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Rajkumari Debi v. Mukundalal Bandopadhyaya
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Three brothers — Chandra, Gopi and Surja — owned two properties referred to as the Dacca property and the Dewali property. The properties were mortgaged in 1885. In September 1886 Chandra by his will bequeathed his one-third share of the Dacca property to his daughter Rajkumari (Defendant No. 1). In December 1888 the three brothers executed a mortgage in favour of Harendra for about Rs. 4,000, and an earlier mortgage (of 1885) was paid off from that advance. Chandra later died and his will was proved.
In 1903 the mortgagee Harendra sued on his mortgage against the Plaintiff, Defendant No. 2 (Surja) and Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 (representatives of the other brothers). Defendant No. 1 (Rajkumari), who had received Chandra's one-third share under the will, was not made a party to that suit. Before that suit the Plaintiff and the Defendants had paid Rs. 3,019 to the mortgagee; the mortgagee brought his suit after giving credit for that sum. A preliminary decree in the mortgage suit was passed on 23 June 1903.
On 22 February 1904 the Plaintiff and Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 paid another sum of about Rs. 3,000. On 9 May 1908 an order absolute for sale of the mortgaged properties was passed; one-third of the Dewali property (belonging to Defendant No. 2) was sold in execution and purchased by the mortgagee for Rs. 744, credited towards his decree. The mortgagee then put up the whole Dacca property and two-thirds of Dewali for sale. To prevent sale, the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 4 deposited about Rs. 3,018 in Court on 23 March 1909, whereupon the decree was satisfied.
The present suit was instituted on 7 October 1915 by the Plaintiff to recover sums he had paid in excess of his share, seeking contribution from Defendant No. 1 proportionate to her share in the Dacca property. The trial court held that the claim relating to the first payment (Rs. 3,019) was barred by limitation but allowed contribution for the later two payments, applying Art. 132 of the Limitation Act and awarding interest at 12%. On appeal that decree was varied only by reducing interest to 7½%. Defendant No. 1 appealed to the present Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the payments made by the Plaintiff and co-defendants were voluntary (such that contribution should not be ordered).
- Whether the Plaintiff acquired any charge (or other enforceable security) over the share of Defendant No. 1 by making payments to the mortgagee.
- Whether the Plaintiff's suit for contribution is barred by limitation — specifically, whether the period for enforcing any charge acquired by a redeeming co-mortgagor runs from the date of the redemption or from the date applicable to the original mortgagee (i.e., the original mortgage date).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Defendant No. 1)
- The payments by the Plaintiff and others were voluntary and therefore not recoverable as contribution.
- The Plaintiff did not acquire any charge over Defendant No. 1's one-third share in the Dacca property when he made payments to the mortgagee.
- The suit is barred by limitation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Unreported case noted in Mitra's Law of Limitation (Pontifix, J.) | Describes a co-mortgagor who redeems the entire mortgage as “standing in the shoes of the mortgagee.” | Used as early authority supporting the view that a redeeming co-mortgagor is subrogated to the mortgagee's rights. |
| Pancham Singh v. Ali Ahmed | Adopts the view that a co-mortgagor redeeming the mortgage stands in the mortgagee's shoes. | Cited as a similar authority supporting subrogation of a redeeming co-mortgagor to the mortgagee's rights. |
| Nura Bibi v. Jagat Narain (Allahabad High Court) | Applying equitable principles (and secs. 95 & 100 of the Transfer of Property Act), held that an owner of a portion redeemed by a co-mortgagor has a right to redeem that portion; such a suit is in the nature of redemption and falls under Art. 148 of the Limitation Act. | Relied upon as authority that certain suits between co-mortgagors concerning redemption may be characterised as redemption suits falling under Art. 148. |
| Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali (Full Bench) | Held that limitation applicable to a suit by a co-mortgagor redeeming is Art. 148 and that time runs from the date of the original mortgage rather than the date of redemption. | Quoted at length and treated as important authority for the proposition that limitation relates back to the date of the original mortgage. |
| Har Prosad v. Raghunandan Prasad | Held that a mortgagor who pays off the whole mortgage debt on a co-mortgagor's share is subrogated and acquires priority over a subsequent mortgagee; equitable principle of subrogation applies. | Used to show that a co-mortgagor discharging prior mortgage may obtain the rights (including priority) of the original mortgagee by subrogation. |
| Digambar Das v. Harendra Narain | Held that a joint mortgagor who pays the joint debt is placed in the position of the mortgagee vis-à-vis co-mortgagors, though substitution is not identical for all purposes and equitable considerations govern the extent of subrogation. | Adduced as supporting authority for subrogation while noting limits to the equivalence of positions in all respects. |
| Vasudeb v. Balaji | Considered whether a suit by a mortgagor to recover his share from a redeemer falls under Art. 148; observed that under the Transfer of Property Act a redeeming co-mortgagor has a charge (not a mortgage), so he may not be a "mortgagee" within Art. 148. | Cited as representing the contrary view that the redeeming co-mortgagor's right may be treated as a charge (under the Transfer of Property Act) rather than a mortgage, which has implications for applicable limitation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court framed the pivotal legal question as whether a co-mortgagor who redeems the mortgage should be treated (for limitation purposes and rights) as an assignee of the original mortgagee's security (i.e., stepping into the mortgagee's shoes by subrogation) or as a person who acquires, for the first time on redemption, a fresh charge on the co-mortgagors' shares.
The Court reviewed competing lines of authority. Several decisions (including the unreported Pontifix, J. note, Pancham Singh, Nura Bibi, Ashfaq Ahmad, Har Prosad and Digambar Das) were cited as supporting the proposition that a redeeming co-mortgagor is subrogated to the mortgagee's rights and should be treated as an assignee of the original security. In particular, the Full Bench decision in Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali was relied on for the proposition that limitation runs from the date of the original mortgage (not from the date of redemption).
The Court also acknowledged contrary reasoning, notably in Vasudeb v. Balaji, which emphasized that under the Transfer of Property Act a redeeming co-mortgagor has a "charge" (as per secs. 95 and 100) rather than a mortgage, and hence may not fit within the concept of a mortgagee for purposes such as Art. 148 of the Limitation Act. The Court examined the language of sec. 95 and sec. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act and commentary in Ghose's Law of Mortgage which discuss the tension between describing the redeeming co-mortgagor's right as a "charge" and the equitable principle of subrogation that would give him all the incidents of the mortgagee's security.
Balancing these authorities and considerations of principle and equity — including the practical consequences (hardship) that would follow either way — the Court concluded, "on principle, and having regard to the weight of authority," that a co-mortgagor redeeming a mortgage is to be treated as an assignee of the original security. Consequently, the period of limitation for enforcing the right is the same as that within which the original mortgagee could have brought a suit on the mortgage.
Applying that principle to the facts, the Court noted the due date of the original mortgage was 13 September 1891. The payments that the Plaintiff sought contribution for were made on 22 February 1904 and 23 March 1909; the present suit was brought on 7 October 1915. Because the limitation period applicable to the claim runs from the date applicable to the original mortgage, the suit was held to be barred by limitation (being more than 12 years after the original mortgage due date). The Court therefore did not decide the remaining contentions.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; SUIT DISMISSED
Direct holding:
- The Court held that a co-mortgagor who redeems the mortgage is to be treated, in effect, as an assignee of the original security (subrogated to the mortgagee's rights).
- Accordingly, the period of limitation for enforcing the redeeming co-mortgagor's right is the same period within which the original mortgagee could have enforced the mortgage (i.e., limitation runs from the date applicable to the original mortgage).
- Applying that principle to the present facts, the Plaintiff's suit (filed 7 October 1915) was barred by limitation and therefore dismissed.
- The Court directed that each party bear its own costs in all Courts.
Broader implications (as reflected in the opinion):
- The decision endorses the view that subrogation places a redeeming co-mortgagor in the position of the original mortgagee for purposes of enforcement and limitation; this aligns with a line of authority emphasising equitable subrogation over a formalistic distinction between "charge" and "mortgage".
- The Court acknowledged competing authority that treats the right as a "charge" under the Transfer of Property Act, but preferred the weight of authority favouring subrogation; this affirms that limitation for such enforcement suits will ordinarily relate back to the original mortgage date rather than the date of redemption.
- The opinion recognizes potential practical hardship for a co-mortgagor-redeemer (who might be obliged to sue within the same period as an unredeemed mortgagee), but holds that adopting the contrary rule would produce other inequities; on balance, the subrogation approach was selected.
Disposition: Appeal allowed; suit dismissed; each party to bear its own costs.
The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
This appeal arises out of a suit for contribution under the following circumstances:—
Three brothers, Chandra, Gopi and Surja, were the owners of an estate comprising two properties which may conveniently be referred to as the Dacca property and the Dewali property. They mortgaged the properties in 1885. One of the brothers, Chandra, in September 1886 by his Will bequeathed his one-third share of the Dacca property to his daughter Rajkumari, the Defendant No. 1. In December 1888 the three brothers executed a mortgage in favour of Harendra for Rs. 4,000 and odd, out of which the previous mortgage (of 1885) was paid off. Chandra then died, and his Will was proved and probate granted. In 1903 the mortgagee Harendra brought a suit upon his mortgage against the Plaintiff, the Defendant No. 2 Surja, and Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 who are the representatives of the other brothers. The Defendant No. 1, who had obtained the one-third share in the Dacca property under the Will of her father, was not made a party to the suit. It appears that the Plaintiff and the Defendants paid a sum of Rs. 3,019 to the mortgagee before the suit was brought upon the mortgage, and the mortgagee brought his suit after giving credit for the said sum. A preliminary decree was passed in the mortgage suit on the 23rd June 1903. On the 22nd February 1904, the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 paid another sum of Rs. 3,000 to the mortgagee, and on the 9th May, 1908 order absolute for sale of the mortgaged properties was passed. An one-third share of the Dewali property (belonging to the Defendant No. 2) was then sold in execution of a money decree and was purchased for Rs. 744 by the mortgagee, which was credited by him in part satisfaction of his decree. The mortgagee accordingly put up the whole of the Dacca property and two-thirds of the Dewali property to sale, and to prevent the sale, the Plaintiff and the Defendant No. 4 on the 23rd March 1909 deposited in Court Rs. 3,018 and odd; and the decree was accordingly satisfied.
The present suit was instituted on the 7th October 1915 by the Plaintiff to recover the sum paid by him in excess of his share which was payable by the Defendant No. 1 proportionately to her share in the Dacca property. The Court of first instance held that the claim in respect of the first payment (Rs. 3,019) was barred by limitation, but that Plaintiff was entitled to contribution in respect of the last two payments and being of opinion that Art. 132 of the Limitation Act was applicable, decreed the claim in respect of the same, (the payments having been made within 12 years of the suit) together with interest thereon at 12 percent. On appeal that decree was varied only by reducing the interest to 7½ percent. The Defendant No. 1 has appealed to this Court.
Three contentions have been raised in this appeal; the first is that the payments were voluntary, secondly that the Plaintiff did not acquire any charge over the share of the Defendant No. 1, and thirdly that the suit was barred by limitation.
We will first deal with the question of limitation. The suit having been brought more than six years after the dates of payments, is barred whether Art. 60 or 99 or Art. 120 of the Limitation Act applies, and it would also be barred unless the charge can be enforced within twelve years of the dates of payment. Assuming therefore that the Plaintiff was entitled to contribution and had acquired a charge on the share of the Defendant No. 1 the question is whether the charge is to be enforced within the same period within which the mortgagee, supposing he had not been redeemed, could have sued as Plaintiff. The determination of the question depends upon whether a co-mortgagor redeeming the mortgaged property should be treated as an assignee of the original security, or as a person who acquires a fresh charge.
Now, if a co-mortgagor redeeming the entire mortgage is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee, his position would be that of an assignee of the mortgagee although he does not take a formal assignment of the mortgage. The position of a co-mortgagor redeeming a mortgage has been considered in several cases in connection with suits under Art. 148 of the Limitation Act. In an unreported case noted in Mitra's Law of Limitation, 1st Edn., at p. 162, Pontifix, J., spoke of the co-mortgagor who redeems the entire mortgage as “standing in the shoes of the mortgagee” in respect of such portion of the redeemed property as belongs to the other mortgagors. A similar view was taken by the Allahabad High Court in Pancham Singh v. Ali Ahmed . In the case of Nura Bibi v. Jagat Narain , the Allahabad High Court applying the equitable principle adopted in secs. 95 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, held that the owner of a portion of a mortgaged estate which has been redeemed by his co-mortgagor has the right to redeem such portion from his co-mortgagor, and a suit brought for the purpose would be in the nature of a suit for redemption, and fall under Art. 148 of the Limitation Act.
The above cases were followed by the Full Bench of that Court in Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali , where Edge, C.J, Straight and Mahmood, JJ., held that the limitation applicable to such a suit was that provided by Art. 148, that time ran not from the date of the redemption, but from the time when it would have run against the original mortgagee if he had been a Defendant, i.e, the date of the original mortgage. Straight, J., after referring to the case of Nura Bibi v. Jagat Narain and certain other cases, observed;—“Further, even before the Transfer of Property Act came into operation, I took the view that a co-mortgagor redeeming the whole mortgage stood in the shoes of the original mortgagee and was entitled to all the rights and the incidents connected with his estate. The principle that underlies that is, that he, having paid off the obligation to the creditor, is entitled to take advantage of all the incidents connected with the security as it stood in the hands of the mortgagee, or, in other words, he is entitled to all the rights and incidents connected with the mortgage as they were in the hands of the mortgagee at the time the redemption took place. Amongst others he cannot gay that a new mortgage transaction commenced from that particular date, but his position as mortgagee stands upon the same footing as it would have if the original mortgagee had assigned over to him by sale his mortgaged interest. Not only do I think that a co-mortgagor redeeming the whole mortgage stands in the position of the original mortgagee, but that time runs from the date of the original mortgage.”…. “But I cannot myself agree with the view that the limitation runs from the date when the redemption took place. It must, in my opinion, relate back to the date of the original mortgage, and upon this I have explained my reasons in the case of Nura Bibi v. Jagat Narain .” In Har Prosad v. Raghunandan Prasad , it was held that the charge obtained by a mortgagor discharging the whole mortgage debt on his co-mortgagor's share of the mortgaged property, takes priority over a subsequent mortgage created by the other co-mortgagors. Sir John Stanley, C.J, observed:— “No doubt the charge came into existence when the mortgage was paid off, but as the person who acquired the charge had discharged a prior mortgage, he acquired, we think, priority over an intermediate puisne mortgagee. There can be no doubt that a subsequent mortgagee or the purchaser of the equity of redemption who pays off a prior mortgage, acquires, on equitable grounds, priority over a puisne mortgagee. On the principle of subrogation he is substituted for the prior mortgagee and acquires the rights of such mortgagee and the benefit of the securities held by him. We fail to see any difference in principle between the case of a subsequent mortgagee or purchaser of the equity of redemption and that of a co-mortgagor who satisfies a prior mortgage. Both classes of persons relieve another and his property of the liability which attaches to them and the same principles of justice and equity which apply to the one class equally apply to the other. The rule of subrogation is founded on equitable principles, and if a subsequent mortgagee or purchaser is subrogated to the rights of the prior mortgagee whose debt he discharges, a co-mortgagor is equally subrogated.” Now the co-sharer redeeming a mortgage can be entitled to priority over a subsequent mortgagee, only if he steps into the shoes of the original mortgagee, and not if he has merely a charge on the property which comes into existence for the first time on the day he redeems the original mortgage.
In Digambar Das v. Harendra Narain , Mookerjee and Teunon, JJ., also held that if one of several joint mortgagors in, order to protect his interest pays the joint debt, he is placed in the position of the mortgagee in relation to his co-mortgagors, to the extent of their shares of the debt; although they held that the substitution of the new creditor in place of the original one does not place the former precisely in the position of the latter for all purposes, and that the extent to which subrogation would be carried in any particular case must be governed by equitable considerations. The question now before us, viz., that of limitation, had not to be considered. On the other hand, in the case of Vasudeb v. Balaji , Jenkins, C.J, in considering the question whether a suit by one of the mortgagors to recover his share against his co-mortgagor who had redeemed the mortgage from the mortgagee, comes within Art. 148 of the Limitation Act, observed:— “Were the Transfer of Property Act applicable, his position would be defined by sec. 95 of that Act, under which a redeeming co-mortgagor has a charge on the share of each of the other co-mortgagors. Then in sec. 100 it is provided that where immoveable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property. We see, therefore, from this that in the Transfer of Property Act a distinction is drawn between a charge and a mortgage, and that what a redeeming co-mortgagor has is a charge and not a mortgage. From this it would follow that he would not be a mortgagee within the meaning of Art. 148. No doubt this reasoning proceeds on the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act which does not govern this case; but, in our opinion, the Act merely gives legislative expression to what was law apart from it, so that even without the Act our conclusion would be the same.”
No doubt sec. 95 of the Transfer of Property Act speaks of a charge, and sec. 100 says that “where immoveable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage the latter person is said to have a charge on the property.” But if the co-mortgagor who redeems stands in the shoes of the mortgagee, and is vested with all the rights and liabilities of the mortgagee in relation to his mortgagors, the transaction (although by fiction of law) may be treated as amounting to a mortgage. If it is a mere “charge” as distinguished from a mortgage, it would not be enforceable against a bonâ fide purchaser for value, which could hardly have been intended by the legislature. It might be, as pointed out in Ghose's Law of Mortgage, 4th Edition, Vol. II, at p. 831, that “the draftsman found the word ‘charge’ in the old Sadar Dewani judgment to which the Law Commissioners refer, where it was probably used as meaning the same thing as a mortgage. This also seems to be a probable explanation of the use of the word ‘expenses’ which ordinarily would not include the mortgage-debt itself.”
In Ghose's Law of Mortgage, Vol. I, at p. 348, it is slated: “Strictly speaking, therefore, when one of several mortgagors redeems a mortgage, he is entitled to be treated as an assignee of the security which he may enforce in the usual way for the purpose of re-imbursing himself. It is true sec. 95 of the Transfer of Property Act allows only a charge on the interests of the co-mortgagors. But whatever may be the true construction of this unskilfully drawn and clumsily worded section, I venture to think it does not impose any new burden, and the charge would have the same priority as the security which has been redeemed on the principle that the benefit of subrogation may be claimed by any person who redeems a mortgage on an estate in which he is only partially interested.” And again at p. 372 the learned author says: “This brings me straight to a question which has hardly received the attention it deserves, namely, the period within which such charge may be enforced under the Limitation Act. It has, however, been elaborately debated in a number of cases in America, and though they betray a singular divergence of views, the better opinion seems to be that a person who is bound only to pay a part of the mortgage debt, acquires on redemption two distinct rights. He may sue simply for re-imbursement, if the Defendant is personally liable, within the period prescribed for such suits by the statutes of limitation. He may also sue to enforce the right of the mortgagee to follow the mortgaged property, but in such case he would occupy the same position as the mortgagee, supposing he had not been redeemed, and was the Plaintiff in the suit. The period of limitation will not be either longer or shorter.”
It may, in some cases, be hard upon the mortgagor redeeming a mortgage and seeking contribution against his co-mortgagor, if the suit is to be brought within the period within which the mortgagee could have brought a suit to enforce his mortgage. The mortgagee may bring the suit on his, mortgage, on the last day of the period of limitation, and in any case the payment of the mortgage decree may have to be made at a time when the period, within which the suit on the mortgage could have been brought, had already expired. But if a contrary view were adopted it would be equally hard in cases coming under Art. 148 of the Limitation Act, where the period for redemption by the co-mortgagor would be cut down to 12 years from the date of the payment, instead of 60 years from the date when the original mortgage money became due.
The question is not free from difficulty, but we think on principle, and having regard to the weight of authority, that the position of the co-mortgagor redeeming a mortgage is that of an assignee of the original security, and that the period of limitation is the same as that within which the original mortgagee could have brought his suit on his mortgagee had be not been redeemed.
In the present case the due date of the mortgage was the 13th September 1891, and the suit on the mortgage itself was brought in 1903. The payments were made on the 22nd February 1904, and the 23rd March 1909. The present suit was brought on the 7th October 1915, i.e, more than six years after the dates of the payment and 12 years after the due date of the original mortgage. It is therefore barred by limitation. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider the other questions in the case. The appeal must accordingly be allowed and the suit dismissed: but we direct that each party do bear its own costs in all Courts.
J.N.R
Appeal allowed.
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