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Akhoy Kumar Banerjee v. Corporation Of Calcutta

Calcutta High Court
Jun 8, 1914
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit initiated by the Corporation of Calcutta to enforce payment of arrears of consolidated rates charged upon immoveable property situated within its jurisdiction. The property originally belonged to Saudamini Dasi, who mortgaged it by conditional sale in 1897. Subsequently, her interest was sold in execution of a decree and purchased by Haricharan Ojah, the first Defendant. The mortgagee, Bankubehari Ghose, obtained foreclosure and became the full owner, later transferring the property to the four other Defendants. The Corporation sued all five Defendants for arrears of consolidated rates accrued between 1903 and 1906. The first Defendant contested on the ground of non-ownership and possession, while the other four Defendants contended that no statutory charge was enforceable against them for arrears preceding their ownership by more than one year. The lower courts dismissed the suit against the first Defendant and refused personal decrees against the others but allowed the Corporation to recover arrears by sale of the property if unpaid within thirty days. The present appeal is by the four Defendants other than the first, raising two principal questions: whether arrears of consolidated rates constitute a charge on the property, and if so, whether such charge can be enforced against the property in their hands.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an arrear of consolidated rate is a charge on the land and buildings in respect of which it has accrued due under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1899.
  2. If such a charge exists, whether it can be enforced against the property in the hands of the present Appellants (the purchasers).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • The first Defendant argued that he was not the owner in possession of the property and thus no personal decree could be made against him.
  • The four other Defendants contended that there was no statutory charge enforceable against the property in their hands and that arrears accrued more than one year before they became owners, precluding personal decrees against them.
  • On appeal, the Appellants argued that the charge under section 228 of the Calcutta Municipal Act should be restricted in scope by section 223, limiting liability to arrears for the year immediately prior to their purchase.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Royzuddin v. Kalinath Distinction between mortgage and charge; mortgage transfers interest, charge does not. Used to explain the fundamental difference between mortgage and charge in the context of consolidated rate arrears.
Narayana v. Verikdta; Tancred v. Delagoa Bay Co.; Burlinsen v. Hall Charge differs from mortgage in that it does not transfer title but creates a security interest. Supported the principle that a charge is a security without transfer of ownership interest.
Gobinda Chandra v. Dwarhanath Mortgage transfers interest; charge only secures payment from property. Reaffirmed the nature of a charge as securing payment without transfer of ownership.
Maina v. Bachchi Enforcement of charge or mortgage against property in hands of purchaser; notice is key. Clarified that a charge can only be enforced against a transferee with notice of the charge.
Kishan Lal v. Ganga Ram; Royzuddi v. Kalinaih Charge enforceable against purchaser only if taken with notice. Applied to determine the appellants' liability based on notice of arrears.
Attorney General v. B.G Company; Wilkes v. Spooner Defence of purchaser for value without notice is a single defence; onus lies on defendant. Used to emphasize the necessity for the appellants to plead and prove their defence of being purchasers without notice.
Radhamadhob v. Kalpataru; Magu Brahma v. Bholi Das Constructive notice rules differ for involuntary alienations like foreclosure. Distinguished the position of the mortgagee purchaser by foreclosure from private purchasers regarding notice.
Harrison v. Forth A purchaser without notice is protected even if vendor had notice. Applied to reject appellants' claim to protection as purchasers with notice from a vendor with notice.
Sweet v. Southdots; Macqueen v. Farquher; Barrow's case; Wilkes v. Spooner Doctrine that purchaser with notice may shelter under vendor's title; implications for notice and protection. Examined the position of the vendor and purchaser regarding notice and liability for arrears.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1899, focusing on sections relating to consolidated rates. It held that section 228 clearly establishes that the consolidated rate is a first charge on the land and buildings, independent of the personal liability of the owner or purchaser under section 223. The Court rejected the argument that section 223 limits the charge to arrears for which the purchaser is personally liable; it clarified that section 223 addresses personal liability, while section 228 creates a charge against the property itself.

Next, the Court analyzed the nature of the charge under section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, distinguishing a charge from a mortgage by noting that a charge does not transfer ownership interest but merely creates security for payment from the property. The Court concluded that the consolidated rate charge is a statutory charge, not a mortgage, and therefore, the charge cannot be enforced against the property in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

The Court noted that the appellants did not plead that they were purchasers without notice, which is necessary to avail that defence. Even assuming this defence was available, the Court found that the appellants were in a difficult position because they would have discovered the arrears by enquiry, were personally liable for arrears of the year immediately preceding their purchase, and admitted to satisfying those arrears. The mortgagee who obtained title by foreclosure was considered to have constructive notice, obliging him to have ascertained the arrears, and the appellants could not claim protection as purchasers without notice since they could have also discovered the arrears by enquiry.

Therefore, the Court held that the appellants are not entitled to protection as purchasers for value without notice, and the statutory charge can be enforced against the property in their hands.

Holding and Implications

The Court’s final decision is that the decree of the Subordinate Judge is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Corporation of Calcutta may enforce the arrears of consolidated rates as a first charge against the property even in the hands of the current owners, the appellants, who are not protected as purchasers without notice. No new precedent beyond the application of existing principles concerning statutory charges and purchaser notice was established.

Show all summary ...

Mookerjee, J.:— This is an appeal by four of the Defendants in a suit to enforce payment of money charged upon immoveable property. The land and buildings in suit lie within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Corporation of Calcutta and were originally owned by Saudamini Dasi. On the 11th September 1897, she executed a mortgage of this property by way of conditional sale. On the 13th January 1903 her right, title and interest were sold in execution of a decree for money against her and were purchased by Haricharan Ojah, the first Defendant to this suit. In 1904, the mortgagee, Bankubehari Ghose, sued to enforce his security, obtained the usual foreclosure decree, and ultimately, when the decree was made absolute, became full owner of the property. On the 19th February 1907, Bankubehari Ghose transferred the property to the four persons who are Defendants other than the first Defendant to this suit. On the 20th August 1908, the Corporation of Calcutta commenced this action against the five Defendants to enforce a charge on the property in their hands in respect of arrears of consolidated rates. These arrears had accrued due during the three years from the 1st April 1903 to the 31st March 1906. The first Defendant resisted the claim on the ground that she was not the owner in possession of the property and that no personal decree could be made against her. The remaining four Defendants contended that there was no statutory charge enforceable against the property in their hands, and that as the arrears had accrued due more than one year before they became owners of the property, no personal decree could be made against them. The Courts below have dismissed the suit against the first Defendant as also the claim for a personal decree against the other Defendants. But they have made a decree which entitles the Corporation to realize the arrears by sale of the land and buildings, if the decretal amount is not paid within thirty days of the decree. On the present appeal, which has been preferred by the Defendants other than the first, two points require consideration, namely, first, whether an arrear of consolidated rate is a charge on the land and buildings in respect of which it has accrued due; and, secondly, if there is such a charge, whether it can be enforced against the property in the hands of the present Appellants.

The answer to the first question, namely, whether an arrear of consolidated rate is a charge on the land and buildings in respect of which it has accrued due must depend upon the true construction of the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1899. For this purpose, reference may briefly be made or the relevant sections. The fourth part of the Calcutta Municipal Act deals with the subject of taxation, and comprises Chapters XII to XIX which include secs. 147 to 235. Chapter XII treats of rates. Sec. 147 specifies four different classes of rates, which the Corporation is authorised to impose upon buildings and lands within its jurisdiction. Sec. 149 lays down that these rates are to be levied as one consolidated rate. Sec. 171 makes the consolidated rate payable in equal halves by the owner and the occupier. Secs. 178 and 186 specify the circumstances under which the entire consolidated rate may be levied from the owner or from the occupier. We next come to Chapter XVIII which defines the special procedure for recovery of the consolidated rate. Sec. 212 lays down that the provisions of the Chapter shall be deemed to be in addition to and not in derogation of any powers conferred in other Chapters for the collection or recovery of the consolidated rate. Sec. 215 provides for one mode of realization of the rate, namely, by distress. Sub-sec. 3 of sec. 222 places a restriction upon the recovery, by distress against the occupier, of an arrear due from the owner; no arrear of the consolidated rate can be recovered by distress from any occupier or sub-tenant, if it has remained due for more than one year or if it is due on account of any period for which such occupier or sub-tenant was not in occupation of the premises on which the rate is assessed. Sec. 223 defines the extent of the liability of the purchaser of any building or land for his vendor's share of arrears of consolidated rate; the purchaser is liable for the amount due on account of the owner's share for any period not exceeding one year prior to his purchase. Sec. 227 authorises a suit for recovery of arrears of consolidated rate, in substitution for or addition to the summary remedy by distress and sale. Sec. 228 which makes the consolidated rate a first charge on the premises is in these terms: “The consolidated rate, due in respect of any building or land, shall, subject to the prior payment of the land revenue, if any, due to the Government thereupon, be a first charge upon the said building or land and upon the moveable property, if any, found within or upon such building or land and belonging to the person liable for such rate.” The language of this section it perfectly plain, and the intention of the Legislature to make the consolidated rate a first charge upon the premises is obvious. But an earnest endeavour has been made, on behalf of the Appellant, to restrict its Scope and operation by a reference to sec. 223. It has been argued that as the purchaser of the premises is liable for arrears of consolidated rate, which have accrued due before title vested in him, only to the extent of arrears for the year immediately prior to his purchase, sec. 228 should be so interpreted as to restrict the charge on the property in his hands, only to arrears for which he is liable. This contention is clearly fallacious, as the two sections are concerned with two entirely distinct aspects of the matter. Sec. 223 deals with the question of the personal liability (liability in personam) of the purchaser of the premises for arrears unsatisfied when the title vested in him. Sec. 228 deals with the question of the liability of the premises (liability in rem) for the rates due thereon. Sec. 228 is perfectly general in its terms and makes the consolidated rate, as it accrues due from time to time, a first charge on the property (subject to arrears of land revenue). The objects of the two sections are radically distinct, and sec. 228 cannot be controlled by sec. 223. We may add that no attempt has been made here to support the view unsuccessfully put forward in the Court below,.that the expression “belonging to the person liable for such rate” in sec. 228 qualifies, not only the expression “moveable property,” but also the expression “building or land.” We hold accordingly that sec. 228 remakes the consolidated rate, as it accrues due from time to time, a first charge on the premises.

The answer to the second question, namely, whether such charge can be enforced against the property in the hands of the. Appellants, must depend upon the nature and incidents of the charge. A charge is defined in sec. 100 of the Transfer of: Property Act in the following terms:—

“Where immoveable property of one person is, by act of parties or operation of law, made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property.” The distinction between a mortgage and a charge, thus indicated in sec. 100, is of a fundamental character, and was explained by this Court in the case of Royzuddin v. Kalinath(1). There is this well-marked distinction between the two, that a mortgage does, whereas a charge does not, involve a transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property: Narayana v. Verikdta(2), Tancred v. Delagoa Bay Co.(3) following Burlinsen v. Hall(4), where Day, J., observed as follows: “A charge differs altogether from a mortgage: by a charge, the title is not transferred, but the person creating the charge merely says that out of a particular fund he will discharge a particular debt.”

To the same effect is the decision in Gobinda Chandra v. Dwarhanath(5): “a mortgage, is a transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property; a charge only secures payment of money out of that property.” When liability has been imposed upon property by act of parties, a question of some nicety may arise, whether a mere charge has been created or whether the property itself has been hypothecated. The point is of great practical importance, because, whether the one view is taken or the other, has an important bearing upon the question, whether the property can be followed in the hands of a bonâ fide purchaser for value without notice: Maina v. Bachchi(6). No such question, however, arises where, as here, only a charge has been created by express words of the Statute, and not a mortgage as in cases under sec. 13 of the Putni Regulation or sec. 171 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. What, then, is the position? The consolidated rate, as it accrued due, became a first charge upon the property, but no interest in such property was transferred by operation of law to the Corporation. The owner continued to be the full Owner of the property; the entire interest therein remained vested in him; when he transferred his right, title and interest in the property, the transferee acquired the whole interest therein. The owner was not in the position of a mortgagor, who has in him nothing beyond the equity of redemption and can consequently convey to the transferee no larger interest in the property. From this principle, the conclusion is inevitable that the charge cannot be enforced against the property in the hands of a bonâ fide purchaser for value without notice; in other words while a mortgagee can follow the mortgaged property in the hands of a transferee from the mortgagor, a charge can be enforced against a transferee, only if he has taken with notice of the charge: Kishan Lal v. Ganga Ram(7), Royzuddi v. Kalinaih. The question, consequently, arises, whether the Appellants are purchasers for value without notice. Here, it is worthy of note that they did not, in their written statement, plead that they were purchasers for value without notice. If they wished to avail themselves of this defence, they should have pleaded it. It was ruled in Attorney General v. B.G Company(8) and Wilkes v. Spooner(9), that it is not a case of, first, a defence that the Defendant is a purchaser for value, and then a reply that he had notice, but of a single defence that the Defendant is a purchaser for value without notice, the onus of proving which is on the Defendant. But even if we assume that the defence, though not expressly taken in their written statement, is available to the Defendants, they are in a position of difficulty from which there is no escape. The Appellants are private purchasers of the property, and if they had enquired at the time of their purchase they would have discovered that the rates were in arrears; as a matter of fact, they would be personally liable under sec. 223 for the arrears of the year immediately prior to the date of their purchase, and they admit that they have satisfied such arrears, though they do not disclose whether by enquiry they had ascertained the existence of the arrears before they made the purchase. But let us assume that they had notice of the arrears at the time of their purchase; still, as a purchaser with notice may shelter himself under the title of the person from whom he purchased, if the latter could successfully raise this defence, we must examine the position of the vendor of the Appellants: Sweet v. Southdots(10), Macqueen v. Farquher(11), Barrow's case(12), Wilkes v. Spooner. Now, as regards the position of Banku Behary Ghose, the mortgagee who acquired title by foreclosure, he was no doubt not in the position of a private purchaser, and if he had enquired of his mortgagor or the subsequent purchaser of the equity of redemption, neither of them would have been bound to give him any information, such as a vendor is under an obligation to furnish under sec. 55 of the Transfer of Property Act to an intending purchaser of his property. The mortgagee, therefore, was in reality a person who acquired title under an involuntary alienation by his mortgagor; to a person in this position, constructive notice cannot be imputed to the same extent as to a purchaser at a private sale: Radhamadhob v. Kalpataru(13), Magu Brahma v. Bholi Das(14). But, by enquiry from the Municipal authorities, he could still have ascertained, whether any arrears of consolidated rate were due. When he took the mortgage, he knew full well that if the rate was not duly paid, the arrears would become a first charge upon the property and would gain priority over his debt; and in our opinion, before he became full owner by foreclosure, he should have ascertained the true state of affairs. He is consequently in the same position as if he had made such enquiry; and the purchasers from him are in no higher position, because, although a purchaser without notice from a person who had notice is protected, Harrison v. Forth(15), the Appellants cannot claim such protection, as, before they acquired title, they might have by enquiry from the Municipal authorities ascertained the precise period for which the rates were in arrears. We hold accordingly that the Appellants are not entitled to protection as purchasers for value without notice.

The result is that the decree of the Subordinate Judge is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.

Beachcroft, J.:— I agree.

Appeal dismissed.