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Kunhi Kutti Ali v. Muhammad Haji

Madras High Court
Sep 8, 1920
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a representative suit instituted by a junior member of a Marumakkathayam tarwad seeking:

  • a declaration that a pattadharam (dated 18 July 1922) granted by defendant 1 (the then karnavan) is not valid or binding on the plaintiff, his tarwad or the suit properties; and
  • delivery of the suit properties to the plaintiff on behalf of the tarwad.

The tarwad consisted of two branches descended from sisters Aliathe and Birambi. The plaintiff belonged to the Aliathe branch and claimed to be the senior anandhravan (a claim challenged). The defendants belonged to the Birambi branch; defendant 1 was the karnavan who granted the pattadharam which leased lands (a kuzhikanam lease for twelve years).

The plaintiff alleged that defendant 1 granted the pattadharam to members of his own branch to enrich them at the expense of the plaintiff and to the prejudice of the tarwad (primarily by fixing an unduly low rent and by appropriating the benefit of improvements). The Subordinate Court found that defendant 1 did not exercise his powers bona fide but acted to enrich members of his own tavazhi and therefore granted the relief sought by the plaintiff. Defendants 2 and 3 appealed to this Court against that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff properly obtained leave to sue in a representative capacity and whether the question of leave could be taken on appeal where the plaint contains an unchallenged recital of leave obtained.
  2. Whether a junior member of a tarwad can maintain a suit to set aside a pattadharam (a kuzhikanam lease for twelve years) executed by the karnavan who is still in office, or whether such acts being within ordinary management are not subject to attack except in exceptional circumstances.
  3. If the grant of the pattadharam is an ordinary act of management by the karnavan, whether the appropriate remedy (rather than setting aside the lease) is to seek removal of the karnavan from management when he is guilty of gross misconduct.
  4. Whether the lower court correctly assessed evidence (including Commissioner reports and oral testimony) to conclude that the rent fixed under the pattadharam was inadequate and that the karnavan acted mala fide.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Defendants (including defendant 1 as second respondent)

  • That the suit is not maintainable because the plaintiff did not properly obtain leave to sue in a representative capacity.
  • That the grant of the pattadharam was an ordinary act of management by the karnavan within his legitimate powers and, therefore, a junior member cannot bring a suit to have it set aside while the karnavan remains in office.
  • That where a karnavan's ordinary management act is challenged, the proper remedy (if misconduct is proved) is removal of the karnavan rather than setting aside an individual lease.
  • Implicitly: that the evidence did not prove mala fides, collusion or such exceptional misconduct as would justify setting aside the pattadharam.

Plaintiff / 1st Respondent

  • That defendant 1 (the karnavan) granted the pattadharam to members of his own branch with the intention of defrauding the plaintiff and depriving him (and the tarwad) of the benefit of substantial improvements effected by the plaintiff.
  • That the pattadharam prejudices the tarwad because the rental fixed under it is far too low (i.e., inadequate), thereby harming tarwad interests.
  • The plaintiff also relied on alleged prior allocations of some suit lands for maintenance of his branch (made orally by a former karnavan) and on his own improvements (including a house) as relevant to the claim of prejudice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Abdulla Koya v. Eacheran Nair Held that although habitual improvident leasing by a karnavan could justify his removal, a particular lease should not be declared invalid merely because it is not beneficial to the tarwad; fettering the karnavan's discretion is undesirable. Used to support the proposition that a single lease (such as a 12-year kuzhi kanom) is ordinarily within the karnavan's management power and that removal (for persistent improvidence) is the appropriate remedy rather than setting aside individual leases in ordinary circumstances.
Kizhakkumbrath Moidin v. Koyambrath Murkothkandi Where a kanom was executed by a karnavan to pay off a tarwad debt, the court is not required to investigate with meticulous care whether the transaction was prudent or necessary. Relied on to show judicial deference to management acts of a karnavan where they appear, on their face, to be within management competence.
Unni v. Kunchi Amma Dealt with recovery of property improperly alienated by a karnavan under a kanom; the decisive point in that case related to limitation and the kanom had been executed by a previous karnavan who had been removed. Distinguished: the Court observed that the facts and limitation point in that case made it materially different from the present suit brought against a karnavan still in office.
Anantan v. Sankaran Held that junior members could maintain a suit for a declaration that a kanom was invalid and for recovery, but the specific facts involved delegation of management to a senior anandravan and urgency (time for filing almost expired) and failure of the karnavan to sue. Cited but distinguished: the Court noted that in Anantan the kanom was executed by a delegated manager (senior anandravan) and exceptional facts (including near expiry of limitation and karnavan's failure to sue) influenced the result.
V. K. Packi v. V. K. Muhammad Commented on Anantan and observed that the broad proposition that junior members can always sue when the karnavan fails to do so is contrary to prior and subsequent decisions; recognized exceptions where the karnavan has disabled himself from suing. Cited to temper Anantan's breadth and to reaffirm that junior members' rights to sue are generally limited and only arise in exceptional circumstances.
Vattavatta Nair v. Kenath Puthen Vittil Kuppasan Menon Allowed a suit by a senior anandravan to set aside a kanom that was a premature renewal of an earlier kanom; held such renewal not binding unless necessity or benefit to the tarwad is proved. Used as an example where renewal before expiry made the kanom vulnerable and where benefit/necessity to the tarwad must be proved.
Chowkaran Kunhi Pocker v. Chowkaran Malikaimal Valia Bappotty Junior member successfully sued to recover properties for which a kanom had been given; the kanom had been granted by a previous karnavan and plaintiff had permission to sue on behalf of members. Distinguished: relied on to show successful suits by juniors when the kanom was by a previous karnavan and where permission to sue had been granted.
Koppassa Menon v. Kalliani Ammal Senior anandravan sued to set aside a prematurely renewed kanom and lost because the renewal was held proper; the case does not deny the right to sue but shows merits-based defeat. Illustrative of situations where the right to sue exists but the factual merits determine outcome.
Ottaparakkal Thazhath Soopi v. Charichal Pallikkal Mariyomma Held that, except in very special circumstances (gross misconduct and collusion), junior members cannot sue for redemption of a kanom granted by their karnavan. Applied to underscore that only exceptional circumstances (e.g., gross misconduct/collusion) justify junior members bringing suits to set aside kanoms executed by a karnavan in office.
Bikutti v. Kalendan Held junior members could bring a suit for cancellation of a deed of gift, but this was in exceptional circumstances because the deed had been granted by the karnavan himself who could not maintain it. Provided an example of exceptional relief where the karnavan's own action rendered the deed vulnerable.
Kunhanod Hajee v. Kuttiath Hajee Indicated that a grossly improvident lease, resulting from a course of conduct where tarwad interests were persistently disregarded, is sufficient ground for removing the karnavan. Used to support the view that removal of the karnavan is the appropriate remedy for persistent misconduct rather than setting aside ordinary leases in isolation.
Chappan v. Raru Observed that tarwad property is vested in its members and, when the karnavan makes an alienation not binding on them, they can sue to recover possession; the cited case involved a mortgage. Noted as distinguishable because it concerned a mortgage rather than a simple lease; helpful for the proposition that members may sue to recover when an alienation is not binding but facts matter.
Manavadan v. Sridevi Jackson J.'s remarks that junior members' rights are confined to suing for maintenance, cancellation of transactions to the family's detriment, and for removal of the manager (karnavat/i); factual context involved allegations of fraud and misappropriation. Referred to as indicating the kinds of suits junior members may bring, but the Court treated those remarks as ancillary and to be read alongside the other authorities emphasizing the exceptional-nature rule.
Ambi v. Kunhi Kavamma Criticized the practice of issuing and relying upon multiple Commissioners who report on the same subject; Court disapproved such practice. Relied on to hold that the Subordinate Judge acted improperly in issuing two separate commissions on the same subject and in balancing their reports against each other instead of treating the earlier commission as superseded.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in clearly articulated steps, applying the authorities cited and the evidentiary record before it:

  1. Maintainability — leave to sue: The Court refused to permit the appellants to raise for the first time on appeal the contention that leave to sue in a representative capacity had not been properly obtained. It relied on the unchallenged recital in paragraph 14 of the plaint that such leave had been obtained and held that, in the absence of any written-statement challenge or issue on the point in the trial court, it must be presumed that the plaintiff was properly permitted to bring the suit as a representative one.
  2. Nature of the act — ordinary management vs. exceptional misconduct: On the substantive question, the Court accepted that on its face the pattadharam (a kuzhikanam lease for twelve years) was an ordinary act of management within the karnavan's competence. The Court reviewed a number of authorities and distilled the governing principle: junior members may, in exceptional circumstances (e.g., gross misconduct, collusion, habitual improvident conduct rendering the karnavan unfit), bring suits to challenge transactions by the karnavan, but ordinarily a single lease will not be set aside merely because it is not beneficial to the tarwad. Where persistent improvidence is proved, removal of the karnavan is an appropriate remedy.
  3. Precedent analysis and distinguishing cases: The Court examined cases cited by both sides and carefully distinguished those where successful suits were brought — often because the challenged alienation was by a previous karnavan, because the manager had been removed, because the management had been delegated to someone other than the karnavan, because the plaintiffs had specific permission to sue, or because exceptional facts (including limitation or the karnavan's disabling himself from suing) were present. The Court observed that it had not been shown any precedent where relief of the kind granted below (setting aside an ordinary twelve-year lease executed by a sitting karnavan) was awarded in a suit framed as this one.
  4. Evaluation of evidence on rent, yield and mala fides: Turning to the trial court's factual findings, the Court critically examined the evidence relied upon to conclude that the rent under Ex. XI was inadequate and that the karnavan acted mala fide:
    • The Court condemned the Subordinate Judge's practice of issuing two separate commissions on the same subject and balancing their reports against each other; it said the second commission should have superseded the first if the first was considered unsatisfactory, and that balancing two commissions was contrary to Order 26, Rule 10(3) CPC (and was disapproved in Ambi v. Kunhi Kavamma).
    • Both Commissioners' reports were found to be of no value because neither Commissioner arrived at an independent conclusion: each merely collected statements from others (tenants, neighbours, defendant 3), and the second Commissioner failed to reduce tenants' answers to writing.
    • Other oral evidence was sparse and inconclusive. The plaintiff's witnesses did not provide credible, specific evidence as to yields or proper rents; one important witness (Shanbogue) gave general observations and equivocal testimony about the effect of a newly opened bar on cropping; a credible witness (D.W.5) said the new bar caused deterioration of the property.
    • The Court identified inaccuracies in the Subordinate Judge's arithmetic and inferences (for example, misreading defendant 3's evidence as indicating a pre-Ex. XI rent of "not less than 1000 paras of paddy" when defendant 3 had not stated such a figure).
    • Allegations about previous oral grants of certain items for maintenance and about construction/occupation of a house were not satisfactorily proven; on the evidence available the matters were not decisive.
  5. Conclusion on merits and further evidentiary relief: Given the lack of compelling evidence of mala fides or of exceptional circumstances justifying setting aside an ordinary lease, and given the unreliability of the Commission reports and insufficiency of other evidence, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish a case warranting the extraordinary relief granted below. The Court also refused a suggestion to issue a further (third) commission, noting that the plaintiff had had ample opportunity to produce competent local evidence and had not done so.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED; the decree of the Subordinate Court is reversed and the suit is dismissed with costs to the defendants 1, 2 and 3 in this Court and in the court of first instance.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The plaintiff's claim to have the pattadharam of 18 July 1922 declared invalid and to obtain delivery of the suit properties was rejected.
  • The defendants (1, 2 and 3) succeed and are awarded costs in this Court and below.

Broader legal implications (as stated or necessarily reflected by the opinion):

  • The decision underscores the settled principle in the authorities that acts of ordinary management by a karnavan — such as granting a limited lease — are generally not susceptible to being set aside at the suit of junior members unless exceptional circumstances (gross misconduct, collusion, habitual improvidence) are shown.
  • The opinion reiterates that removal of a karnavan is the appropriate remedy where there is a sustained course of management detrimental to the tarwad, rather than the routine setting aside of individual management acts.
  • The Court disapproved the procedural practice of issuing and balancing multiple Commissioners' reports on the same subject, reaffirming the admonition in Ambi v. Kunhi Kavamma and criticizing the Subordinate Judge's reliance on two conflicting commissioner reports that were not independently founded.
  • No novel precedent was announced; the Court explicitly noted that no case had been shown to it in which relief of the kind granted below had been given in circumstances like those of this suit.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "V. C. S. Appeal allowed."

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JUDGMENT

The suit under appeal has been brought as a representative suit by a junior member of a Marumakkathayam Tarwad for a declaration that the pattadharam granted on 18th July 1922 by defendant 1 who is the present karnavan, is not valid and binding on the plaintiff, his tarwad or the suit properties and for delivery of the suit properties to the plaintiff on behalf of the tarwad. The tarwad consists of two branches, the descendants of two women, Aliathe and Birambi, who were sisters. The defendants are all of the branch of Birambi while the plaintiff belongs to that of Aliathe and claims to be the senior anandhravan, though this claim is challenged. The plaintiff asserts that the suit pattadharam has been granted by defendant 1 to two members of his own branch with a view to defrauding the plaintiff of the benefit of the great improvements which he has effected to the suit lands, while it prejudices the tarwad, on whose behalf the suit is brought, in that the amount of rental fixed under it is far too low. The Court below has found that the suit pattadharam was not executed by defendant 1 in the bona fide exercise of his powers of management as karnavan of the tarwad, but for the purpose of enriching members of his own tavazhi at the sacrifice of the interests of the entire tarwad, and it has, therefore, granted a decree to the plaintiff as prayed for. Against this decision defendants 2 and 3 are appealing.

It has been urged for the appellants and for defendant 1 as second respondent that the suit is not maintainable on two grounds. The former of these grounds is that leave has not been properly obtained by the plaintiff to sue in a representative capacity. This, however, is a point that we cannot allow to be taken. The plaintiff definitely states in paragraph 14 of his plaint that he has obtained the leave of the court to sue on behalf of the tarwad and this recital has not been challenged in any written statement, nor was any issue taken as to it. We have to presume in these circumstances that there was he irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court and that the plaintiff was properly permitted to bring the suit as a representative one.

The other ground is more important. It is that the grant of the pattadharam by defendant 1 was an ordinary act of management by the karnavan, in the exercise of his legitimate powers; and that consequently no suit can be brought by a junior member of the tarwad to have it set aside but that if the view of the learned Subordinate Judge in this particular instance as to the nature of the act of the karnavan that is in question is correct then the proper remedy was to bring a suit for the karnavan's removal. There is no dispute as to the correctness of the view expressed in the lower court's judgment that, on the face of it, the suit pattadharam, which grants a kuzhikanam lease for a period of twelve years, is an ordinary act of management within the karnavan's competence. Stress is laid on Abdulla Koya v. Eacheran Nair in which a Bench of this court has remarked, in the matter of a suit as to a Melcharth, granted, as it was contended, improperly, by a karnavan: “No doubt if a karnavan habitually grants improvident leases and thereby renders himself unable to fulfil his obligations towards the other members of the tarwad, this would be a ground for removing him from the karnavasthanam, but we do not think that a particular lease can be declared to be invalid as against the lessee merely because it is not proved to be beneficial to the tarwad. To fetter a karnavan's discretion in this way would be to render his whole management of the tarwad liable to criticism and reversal at any moment.” Again, in Kizhakkumbrath Moidin v. Koyambrath Murkothkandi (2), it has been held by a Bench of this court that where a kanom is executed by a karnavan of a Malabar tarwad for the purpose of paying off a debt binding on the tarwad, the court is not required to investigate with meticulous care whether the transaction was a prudent one or whether there was necessity for entering into such a transaction for the purpose of raising the necessary amount.” On the other hand a number of decisions have been quoted to us to show that in the case at any rate of kanoms that have been improperly granted, the Court will interfere, and that at the instance of junior members of a tarwad. One of these is Unni v. Kunchi Amma (3), which dealt with a suit brought to recover property that had been improperly alienated by a karnavan under a kanom. The point, however, for decision in that case was one of limitation while the kanom had been executed by a previous karnavan who had been removed from office, and the suit was brought by two persons who claimed to have been appointed managers by a decree of Court. In Anantan v. Sankaran (4), it was held that junior members of a tarwad could maintain a suit against their karnavan, senior anandravan and others for a declaration that a kanom was invalid and for recovery of properties. In that case, however, the kanom was granted not by the karnavan but by the senior anandravan to whom the karnavan had delegated the management under a karar, and emphasis was laid on the fact that the time for filing the suit had almost expired and that the karnavan, who was joined as a defendant had failed to sue. It is to be observed that in V. K. Packi v. V. K. Muhammad it has been remarked that this decision in so far as it suggests the broad proposition that in all circumstances the junior members will be entitled to sue when the karnavan has failed to do so seems to be opposed to all the prior and subsequent decisions, but that on the actual facts the case came within the accepted principle that the anandravan may be permitted to sue when the karnavan has disabled himself from bringing such a suit, that is when the circumstances are exceptional. Vattavatta Nair v. Kenath Puthen Vittil Kuppasan Menon , deals with a suit brought by a senior anandravan for having set aside a kanom granted by the karnavan in office who was defendant 2. The suit was allowed on the principle that a kanom granted, as had been in that suit, by way of renewal of an earlier kanom the term of which had not expired, was not binding on the tarwad except on proof of necessity or benefit to the tarwad which proof was lacking. Chowkaran Kunhi Pocker v. Chowkaran Malikaimal Valia Bappotty , is a case in which a junior member of a tarwad successfully sued to recover properties for which a kanom had been given, but it was a case in which the kanom had been granted by a previous karnavan. The plaintiff in that case had obtained permission to sue on behalf of all the members. In Koppassa Menon v. Kalliani Ammal , the senior anandravan brought a suit to set aside a kanom that had been renewed prematurely by the karnavan in office who was a defendant, and lost the suit not because he had no right to maintain it but because it was held that in the circumstances the renewal was proper.

It would thus appear that a junior member of a tarwad may bring a suit to set aside even a kanom that has been executed by a karnavan who is still in office; but that he can only do so in exceptional circumstances is shown by the decision in Ottaparakkal Thazhath Soopi v. Charichal Pallikkal Mariyomma (5) There it was held that, except in very special circumstances, where the karnavan is proved to be guilty of gross misconduct and collusion, it is not competent to the junior members of the tarwad to sue for redemption of a kanom granted by their karnavan.

Bikutti v. Kalendan deals with a case of a deed of gift and holds that junior members of a tarwad could bring a suit for the cancellation of such a deed, but this was in exceptional circumstances in that the karnavan, who was defendant 1, could not maintain the deed in that it had been granted by himself.

Kunhanod Hajee v. Kuttiath Hajee indicates what is an appropriate remedy in the event of a grossly improper lease being granted by the karnavan in office, what it finds being that the grant of a very improvident lease, following on a course of conduct pursued for some years, in which the interests of the tarwad were persistently disregarded, is sufficient ground for removing the karnavan from the management of the tarwad property. That this is an appropriate remedy is also indicated in Abdulla Koya v. Eacharan Nair to which reference has been made in paragraph 3 above. No case has been shown to us in which a suit has been brought successfully by a junior member of a tarwad against his karnavan, praying for such relief as has been granted to the plaintiff in respect of such an ordinary act of management as the granting of a twelve year kuzhi kanom lease. Our attention has been called to Chappan v. Raru in which it has been remarked that the property of a tarwad is vested in its members, who, when the karnavan makes an alienation that is not binding on them, can sue to recover possession and may do so on their title without even asking for the alienation to be set aside, it being for the alienee to prove that the alienation was binding on them. That, however, was a case in which the alienation by the karnavan was by way of a mortgage. The case for the plaintiff 1st respondent in this connection receives most assistance from some remarks of Jackson J., in Manavadan v. Sridevi . In his judgment in that case the learned Judge has stated that the rights of the junior members of a tarwad are confined to suing for maintenance, to suing for cancellation of any transaction entered into by the karnavan to the detriment of the family and to suing for his removal. The junior; members sued in that case for the removal of the karnavati on allegations of fraud and misappropriation of family funds and it was held that they could not as a matter of right, when suing for such relief, ask for the karnavati to render general accounts. As a matter of fact the karnavati a woman, ceased in the course of the suit to occupy her position as such because by the rule of family succession she moved to a higher sphere. In such circumstances it was found that the plaintiffs had no cause of action. They were entitled to sue for a decree removing defendant 1 from management and to contend that, if she gave no account by way of rebutter of their proved allegations, such a decree should be granted and defendant 1 should be removed. As, however, the removal was already an accomplished fact such a contention would be idle. The judgment then goes on to remark that the plaintiffs might have brought their suit in a different way, that each proved defalcation might be set aside and defendant 1 held liable. These remarks, however, as to the kind of suits which junior members of a tarwad are entitled to bring, are by the way and have no bearing on the point which the case actually decided, and, in any case, they have to be considered along with what has been laid down in the other decisions to which reference has been made already. These make it clear that when the alienation which is attacked as fraudulent, improper or to the detriment of the tarwad does not amount to more than a lease, a suit to set it aside can only be brought in exceptional circumstances. It is unnecessary in this particular case to say more than this, apart from reiterating that no precedent has been shown to us for such a relief as has been granted in this suit, in a suit framed as this has been, as we are satisfied that in this case no circumstances have been shown to exist which would justify its being regarded as one in which the plaintiff is entitled to exceptional treatment. The plaintiff asserts that the suit pattadharam is to the prejudice of the members of the tarwad generally and the main consideration from this point of view is whether the rent fixed under Ex. XI is a reasonable one or is one, as the court below has found it to be that is quite inadequate. The plaintiff asserts that a good many of the suit items have been assigned for the maintenance of his branch by a former karnavan and that the assignment has been continued by subsequent karnavans, but the learned Subordinate Judge does not give any clear finding as to there having, been such a grant for maintenance nor is the point one of great importance. Even too, if some of these suit lands have been granted to plaintiff's branch for maintenance, their being leased out under the suit document will matter little as long as a proper, rental has been obtained for them which can be used for the purpose of such maintenance. We may, however, remark that; the evidence as to there having been such a grant is not entirely convincing. Plaintiff himself as P.W 2 shows that the grant was not for the whole branch to which he belongs but only to his particular sub-tavazhi, and he admits that there was no such grant to the other two sub-tavazhis of his branch and that the grant which he sets up was made orally only and was not reduced to writing. Further there is the matter of a house. This house does not stand on one of the items which is said to have been allotted for maintenance but on what was a waste plot. On this plot there is a house called Kadinhamoola which the plaintiff says is a tarwad house occupied by himself and the four daughters of his deceased sister. He declares that there was formerly a small house and that he has had this house built, while on the defence side there is evidence that this house was not built by him and that he does not himself live in it. This however, is again a matter of no very great importance as it is clear even from the evidence of plaintiff himself, that there are other places of residence available for his branch and he has not stated that no provision can be made, or is being made, by the karnavan for his residence in the event of his leaving this house. According to D.W 3 there are three other houses available for his branch.

We come, then, to the question of rental in which connection the learned Subordinate Judge has taken largely into consideration the reports of two Commissioners, both of whom have reported on the probable yield of the suit lands. We have, in the first place to remark that the lower court should not have issued two separate commissions to deal with one and the same subject and to treat the reports of both the Commissioners as evidence in the case. The exact circumstances in which he came to issue the second commission do not appear from the record that has been placed before us, but the second commission should not have been issued, unless it was thought that the report of the 1st Commissioner was not satisfactory in which case the earlier commission should have been wiped out altogether and attention should have been paid only to what was reported by the second Commissioner. Instead of this the learned Subordinate Judge has balanced the report of one Commissioner against that of the other and has expressed a preference for the views of the first Commissioner. In taking this course he has acted with great impropriety and contrary to what is contemplated by O. 26, R. 10 (3) of the Civil Procedure Code. Though the practice which he has adopted may be one that is prevalent in Malabar it is one that should no longer be continued as has been pointed out in clear terms by this Court in Ambi v. Kunhi Kavamma .

Apart, too, from this consideration, the report of neither Commissioner deserves any attention as neither of them has come to any independent conclusion of his own, but each of them has only made a collection of statements of what he had learned on enquiry from others. The first Commissioner made his enquiries as to the rent from some tenants who happened to be present and as to the yield from some neighbours. The second Commissioner got most of his information from defendant 3, though he also questioned the tenants, but without reducing their answers to writing. In these circumstances their reports are not of the slightest value.

The remaining evidence is by no moans sufficient to make out a case for the plaintiff. There is only one witness on his side apart from himself. This man is the Shanbogue who gives no assistance as to what the yield or proper rent should be, but makes some general observations as to the nature of the lands and as to the effect of the opening of a new bar some fifteen years or so ago. The lands lie near the sea as well as to a river which surrounds them on three sides, and the bar has been opened as a new outlet for the river into the sea. The Shanbogue says that within the last 20 years three crops have been raised on certain of the fields, without specifying which these fields are, and that before the opening of the bar only one crop was being raised on these fields as they used to be flooded with water during the rainy season, but at the same time he is rather lukewarm as to the benefit that has been derived from the bar, as he says that after the opening of the new bar there is not so much damage to the first crop as before, and that there is no special damage to second and third crops by reason of its opening, thereby implying that there still may be some damage, caused to all these crops. On the other hand D. W. 5 who is a Taluk Board Member and against whose credibility nothing has been advanced, says that the new bar has caused the suit property to deteriorate. It cannot be assumed, as has been done by the learned Subordinate Judge, that the opening of the bar must have been beneficial because it was a work undertaken by Government. On this oral evidence, then, it is impossible to say that the suit lands have become specially valuable during the last 15 years or so, or that they have become considerably more valuable than they were 15 years ago, even if he had, as we have not, information as to their yield or rental at that earlier period.

In one of his calculations the learned Subordinate Judge has been guilty of an inaccuracy. He has said that according to defendant 3 (D.W 7) the tenants paid a rent of not less than 1000 paras of paddy before the date of the suit document Ex. XI. But defendant 3 has said nothing of the kind. What he said was that prior to Ex. XI the total waram was below 1000 paras of paddy and the total pattam was below Rs. 700, without stating the actual figures in either case. The learned Subordinate Judge is, therefore, wrong in adding to 1000 paras the 500 paras by which the paddy that must have been admittedly raised since Ex. XI and saying that the rent at the time of the second Commissioner's inspection was at last 1500 paras.

The rent actually reserved under Ex. XI is 1500 paras of paddy and Rs. 800 cash. In considering whether the rental in grain is proper the lower court has gone into another calculation in paragraph 41 of its judgment, but here again we cannot follow it. As part of its basis of calculation it accepts what the Shanbogue says as to one acre being equivalent to 5 pothipads without saying anything as to why it prefers this evidence to that of D.W 1 who says that an acre is divided into 2 pothipads. As a further basis of its calculation it takes the yield of one item as found by the second Commissioner whose report we have found to be worthy of no consideration. This calculation then, is not of the slightest use.

Nor can we accede to the suggestion of the learned counsel for the plaintiff 1st respondent that, as the defendants stated no objection to what the first Commissioner found as to the yield from certain items, the excess as between what he found to be their yield and what has been found to be their yield by the second Commissioner, should be added to the total yield as found by the second Commissioner and the result taken as the proper yield from the suit lands. We cannot consider the figures of either Commissioner in any way.

Some lease deeds have been filed for the defence to show that the rent fixed under Ex. XI is not excessive. Some of these the lower Court has brushed aside and others it has not considered at all. We do not however, propose to discuss these documents as they would only require consideration if the plaintiff had made out an exceptional case of gross betrayal of the interests of the tarwad as a whole. This, however, he has quite failed to do.

A suggestion has been made that a third Commission should be ordered to be issued but it is one that does not appeal to us. This is really not a case in which a commission such as was ordered was necessary. What was required was evidence as to the yield of the lands from persons with local knowledge of the conditions. The plaintiff has had ample opportunity of letting in such evidence and has not availed himself of it. There is no reason for giving him any further chance of adducing any kind of evidence.

The result, then is that the appeal succeeds. The decree of the lower court is reversed and the suit is dismissed with costs to the defendants 1, 2 and 3, in this court and in the court of first instance.

V. C. S. Appeal allowed.