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Halli Jha v. Lal Singh
1. This is an appeal by defendants 3, 4 and 5 in a suit for recovery of possession of immoveable properties purchased by the plaintiffs at a sale in execution of a mortgage decree. The mortgage was created on 13th November 1896 by the representatives of different branches of a joint Mitakshara family. On 20th June 1913, the mortgagee sued to enforce his security. He joined as defendants the mortgagors as also the infant sons of one of them, namely, Halii Jha and Magnu Jha, who are defendants 3 and 4 in this litigation. Defendant 5 (the brother of the two defendants just mentioned) was not a party to that suit; and one of the points in controversy is, whether he was born before the mortgage suit was commenced. The suit was decreed in due course, the mortgaged properties were brought to sale and were purchased by the decree-holder himself. The purchaser has not been able to obtain possession and he has instituted this suit for declaration of title and for recovery of possession and mesne profits. His claim is resisted by the three defendants-appellants, on the ground that they are not bound by the mortgage decree and the proceedings consequent thereon. In so far as defendants 3 and 4 are concerned, their contention is that although they were joined as parties defendants, no guardian ad litem was appointed for their benefit and that consequently, they were essentially strangers to the suit and are not affected by the decree made therein. It appears from an examination of the order-sheet in the suit, that on 20th January 1903 the mortgagee applied for the appointment of the two minor defendants. His prayer was that their father, who was also a defendant to the suit, should be appointed guardian. Notice was served but there was no appearance on behalf of the proposed guardian and yet the Court proceeded to appoint him as guardian ad litem. Subsequently, on 17th March 1903, the father entered appearance and intimated so the Court that he had not received the notice issued to him. At the same time, he declined to act as guardian on behalf of his infant sons, on the allegation that there might be a conflict of interest between him and them. He therefore suggested that Babulal, who was related to the infants, might be appointed guardian. Notice was issued to Babulal, but we cannot trace any order by which he was appointed to act as guardian on behalf of the infants. It is also plain that he did not enter appearance at any stage of the suit to look after the interest of the infants. The result was that, in so far as the infant defendants were concerned, the suit was decreed ex parte. The decree shows however on the face of it, that the father of the infants was their guardian ad litem. This was clearly an error, traceable possibly to the fact that no formal order was passed by the Court to discharge the order of 12th February 1903, by which the father had bean, without his consent appointed to act as guardian ad litem of his minor sons. Subsequently, on 9th August 1906, the decree-holder applied to have the decree amended. The order made on this application is not on the record, but as the decree has not been altered, we may take it that the application for amendment was rejected. It is clear, upon this statement of the fact, that no guardian ad litem was ever appointed in respect of the two infants, and they are consequently in the same position as if they had never been made parties to the suit: Narsingh Narain v. Sheikh Jahi Mistry . 1912 12 IC 414.. It follows accordingly that the decree-holder-purchaser has not acquired the right, title and interest of the infants in the mortgaged properties. This position, indeed, has not been seriously contested on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. But it has been strenuously contended that the Court should investigate in the present suit, whether the mortgage was executed under circumstances which might make it binding upon these two infants, and if the Court should decide in favour of the mortgagee, a decree for possession might be made in his favour, with liberty to the infants to redeem.
2. We are of opinion that this matter should not be determined in the present litigation. The question of the true character of the mortgage was not raised in the Court below and there has been no investigation by the Subordinate Judge as to the circumstances under which the mortgage was executed. The result, therefore, is that, in so far as these two infants are concerned, it must be declared that the plaintiff has not acquired their shares in the disputed property. In so far as the fifth defendant is concerned, his case stands on a different footing. The Subordinate Judge has held that he was born after the institution of the mortgage suit and before the mortgage sale took place. From the evidence as to the time of his birth placed before us, it is clear that neither party has correctly stated the age of the fifth defendant. We are not prepared, however, to dissent from the finding of the Subordinate Judge upon this part of the case.
3. But it is plain that even if it be assumed that he was born before the mortgage suit was instituted, the omission to make him a party will not give him the advantage which he claims. There is nothing to show that the mortgagee was aware of his existence. On the other hand, the very fact that the mortgagee joined his two brothers as parties to the suit, indicates that if the mortgagee had been aware of his existence; he would have equally made him a party to the suit. We must take it then, that the mortgagee had no knowledge of the existence of defendant 5. In these circumstances, on the authority of the decision of the Judicial Committee in the cases of Kishen Parshad v. Har Narain Singh . 1911 33 All 272 and Sheo Shankar Ram v. Jaddo Kunwar . AIR 1914 PC 136, it must be held that is interest was sufficiently represented by his father and has passed to the purchaser at the auction-sale: Raghoram v. Rajani Kanta. A.O.D No. 231 of 1911 decided on 17th August 1914.
4. The result is that this appeal is allowed in so far as defendants 3 and 4 are concerned and dismissed in respect of defendant 5. The share decreed to the plaintiff will be reduced by 1/12th in respect of estate No. 18423 and by 1/18th in respect of estates No. 8398 and 8559 each. The fractions mentioned have reference to the entire sixteen annas of the estate taken as the unit. Defendants 3 and 4 are entitled to their costs of this, appeal. We assess the hearing fee at five gold mohurs. They are also entitled to their costs in the Court below. As the costs of defendants 3, 4 and 5 were assessed in a lump sum, the successful defendants will be entitled to two-thirds of the amount stated in the decree of the Subordinate Judge.
V.B/R.K
5. Appeal partly allowed.
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