G. Narayanaswamy Naidu Garu v. Kamuri Ramayya

1. The facts of this case are not in dispute. The suit is one for damages against defendant for having cultivated the plaintiff's land without permission. It was instituted on 30th June 1908. The Estates Land Act came into force only on 1st July 1908. It is contended by Mr. Nagabushanam who appeared for the plaintiff, that under the new Act the claim ought to be laid in the Revenue Court. It is also clear that prior to the Act, the civil Courts had jurisdiction to entertain this suit. The question for consideration is whether the fact that the trial of the suit had to be commenced after the new Act came into force, takes the case from the jurisdiction of the civil Courts. We are clearly of opinion that it does not. It is now well established that plaintiff's remedy in a suit should ordinarily be restricted to the cause of action with which be comes into Court. The events that transpire since will not enable him either to add to his reliefs nor will they cut down his rights. It follows from this that jurisdiction in respect of his remedy is in the forum which was competent to grant the appropriate reliefs at the time of the institution of the suit. As was pointed out by Lord Watson in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Young v. Adams(1): “It does not seem to me very probable that the legislature should intend to extinguish, by means of retrospective enactment, rights and interests which might have already vested.” Erle, C.J, in Midland Ry. Co. v. Pye(2) and Cockburn, C.J, in Queen v. Ipswich Union(3) have laid-down the same principle. In a very recent case decided by the Calcutta High Court, Rai Charan Mandul v. Biswanath Mandul(4) Mookerjee, J., points out that a suit is to be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed at the date of its commencement. Reference may also be made to Govinda v. Perumdevi(5) and Ramanadan Chetty v. Pulikutti Servai(6). We therefore hold that the civil Courts which had jurisdiction to entertain the suit must try it in all its stages.

2. One other argument should be noticed.

3. When the civil Court originally returned the plaint on 21st August 1908, the plaintiff filed it on the 24th in the Munsif's Court on its original side. That officer held that he had no jurisdiction and returned the plaint. Against this order an appeal was preferred to the Subordinate Judge. The appellate Court decided on 31st March 1909 that the Munsif had jurisdiction and directed him to take the case on his file. The Munsif again came to the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction. We are surprised at this attitude of the Munsif. If the parties do not choose to question the order of 31st March 1909, it was the duty of the Munsif to obey it. It would strike at the root of judicial efficiency, if the Court of first instance takes upon itself the responsibility of criticizing the judgment of the Court to which it is subordinate, when the parties are willing to abide by it. We are of opinion that the Munsif was bound by the order of the appellate Court passed on 31st March 1909 and that it was not open to him to go behind it.

4. For the above, reasons we reverse the orders of the Court below and direct the Munsif to re-take the case on his file and to dispose of it according to law. Respondents will pay petitioner's costs of these petitions in this Court.

S.N/R.K

5. Order set aside;

6. Case remanded.