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Midnapore Zemindari Company Limited v. Kumar Nares Narain Roy

Calcutta High Court
Jan 17, 1921
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Analytical Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises from a complex history of alluvial accretions and successive land settlements involving several mauzhas and multiple proprietary interests (the Putia Raj family, the Choudhuris of Mathurapur and later purchasers such as Messrs Watson & Co. and their successors). Originally settled in 1840, the estates were repeatedly altered by erosion and accretion. By various settlements (notably numbers 814, 815 and later 3514) lands were allocated, reallocated and sometimes recorded as in the possession of Watson & Co. despite the Putia Raj's claims.

Litigation began in 1891 (Title Suits No. 5 and 6 of 1891) in which the Putia Raj sought declarations of proprietary rights, settlement from the Collector, recovery of possession and mesne profits. After a series of decrees and appeals, this Court decided in favour of the Putia Raj on May 30, 1899 (decree signed 20 March 1900). Execution steps were taken in 1902–1903; possession was purportedly delivered by the Commissioner in those years. Subsequent settlement and recording processes (including collectoral orders and kabuliats executed by purchasers/successors to Watson & Co.) gave rise to further disputes about whether the Putia Raj had obtained actual possession free from the defendants’ alleged jote (tenancy) rights. A fresh suit was filed by the Putia Raj on 8 August 1912 raising these controversies (partition, declaration that the defendant company has no jote right, ejectment and mesne profits). The learned Subordinate Judge decreed in favour of the plaintiff; on appeal the principal matters before this Court were limitation defences, estoppel by kabuliat, and (central) whether the defendants' claim of jote-right was res judicata by the earlier High Court decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present suit is barred by limitation — specifically under Articles 14 and 142 (and related provisions) of the Limitation Act — or otherwise time-barred.
  2. Whether the question of the defendants' claimed jote (tenancy) rights is res judicata by reason of the earlier High Court decision in Title Suit No. 6 of 1891.
  3. If there is no bar and no res judicata, whether the defendant company in fact possesses a valid tenancy (jote or occupancy) right in respect of the lands in suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant Company (Appellants) — principal contentions

  • The suit is barred under Article 14 of the Limitation Act (one-year period to set aside an act or order of a government officer) so the plaintiff cannot challenge the Collector's order recorded by Mr. Ezechiel (dated 20 September 1909).
  • The suit is barred under Article 142 of the Limitation Act because the plaintiffs have not been in possession within twelve years of the suit (i.e., the alleged dispossession occurred more than 12 years earlier).
  • The issue of the defendants' tenancy (jote) rights is res judicata by reason of the earlier High Court decree; the remedy, if any, is execution of that decree rather than a fresh suit.
  • The plaintiff is estopped by covenant in the kabuliat(s) executed by members of the Putia Raj (notably the kabuliat dated 9 February 1912) from challenging recorded rights of raiyats/tenants; the kabuliat contains undertakings to respect recorded rights made at settlement.
  • On the merits (if reached), the defendants assert title/possession and claim tenancy/right to jote in large parts of the disputed lands (they had relied on adverse possession and settler-records in earlier proceedings).

Plaintiff (Putia Raj and co-plaintiffs) — principal contentions

  • The Collector's order of 20 September 1909 (Mr. Ezechiel) is an "award" within the meaning of Article 45 of the Limitation Act (and under the Bengal Land Revenue Settlement Regulation 1822 and related provisions), so the three-year period applies and the suit (filed 8 August 1912) is within time.
  • The High Court's earlier decree (Title Suit No. 6 of 1891) granted not only proprietary relief (settlement) but also possession free of the defendants' alleged jote rights; the decree was executed in 1902–1903 (commissioner proceedings, demarcation and symbolic delivery of possession), so Article 142 does not bar the present suit.
  • The kabuliat(s) executed by the plaintiff were signed under protest and with a reserved right to question the correctness of settlement entries in civil court; accordingly, the plaintiff is not estopped from litigating the defendants' alleged tenancy rights.
  • On res judicata, the plaintiff relies on the earlier High Court decision which, the plaintiff contends, negatived the alleged jote rights of the defendants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Kadir v. Hamdu Miah Support for the proposition that Collector's decisions under the Bengal settlement regulations may be treated as judicial awards (i.e., fall within the concept of “award” for limitation purposes). The Court relied on this decision to hold that Mr. Ezechiel’s order was an "award" under Article 45 (and view of Sections 93 and 33 of the Regulation) so that the three-year limitation period applied and the suit was not barred on that basis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the contested questions in sequence, applying statutory limitation rules, execution facts, estoppel principles and the doctrine of res judicata as shown in the opinion.

Limitation under Article 14 v. Article 45:

  • The appellants argued Article 14 (one year to set aside an officer’s order) applied to Mr. Ezechiel's collectoral order (20 September 1909). The Court examined whether that order was instead an "award" within Article 45, which provides three years to contest awards under the Bengal Land Revenue Settlement Regulation 1822.
  • The Court observed that Section 93 of the Regulation treats Collector's decisions as judicial awards and Section 33 contemplates awards via arbitration. Relying on the cited precedent (Abdul Kadir v. Hamdu Miah), the Court held that Mr. Ezechiel's order was an award within Article 45. Consequently the plaintiff's suit, filed within three years, was not barred as an attempt to set aside a collectoral "award."
  • The Court also noted that the absence of a formal prayer to set aside the Collector's order did not defeat the plaintiff’s case, invoking Section 31 (as relied upon in the opinion) and concluding the suit was not time-barred on this ground.

Limitation under Article 142 (possession within 12 years):

  • The appellants argued the plaintiffs had not been in possession within twelve years of the suit (Article 142). The Court analysed what the High Court decree gave and whether those decrees had been executed to effect actual possession free of the defendants’ jote rights.
  • The Court found that execution proceedings (commissioner appointed) led to demarcation and symbolic delivery of possession of the relevant shares in 1902 and 1903 (bamboo-sticks, beating of drums, proclamations in Bengali and reference to the High Court’s decree), and that those steps were sufficient to show the decree-holders had taken all steps necessary to enforce their proprietary rights under the decree.
  • Given this execution and the circumstances (including the co-proprietary character of the holdings and the practical limits on ejecting a co-proprietor without partition), the Court concluded the plaintiffs had taken necessary steps to obtain the possession the decree afforded and that the suit was not barred by Article 142.

Estoppel by Kabuliat (covenant argument):

  • The appellants claimed that the kabuliat(s) (including the kabuliat of 9 February 1912) contained covenants obliging the plaintiff to respect recorded tenants' rights and thus estopped the plaintiff from challenging the Company's tenancy rights.
  • The Court recognised the general rule that a covenant in a settlement (kabuliat) binds the covenantor to recognise recorded rights even if wrongly recorded. However, it emphasised that the plaintiff had executed the kabuliat under protest and with a reserved right to question the correctness of the record in the Civil Court (permission to appeal against the record was refused but the kabuliat was executed subject to civil challenge).
  • On those facts, the Court held that the estoppel contention could not be sustained — the plaintiffs were not estopped from litigating the correctness of recorded entries as to the Company's alleged tenancy rights.

Res Judicata analysis (the pivotal issue):

  • The Court carefully reviewed the pleadings and judgments in Title Suit No. 6 of 1891. In that earlier litigation the plaintiffs' pleader had made a statement limiting the claim to a right to settlement (and apparently not to immediate khas possession), leading the learned Subordinate Judge to refrain from deciding the tenancy issue. Watson & Co. (the then defendants) appealed and specifically argued that the Subordinate Judge ought to have decided whether they had jotedari rights; their appeal grounds expressly requested such a decision.
  • This Court (on the earlier appeal) did consider and decide the point: Chief Justice Maclean and Banerjee, J. both dealt with the contention that defendants were entitled to jotedari rights, and the judgment concluded there was no jote right. Although the drawn-up decree did not expressly state the decision on jote rights in the operative paragraph, the judgment's discussion negatived the alleged jote rights and the decree granted possession consistent with that finding.
  • The present Court reasoned that because the earlier High Court had been moved to decide the tenancy point by the then defendants and had in fact considered and negatived the alleged jote rights, the issue was necessarily and properly decided in that prior suit. Consequently the matter as to the defendants' jote right is res judicata.
  • Given this finding of res judicata, the Court did not need to (and accordingly did not) go on to decide afresh whether the appellants had established the tenancy rights in the present suit on the merits.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court affirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the appeal. In the words of the opinion: the decree of the Subordinate Judge "should be affirmed. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed."

Implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The Subordinate Judge's decree — declaring that the defendant Company have no jote right in the lands decreed in Title Suit No. 6 of 1891, ordering partition and directing that the plaintiff obtain khas possession according to the demarcation — is upheld.
  • Because the Court found the issue of the defendants' jote right to be res judicata by the earlier High Court decision, the defendant company's attempt to relitigate that matter in the present suit is barred.
  • The plaintiff's remedies for partition and khas possession (as ordered by the Subordinate Judge) remain enforceable; the appeal is dismissed with costs in favour of the decree-holder.

Note: The opinion does not purport to set out a new principle of law beyond applying established doctrines (limitation rules, estoppel by covenant in settlement documents, and res judicata). The Court's decision rests on the application of those doctrines to the facts and prior judgments recited in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. The char to which this appeal relates has had a chequered history. The land was resumed by Government. In 1828, and the first settlement was made in 1840. It was found to comprise an area of 36,652 bighas, and out of this area 23,498 bighas were accretions to seven mouzhas Khairbola, Baliadoba, Ghaipara, Bahadlar, Majhdlar, Kolidar, and Nayadiar, while the remainder formed accretions to twelve mouzahs, of which it is necessary to mention only two Ramkrishtapur and Poolberia. The Rajahs owned the entire Interest in the last twelve monzahs, while in the other seven mouzahs they owned half, and the Choudhuris of Mathurapur owned the other half. When the settlement was made, there were two mahals formed, Nos. 814 and 815. No. 814 consisted of half the land of the seven mouzahs in which the Patia Raj and the Mathurapur Chandhuris were joint owners plus the and that had accreted to the twelve mouzah owned exclusively by the Baj, and No. 815 of the other half of the seven mouzahs. The ??? was made with the Putia Raj No. 814 and wish the Chaudhuris of No. 815.

2. When that settlement expired in 1860, it was found that thirteen out of the nineteen mouzahs had been washed away and that the area remaining to No. 814 was 6989 bighas, and to No. 815, 4880 bighas. In 1870 the area had been further reduced; the area was found to be only 459 bighas, and half of this was settled as No. 814 with Raj, and the other half as No. 815 with the Chaudhuris.

3. In 1879 proceedings for a fresh settlement were begun. The area was then found to be 4021 bighas, afterwards raised to 6763 bighas, forming part of mouzahs Majhdiar, Koidiar and Baliadoba. Again this area was settled, half as No. 814 and half as No. 815, and as Messrs Watson & Co. the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant Company had bought two annas of the proprietary interest in No. 814 from the Raj, the settlement was made with them and the Raj jointly.

4. Shortly after the settlement had been made it was found that the river had thrown up a very large new area, which on measurement proved to be as much as 18750 bighas. This area was formed into a now estate, numbered 3514, and was settled with Messrs Watson & Co., as the persons in actual occupation of the land, although it was recognised at the time, as it is conceded now, that the area actually formed parts of the original estates, Nos. 814 and 815. Claims to settlement?era made by the Raj and by the Chaudhuris, but they were rejected on the ground that Watson & Co., were actually in possession. This settlement was for a term of seven years, to expire on the same date as the settlement of Nos. 814 and 815. In 1891 the Chaudhuris and the Rajas instituted suits in the Court of the Subordinate Judge about this estate No. 3514 The suits were numbered 5 and 6 respectively of 1891. As the present appeal does not touch the Chaudhuris estate, it is enough to say that their suit followed the same lines as that of the Rajas. The Raja's plaintiff gave a brief history to the chur, and then not out that the revenue authorities had come to a wrong conclusion in holding that they were not in possession of an area of 13020 bighas; it asserted that the Rajas were in possession until November 1989 when Watson & Co., on the strength of the decision by the Board of Revenue entered Into possession. The area was made up of half the land found to belong to mouzahs Koidiar, Majhdiar, Baliadoba, Chalnpara, Khairbola with the area given up to Watsons by the Collector (namely 1558 bighas odd), and the whole of the land found to belong to Ramkrisnapur and Poolberia, the two villages among the twelva, of which the names were given at the beginning of this judgment. A remark was added to the plaint that Watsons owned a share of 3 A. 13 G. 1 K. 1 Kr. in the Touzi No. 814.

5. The cause of action was given as November 1889 when the plaintiffs said that Watsons entered into unlawful possession.

6. The prayers in the plaint ware (a) for a declaration that the land in suit formed part of touzi No. 814; (b) for a declaration that as the land was in possession of the plaintiffs until the time of dispossession, the plaintiffs were entitled to get settlement from the Collector; (c) for a decree directing that the plaintiffs should be put in possession; (d) for mesne profits from the date of dispossession until the date of recovery of possession.

7. The suit was decreed in plaintiffs' favour in May 1894: on appeal it was remanded for the Secretary of State to be made a party, and it was again decreed in August 1897. The defendants again appealed, and his Court decided the appeal in favour of the plaintiff on May 30, 1899, but its decree was not signed until March 20, 1900.

8. Meanwhile the term of the settlement made in 1887 had coma to an end. The reduced estates, Nos. 814 and 815 ware settled as before for ten years. A similar term was proposed for No. 3514, but as the civil suits ware pending the Commissioner ordered that it should be settled from year to year and this was done until 1900, when in consequence of mora land being added, a fresh settlement was made again with Watson & Co., to expire in 1909, on the same date as the settlements Nos. 814 and 815. In the Collector's proceedings reference is made to the pending suits, and the settlement was “on condition that if the results of the civil suits be known at any time during the period the terms of the settlement will at once be modified accordingly.” As this settlement was made ten months after the decision in this Court it seems unfortunate that the tenor of the judgment was not made known to the Collector.

9. It appears that no steps were taken by the Putia Raj to enforce the decree until February 3, 1902, when execution proceedings were instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. As the result of those proceedings a Commissioner was appointed, and he went to the chur and purported to deliver possession to the decree-holders in August 1902 and September 1903. The decree-holders did not deposit the fees required for a commissioner to determine mesne profits.

10. In November 1903 the Raj filed a petition before the Collector about the settlement of Touzi No. 3514; the petition alludes to notices requiring the Raj to take settlement, and to a previous petition asking for the settlement of No. 3514 to be made along with Touzi No. 814 “according to the final decree of the Honourable High Court” and objecting to the tenants and officers of Watson & Co., being entered at lower sums than those actually paid. This petition was ordered to be filed.

11. It is not clear what happened after this but in August 1904 proceedings began before the Collector for the amalgamation of those parts of Touzi No. 3514 which had been declared by the High Court to belong to Touzi Nos. 814 and 815 with their parent estates, and eventually in April 1906, the Board of Revenue ordered that half of the areas found in the Mouzahs of Majhdiar, Koldiar, Chainpara, Baliadoba and Kairtola, and the entire areas found in Ramkrishtapur and Poolbsira should be amalgamated with Touzi No. 814. In May 1905 a Kabuliat was executed in respect of Touzi No. 814 by Mr. Gregson, who had then bought Watson & Co.'s interest; and by various members of the Putia Raj family. Similar Habuliats were executed on July 22, 1910, and February, 9, 1912. It may be noted here that in these two kabuliats the Midnapnr Zamindari Company appears in place of Gregson. At the time of executing the second of these kabuliats the plaintiff put in a petition saying that he did not ware his right to question an order passed by the Collector as to Watson's jote rights is the lands.

12. The order complained of was passed in 1909. In 1908 proceedings were begun for a new settlement; while they were in progress settlements from year to year were made, and the kabuliat of July 22, 1910, just mentioned relates to one of those settlements. In the course of those proceedings an application was filed behalf of the present plaintiff ??? was then in the Court of Wards. The application was aimed at an entry in the settlement record to the effect that Midnapur Zamindari Company had jote rights is the land. The Assistant Settlement Officer quoted a passage from the judgment of this Court in the suit of 1891, and said that in view of that decision he could not show the Company as having jote rights, but as the Company was in possession he must show it as in possession. The Company then appealed to the Collector of Nadia, and the Collector, Mr. Ezeohlel held that the Assistant Settlement Officer had misapplied the judgment of this Court and directed that the Company should be entered as tenants with occupancy rights. The manager of Ward's Estate wanted to appeal, but the Collector of Rajshahi to whom he was subordinate did not allow him to do so. Mr. Ezechiel's order was dated September 20, 1909.

13. After the conclusion of the settlement, a kabuliat was executed by the Company, and the plaintiff and other members of the Raj family for a barm expiring on March 31, 1920, as already mentioned.

14. On August 8, 1912, the plaintiff filed the suit from which this appeal arises. He alleges that the High Court decree was executed and possession given. Bub to use the language of the plaint “the plaintiffs have not in reality gob possession of the decreed lands in proper order even in spite of their having obtained possession aforesaid and the defendant Company have illegally and without any right been skill holding possession of the whole of the decreed lands on the ground of their having obtained the property by transfer from Messrs Watson & Co.” It then refers to the recording by the Collector of the alleged the right of the defendants after and notwithstanding the decision of this Court which was held to be applicable only to the stabs of affairs existing when it was given. It accordingly asks that it may be declared that the defendant Company have not the to be right alleged by them, for partition and for a decree giving him direct possession of the share to which he is entitled on partition free of the alleged jote right after ejectment of the defendant Company. The latter does not now contest the suit in so far as it is one for partition of the proprietary right in the lands suit. The Company asserts a tenancy ??? and denies that the plaintiff is entitled to any snob declaration or possession of the land free of such alleged tenancy as is claimed.

15. The learned Judge has decreed the suit declaring that the defendant Company have no jote right in the lands decreed in the Title Suit No. 6 of 1891, ordering a partition and decreeing that the plaintiff do get khas possession in the lands given by demarcation according to the said partition.

16. A large number of issues were framed including one objecting to the suit on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action. An objection was raised before us to the frame of the suit which was an objection to the joinder of causes of action namely, whether the plaintiff could agitate this matter of the tenancy in a suit for partition. It was argued that there cannot be a decision in this suit of rights, subordinate to that of the co-sharers. But we held that this point could not now be gone into, as such an objection should have been taken in the Court of first instance and if not taken, must be deemed to be waived. It is true that an objection was taken to misjoinder of parties and causes of action but as appears from the judgment it was of a different character from that now urged.

17. The main argument in the appeal may be divided into three heads: (a) objections in bar of the suit by the defendant Company; (b) the Question whether this claim of jote right is or is not res judicata by reason of the previous High Court decision; (c) if there is no bar to the hearing of the suit and if there is no res judicata have or have not the defendant Company the tenancy right which they claim?

18. We may say at once that it is not necessary to consider this last issue because the conclusion at which we have arrived is that the bars to the suit which the defendant Company set up are not established and the contention of the respondents that the issue of tenancy right is res judicata is made out.

19. The arguments in bar of the suit are (1) that the suit is barred both under the provisions of articles 14 and 142 of the Limitation Act; (2) that it the issue as to tenancy is res judicata, as the respondents allege, their remedy is not by suit but by execution of the decree which they say finally determined the question; (3) that the plaintiff is estopped by covenant from disputing the appellants' alleged tenancy right. It is then urged (4) that the question of tenancy right is not res judicata as found by the learned Judge and that, that being so both by title and possession the appellants are entitled to the tenancy which they claim.

20. On the question whether the appeal is barred under the provisions of article 14 of the Limitation Act the facts are as follows:—

Mr. Ezechiel's order on the appeal preferred by the Midnapur Zamindari Co., against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was passed on September 20, 1909. The present suit was filed on August 8, 1912.

21. Mr. Ezechiel said in his order that the Company had been in possession of the land since 1887; that it had been recorded in the proceedings of 1895 as having rights of occupancy, and that in any case the judgment in a suit of 1891 could not affect rights acquired since 1891.

22. Argument has proceeded on the footing that this order of the Collector's must be set aside if the plaintiff is to obtain anything more than his bare proprietary right, which he has obtained by being admitted to settlement.

23. For the appellants it is urged that article 14 of the Limitation Act applies to the case, that article runs “To set aside any act or order of an officer of Government in his official capacity, not herein otherwise expressly provided for” and allows a period of one year. If this argument is correct, the suit is barred by limitation so far at least as it seeks to set aside that order of the Collector. The plaintiff however urges that in article 45 there is express provision for a suit of this nature. It runs “To contest an award under any of the following Regulations of the Bengal Code; the Bengal Land Revenue Settlement Regulation 1822.” It gives a period of three years. It is conceded that the order was passed under Regulation VII of 1822, and that the suit was instituted within three years from the date of the order. For even if this case falls under the Bengal Alluvial Lands Settlement Act 31 of 1858 that Act extends the Regulation to all settlement under the Act. The question therefore is whether Mr. Ezechiel's order is an award within the meaning of article 45. We think it is, Section 93 of the Regulation provides that Collector's decisions are judicial awards and under Section 33 awards may be made in arbitration. The decision in Abdul Kadir v. Hamdu Miah (1) seems in point. We hold that the suit is not barred on the grounds stated. In our opinion also the suit is not bad because there is no formal prayer to set aside the order of the Collector, Section 31 being relied on.

24. It is next argued that the plaintiffs are barred by Article 142 of the Limitation Act as it is alleged that they have not been in possession within 12 years of suit. The decree of this Court which was drawn up after reference to the Surveyor General's Office, gave the Putia Raj relief of three kinds viz., a declaration that they were entitled to certain shares in seven villages; a declaration that they were entitled to recover possession of the lands to which they had been declared entitled; and a declaration that they were entitled to recover mesne profits from November 1889 to the date on which they recovered possession.

25. To take the last declaration first, as already pointed out, the decree-holders in their execution proceedings did not deposit the fees which they were called on to deposit for an enquiry into mesne profits, and the proceedings were dismissed for default on September 21, 1904. It has not been shown that any further step was taken in this direction.

26. Regarding the other declarations a commissioner was appointed at the instance of the decree-holder: The commissioner's proceedings occupied a large part of the years 1902 and 1903. Altar demarcating the land he delivered possession of the shares in the five mouzahs (Kaldiar, Majhdiar, Baliadoba, Chainpara, and Khairtola), that is (a), (b) and (c) of this Court's decree on July 26, 1902, and of the shares in Poolberia and Ramkrishtapur, that is (d) and (e) of the decree on June 20, 1903. In each case, delivery of possession was effected “by the usual mode of sticking bamboos and the beaming of drums, and by speaking aloud in Bengali in the presence of number of persons of the vicinity, the berms of the Honourable High Court's decree and of the parwana of this Court”.

27. As already mentioned it is not what steps were taken by the Collect but the petition filed by the Patia Raj ??? November 17, 1903 refers to notices being served on the Raj to take settlement of Mahal No. 3514.

28. There can be no doubt therefore that before the end of 1903 the decree-holders had taken all steps necessary to enforce their rights under the decree so far as the dense related to their proprietary right.

29. The question is whether they did all that they could, and ought to have done to get direct and actual possession of the land free from the presence of the Company as occupancy-raiyats and whether in fact they got such possession. For if so then the suit which was instituted on the 24th September, 1912, is within the period of 12 years.

30. On this and other questions it is important to enquire what it was that the respondent gob on the execution of the High Court decree. This involves the question what it was that the High Court gave them. For reasons stated on the issue of res judicata we are of opinion that the High Court decreed not only the right to get a settlement but also a right to possession of the land free of the alleged jote rights of the appellants which were expressly set up in that suit and negatived by this Court. Then did the respondents execute this decree? It is admitted that execution proceedings as abovemantiosed were taken. It is not denied that the decree so far as it declared the proprietary right of the respondents was executed and that so far as such co-proprietary right was concerned that what the decree-holder the was effective. But it is said that even if High Court's decree gave relief in respect of the claim for jote right made by the appellants (which is denied) that the respondents did not execute the decree so as to displace the appellants' possession as jobedar. This question is certainly open ??? argument but the following facts induce ??? to reject the appellants' contentions of this head. For we have (in our view ??? the High Court decree) the facts that this Court declared the rights of the plaintiff in that suit free of the alleged joteda right; proceedings in execution were take (except for mesne profits which were dis continued) with, we must presume, be object of gabbing what the decree gave and all that could be done was ?????? the appellants could not have been ??? evicted from the property, they were co-proprietors and entitled to joint possession with the respondents. The plaintiff could only get rid of the Midnapur Company absolutely by a suit for partition giving him exclusive and direct possession; without that no actual possession could be given because it was a case of an undivided share. The question is not free from difficulty owing to the fact that the proprietary and the alleged jots rights were vested in the same person. But on the whole we see no sufficient reason for reversing the judgment of the learned Judge on this point. He has held that the respondents obtained such possession in 1902, 1903 as is an answer to the contention that they have not been in possession within 12 years of suit. We therefore hold that the salt is not barred under Article 142.

31. It was then objected that if it be the fact that fail possession was gob in 1902 and 1903 in the execution, then, since the appellants are admittedly in possession there is no allegation in the plaint of dispossession. It is true that the sanse of action is stated as arising on the date of execution and not immediately thereafter. Bub the objection bakes too narrow a view of the matter. The substantial question is that already stated namely whether the respondents executed the decree to the full extent of the relief which (we hold) it gave them and got such possession as was possible under the circumstances. Having regard to the above conclusions it is only necessary to here not the appellant's argument that it in 1902 and 1903 the respondents did not get such possession as they are asking for tin the suit then the respondents should have proceeded by execution and that as three years have gone by they are barred. On our findings this does not arise.

32. A bar is next alleged to this suit in so far that, whilst it is denied that there is any res judicata here, it is contended that if there is res judicata then the plaintiffs cannot sue but must proceed not by suit but by execution of the High Court decree, and that this execution is barred. We, have deal with this member of execution in its place. As regards the Immediate, point it is sufficient to say that the relief claimed in the present and earlier suit is not the same is so far as the suit is for partition. Then the plaint in effect asks that the plaintiffs' share on partition should be made over to them free of the defendants' alleged jote right. Since the last High Court suit a cloud was thrown on the plaintiffs' bible in this respect by the subsequent recognition of the appellants' alleged jote rights which they have themselves also affirmed. We are of opinion that if there is res judicata, there is no such bar as the appellants contend. If there is no res judicata, the appellants claim to be entitled to jote right by the same title under which they have proprietary tight. They claim to have jota right in the whole of estate No. 814 as it existed before its disappearance. It is admitted that the appellants had jote rights in 814 but whether the state of the appellants' evidence is such (having regard to the finding of reformation) that there is no res judicata, they have established their alleged jote right need not be considered having regard to car finding upon the issue of res judicata.

33. It is next argued on behalf of the appellant Company that the plaintiff is estopped from challenging the status of the company as tenants on the ground that the second term in the kabuliat which he executed on February, 9, 1912—the kabuliat relating to the berm that expired last March—he undertook to respect the recorded rights of raiyats and others.

34. So far as the suit claims partition there is no dispute, for it is not now contended that there can be no partition of a temporarily settled estate as between co-ordinate holders. But so far as the suit calls in question the defendant company's alleged tenancy right it is contended for the appellants that the respondent is estopped by the covenant in his kabuliat executed on the 9th February, 1912, from disputing the rights of the defendant Company tenants, which ware in fact recorded, the Company having been entared as tenants with a right of occupancy. The ordinary rule in the case of such a covenant is that the person entering into it is bound to recognise rights so recorded even if such rights were incorrectly recorded and had no real existence. The appellants do not rely on the covenant as conferring a benefit on them as third parties but as a question of title that is certain lands were settled on them on certain conditions: and what was given to the respondents was a right which was determined by the kabuliat in a particular way namely the right to hold the lands in settlement subject to the recorded rights of tenants. It is however to be observed that in this case the respondents wished to appeal against the record but sanction to appeal was refused and the kabuliat was executed under protest subject to the right to question the correctness of the record in the Civil Court. We are unable to hold that in these circumstances the respondents are estopped as contended.

35. We now pass to the issue of res judicata the facts as to which are as follows:—

In the plaint in Title Suit 6 of 1891, the plaintiffs i.e, members of the Putia Raj family, alleged that the revenue authorities had been wrong in holding that Watson & Co., and not the plaintiffs, were in possession of the land that was being settled in 1887, and that Watson & Co. dispossessed them by virtue of the order of the Board of Revenue that the settlement was to be with Watson & Co. They admitted that Watson & Co., owned an undivided share of 3 annas odd with themselves in the mahal. Their prayers were as follows:—

(a) for a declaration that the land appertained to touzi No. 814;

(b) for a declaration that they were entitled to get settlement from the Collector;

(c) for recovery of possession;

(d) for mesne profits' provisionally estimated at Rs. 1692.

36. The defence was (a) that some of the land in suit viz., 1558 B. 1 K. 10 Ch. bad accreted to their estates chur Hogulberia and Niamatpur, as held by the revenue authorities, (b) that the remainder had accreted to their estates, Udainagar, Temadia and others; (c) that they had acquired a right by adverse possession, and (d) that the plaintiffs could not in any event obtain khas possession. Other pleas were raised, but we are not Concerned with them.

37. It was found that the plaintiffs' claim was barred as to the 1558-1-10 by adverse possession for twelve years, but that the remainder of the land was an accretion to mahal No. 814 and that the defendants had not been in adverse possession for the statutory period. These findings of the first Court were upheld on appeal.

38. Regarding khas possession an issue was framed as follows:—“Are the plaintiffs entitled to recover khas possession ??? land in suit? Have the defendants ??? jotedari right in the land”? But on ??? 23, 1893, the plaintiffs' pleader made a statement in these words “The plaintiffs claim only a right to the settlement of the disputed land and no other right.” On the same day the defendants' pleader made a statement and asserted that in any event khas possession could not be given because the defendants had jotedari right in the land. As a result of the statement made by plaintiffs' pleader the learned Judge did not decide the issue. He said “The plaintiffs do not ask for khas possession. Hence it is not necessary to enquire whether the defendants have a jotedari right in the lands.”

39. Watson & Co. preferred an appeal, and raised the question that the Judge had left open, in the eighteenth and nineteenth paragraphs of their memorandum. It will be seen from these grounds that the appellants who now contend that the decision of the issue was unnecessary expressly Invited this Court to decide it. The 18th of their grounds of appeal ran as follows:—For that the learned Sub-Judge having held that it was not necessary to enquire whether the appellants have Jotedari right in the land in suit, has erred in giving a decree for possession of the same to the plaintiffs. The 19th ground was equally explicit and ran “For that it should have been held that the appellants are entitled to hold most of the disputed lands in jote rights and that the plaintiffs have no right to evict them from the same without determining their tenancy in the manner prescribed by law. The point was pressed in argument before this Court. But it was held that there was no evidence in support of the contention.

40. The decree that was drawn up in this Court made no express mention of the decision on this point in terms: it affirmed the first Court's decree with modifications intended to remove uncertainties.

41. In the present suit the plaintiff says that the decree was to the effect that the Raj should get possession after ejectment of Watson & Co., that Watson & Co., were ejected and possession delivered. The statement continues. “But the plaintiff has not in reality got possession of the decreed lands in proper order even in spite of their having obtained possession in manner aforesaid, and the defendant company have ??? and without any right been still ??? possession of the whole of the ??? lands.”

42. The prayers are as follows:—(a) for a declaration that the Company has not, never has had and never can have jote rights in the lands ocvered by the decree in Title Suit No. 6 of 1891; (b) for a partition of those lands and of the land in Touzi No. 814 as it was in 1891; (c) for possession of the separate share of 5-a. 16-g. 2-k. 2-kr., to be allotted to the plaintiff by the ejectment of the defendant company; and (d) for an account and mesne profits & c.

43. There is no dispute about the identity of the land now in suit with the land of the previous suit.

44. Now had the matter rested where the Subordinate Judge left it, no such question as we have to discuss would have arisen. Whether the suit might and should have been properly determined without entering into the question of the tenancy right as the plaintiff apparently wished to do we need not now enquire. For in fact (as we have seen) the present appellants directly insisted am the point being tried and alleged that the first Court should have done so. It was contended before us that whatever the appellants might have done in this respect the issue in fact was not a necessary or proper one to be tried in that suit and that it is open to us to say so. But we must see first whether this Court adjudged otherwise, that is whether this Court having the question before its mind decided that the issue did arise. If so that decision would be as much res judicata as the final determination of the issue on the merits. If we are of opinion that the Court did so decide we are not concerned to see whether it did to rightly or not and indeed cannot do so. Now this is not a case as not infrequently happens where incidentally some point is decided which is no necessary which was not of first rate importance or specially brought to the notice of the Court. The plaintiff has excluded the question by the statement of his pleader. The first Court therefore expressly stated that it could not decide it. The defendant the present appellant as expressly urged that the Judge was wrong in not deciding this question even though his action was based on the plaintiff's adviser's statement and he asked this Court expressly to decide it. As this Court did so it seems to as that we ought to assume not that it did some thing which was unnecessary but that, in so far as it decided the point raised, it must also have decided that the then defendant's objection that the point should be tried was a good one and that the issue was one which did arise in the suit.

45. Then what did the learned Judges say? Maclean, C.J, after disposing of the question of reformation sets out the three contentions of the than defendants and present appellants the third of which was that the defendants are entitled to jotedar right. On this the Chief Justice held that no such rights were anywhere recorded nor was there any evidence of such rights. It was be said for the then defendants the present appellants to make out such right but that they had not succeeded in doing so. Banerjee, J. states the contention that the plaintiffs cannot claim khas possession as the defendants had jotedari rights in the grater part of the lands in suit. He says that was part of the defence which it was necessary to consider. He then points out that the first Court did not consider the question of jotedari right necessary to be determined, and expressly refers to the ground of appeal that the first Court ought to have determined the question of tenancy right and held that the possession to which the then plaintiff was entitled was subject to the tenant right of the present appellants. It is quite clear from the above that the then defendant's case was present to the minds of the Court. The learned Judge than proceeded to decide it and held that there was no jote right. If the learned Judges had thought the issue unnecessary they would presumably have said so and not decide it. But they did decide it can it be said under these circumstances that the point was not raised, that the Court did not consider it to be a necessary issue and did not impliedly decide that it was necessary and did not decide the issue on the merits. We think the answer is clearly in the negative. Than what of the decree. It is brae that it does not expressly refer to the tenancy right but it gave a decree for possession. What then did it intend to give. For the appellant it is said that all that was given was possession as co-proprietor and that the question whether such possession was free of the alleged tenancy right was left untouched. But if so, what was the necessity of dis sassing the question in the judgment. We ought not we think to assume Shat the judges discussed a question which was irrelevant so the case and then granted no relief in respect of it but rather that as they had discussed and negatived the alleged tenancy right in the judgment they intended to and did give a decree which should give effect to these findings. If so, the learned Judge's decree in effect gave to the respondents before us a right to the lands in that suit free of the alleged tenancy right claimed. We are of opinion therefore that the issue as to the appellants' right is res judicata. As we are of opinion that the appellants have established no bar to the hearing of the suit it is unnecessary to discuss whether notwithstanding the finding of the High Court on the 30th May 1899 the appellants have on the facts established the alleged right in this suit.

46. In our opinion then the decree of the Subordinate Judge should be affirmed. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.