- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Tustee Mondal v. Kenaram Mondal
Judgment Summary — Mookerjee, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent from the judgment of Mr. Justice Huda in a suit instituted by the plaintiff-respondent for recovery of certain plots of land from which he alleged he had been dispossessed and also for a declaration that the defendants had no right of way over certain other plots of land.
At first instance the suit was dismissed. On appeal the Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. On a subsequent appeal to the High Court the Subordinate Judge's decree in so far as it established the plaintiff's title to the plots claimed was not controverted. The contention that the Subordinate Judge had erroneously negatived the right of way claimed by the defendants was taken before Mr. Justice Huda, who held that the defendants' contention with respect to the alleged right of way was not maintainable and confirmed the Subordinate Judge's decree on that point.
The present appeal challenges Mr. Justice Huda's application of the legal principle governing reservation of easements.
Material factual events recorded in the opinion: originally the defendants held a plot as tenants; the land was sold in execution of a decree against them and bought by the landlord. In 1901 the landlord settled (transferred) the western plot to the plaintiff; in 1906 the eastern plot was settled with the defendants. The defendants claim a right of access from their eastern plot to the road across the western plot settled with the plaintiff.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the principle applicable to reservation of easements (and specifically the doctrine of implied reservation of easements of necessity) was correctly applied by Mr. Justice Huda in refusing the defendants a right of way.
- Whether, when the landlord settled the western plot with the plaintiff in 1901, there was an implied reservation of an easement of necessity in respect of the eastern plot retained (such that the later settlement with the defendants would be entitled to a way over the plaintiff's plot).
- Procedurally, whether the question formulated in the eighth issue (whether the defendants have a right of way as claimed over the land shown in the annex to the written statement) should be remitted for further consideration and, if so, the order in which issues should be addressed (first: existence of easement of necessity; second: location of the way).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The judgment of Mr. Justice Huda misapplied the legal principles on reservation of easements and ought to be set aside.
- The crucial factual and legal question is whether, at the time the western plot was settled with the plaintiff in 1901, there was an implied reservation of an easement of necessity benefitting the eastern plot retained by the landlord; if so, the defendants (as later transferees of the eastern plot) are entitled to a right of way.
Defendants' Contentions and Holdings by Mr. Justice Huda (as recorded)
- The defendants contended that they were entitled to access to the road across the western plot settled with the plaintiff.
- Mr. Justice Huda held that the defendants could not rely on rights their grantors might have possessed before the execution sale (which extinguished their title) and could not claim a right of way against the plaintiff under section 26 of the Indian Limitation Act because they obtained the settlement within a period of less than 20 years from the date of institution of the suit.
- Mr. Justice Huda further held that because after the settlement with the plaintiff no khas land of the landlord remained and the settlement included the whole land to the west, the landlord could not, when he afterwards settled the eastern plot with the defendants, grant to them expressly or by implication a passage over the land already settled with the plaintiff.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent / Statute | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Suffield v. Brown | Authority for the proposition that where the owner of two tenements transfers one part he ends the relation created by joint ownership; the condition of the land is thereafter determined by the contract of alienation, not by previous user. | Used to support the observation that rights of a grantor or previous owner do not survive so as to burden a plot once alienated, in the context of distinguishing implied grants and reservations. |
| Crossley v. Lightowler | Similar authority cited alongside Suffield v. Brown for the principle that transfer of part severs prior relations and user. | Cited with Suffield v. Brown to explain Mr. Justice Huda's reasoning which relied on that principle to deny the defendants' claim based on prior user. |
| Wheeldon v. Burrows (Wheeldon v. Barrows in text) | Explains general rules: (1) on a grant by the owner of a tenement or part as then used, continuous and apparent easements necessary for reasonable enjoyment pass to the grantee; (2) if grantor intends to reserve a right over granted tenement it must be reserved expressly, excepting ways of necessity. | The court relied on the Wheeldon rule to frame the question whether an easement of necessity could be impliedly reserved for the retained eastern plot; the Wheeldon formulation guided the analysis of implied grants versus implied reservations. |
| Pyer v. Carter | Earlier case that treated implied grants and implied reservations on the same footing (later disapproved). | Cited to note historical divergence of authorities and to explain why later cases (including Suffield and Wheeldon) disapproved Pyer v. Carter. |
| Taws v. Knowles | Illustrates refusal to imply a reservation of an easement when no express reservation was made despite prior use. | Used to show cases where implied reservation was disallowed on separation of estates without express reservation. |
| Thomas v. Owen | Example where a reservation of a right of way was implied without express words because of the character, direction of the road and long user for the benefit of the reserved part. | Adduced to show there are authorities which allow implied reservations in special circumstances. |
| Richard v. Rose | Authority cited for the view that easements of necessity for the retained part may be implied in the grantor's favour. | Included among cases supporting the proposition that easements of necessity can be implied for the retained tenement. |
| Union Lighterage Co. v. London Graving Dock Co. | Authority supporting the implication of easements of necessity for the retained part. | Relied upon as part of the weighty authority for implied easements of necessity in favour of the part retained. |
| Ray v. Hazeldine | Authority cited in the line of cases recognising implied easements of necessity for retained land. | Included in the list of cases supporting the implication of easements of necessity. |
| Gordon v. Ogilvie | Another authority in the same vein on easements of necessity. | Referenced among cases supporting implied easements of necessity. |
| Schwann v. Cotton | Authority cited for implied easements of necessity. | Part of the judicial support for the proposition that easements of necessity may be implied in favour of the retained tenement. |
| Derry v. Sanders | Authority cited in support of implied easements of necessity. | Included among the cases relied on for the view that easements of necessity may be raised by implication for the retained land. |
| Kadambini Debi v. Kali Kumar Haldar | Principle that where no legislative enactment applies, courts should decide questions by reference to justice, equity and good conscience; English doctrine of implied grants has been applied in India on that basis. | Cited to justify applying English doctrines of implied easements (and principles) despite the Indian Easements Act not being directly applicable to the facts. |
| Indian Easements Act, s.13(4) (and Illustration C) | Statutory rule: where transfer of immovable property requires easement in other immovable property of transferor for enjoyment, the transferee is entitled to such easement; Illustration C gives an example of a right of way for agricultural purposes. | Although the Act was said not to be applicable to the present case, the court relied on its principles as consistent with the common-law rule that easements of necessity may be implied in favour of the retained land. |
| Indian Limitation Act, s.26 | Raised by Mr. Justice Huda: argued that the defendants could not claim a right of way under s.26 because they obtained settlement within less than 20 years of suit institution. | The opinion records Huda's reliance on s.26 to reject a limitation-based claim by the defendants; the present court did not accept Mr. Justice Huda's overall view and remitted the easement question for reconsideration. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the central issue as whether, when the landlord settled the western plot with the plaintiff in 1901, there was an implied reservation of an easement of necessity for the eastern plot retained by the landlord (and later settled with the defendants in 1906).
The court analysed the applicable principles in these steps:
- Recapitulation of Mr. Justice Huda's reasoning: Huda held defendants could not rely on pre-sale rights of their grantors (extinguished by execution sale) and could not claim under section 26 of the Limitation Act because the settlement occurred within 20 years of suit; Huda also found that after the plaintiff's settlement no khas land of the landlord remained so that the landlord could not have granted a passage over land already settled with the plaintiff.
- The court examined established authorities on implied easements. It quoted Wheeldon v. Burrows (Wheeldon v. Barrows in the text) to set out two general rules: (a) on a grant all continuous and apparent easements necessary for reasonable enjoyment pass to the grantee by implied grant; (b) if the grantor intends to reserve rights over the tenement granted he must reserve them expressly, subject to exceptions—most notably ways of necessity.
- The court recognised historical divergence in authority (e.g., Pyer v. Carter, later disapproved by Suffield and Wheeldon) on whether implied reservations can be treated like implied grants, and reviewed cases both disallowing and allowing implied reservations in special circumstances (Taws v. Knowles; Thomas v. Owen).
- The court identified a line of authorities supporting the narrower proposition that easements of necessity, without which no enjoyment at all would be possible, may be implied for the retained land (Richard v. Rose; Union Lighterage Co. v. London Graving Dock Co.; Ray v. Hazeldine; Gordon v. Ogilvie; Schwann v. Cotton; Derry v. Sanders).
- Although the Indian Easements Act was said not to apply directly to the facts, the court noted s.13(4) and Illustration C of the Act reflect the same rule: where an easement in other immovable property of the transferor is necessary for enjoying the transferred subject, the transferee is entitled to an easement. The court treated this as supportive of the doctrine of easements of necessity.
- Relying on the observation by Mr. Justice Banerjee in Kadambini Debi v. Kali Kumar Haldar that in absence of a governing enactment questions must be decided by principles of justice, equity and good conscience, the court concluded that English law doctrine concerning implied easements accords with those principles and therefore is applicable in the present circumstances.
- On that basis the court concluded that Mr. Justice Huda's view could not be sustained: if at the time of the 1901 grant there was a way of necessity for the eastern plot retained, an implied reservation should be recognised.
- Accordingly, the court allowed the appeal in part, set aside Mr. Justice Huda's judgment and decree with respect to the right of way issue, and remitted the matter to the Subordinate Judge to decide the eighth issue (whether the defendants have a right of way as claimed). The Subordinate Judge was directed to first determine whether an easement of necessity exists and, if so, to determine the location of the way. The Subordinate Judge's decree on the question of title (as not assailed) was to remain confirmed.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: Appeal allowed; the judgment and decree of Mr. Justice Huda are set aside and the case is remitted to the Subordinate Judge for determination of the eighth issue (the right of way).
Implications (direct effects recorded in the opinion):
- The Subordinate Judge must first consider whether the defendants have an easement of necessity. If that question is answered affirmatively, the Subordinate Judge must next consider and determine the precise location of the way.
- The Subordinate Judge's earlier decree in favour of the plaintiff as to title (the question of title/bible as described in the opinion) was not assailed on this appeal and thus remains confirmed.
- There will be no order as to the costs of this appeal (the opinion records that no order as to costs is made).
The opinion does not state that a new, binding precedent is being created; it applies established authorities and statutory illustrations to the facts and remits the factual questions (existence and location of an easement of necessity) for further adjudication.
End of summary — content derived exclusively from the provided opinion text.
Mookerjee, J.:— This is an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent from the judgment of Mr. Justice Huda in a suit instituted by the plaintiff-respondent for recovery of certain plots of land from which he alleges he has been dispossessed by the defendants and also for a declaration that the defendants have no right of way over certain other clots of land. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit. Upon appeal the Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. On appeal to this Court the decree of the Subordinate Judge in so far as it establishes the bible of the plaintiff to the plots claimed by him was nab controverted. But it was argued that the Sub-ordinate Judge had erroneously negatived the right of way claimed by the defendants. Mr. Justice Huda held that the contention of the defendants in respect of the alleged right of way was not bankable and confirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge. On the present appeal the judgment of Mr. Justice Huda has been assailed on the ground that the principle applicable to cases of reservation of easements has not been correctly applied to the facts of this litigation.
2. It appears that there was a plot of land which was originally held by the defendants as tenants.
3. The land was sold in execution of a decree against them and was purchased by the landlord. In the year 1901 the plaintiff book settlement of the western plot which abutted on a road and in the year 1906 the defendants book settlement of the eastern plot. It is with regard to this eastern plot that the defendants now contend that they are entitled to have access to the road across the western plot settled with the plaintiff. Mr. Justice Huda has held that the defendants cannot rely on any rights their grantors might have possessed before the execution sale which extinguished their title, nor can they claim a right of way against the plaintiff under section 26 of the Indian Limitation Act because they obtained the settlement within a period of less than 20 years from the date of the institution of the suit. This view is unquestionably right; the decisions in Suffield v. Brown (1) and Crossley v. Lightowler (2), show that where the owner of two tenements or if one tenement divided into two parts transfers one part, he puts an end by contract to the relation which he had himself created between the land sold and the land retained. He discharges the land so sold from any burden imposed upon it during his joint occupation; the condition of such land is thenceforth determined by the contract of alienation and not by the previous user of the former common owner during his common ownership. The question thus inevitably arises, whether the defendants have an easement of necessity, because, where a man disposes of part of his land and that part affords an accommodation to the part retained, that accommodation will upon severance ripen into an easement, if it be such as to be absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of the part retained and the accommodation be such that it is capable of constituting the subject matter of an easement. According to Mr. Justice Huda, inasmuch as it has been found that after the settlement with the plaintiff, no khas land of the landlord remained and that the settlement included the whole land to the wast, the landlord could nob, when he afterwards settled the eastern plot with the defendants, grant to them expressly or by implication a passage over the land which he had already settled with the plaintiff. This view is assailed by the appellant, and the crucial question is, whether when the landlord settled the western plot with the plaintiff in 1901, there was an implied reservation of an easement of necessity in respect of the eastern plot retained by him. We are of opinion that this question should be answered in the affirmative provided that it is established that at the time of the grant there was a way of necessity in respect of the eastern plot which was retained by the landlord.
4. The principle applicable to cases of this character was lucidly explained by Thesiger, L.J, in the case of Wheeldon v. Barrows (3) in the following berms.
“We have had a considerable cumber of cases cited to us and out of them I think that two propositions may be stated as what I may call the general rules governing cases of this kind. The first of these rules is that on the grant by the owner of a tenement or part of that tenement as it is then used and enjoyed, there will pass to the grantee all those continuous and apparent easements by which of course I mean quasi easements, or in other words, all those easements which are necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted. The second proposition is that if the grantor intends to reserve any right over the tenement granted, it is his duty to reserve it expressly in the grant. Those are the general rules Governing cases of this kind, but the second of those rules is subject to certain exceptions one of those exceptions is the well-known exception which attaches to cases of whit are called ways of necessity: and I do not dispute for a moment that there may be, and probably are, certain other exceptions, to which I shall refer before I close my observations upon this case. Both of the general rules which I have mentioned are founded upon a maxim which is well established by authority as it is consonant to reason and common sense viz., that a grantor shall not derogate from his grant.”
5. The distinction thus pointed out between easements which may be claimed by the grantee and easements which are reserved by the grantor has not always been recognized. In Pyer v. Carter (4), Implied grants and implied reservations of apparent easements were put on the same footing, but this was disapproved of in Suffield v. Brown and Wheeldon v. Barrows and it was held that if a grantor of part of his estate wishes to reserve an easement over it for himself, he should do so in express harms, as such reservation cannot be implied, being in derogation of his grant. The same view was maintained in the case of Taws v. Knowles (5) in which the owner of a house and garden built a second house in the garden and walled off a strip of the garden by the second house do serve as a special way from the old house to a back street and used it continually; yet because on separation of the two houses, when the strip with the path went with the new house, no express reservation was made of the right of way from the old house, the right was disallowed. In Thomas v. Owen (6) however a reservation of a right of way was allowed to be implied without any words of reservation in the grant, as the condition and direction of the road as well as the long user of it for the sole benefit of the part of the estate reserved was considered proof positive that the grantor of the servient tenement must have intended to reserve the right of way. Thus the old rule that upon severance of an estate and in the absence of any express grant, those quasi-easements which the owner of the entirety has been accustomed to use for the beneficial enjoyment of the part sold over the part retained, if of an apparent and continuous character, will be given to the grantee by implied grant, but that similar easements will not be reserved for the benefit of the part retained by implied reservation, must be deemed to have been shaken, if not “almost swept away.” But, whatever divergence of opinion there may be upon the general doctrine of the creation of easements by implication of law and the applicability of the principles that a man shall not derogate from his grant and a grant shall always be construed most strictly against the grantor, there is Weighty authority for the view that where an owner grants part of his land and retains other part himself, although the grantee may be in a more favourable position than the grantor in so far as the grantee may claim all easements necessary for reasonable enjoyment of the part so granted, the grantor may claim that all “easements of necessity” without which no enjoyment at all would be possible should be raised by implication in favour of the part retained: Richard v. Rose (7); Union Lighterage Co. v. London Graving Dock Co. (8) Ray v. Hazeldine (9) Gordon v. Ogilvie (10) Schwann v. Cotton (11); Derry v. Sanders (12). This is also the result of the provisions of the Indian Easements Act. Section 13, clause (4) provides that where one person transfers immoveable proper by to another. If an easement in other immoveable property of the transferor is necessary for enjoying the subject of the transfer, the transferee shall be entitled to such easement. Illustration (C) is to the following effect:
“A the owner of two fields, sells one to B and retains the other. The field retained was at the date of the sale used for agricultural purposes only, and is Inaccessible except by pissing over the field sold to B. A is entitled to a right of way, for agricultural purposes only, over B's field to the field retained.”
6. The Indian Easements Act no doubt is not applicable to the case before us; but, as was pointed out by Mr. Justice Banarjee in Kadambini Debi v. Kali Kumar Haldar (13), since there is no enactment of the legislature applicable to a case like this, the question raised will have to be answered with reference to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience; end the Courts in this country have considered the rule of English law known as the doctrine of implied grant of easemants upon severance of tenements, as in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience. The conclusion follows that the view taken by Mr. Justice Huda cannot be supported.
7. The appeal must consequently be allowed, the judgment and decree of Mr. Justice Huda set aside and the case remitted to the Subordinate Judge for consideration of the question raised in the eighth issue which was framed in the following terms whether the defendants have a right of way as claimed by them over the land as shown in the ??? annexed to the written statement. The Subordinate Judge will first consider whether the defendants have an easement of necessity. If the question is answered in the affirmative the Subordinate Judge will next consider the location of the way. As the decree of the Subordinate Judge upon the question of bible has not been assailed and must stand confirmed, there will be no order as to the costs of this appeal.
8. Appeal allowed: Case remanded.
Alert