in possession nor enjoyed any of the deceased judgment-debtor's assets;

(2) that the decree is not binding on him;

(3) that as the judgment debtor's rights over the property were soil away in 1902 they are no longer liable for his debts and that he (respondent) is in possession by purchase for valuable consideration.”

4. In Miscellaneous Petition No. 2934 of 1910 the appellant's claim was allowed on the ground that respondent 1 had no charge on the property till the date of the decree in her favour, i.e, 19th September, 1902, and that as the attachment of the property by the appellant's predecessor-in-title was made on 19th August 1902, prior to the decree, the attachment must prevail.

5. On this the third suit was filed. The present appeal arises out of this third suit. Respondent 1 seeks in this suit a declaration that by reason of the charge created in the second suit, she is entitled to have the properties sold, in other words, that the purchase by the appellant's predecessor-in-title was subject to her charge, and that the appellant must hold the property with the same limitations.

6. The appellant relied on (1) his sale certificate (2) on a certain mortgage, Ex. 4 dated 8th May 1899. The mortgage does not affect the other question; there was no issue as to its existence or validity or as to whether it must have precedence over the maintenance charge Gokaldas Gopaldas v. Puranmal Premsukhdas(1). The mortgage can have no practical effect on the rights of the appellant and respondent 1, unless it is held that respondent 1 can succeed in her contention. It has however been held that the mortgage does exist and there are no cross-objections on the point. I will therefore, not refer to it any further.

7. Under the circumstances the priority has to be determined between (1) respondent 1's decretal charge for maintenance as a widow, and (2) the appellant's sale which was later than the decree charging the properties, but which was in pursuance of an attachment prior to the decree.

8. The appellant claims that the property has been derived by him through such a transferee for consideration as is referred to in Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that therefore in his hands the property is not subject to any charge.

9. The considerations affecting the determination of these questions may be grouped under the following heads: (1) The nature of respondent 1's claim before and after she had obtained the decree in the second suit charging the properties with her maintenance; (2) whether for this purpose respondent 1's rights must be considered (a) to date back to the time when she instituted her suit for maintenance or (b) on the footing that her charge was created at the date of the decree and (3) if the latter, then whether or not the attachment protected the appellant against any charge being created by such a decree as the respondent obtained; (4) the nature of the claims of the decree holder in Original Suit No. 4 of 1900—the first suit—with reference to respondent 1's claim and (5) whether respondent 1's right must in any event prevail against the whole of the co-parcenary property or only against such part of it as would have coma to her husband's share on partition. It will not be necessary to deal with all these questions seriatim.

10. With reference to the nature of a widow's claim for maintenance we have the benefit of the judgments of Westropp, C.J, and West, J., in Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai(2).

11. In that case the question was whether the widow Satyabhamabai could claim to have a charge for maintenance (1) on property sold by her deceased husband's brother Mahadeo to defendant 2 (Lakshrriin) and (2) on part of the same property re-sold by defendant 2 to defendant 3 (Vishnu). It was admitted that both the original purchaser (defendant 2) and the purchaser from him (defendant 3) had notice of the widow's claim (p. 498).

12. Westropp, C.J, held that notice of the claim was not conclusive because the widow's rights could not be put on a higher footing than the sons; and because when ancestral property devolves upon the widow, she would not only be justified, but it would be her duty, to apply it if necessary in payment of the debts (not contracted for immoral purposes) of her deceased husband or of his father or grandfather; so that for the purpose of paying such debts, the mortgage and sale would be valid as against the widow, whether or not the transferee had notice of her claim for maintenance. Westropp, C.J, refrained from expressing any opinion as to the rights of a widow who obtained a decree against the family estate for prospective maintenance, if subsequently the creditors of her husband or of his father or grandfather instituted an administration suit against her and the surviving coparceners praying a sale of the estate and application of the proceeds in payment of the debts due to creditors by her husband or his father or grandfather.

13. West, J., pronounced an elaborate judgment dealing with the question on first principles. All the elements of the right of maintenance are considered in that judgment—elements which, I think, must be adverted to. For though Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, was enacted after the decision, yet the section refers to the defeating and enforcing of the right to receive maintenance: the nature of the right must therefore be fixed as a preliminary to the construction of the section.

14. West, J., in the first place referred to the conflict between Lakshman v. Saraswatibai(3), where the maintenance of a Hindu widow was held not to be a charge on property in the hands of a bona fide purchaser from her late husband's successors, and to Heera Lal v. Mt. Kausillah(4) and Ramchandra v. Savitribai(5), which seem to lay down that the widow has such a charge. In the result he thought it desirable to examine more at large the topic of the Hindu widow's maintenance in relation to the family estate. In the course of such examination he traces the right of maintenance through four stages: (1) the right of a wife against her husband; (2) the right of a widow (a) against sons, whether they be her own sons or of her deceased husband by another wife, (b) against the coparceners of her deceased husband, who are not his sons, and (c) against a sole surviving coparcener not being a son.

15. He cites Jimutavahana* that a wife acquires an interest in her husband's property. He points out however that on the one hand her interest in her husband's property must be considered to be of a secondary nature for four reasons to which I add a fifth from Sham Lal…(Defendant); v. Banna…(Plaintiff).*(6): (i) according to Manu (Ch. VIII, P1. 416) the wife is ranked along with a son and a slave as incapable of having wealth exclusively her own†, (ii) Apastamba denies that a partition can take place between husband and wife because of the essential unity of the married pair, (iii) Manu (Chapter V, P1. 148) and Narada alike insists on the dependence of women, (iv) Jimutavahana says there is neither partition nor coparcenary, i.e, membership of a joint Hindu family with the motherş (v) “the author of Viramitrodaya | does not apparently consider there is any real ownership on her part; he says: “Her right is only fictional but not a real one: the wife's right to the husband's property, which, to all appearance, seems to be the same (as the husband's right), like a mixture of milk and water, is suitable to the performance of acts which are to be jointly performed, but is not mutual like that of the brothers; hence it is that there may be separation of brothers, but not of the husband and wife; on this reason is founded the text, namely…… ‘Partition cannot take place between the husband and wife’; therefore it cannot but be admitted that on the extinction of the husband's rights the extinction of the wife's rights is necessary.”

16. Yet on the other hand West, J., points out (p. 504) that: (i) the wife's interest has been deemed enough to entitle her to an equal share with sons when her husband makes a partition of his property; and (ii) the removal of “the superior and dominant interest of the husband appears to have been recognized by, at least, some of the Smiritis as bringing out the wife's right into greater definiteness;” so that the widow's interest may be higher than the wife's. As examples of the recognition, he refers to Narada (Part 1, Chap. 3, 39, 40) assigning “to the widow a general control of the estate in priority even to sons,” and Manu (Ch. 9, 104) making the widowed mother's consent necessary for partition by her sons during her life time.

17. In the result he concludes that the nebulous interest of the wife in her husband's estate during his life time becomes something more definite and more important on his death.

18. I might pause here a moment to allude to the analogous development of the law relating to the maintenance of a wife and widow in Mahomedan law. The wife's claim to maintenance being a personal claim against her husband was (according to the earlier Qaranic rule) continued on the death of the husband in the same form as a claim for a year's maintenance out of his estate (Qaran, II, 241): later this right was developed into a claim more definite and important, a right to inherit a share of the estate (Quran, IV, 15, 16). A similar process took place with the parent's right: the claim to maintenance developed and became transformed to a right to inherit a definite fraction of the estate (Quran, II, 176, IV, 12).

19. It would seem however that while the stages through which Mahomedan law has developed are perhaps more clearly marked and easier of being historically fixed, they also led the rights of the widow to a point of crystallization denied to her in Hindu law. Yet in Hindu law likewise several stages may be noticed. Thus, according to Jimutavahana, the rights have acquired greater solidity as against brethren than as against the superior claims of a son, grandson, or grand-grandson. The latter through the operation of special texts in their favour hive succeeded in keeping the rights of the widow in a state of fluctuation. But according to the Mitakshara the rights against all co-pareanars are undeveloped to any more substantial form than a claim to maintenance. In one respect the Dayabhaga and the Mitakshara systems have operated in opposite directions. For under the Mitakshara the doctrine of survivorship and the allied doctrine that sons like all joint owners acquire an interest in the ancestral property by birth, give to the sons an ownership antecedent to the rights of the widow as such and yet as against the sons she has the right to an equal share in partition; to this right I am going presently to refer.

20. For fixing the nature of the rights of the widow as against the sons of the late owners West, J., refers to the following considerations, the first six tending to enhance the widow's rights and the other two showing their limitations: (1) Narada assigns to her a general control over her deceased husband's estate in ??? even to sons; (2) Manu makes her consent necessary for partition by her sons; (3) she has the right of absolute disposal over the property that is allotted to her in such partition; (4) she is not allowed any such veto over partition by the sons in modern Hindu law as is adjudged to her by Manu, yet when there is a partition her share is equal to that of a son and not a mere equivalent for maintenance; (5) as a consequence of this where a partition suit is instituted by the sons, the mother is a necessary party and where the suit is by others than the sons, the Court insists on a provision for suitable maintenance for her, as a necessary preliminary or ingredient in the decree for partition, so that the Privy Council, while holding in Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh(7) that a purchaser at an execution sale of the father's interest had acquired a right only to a severance of his share as distinguished from the son's, recognizes that, in the partition to be thus made, the wife also of the judgment-debtor, if he had one, might be entitled to an allotment; (6) “precisely the same word “bhartavyum” is used by Yajnavalkya to express the claim of persons who are excluded from a share and of their wives, and the same verb is used to express the right to support of a deceased coparcener's widow in Narada (Part II, Chap. 13, Sloka 28); (7) debts of the deceased owner take precedence over the maintenance of the widow; (8) even the existence of such debts does not prevent the sons disposing of the estate so as to convey a good title to a purchaser, Jamiyatram Ramchandra v. Prabhudas Hathi(8): much less therefore can the existence of the right to maintenance prevent such disposition, yet this power of disposition is curtailed by the decision that an adopted son cannot convey to a stranger such a right to the family dwelling as to deprive the adoptive mother of her right of residence: Mangala Debi v. Dinanath Bose(9); Srimathi Bhagabati Dasi v. Kanailal Mitter(10) and Gauri v. Chandramani(11).

21. The result of this West, J., sums up as giving to the sons under Mitakshara law “a more completely untrammelled power” than under Dayabhaga law “of dealing with the estate without regard to the widow's claims, however subject they may be to moral reprobation should they heedlessly dispose of it, and however impossible it may be for them to escape a personal liability for the widow's maintenance.” He concludes on pp. 510-511: “It seems opposed, therefore both to the text of the Mitakshara and to the constructions of the local interpreters to regard the widow's maintenance as “a charge on the inheritance” taken by the sons in the sense of a perfect right in re. At the same time as the maintenance, even of a concubine, “is a burden placed upon (the estate) by Hindu law,” which may properly be secured by an investment or other secure provision under the direction of the Court, the widowed mother or step-mother may demand, at least, an equal protection. Her right then, though resting on a somewhat different theory, appears, on the whole, to stand practically on the same level here as in Bengal. “The widow's claim to maintenance from her husband's estate,” Mr. Ellis says, “is absolute, unlimited by circumstances; but then it is only a claim to maintenance, and it is not correct to say that she is entitled to any share or division.” The sons taking the property subject to the burden of maintaining the widow are in a position bearing some analogy to that of a husband becoming owner-at-law of his wife's property, but bound to provide for her support. The origin of the obligations, no doubt, is quite different; but, in the relations to which they give rise between the parties and in their bearing on the property, they seem to be very nearly alike. If, then, a mother forgoing her claim to a, separate provision out of the paternal property resides with her sons or stepsons, and is maintained by them, she must submit, I think, to their dealing with the estate. A fraudulent alienation for the purpose of defeating her claims as pointed out by Sir G. Turner, V.C, in the case of a wife in Tidd v. Lister(12) will not be supported; but the particular assignee for value acquires under such circumstances a complete title not impaired like that of the assignee in insolvency by the then obvious incapacity of the insolvent son to support, out of the estate those whose maintenance is a charge on it. The charge must, I think, be regarded as an equitable one of a special kind, enforceable in all cases in which the mother or stepmother living apart is not maintained by the sons, but not in other cases except under circumstances which affect the good faith of a transaction by which it is sought to get rid of the burden.”

22. Having thus considered the right of maintenance of the wife as against the husband and of the widow (when she has to assert it against the sons), West, J., proceeds to consider if the incidents of the right might be different where the joint family consists of surviving brothers or cousins. In such circumstances “her identity with her deceased husband cannot be considered leas than where the husband was separated from his brethren and has left sons:” Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai. But the texts are in different terms and refer to “maintenance or a share of the property for her life” which right is subject to be resumed if the widow “does not keep unsullied the bed of her lord” and there is “no express injunction to assign an aliquot portion to any widow except the widow of a father. Yet Sir T. Strange says that in every case an allowance……. proportioned to her support……with a reference to the amount of the property so as, at the utmost (as has been said), not to exceed a son's or other coparcener's share” is to be made to her and that “care should be taken to have it secured.” He thus places the widow of the ordinary coparcener apparently on exactly the same level with a mother seeking maintenance from her sons: p. 513.

23. The decisions referring to the widow's rights at this stage, recognize that she is entitled to a charge, but apparently involve the limitation (not approved by West, J.) that the widow's charge arises only in case there is no other property in the hands of the members of her late husband's family out of which she can claim maintenance or “if she failed in getting her maintenance” from the said members.

24. This alleged limitation upon the widow's rights is considered by West, J., on pp. 515–517. The inconvenience is pointed out of subjecting property to a sort of springing use uncertain in itself and calculated to injure the value of the property, being dependent on the solvency and honesty of the vendor and perhaps of several other persons. The analogy of English law is also considered.

25. The result arrived at may be formulated as follows: (1) the widow has a right to get the estate charged with her maintenance, which she may or may not exercise; that right contains all the elements necessary for its ripening into a specific charge; it only needs formal assertion to obtain recognition: but nevertheless, West, J., observes: “I do not think it can be called an already existing proprietary right.” (2) Waste or improper alienation with the very object of depriving her of her subsistence would be a fraud upon a person specially under the protection of the law and would be pronounced invalid or subject to revision in the interests of the persons prejudiced; (3) the purchaser who joins in the effort to defeat the widow's rights may himself be made subject to the charge: whether or not this should be done would depend upon considerations which include (a) the sacredness of the duty to maintain, (b) the existence of other property out of which maintenance may be obtained, (c) whether or not the widow has deliberately (in the hope of sharing the imporvement in the family circumstances) or through neglect (i.e, the failure to assert her right, of obtaining a charge) thrown in her lot with the family leaving to the male coparceners an unlimited estate to deal with at their discretion, (d) whether such property sought to be followed in the hands of the purchaser was honestly available in toto to the widow for her maintenance or whether a deduction for unpaid debts would first have had to be made, (e) whether the consideration received by the heir for the sale of the deceased's property will so far as the widow's right of recourse to it is concerned take the place of the property sold,” (f) knowledge or means of knowledge on the part of the vendee that the widow's claim cannot be satisfied without recourse to what he proposes to buy; in other words, whether the purchaser has “notice of the existence of a claim likely to be unjustly impaired by the proposed transaction.”

26. How this question of notice has to be determined in any particular case is further elucidated by the questions that were referred to the lower Court by Westropp, C.J, at p. 500 and by West, J., at pp. 523, 526. West, J., proceeds to consider the four stages of maintenance right: that of a widow against a single surviving coparcener. He points out that the only distinction that can arise from the fact of there being a single coparcener is that the right which a mother or an unmarried sister of the coparceners has no partition to have a definite share allotted to her is unavailing, as there can be on partition where there is a single coparcener to whom the whole joint property belongs.

27. The result of West, J's examination of the nature of the widow's rights where she has not obtained a charge on any property has already been formulated by me.

28. With reference to the effect of a decree effecting such a charge, West, J., says: “As the maintenance, even of a concubine, “is a burden placed upon (the estate) by Hindu law”, which may properly be secured by an investment or other secure provision under the direction of the Court, the widowed mother or step mother may demand, at least an equal protection”: p. 510. “She may at her will get her claim recognized as chargeable on the estate in the hands of the coparceners reduced to certainty and secured as a specific charge on the estate or, as Katyayana says, by “the allotment of a share for her life.”: p. 515. Finally in distinguishing (he right of the two widows mentioned in the case before him one of whom (Sarasvatibai) had, and the other (the plaintiff) had not, obtained a decree, he said: “For proper reasons, as for the discharge of a debt incumbent on the family and on him as its sole surviving proprietary member, Mahadev might sell the estate which had thus vested in him. He could not thus affect the right of another coparcener's widow Sarasvatibai, whose claim had by means of a decree become a right in re adhering to the estate; but the right of Satyabhamabai, not yet reduced to definiteness and made a precise and actual charge on the property, could not prevent his dealing with it at his discretion:” p. 524.

29. Westropp, C.J, as I pointed out before, refrained from expressing an opinion on the question of how far the widow's decree would avail against an administration suit by creditors of the family. That question does not arise in the present case either. We are not concerned with a case where the creditors of a joint family claim to have their rights enforced in priority to the widow's, or when they contend that they cannot be prejudicially affected by a decree to which they were not parties and which has the effect of defeating their claims.

30. I will assume (without expressing an uncalled for opinion on the question) that just as a transfer with the intention of defeating the right to receive maintenance will not affect the right to receive maintenance, so conversely an assertion of a claim to maintenance and a decree collusively obtained with the intention of defeating creditors or coparceners would be unavailing against the creditors or coparceners. Even where there is no such intention the Allahabad High Court has expressed an opinion that the maintenance charge cannot avail against creditors to whom the property has been transferred in satisfaction of claims which would have precedence over maintenance: Gur Dayal…(Dependant); v. Kaunsila…(Plaintiff).*(13). But creditors do not necessarily have such precedence. Respondent 1 might well rely upon the existence of her pending suit for maintenance which would make it more difficult for the transferee to avail himself of the provisions of Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act. Had the decree been passed and had the claim of the transferee arisen after the decree, it is clear that the transferee would have taken subject to the charge: Kuloda Prosad Chatterjee v. Jogeshar Koer(14); and even where the transfer is pending the decree, if the property is directly and specially brought in question in a maintenance suit Manika Gramani v. Ellappa Chetty(15) and a mortgage is made pending the suits though prior to the actual passing of the maintenance decree the mortgage may be effectual only subject to the maintenance charge: Dose Thimmanna Bhutta v. Krishna Tantri(16).

31. These considerations make it clear, it seems to me, that in so far as the sale of 28th October 1902 is concerned it cannot, avail the appellant, for that is subsequent to the maintenance decree. The appellant must succeed, if at all, on the strength of the priority (over maintenance) of these claims in satisfaction of which the sale was held: he can succeed only if he can make out that (1) he is entitled to stand in the shoes of a creditor, (2) that creditor could have had the property sold free from the maintenance charge and (3) that the property was so sold.

32. Before considering the appellant's rights on this basis I must deal with another point taken for the appellant. He claims that there is another reason why his rights should have priority—a reason not dependent on the inherent priority of the claims of the creditor in whose shoe he alleges he stands. This reason is that, prior to the date of respondent 1's decree, the property had been attached (in the first suit). The respondent at the time of the attachment had no charge on the property. The property by the attachment was, it is true, merely kept in custodia legis, Sankaralinga Reddi v. Kandasami Thevan(17), so that according to that decision, in one sense and to the extent pointed out in that decision, “the attaching creditor is said to have a charge on the attached property”: p. 416 first line. Still it may be that the Court could have ordered the charge to take effect retrospectively and that Section 61 of the CPC, would not prevent the property being affected by a charge created by the Court. In the present case however the decree, which is not very happily worded does not purport to do so. It is ordered “that the plaint 46 items of properties, described in the schedule below, be a charge for the lifelong maintenance of the plaintiff.” Presumably the charge would take effect from the date of the decree.

33. It may be that the attaching creditor (in the first suit) would have been entitled to claim, if he had been before the Court creating the charge (in the second suit) that the property attached by him should not be charged so far as his claims were concerned and it may even be that in the absence of his having an opportunity to make such an application the charge created on the property should be held subject to his own claim, provided that they arise out of some liability which is imposed upon the joint property and which has priority over the maintenance claim. It may also be that the attachment was evidence of the existence of prior claims which should not have been disregarded when the decree for the maintenance charge was passed in the second suit and that this may throw light on the question whether a decree in the second suit was collusive—a point to which I shall allude.

34. But none of these points seems to me to require consideration now. It seems to me, for reasons which I shall presently state, that all that has to be considered is whether this property could be subject to the charge at the time of the second decree. If it had then been sold away and gone out of the possession of the family it could not have been so charged. Being merely under attachment it was subject to being charged by the Court. It is common ground that the Court would have made the maintenance charge subject to such prior debts as would have had priority over maintenance claims. Had the question arisen between the widow and a creditor seeking to bring himself under Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act or under the rulings in Gur Dayal…(Dependant); v. Kaunsila…(Plaintiff).*, all the considerations to which I have referred might have been relevant. They seem to me to be of no relevancy.

35. I will assume that the attachment was in respect of such a debt as would have priority over a widow's maintenance decree; and that the auction-purchaser in the first suit from whom the appellant purchased the property was a bona fide transferee who had no such intention to defeat the rights of the widow as would make the property in his hands subject to the charge under Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act. The result would therefore be that the purchaser could have said to the widow if he had the good fortune to possess the combined scholarship and legal acumen of West and Phear, J.:— “This property is not in honesty available to you except with a deduction for debts unpaid; and so far as your right of recourse is concerned, the consideration received by the heir for the sale of the property will take the place of the property sold.” The widow would then have turned away, leaving the property in the hands of the purchaser, and sought to have recourse against the consideration and what would have been the result of her search? She would have found that on 10th July 1909 the consideration had, by virtue of Ex. 2, taken once again the shape of the property. Can these transactions therefore affect her charge? In Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai it is shown with abundant learning that by no device can the coparcener evade his liability to maintain the widow so long as he has ancestral funds: by no jugglery of sale and repurchase can the essential liability be “shuffled off.” The widow being entitled to claim her maintenance from the joint property in which her deceased husband was interested subject only to a deduction for just debts, and that right being of so sacred a character that even a third party purchasing for consideration, if it be proved that he attempted to join in an effort to defeat the widow's rights by a colourable purchase, will hold the property subject to her charge, how can the Court in the present case proceed on the basis that right has been defeated by the course of events which have taken place, though the property is now in the hand of the sole male member of the joint family who admits in his written statement that the property is ancestral?

36. Must the property then be considered to be subject merely to such an inchoate right in favour of the widow as she would have had prior to and irrespective of the decree in the second suit (as contemplated in Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act) or will the decree operate against this property and subject it to a charge of such a specific character as has been held to come within Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act: Maina v. Bachchi(18)? Respondent 1 claims to bring the property under the latter alternative notwithstanding that it may have passed through the crucible of Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act.

37. It seems to ma that respondent 1 must succeed in this contention also and for this reason: assuming that the decree in the second suit is binding upon the appellant, that decree subjects the property to a specific charge, and if a third party was, by availing himself of Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, enabled to withdraw the property from the decretal charge in favour of respondent 1, then the charge would operate on the consideration by which the third party replaced the property originally charged, and that consideration, as I have already stated, is now again represented by the property itself. This result might, it is true, have been prevented from arising if the consideration for Rs. 2 were not the consideration for the sale held on 28th October 1902. For in that case the appellant could have said that, on the reasoning I have adopted, the charge must continue on the consideration for the latter sale, and that consideration is not have represented by the property now in question. But as the appellant is the sole member of the joint family to which he belongs, and as according to his own allegations there has been no partition, and there is no allegation that the consideration for Ex. 2 was paid out of his self acquisitions, which would not be liable to any maintenance charge, it seams to me that the property must be held by him in the same way as if it had never passed out of the family. In speaking of the consideration for the sale of 28th October 1902, I have not lost sight of the fact that it purports to consist, not of a sum of money, but of the satisfaction of liabilities to which the property of the joint family was subject. The sale of 28th October 1902 enhanced the value of the joint family property by reducing its liabilities; the consideration for Ex. 2 proceeds from the sole surviving member of the family who has not shown that he had property which he could hold as his self-acquired property. It may be admitted that from the nature of the transaction the consideration for the sale of 28th October 1902 cannot be said to have been earmarked; or that the same consideration was present in the identical form in both cases. The consideration may be shown to be identical in this with such strictness only in cases where there is a barter in each case, or where the property is alienated by the manager of the family in the first instance for a bag of money which is sealed up and kept apart and with the same bag of money the property is repurchased. But it is not necessary to trace the identity of the consideration with such strictness. The consideration came out of the joint family property and was again merged into it. That, in my opinion, is enough for the purposes of the questions now before us.

38. I have so far assumed that the decree in the second suit creating the charge was binding upon the appellant. The appellant in para. 9 of his written statement contended that the decree for maintenance in the second suit was not binding on him because it was fraudulently obtained. The question whether the decree had been so obtained was not made the subject of any specific issue, nor considered by either of the lower Courts except casually. There is no ground of appeal expressly referring to this point. There is certainly no evidence in support of the allegation. It may, on the other hand, be admitted that what appears on the record casts suspicion on the decree. We cannot however on mere suspicion disregard the decree. There is no much force in the argument that at most the appellant can attack the decree on the ground that the amount allowed for maintenance is excessive. That contention was not taken in the suit. If the circumstances necessary for a redaction of the a mount exist the appellant ought to have taken the point specifically or instituted a suit for the purpose: Sidlingapa v. Sidava kom Sidlingapa(19); Bangaru Ammal v. Vijayamachi Reddiar(20).

39. Taking then the facts as they stand on the contentions of the parties and the evidence before us, the decree must, in my opinion, be considered to be binding on the appellant both as regards the amount of the maintenance and as regards the creation of the charge.

40. It was argued before us that the charge on the property in favour of respondent 1 ought to prevail only as against such part of it as would on partition have been allotted to her deceased husband. Reliance is placed for this proposition on the remarks in Jayanti Subbiah…(Plaintiff), v. Alamelu Mangamma…(Defendant), .*, (21). Those remarks refer to what should ordinarily be considered to be a reasonable portion of the property for being so charged. With great respect I express my entire concurrence with those remarks. The Court has however power to charge the whole of the joint family property though her deceased husband's property in the share will naturally be taken into consideration in fixing the amount of the maintenance: Subrayulu Chetty v. Kamalavalli Thayaramma(22). It cannot therefore be said that the decree is leas binding on the appellant because it purports to charge more than such a portion of the joint property as would have coma to her husband's share in partition.

41. I must here draw attention to the necessity for caution before a decree is passed creating a maintenance charge on the whole of the family property, especially in a case where only one out of several members of a joint family is a party to the suit and that, member does not appear at the hearing. Decrees hastily passed in such circumstances without consideration being given to the rights of creditors or coparcener who are not parties would, frequently be ineffectual. The jurisdiction of creating a charge on property is exceptional. There seems no exact equivalent in England. The analogy of the statutory jurisdiction of charging funds in Court and of enforcing a covenant made by the parties to charge property is not very helpful: Daniell's Chancery Practice, Vol. 1, p. 755. Fisher on Mortgages, paras. 217-224, 468-473. The present case well illustrates the necessity for caution.

42. There still remains the question as to whether defendant 2 (the defendant 2 before us) was a necessary or proper party to the suit. I cannot see how defendant 2 is interested in these proceedings. She is, no doubt, interested in having her rights under her own decree for maintenance considered and adjudicated upon. Those rights may be very similar to the rights of respondent: 1 (the original plaintiff). It may be that if there had been another suit by defendant 2 against the appellant (defendant 1) that suit and the plaintiff's may well have been tried together. But that does not make defendant 2 a necessary or proper party to a suit by another widow for a declaration that the property is subject to a charge created by another decree. There have however been no separate costs caused by defendant 2's presence and the only question is whether the lower Courts were right in giving to defendant 2 a decree in the same terms in which they have given a decree to the plaintiff. Their procedure seems to ma to have been obviously erroneous.

43. They might have added defendant 2 as a plaintiff. To such addition the other parties may have taken such objections as they might have been advised to take. Or defendant 2 might have been referred to another suit with such alterations in regard to the prayers and allegations as might have been necessitated by what I understand to be the fact, viz., defendant 2 did not put in any such execution petition as is referred to in para. 6 of the plaint.

44. Under the circumstances the words in the decree declaring the rights of defendant 2 must be omitted. This will not, of course, affect her rights. It will merely mean that in the present proceedings defendant 2 would not have been a party and can claim no relief.

45. With the omission of the words above referred to the decree under appeal will be confirmed and the appeal dismissed with costs.

Spencer, J.:— The appellant is the transferee from a purchaser of property sold at a Court sale in execution of a simple money decree obtained against his uncle Ramasami Patter. The sale was held on 28th October 1902. On 19th September 1902 respondent 1, who is one of the widows of Ramasami Patter, obtained a decree for maintenance charging 46 items of family property. The money decree was prior to the decree for maintenance.

46. The principal question argued before us is whether the appellant's purchase was subject to the charge for maintenance or takes precedence over it.

47. There can be no doubt as a general proposition that debts contracted by a Hindu take precedence over maintenance as a charge upon the estate (Mayne's Hindu Law, para. 464): The District Judge holds that the case is different where a definite charge is created over specified items of property by a decree for maintenance, and he supports his opinion by a reference to Maina v. Bachchi. In that case certain transferees for value without notice had to take the property purchased by them from a daughter of the last male owner subject to the charge for maintenance created previously by a decree incorporating a compromise in favour of a son's widow. In Kuloda Prosad Chatterji v. Jogeshar Koer the purchasers, in execution of a mortgage-decree obtained by them on a mortgage bond executed after the date of a decree for maintenance, which effected a charge on certain properties, were held to be bound by the maintenance decree even in respect of maintenance that accrued due subsequent to their mortgage. The present case differs on the facts from those two cases in that a as I have already pointed out, the money decree here was obtained before the mortgage decree for maintenance, but the sale in execution of the money decree was after the charge for maintenance had been imposed on specific property by the mortgage decree.

48. In Sham Lal…(Defendant); v. Banna…(Plaintiff).* the following observation occurs at the end of the Full Bench decision: “When the maintenance has been expressly charged on the purchased property it will be liable, although it be shown that there is property in the hands of the heirs sufficient to meet the claim, but the property will not be liable if the transfer was made to satisfy a claim for which the ancestral property is liable by Hindu law, and which under that law takes precedence of that of maintenance.” This was followed in Gur Dayal v. Kaunsila. On the strength of these decisions and of that in Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai. Sir John Trevelyan at p. 87 of his Hindu law comes to the conclusion that even a decree for maintenance charging specific property would not bind a purchaser who purchased in execution of a decree that enforced a claim which under Hindu law takes precedence of a claim for maintenance.

49. There is no evidence of record as to the nature of the debt for which the decree in Original Suit No. 4 of 1900 was obtained.

50. In her plaint Alamelu Ammal characterized the auction held on 28th October 1902, as fraudulent and deceitful. The District Munsif found no evidence that the purchaser at the Court auction had any notice of this plaintiff's decree. The District Judge did not record a finding on this point. It might be a question for consideration whether defendant 1 owing to his close relationship as nephew of the judgment-debtor was not likely to have been unaware of the plaintiff's decree for maintenance when he took a transfer from the auction-purchaser, Nanu Patter, at the sale under the decree in Original Suit No. 4 of 1900.

51. In this view, it might be necessary to call for findings from the lower appellate Court on the two following issues:

1. Whether the debt which formed the subject-matter of Original Suit No. 4 of 1900 was one which by its nature would take precedence of a claim for maintenance.

2. Whether defendant 1 was a bona fide transferee for consideration without notice within the moaning of Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act?

52. The appeal however can be disposed of without a remand as, in my opinion, it must fail on other grounds. Defendant 1 and his uncle Ramasami Patter belonged to a joint Hindu family and the properties charged with the widow's maintenance by the decree in Original Suit No. 264 of 1902 were ancestral properties. At the trial of this suit there was no dispute that the family was undivided when that decree was passed. Although defendant 1 alleged in his written statement that he had been residing separately from his uncle, he made no attempt to prove partition or that there was fraud and collusion between his uncle and his uncle's wife in getting the ex parte decree passed. Having succeeded to the family properties therefore he cannot now repudiate the act of the then manager of the family in permitting particular items of property to be made liable for the widow's maintenance.

53. The other questions raised before us may be briefly dealt with, They are (1) that defendant 1's half share of the family properties could not be made liable for the maintenance of his uncle's widow;

(2) that the priority in time of the attachment in execution of the decree in Original Suit No. 4 of 1900 to the decree in Original Suit No. 264 of 1902 created a superior title in the decree-holder in Original Suit No. 4 of 1900 (Subramaniam Patter) and in the decree-holder's son (Nanu Pattar) who purchased at the auction sale held in consequence of the attachment;

(3) that defendant 1 being the assignee of the prior mortgage (Ex. 4) in favour of Seetharama Pattar, takes in priority to the subsequent mortgagor decree holder;

(4) that defendant 2 being a co-widow of the deceased Ramasami Pattar with the plaintiff, should have not been joined in this suit.

54. Following Subrayulu Chetty v. Kamalavalli Thayaramma I consider that the whole of the joint family property could be made liable for the widow's maintenance provided that the portion charged did not exceed her husband's interest therein.

55. Following Soobul Chunder Law v. Russik Lal Mitter(23) and Moti Lal v. Karrabuldin(24) I think that the attachment of the property under the decree in Original Suit No. 4 of 1900 created no right or title in the attaching creditor. This is not a case of lis pendens as the purchase was subsequent to the decree for maintenance.

56. The lower appellate Court's decree provides for the plaint properties being sold subject to the prior mortgage under Ex. 4 of which defendant 1 has got an assignment. Defendant 1 is not entitled to defeat the rights of the subsequent mortgagee by tacking his rights as transferee from a purchaser at a sale under a simple money decree to his rights as transferee under the prior mortgage bond (Ex. 4.) Defendant 2 who got a separate decree for maintenance had no cause of action under O. 21, R. 63, in respect of the order on the claim petition passed against the plaintiff. She was not a necessary party to this suit and the words “and defendant 2” after the words “the maintenance of the plaintiffs” will have to be struck out of the decrees of both the lower Courts; but in respect of costs no alternation is required, the District Munsif's order having been passed subject to the condition that she paid her own costs. In other respects this second appeal must be dismissed with costs.

S.N/R.K

57. Appeal dismissed.