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Tadibulli Tammireddi v. Tadibulli Gangireddi

Madras High Court
Nov 30, 1921
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Partition Appeal

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit for partition brought by the respondent (plaintiff) against the appellants (including the first defendant, Bulli Tammi Reddi). The family facts as found in the opinion: Gangi (Gangireddi) Reddi died in May 1917 leaving a widow Subbamma and sons Thammayya and Bulli Tammi Reddi (the first defendant). The plaintiff is the son of Thammayya; the second defendant is the son of the first defendant. The plaintiff attained majority in 1916 and lived with the first defendant until about July 1919. The Subordinate Judge made a decree for partition with several specific directions:

  • He directed the first defendant to account for his management of family properties from October 1916 (six months before Gangi Reddi's death).
  • He held that the opium business carried on by the first defendant was his exclusive business and not joint family business, and that the plaintiff was not liable for losses in that business.
  • He made findings about the choultry (charity house) and the alleged endowment from a usufructuary mortgage of Chengondapalli estate.
  • He rejected the first defendant's case that certain jewels in his possession were his wife's jewels.
  • He allowed testamentary provisions for jewels to be made for the marriages of the second defendant and his sister (Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 1,000 respectively) but did not fix overall marriage expenses.

The appellants appealed against these points. The appellate court reviewed evidence (including seized account books and partnership and licence documents) and the findings of the Subordinate Judge, and gave reasons for modifying parts of the decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the first defendant should be ordered to account from October 1916 (six months before Gangi Reddi's death) or whether the accounting should be limited to the properties existing and available for partition at the date of the plaint.
  2. Whether the opium business entered into by the first defendant (partnership for 1917–1918 and arrangements for 1918–1919) was a joint family business binding on the adult coparcener (the plaintiff) or was a personal/illegal undertaking for which the first defendant alone is liable.
  3. Whether the partnership deed (Exhibit A) and the benami arrangements (Exhibit VII) that gave non-licensees an interest in vending opium were legal and binding on the family.
  4. Whether there was a valid dedication (endowment) of the income from the Chengondapalli muttah for the upkeep of the choultry, making that income not liable for partition.
  5. Whether jewels in the possession of the first defendant were his wife's jewels (and therefore not divisible as joint family property).
  6. What provisions, if any, should be set apart for the marriage expenses of the first defendant's son and daughter given testamentary directions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The appellants contended that the Subordinate Judge's decision was incorrect on the points appealed.
  • Regarding the accounting period: it was argued (by or for the appellants) that the Subordinate Judge erred in fixing the account from October 1916 because the first defendant allegedly had not been maintaining proper accounts for some time before Gangi Reddi's death.
  • Regarding the opium business: Mr. Ranga Acharya for the appellants argued that the opium business was carried on by relations of the plaintiff and the first defendant; that the first defendant, as managing member, after inquiry was satisfied it was profitable; he acted bona fide and for the family's benefit; and the managing member has powers to continue family trading activities (implied contention that the business bound the family).
  • It was also contended that the managing member has certain immunities with respect to past transactions and cannot be called upon to account for all past dealings.

Plaintiff / Respondent's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The plaint alleged that the first defendant, with intent to defraud, falsified accounts, concealed books, converted family money into jewels under the pretext of stridhanam, and concealed profits while showing heavy losses, thereby depriving the plaintiff of his share; the plaintiff sought accounts from 1902 (date of his father's death).
  • The plaintiff argued that even if a managing member may carry on an ancestral business, he has no right to embark on a new and speculative venture without concurrence of adult coparceners; such new ventures do not bind other adult coparceners inter se.
  • The plaintiff contended the opium business was unlawful (contravened the Opium Act/licence conditions) and therefore the managing member could not saddle the family with resulting losses.
  • The plaintiff sought surcharge and the right to show that entries or alleged expenditures were not actually incurred or were overstated in the manager's accounts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balakrishna Iyer v. Muthusdmi Iyer; Narayan Bin Babaji v. Nathaji Durgaji; Parmeshwar Dube v. Gobind Dube; Bhowani Prasad Shaha v. Juggernath Shaha; Kristnayya v. Guruvayya Establishes that when accounts are taken for partition the head/manager is not generally required to defend past transactions except in cases of fraud, misappropriation or gross reckless waste; account primarily concerns existing assets at date of partition. The court relied on these authorities to hold that the Subordinate Judge's direction that the first defendant account from October 1916 could not be supported; instead the first defendant must file accounts of properties existing and available for partition at the date of the plaint, subject to the plaintiff's right to surcharge.
Parmeshwar Dube v. Govind Dube; Kristnayya v. Guruvayya (also cited above) Other family members are not bound to accept the manager's statement of what properties exist; inquiry must be conducted to discover actual properties and members may show expenditures were not incurred or savings not entered. The court applied this principle to explain the proper scope and manner of the account to be filed and the inquiry to be conducted by the parties in the suit.
Nalam Padmandbham v. Sait Badrinadh Sarda Partnerships/agreements that enable persons not entitled to sell opium (i.e., non-licensees) to acquire an interest in the opium vending business or to sell opium are void as violating licence conditions. The court held the 1917–1918 partnership (Exhibit A) fell within this principle and was void; clause 3, which made the non-licensee first defendant the sole appointer of agents, rendered the agreement invalid.
D. Me. Laren Morrison v. S. Versclioyle Holds that a kartha (manager) has implied power to pledge family credit/property only for the ordinary family business and not for embarking upon a business which is not ancestral. The court cited it to support the proposition that the managing member cannot embark on a new trade binding adult coparceners without their concurrence.
K.K. Abdur Rahman Kuiti Haji v. Hussain Kunhi Haji Junior members of a Malabar tarwad are not liable for debts contracted by the manager/karnavan in the course of a trade carried on by him unless it was a family business or conducted with their consent. The court used this authority by analogy to support that a managing member cannot bind adult coparceners by starting a new business without consent.
Govinda Doss v. Raja Venkata Perumal Principle relied upon by the Subordinate Judge: mere use of income by a testator is not necessarily evidence of a dedication of the corpus. The Subordinate Judge relied on this precedent to question dedication of corpus; the appellate court considered the total evidence (earlier deposition, wills, and accounts) and concluded there was a dedication of the income from the Chengondapalli muttah to the choultry.
Pallayya v. Ramavadhanulu; Ramalingam Chetti v. Sivachidambara Chetty Authority for the position that no formal document may be necessary to prove a dedication/endowment of income for charitable purposes. The court applied these authorities to find that the income from Chengondapalli muttah had been dedicated to the choultry and therefore was not joint family property liable for partition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in focused steps tied to the evidence and legal principles cited in the opinion:

  1. Accounting period and account books:
    • The first defendant's regular account books had been seized in connection with a criminal complaint and returned only in October 1918. In the interim he used loose sheets later entered into Exhibits III (fair day book), IV (ledger) and V (rough day book).
    • The court found these ledgers were not kept in the regular course of business day-to-day; however, there was no evidence that entries were false or that there had been suppression of accounts or jewels as alleged in the plaint.
    • Applying the well-settled principle that a head/manager is not normally called upon to defend all past transactions unless fraud/misappropriation/gross waste is shown, the court concluded that the Subordinate Judge's direction to account from October 1916 could not be sustained.
    • Instead the court directed that the first defendant should file accounts of properties existing and available for partition at the date of the plaint; the plaintiff retains the right to surcharge and to challenge particular items in those accounts.
  2. Opium business (1917–1918 and 1918–1919):
    • Evidence showed the first defendant entered into a partnership (Exhibit A) on 26 March 1917 and advanced large sums (ledger shows over Rs. 55,442 advanced between Feb–Dec 1917) to finance opium vending by licensees.
    • The plaintiff was an adult at the time and was not consulted; the first defendant admitted he did not consult the plaintiff. The court held that a managing member cannot commence a new business binding adult coparceners without their concurrence; inter se, a new trade started without consent will not bind adult coparceners unless there is evidence of acquiescence.
    • Regarding legality, licence conditions (Exhibit B) prohibited transfer or assignment of the right to sell opium or appoint agents without District Collector's sanction. Clause 3 of Exhibit A made the non-licensee first defendant the person to appoint agents and control accounts—thereby giving non-licensees an effective interest in the vending business.
    • Relying on Nalam Padmandbham v. Sait Badrinadh Sarda, the court held the 1917–1918 partnership was void as it enabled a non-licensee to gain an interest and control in opium vending contrary to licence conditions. The benami arrangements for 1918–1919 (Exhibit VII) were similarly illegal.
    • Consequently, the first defendant could not saddle other coparceners with the losses of these illegal transactions. The court regarded the opium businesses of 1917–1918 and 1918–1919 as the separate property of the first defendant—he is entitled to any profits and liable for losses.
    • Practically, the court ordered that in taking an account of the joint family properties the first defendant must pay the plaintiff one-half of the monies of the joint family that he used for the opium business.
  3. Choultry and dedication of income from Chengondapalli muttah:
    • Evidence included early deposition of Gangireddi (1903) indicating he had endowed a fund for a chatram and later testamentary directions (wills of 1906 and 1913) referring to Rs. 10,000 and the net profits of Chengondapalli muttah to be used for the choultry.
    • Account books showed the income from the muttah had been utilised for the choultry from its opening. Although the Subordinate Judge was cautious (relying on Govinda Doss), the appellate court found the preponderance of evidence, the earlier deposition, wills, and accounts supported a dedication of the income.
    • Relying on authorities that no formal document is necessary to prove dedication, the court concluded the income from Chengondapalli muttah was dedicated to the choultry and therefore was not joint family property liable for partition.
  4. Marriage expenses and jewels:
    • The will provided Rs. 1,000 for jewels for the daughter; the court held she was entitled to marriage expenses from joint family funds and, given family status, directed Rs. 3,000 be set apart for her marriage in addition to Rs. 1,000 for jewels.
    • No issue had been raised in pleadings regarding specific marriage expenses for the second defendant; the court declined to entertain a new claim first raised during oral argument.
    • On the jewels claimed by the first defendant, the court accepted the Subordinate Judge's finding against him: he failed to prove the jewels belonged to his wife or to show which jewels were pledged or lent as alleged; he had offered to file a list but did not do so. The court refused to permit a new case to be opened on that point at this late stage.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The decree of the Subordinate Judge is modified in part.

  • The Subordinate Judge's direction that the first defendant account from October 1916 is set aside. The first defendant must file an account of the properties existing and available for partition at the date of the plaint, subject to the plaintiff's right to surcharge and to challenge specific items.
  • The opium businesses of 1917–1918 and 1918–1919 were illegal or unauthorized as between coparceners; they are to be treated as the separate property of the first defendant (he is entitled to any profits and liable for losses). In taking accounts, the first defendant shall pay the plaintiff one-half of the monies of the joint family which he used for the opium business.
  • The income from the Chengondapalli muttah was dedicated to the choultry and is not joint family property liable for partition.
  • The daughter is entitled to Rs. 1,000 (for jewels as in the will) and an additional Rs. 3,000 towards marriage expenses to be set apart from joint family funds. No provision was made for the marriage expenses of the second defendant because the matter was not raised in pleadings or trial.
  • The first defendant's claim that certain jewels belonged to his wife is rejected for lack of proof; he did not establish which jewels were pledged or lent, and he failed to present the list he had offered to file.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the first defendant must file accounts limited to assets existing at the plaint date and will be held personally responsible for monies used in the illegal opium ventures (accounting for half to the plaintiff as directed). The choultry's dedicated income is excluded from divisible family assets; certain marriage provisions are to be set apart as directed; the jewels claimed by the first defendant are not excluded from partition on the evidence.
  • Costs: as the appellants "have failed substantially" the court ordered them to pay the respondent's costs.
  • No broader new legal principle was announced beyond application of established authorities: the court applied settled rules about the scope of accounting in partition suits, the limited power of a manager to embark on non-ancestral or unauthorized business, and the illegality of arrangements that contravene licence conditions governing opium vending. The decision modifies the lower court's directions in light of those principles and the evidence in the record.
K.R
Show all summary ...

This Appeal arises out of a suit for partition filed by the respondent against the appellants. One Gangi Reddi died in May 1917 leaving a widow Subbamma (the third defendant). He had two sons, Thammayya and Bulli Tammi Reddi, the first defendant. The plaintiff is the son of Thammayya and the second defendant is the son of the first defendant. Plaintiff's father died in 1902. The plaintiff who attained majority in 1916 lived with the first defendant till about July 1919. The Subordinate Judge passed a decree for partition directing the first defendant to account for his management of the family properties from six months prior to the death of Gangi Reddi, i.e, from October 1916. He held that the business in opium carried on by the first defendant was his exclusive business and not joint family business, and that the plaintiff was not bound to bear any part of the loss incurred in that business. As regards the choultry founded by Gangi Reddi he held that there was no endowment in respect of the usufructuary mortgage in favour of Gangi Reddi relating to Chengondapalli Estate. He held that the first defendant did not make out his case that the jewels in his possession were his wife's jewels. As regards the second defendant and his sister, he allowed a sum of Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 1,000 mentioned in the will for the purpose of making jewels on the occasion of their marriages but did not fix the amount to be spent for their marriages. The Appeal relates to the above points and it is contended for the appellants that the decision of the Subordinate Judge is incorrect. As regards the accountability of the first defendant, the Subordinate Judge bases his decision on the ground that the first defendant had not been maintaining proper accounts for sometime prior to Gangi Reddi's death and that the plaintiff is consequently entitled to claim an account from October 1916. The case for the plaintiff as laid in the plaint is that the first defendant with the object of defrauding the plaintiff “showed differences in the accounts, reduced considerable amount's, and in order to deprive the plaintiff of a share, he converted a considerable amount as jewels worn by women and showed under stridhanam, and even though profit was derived in some transactions, he concealed the same and showed heavy loss, concealed some account books and has been conducting himself in such, a way as to cause loss to this plaintiff in all ways,” that the first defendant misappropriated the properties and that he has a right to demand the first defendant to furnish an account from the year 1902 when his father died. The Subordinate Judge has found that the charge as regards the jewels has not been made out and that the first defendant was not guilty of secreting any accounts. He, however, is of opinion that proper accounts were not maintained. As regards the accounts, it is admitted that the first defendant filed a criminal complaint against one Subbarayudu on the 24th of April 1917 of misappropriation of a sum of about Rs. 6,000. Exhibit R is the judgment of the Magistrate in that case. In connexion with that complaint, a warrant was issued by the Magistrate and the account books of the family were seized and taken to the Police Court. The books were not returned till about October 1918. (The plaintiff filed his plaint in December 1918 and a commissioner was appointed who made an inventory of all the account books in the family. After the seizure of the account books by the Police, the first defendant did not open regular account books but, according to the evidence, he was making entries on loose sheets of paper which were subsequently entered in the account books, Exhibits III, IV and V, filed in the suit. Exhibit V is the rough day book, Exhibit III is the flair day book and Exhibit IV is the ledger. These account books were not kept in the regular course of business from day to day and so far as the proof of any of the entries in these books is concerned, it is clear that these account books cannot have the same effect as account books kept from day to day in the regular course of business. The question, however, is whether the first defendant's not keeping the books from day to day can be said to be such misconduct as would make him accountable during the period that the accounts run. It is not shown that any of the entries in these account books are wrong or that there has been any suppression of entries. It is explained for the first appellant that he expected the books in the Magistrate's Court to be returned soon, that he therefore thought he could continue the accounts in those books when they were returned and, that during the interval he did not open regular account books. We do not think the mere fact that regular books were not kept would, in the absence of any evidence to show that the accounts now produced are false in any particular, render the first defendant accountable especially as the most serious charges made in the plaint as regards the suppression of account books, making of false entries in the account books and misappropriation of jewels, have not been made out. It is now well settled that, when an account has to be taken, with a view to make a partition of joint family properties, the account is merely an inquiry into the existing assets and that the head of the family cannot in general be called upon to defend the propriety of his past transactions of the family except in cases of fraud, misappropriation or gross reckless waste. We need only refer to Balakrishna Iyer v. Muthusdmi Iyer, Narayan Bin Babaji v. Nathaji Durgaji, Parmeshwar Dube v. Gobind Dube(3), Bhowani Prasad Shaha v. Juggernath Shaha(4), and Kristnayya v. Guruvayya(5). All that a coparcener seeking partition is entitled to is an account of the properties which exist at the date of partition or at the date when, owing to a demand for partition, there has been a severance of status and accounts will have to be taken in so far as they relate to the ascertainment of what the properties in existence are. The manager of a joint family being the accounting party has to file an account as to the properties available for partition but, as pointed out in Parmeshwar Dube v. Govind Dube and Kristnayya v. Guruvayya, the other members of the family are not bound to accept the statement of the manager as to what the properties consist of and the inquiry directed by the Court should be conducted in the manner usually adopted to discover what in fact the property consists of and not what the manager says it is. In such a case it is open to the members of the family to show that expenditure which the manager says has been incurred has not been incurred or that the savings out of joint family funds have not been entered in the accounts. We are therefore of opinion that the direction of the Subordinate Judge that the first defendant is to account for the management from October 1916 cannot be supported. The direction ought to be that the first defendant should file an account of the properties existing and available for partition at the date of the plaint, the plaintiff being entitled to surcharge the accounts and, to show that items of expenditure said to have been incurred were not, as a matter of fact, incurred or were not incurred to the extent mentioned in the accounts filed by the first defendant, or that more properties are available for partition than those mentioned in first defendant's accounts.

As regards the opium business which the first defendant carried on, it appears from the evidence that he entered into partnerships with those who got licences from Government to vend opium and that large amounts were spent by him for financing the business. Gangireddi, the grandfather of the plaintiff, died in 1917 and the case for the defendant and the evidence adduced by him is to the effect that, though he was bed-ridden for about six months before his death, he was giving instructions for the management of the family affairs and that the first defendant was transacting business after informing Gangireddi and getting his directions. An attempt was made by the first defendant to show that this opium business which he carried on was carried on with the consent and under the directions of Gangireddi but this evidence has been rightly discredited by the Subordinate Judge. The evidence is that in 1901 and 1902. Gangireddi did business in opium but that he stopped that business and that, although he subsequently carried on extensive business in other directions, he did not do any business in opium. It is suggested that it was because he thought it was morally wrong to do so, but the probabilities are that he stopped business because, as the plaintiff's vakil contends, the business ended in a loss.

It is argued by Mr. Ranga Acharya, for the appellants, that the business in opium was being carried on by the relations of the plaintiff and the first defendant, that the first defendant as managing member of the family after making inquiries was satisfied that it was a profitable business and that he did the opium business bona fide and for the benefit of the family. The contention for the plaintiff is that the managing member of a family while he is entitled to carry on an ancestral business has no right to embark on a new and speculative venture., that the business would not bind the other members of the family, that in the present case the business which the first defendant entered into was illegal as it contravened the provisions of the Opium Act, and that the managing member who enters into unlawful transactions has no right to saddle the family with the losses incurred therein. The business was commenced by the first defendant on the 26th of March 1917 as evidenced by Exhibit A, the deed of partnership between the first defendant and others. Gangireddi died in May 1917. The plaintiff had at that time attained majority and it is not suggested that he was taking any part in the management of the family affairs. He was a student before and, although he was living with the first defendant and his grandfather, Gangireddi, it is not shown that he was aware of the business that was being carried on in opium. The first defendant in his evidence admits that he did not consult the plaintiff before he began the business. The finding of the Subordinate Judge is that the first defendant was managing the family N affairs for at least six months prior to the death of Gangireddi though the case for the first defendant is that Gangireddi was himself managing the family affairs till the date of his death. Even assuming that the first defendant was managing the family affairs at the date when the opium business began, we do not think he had power to commence a new business without the concurrence of the plaintiff who was an adult member of the family and living with him at the time. As between the members of a joint family inter se, whatever may be the powers of the manager as regards the minor members of the family, there is no authority for holding that he can start a new venture without the concurrence of the adult coparceners. His position cannot be better than that of a partner and whatever may be the rights of third persons dealing with the family, as between the members of the family inter se a new trade or business commenced by one member, even though he is the managing member, without consulting the adult coparceners would not bind them in the absence of evidence of acquiescence. It is argued by Mr. Ranga Aeharya that no new business can be carried on by the managing member unless he was given a discretion in the matter but it seems to us that the remedy is obvious. He should get the consent of the adult coparceners. In the case of minor members, the position of the kartha is that while he has power to carry on an ancestral trade that has devolved on the joint family he cannot bind the minors by embarking on new ventures. In D. Me. Laren Morrison v. S. Versclioyle, it was held that the kartha of a joint family possessing an ancestral business has an implied power to pledge the credit and property of the family, but only for the ordinary business of the family, and that he cannot do so for the purpose of embarking on a business which is not the ancestral business. The power of the manager to bind the family by embarking on a new business was considered by Abdur Rahim and Spencer, JJ., in K.K Abdur Rahman Kuiti Haji v. Hussain Kunhi Haji, and it was held that the junior members of a Malabar tarwad are not liable for the debts contracted by the karnavan in the course of a trade carried on by him, unless it is shown either that the trade was a family business or that it was carried on by the karnavan with the consent of the junior members. So far as trading families are concerned, there is not much difference between the position of a karnavan in his relations with the junior members and that of a manager of a joint family under Mitakshara with his coparceners. We do not think that in the present case the trade carried on in opium by the first defendant is binding on the plaintiff who was an adult member at the time when it was commenced and who admittedly was not consulted about it and who, on the evidence, is not shown to have acquiesced in the business or to have known that it was being carried on. The business was of a highly speculative character, the first defendant financing the various renters of opium in consideration of a share of the profits. According to the ledger, Exhibit IV, between February and December 1917 over Rs. 55,442 were advanced out of the family funds in respect of the opium business of 1917-1918.

Turning to the legality of the opium business carried on by the first defendant, we are of opinion that the partnership entered into by him for 1917-1918, as evidenced by Exhibit A, is not legal. The effect of the transaction was that the first defendant entered into a partnership with a number of people some of whom had obtained licences to sell opium, he agreeing to finance the business and retaining the control of the whole business in his own hands. One of the terms in the licence, Exhibit B, which is typical of the other licences, runs as follows:

“You shall not sell, relinquish or sub-lease to others your right to supply or sell opium without obtaining the previous sanction of the District Collector in that respect. Even after obtaining orders of the District Collector in the said respect, no agent shall be appointed to exercise any such right without previously obtaining the approval of the District Collector in regard to such appointment.”

Exhibit A, which is the deed of partnership between the first defendant and some others who had obtained licences to vend opium, begins by stating that for the benefit of the first defendant and twelve others mentioned therein, five of them bid at the auction for the sale of opium in the villages mentioned in the schedule annexed thereto from the 1st of April 1917 to the 31st of March 1918, that it was agreed that the capital required for the business should be advanced by the first defendant who should get interest at Rs. 1-0-6 per Cent per mensem and that each of the other partners was to deposit with the first defendant Rs. 125 for each share they had in the business, they getting similar interest. Clause 3 runs as follows:

“It is settled that Tadi Bulli Tammireddi (first defendant), out of us, should be writing all proper and necessary accounts such as chittas, ledgers, etc., for this joint business and that Bulli Tamnjireddi should appoint, as he pleases, proper persons for selling opium in the villages specified in the schedule annexed hereto according to Government rules and get the work done by them and that a monthly report clearly showing purchase of opium, sadar, sale, etc., should be made to Bulli Tammireddi once in a month from all stations and that the amount also should be sent (to him) then and there.”

It was arranged that the profits should be divided into 64 shares and that the first defendant should get 20 shares and the others the various shares mentioned in the document. The effect of the transaction is that whereas under the licences the only persons who can deal in opium are the licensees, a partnership is formed which gives to persons, who are not licensees, an interest in the business, the shares being determined by the terms of the agreement. It is also clear that, as regards the vending of opium, clause 3 makes the first defendant, who is not a licensee under any of the licences, the sole person entitled to the right to appoint agents for the sale of opium. We are of opinion that the present case falls within the principle of Nalam Padmandbham v. Sait Badrinadh Sarda, where two persons who were farmers of opium revenue under the Government entered into a partnership with a third person by which they admitted him as a partner in the opium business, and it was held that the partnership agreement was void and the suit not maintainable, as the effect of the agreement was to enable a person, who was not entitled to sell opium, to sell it and as it also amounted to a transfer to the person, who was not a licensee, of an interest in the business which was in violation of the conditions subject to which the licence was granted. We are of opinion that clause 3 of the agreement set out above gives the first defendant, who is not a licensee, a light to sell opium through his agents, and prevents the licensees from having any voice in the matter of the appointment of agents to sell opium.

As regards the trade for 1918-1919, it is clear from Exhibit VII and the evidence of the first defendant that it was wholly illegal. The first defendant states that the persons who bid at the auction sale for that year and who were, under the Act, licensees for the vending of opium were merely benamidars for the first defendant and that the business was solely for the benefit of the first defendant, there being no partners in the business. Exhibit VII states that the persons who bid for the right to sell opium in 38 villages were merely benamidars and bid for the first defendant. The agreement proceeds as follows:

“Therefore you may lease out the said shops as you please and vend the opium. Because of the said shops standing in our names we shall always be ready to sign any papers you might require to be signed by us in connexion therewith for any purpose at your request. We shall not claim any remission whatever from you for the same. Further you shall yourself recover the profit or loss accruing from the trade of the said 38 shops as you please and we shall have nothing to do therewith,”

As the partnership for 1917-1918 was illegal and as the benami purchase by the first defendant in 1918-1919 was also illegal, it is clear that the first defendant cannot make the other coparceners liable. It is not open to one coparcener to enter into illegal transactions and to Saddle the other coparceners with the loss arising from them, especially where it is not shown that the other coparceners consented to it.

It is argued by Mr. Ranga Acharya that, whatever may be the lights of third persons, as between coparceners themselves the first defendant cannot be called to account for the monies he spent on this business, because it will really be calling him to account for his past transactions. No authority has been cited for the proposition that the immunity of a manager to account for his past transactions entitles him to enter into illegal transactions and use joint family properties for the purpose. We think it will be gross misconduct sufficient to entitle the coparceners to require the managing member to bear the loss incurred in such transactions and to put back in the family any money that he may have taken out of the family for such transactions. Both on the ground that the business was unauthorized and that it was also illegal, we are of opinion that the decision of the Subordinate Judge is right. In taking an account of the joint family properties, the first defendant will pay the plaintiff one-half of the monies of the joint family which he has used for the opium business. The opium business for 1917-1918 and 1918-1919 will be treated as the sole separate property of the first defendant, he being entitled to the profits, if any, and liable to bear the loss.

As regards the choultry started by Gangireddi, there is little doubt on the evidence that it was started by him with approval of his two sons. In his deposition given on the 16th October 1903, Gangireddi states:

“I endowed a ??? Samarlakota for Rs. 10,000. I gave a leasehold right of the annual value of Rs. 1,200 for 25 years for a chatram in my village. My son asked me to endow the chatram for lame and blind, people with the interest accruing on Rs. 10,000, funded capital. I am going to do so hereafter.”

In his second will, Exhibit la, dated the 13th day of May 1906, he states:

“From after my death, interest accruing on a sum of Rs. 10,000 shall be paid once a year for the Dharma Ghatram (charity house) situate in Gollala Mamidada.”

In his third will, Exhibit 1b, dated the 8th day of October 1913, he states that he advanced a loan to Muchilika Appalaraju and others of Chengondapalli and took a usufructuary mortgage, of Chengondapalli and its hamlets which form a muttah and continues as follows:

“The net profits realized from the said muttah annually I have been giving away for the expenses, of feeding, etc., of the choultry which I built in Gollala Mamidada and have been making credit and debit entries accordingly in the accounts also. So long as the said. Chengondapalli muttah is in our possession according to the term, the net profits annually realized therefrom shall be paid for the expenses of the said choultry even after my death and Bulli Tammireddi shall look after the whole management needed for it. Besides this, the interest that may annually be realized on a sum of Rs. 10,000 out of my own funds shall either be spent to meet the expenses of the charity choultry at Gollala Mamidada once a year or shall be kept in deposii for the said purpose.”

It appears from the accounts that the income from the muttah was utilized for the expenses of the choultry from the date of its opening. The evidence shows that there was a dedication of the income from the muttah for the purpose of the upkeep of the choultry and we see no, reason to doubt the truth of the statement made by Grangireddi in his deposition given so early as 1903, already referred to, that he had already given the leasehold right he had in the muttah as an endowment for the choultry. The Subordinate Judge upholds the provision in the will regarding the setting apart of Rs. 10,000 as funded capital for the choultry but thinks that the dedication of the income from Chengondapalli muttah which is also referred to in the same will is not bindingon the plaintiff. He observes;

“there is no doubt of the fact that in the Chongondapalli Khata the income was being shown as having been taken on to the account of the choultry in the account books maintained during the time of the late. Gangireddi.”

Relying on Govinda Doss v. Raja Venkata Perumal, lie is of opinion that the mere fact that the income was used by Gangireddi is no ground for holding that there was a dedication of the corpus. It is, however, clear on the findings of the Subordinate Judge that Gangireddi and his sons were members of an undivided family and that the trade carried on by Gangireddi was a joint family business in which the father and the sons were interested. The will executed by Gangireddi by itself cannot bind the plaintiff but the contention for the appellants is not based on the will but on an anterior dedication by Gangireddi, and the will is only used as evidence of dedication. There seems to be no adequate reason for disbelieving the statement made by Gangireddi so long ago as 1903 that he had endowed the choultry with the income of Chengondapalli muttah, especially as the account books also support his statement. So far as the dedication is concerned, no document is necessary. We need only refer to Pallayya v. Ramavadhanulu and Ramalingam Chetti v. Sivachidambara Chetty. We are of opinion that the income from Chengondapalli muttah was dedicated to the choultry and that it is not joint family property liable for partition.

The next question is as to the marriage expenses of the first defendant's son and daughter. So far as the daughter is concerned, the will of Gangireddi directs that a sum of Rs. 1,000 should be given for the purpose of making jewels for her. She is clearly entitled to the expenses of the marriage being provided for out of the joint family funds and, having regard to the status of the family, we are of opinion that a sum of Rs. 3,000 should be set apart for the expenses of her marriage in addition to the sum of Rs. 1,000 provided for jewels.

As regards the marriage expenses of the second defendant, no claim was made in the written statement for any such provision. No issue was raised on the point. The only point raised was as to the setting apart of Rs. 2,000 for jewels to be made for the girl he might marry, as to which provision was made in Gangireddi's will. This has been allowed. The question as to the provision to be made for his marriage expenses was raised for the first time by Mr. Ranga Aeharya during the course of his argument. Under these circumstances we are not prepared to go into the question and direct any provision to be made.

As regards the jewels which form the subject matter of the tenth issue and which are claimed by the first defendant, we think the Subordinate Judge was right in deciding against the first defendant. He set up the case that some jewels were pledged by strangers with the family and some were lent to the family by others. He offered to file a list stating which jewels were pledged and which jewels were lent but did not do so. It is not proved that the jewels are the jewels of the first defendant's wife, and we do not think that, having regard to the contentions raised by the first defendant, he should now be given an opportunity of adducing evidence that the jewels belong to his wife, a case which was never set up by him in the written statement or at the time of trial in the lower Court.

This disposes of all the points raised in Appeal. The decree of the lower Court will be modified in the light of the above observations. As the appellants have failed substantially they will pay respondent's costs.

K.R