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Sanagavarapu Jwala Lakshmi Narasimham v. Mulpuru Veerabhadrudu

Madras High Court
Oct 24, 1923
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two ejectment suits were instituted by the plaintiff in the District Munsif's Court of Nuzvid seeking to eject the defendants, who were alleged to be his tenants. The disputed land lies in Arungolanu Mokhasa (or Arngolanu Mukhasa) within the Nuzvid Zamindari. The plaint alleged an exchange for patta lands under Government pattas.

The defendants pleaded, inter alia, that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction because the lands formed part of an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act. The District Munsif found the fifth issue (whether the suit village is an estate) in favour of the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff's suits.

On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the village formed part of the Nuzvid Zamindari and constituted an estate as defined in Section 3, Clause 2(e) of the Estates Land Act; that the land's character had not been changed by the alleged exchange; and that the plaintiff was a landholder. The Subordinate Judge returned the plaints for presentation to the Revenue Court. The plaintiff then filed the present appeals against those orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit village / disputed land forms part of an "estate" within the meaning of Section 3, Clause 2 (e) of the Estates Land Act (i.e., whether Civil Courts have jurisdiction).
  2. Whether the pre‑settlement Mokhasa (an inam granted in 1747 described as "Chatur Bhagam") was excluded from the Zamindari assets and assessment by reason of Regulation XXV of 1802, Section 4 (i.e., whether a pre‑settlement inam on favourable quit rent was excluded from the Permanent Settlement).
  3. Whether the alleged exchange (conversion to patta lands under Government pattas) changes the character of the suit lands so as to remove them from being part of an estate.
  4. Whether the plaintiff, alleged to be a minor inamdar in a Mokhasa, is a "landholder" within the meaning of Section 3, Clause 5 of the Estates Land Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • It was argued that the Mokhasa grant was on a favourable quit rent (less than the landlord's full Melwaram) — specifically a Chatur Bhagam arrangement where only a fourth of the produce was paid to the Zamindar — and therefore the grant should be excluded by Section 4 of Regulation XXV of 1802 from the Permanent Settlement assessment.
  • Reliance was placed on Kuppa Reddi Nookayya v. Bheemanna, where a pre‑settlement inam was held not to be part of the Zamindari because it was excluded from assessment.
  • It was contended that even if the Mokhasa income had been included in the Zamindari assessment, Section 4 should operate to ignore it because Section 4 excludes lands paying only favourable quit rents from permanent assessment.

Respondents' (Defendants' / State / Subordinate Judge supporting view) Arguments and Evidence

  • The defendants contended that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction since the lands were part of an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act (defence pleaded in the Civil Court and accepted by the District Munsif).
  • The Subordinate Judge relied on historical treatment of the Mokhasa and on administrative records indicating that at the time of the Permanent Settlement the Mokhasa villages had been included in the Zamindari assets; an attempt to enfranchise the village was abandoned after consideration and referral up to the Secretary of State, suggesting the income had been treated as part of the Zamindari.
  • The Government Order No. 2374 dated 24th December 1861 and the accompanying inquiries (including the Inam Commissioner's letter of July 23, 1860) were relied upon to show that the Mokhasas were not excluded from the Zamindari and could not be enfranchised.
  • As to the alleged exchange (patta), it was argued (and the court held) that there is no evidence of the Zamindar's consent to any exchange and that the exchange, even if alleged, would not by itself change the character of the lands.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sri Rajah Sobhanadri Appa Rao Bahadur v. Sri Rajah Venkatanarasimha Appa Mao Bahadur Definition of the tenure "Mokhasa" — created by assignment of village or land to an individual rent‑free or at a low quit rent on condition of service. Used to interpret the nature of the 1747 Mokhasa grant (described as Bhata Vrithi and Chatur Bhagam) and to situate the grant within recognized tenure types.
Kuppa Reddi Nookayya v. Bheemanna Held that a pre‑settlement inam (granted in 1800) was not part of the Zamindari because it was excluded from the assessment of the Zamindari under Regulation XXV of 1802. Relied upon by appellant to argue that the Mokhasa here should likewise be excluded from the Permanent Settlement; the court considered the authority but distinguished factual treatment in settlement accounts.
Varahaliah v. Suryanarayana Jagapathiraju Held that while a pre‑1802 inam raises a presumption of exclusion from settlement, that presumption is rebuttable. Cited to support the proposition that the presumption of exclusion can be rebutted by evidence that the land/income was in fact included in the Zamindari assessment.
Secretary of State for India v. Rajah of Venkatagiri Privy Council discussion that Section 4 of Regulation XXV is not precise; where a Sannad contains no reference to Lakiraj lands, Section 4 may have no application — assessment may have been fixed on a different basis. Applied to show that the question of exclusion must be decided with reference to the Sannad and what actually occurred at the time of the Permanent Settlement rather than by a blanket rule.
Parthasaradhi Appa Rao v. Raja Bommadevara Satyanarayana Held that acts of the Inam Commissioners are not alone sufficient to affect the rights of the Zamindar. Relied on by the court in concluding that alleged administrative acts (or exchanges) without the Zamindar's consent do not alter the Zamindar's rights or the character of the land.
Sobhanadri Appa Rau v. Gopalkristnamma (Referenced in the opinion) Principle that acts of Inam Commissioners are not by themselves sufficient to affect the Zamindar. Cited in support of the court's treatment of the exchange/enfranchisement issue.
Brahmayya v. Achiraju Full Bench decision holding that a minor inamdar in a Mokhasa is a "landholder" within the meaning of Section 3, Clause 5 of the Estates Land Act. Deemed binding on the court and applied to hold that the plaintiff (a minor inamdar) is a landholder for the purposes of the Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the historical character of the disputed land and the administrative treatment of the Mokhasa at the time of the Permanent Settlement. Key steps in the court's analysis were:

  1. Historical status: It was undisputed that the land formed part of the Nuzvid Zamindari and that the village (Arngolanu / Arungolanu) had an original Mokhasa grant in 1747 to the Desapandyas described in the Inam Register as a "personal Inam" with tenure entry "The tenure is Chatur Bhagam now also settled on the same tenure on produce 450-0-0." The grant predates both the Permanent Settlement and the East India Company acquisition.
  2. Character of Mokhasa: The court used Wilson's Glossary and the cited authority defining Mokhasa to interpret "Chatur Bhagam" (a quarter of produce) and Bhata Vrithi (service) as the nature of the grant, and noted appellant's argument that the benefit to grantees was the difference between ordinary rent and the one‑fourth payable under Chatur Bhagam.
  3. Regulatory question — Regulation XXV of 1802, Section 4: The court considered the contention that Section 4 excluded lands paying only favourable quit rents (and similar categories) from permanent assessment, thereby excluding pre‑settlement Mokhasas. The court reviewed the authorities (including Kuppa Reddi, Varahaliah, and the Privy Council in Venkatagiri) and concluded that the question cannot be resolved solely by the pre‑settlement date; rather, it required examination of the Sannad and what actually occurred at the time of the Permanent Settlement.
  4. Need for primary evidence: Because of contested factual matters (including references to attempted enfranchisement proceedings), the court sought and called for Government Order No. 2374 dated 24th December 1861 and connected papers. Those documents — including the Inam Commissioner's letter (July 23, 1860) and the Government order — showed that the Inam Commissioner and subsequent Board of Revenue enquiries concluded that the Mokhasas of the Nuzvid Zamindari had been included in the accounts on which the Permanent Settlement was based and were not excluded as Lakhiraj lands.
  5. Effect of administrative treatment: The Government order of 24th December 1861 recorded that the Board and Government agreed that the Mokhasas could not be enfranchised and that Government could not claim a reversionary right. The court concluded from these records that the Mokhasas had been treated as part of the Zamindari assets at the time of the Permanent Settlement.
  6. Legal consequence: Because the Mokhasas were treated as part of the Zamindari and therefore form part of an "estate" under the Estates Land Act, the Civil Courts lacked jurisdiction over the ejectment suits; those matters lay with the Revenue Court.
  7. Exchange / patta argument: The court held that the alleged exchange (conversion to patta lands) would not change the character of the lands unless the consent of the Zamindar had been obtained. The court relied on Parthasaradhi Appa Rao v. Raja Bommadevara Satyanarayana and related authorities to hold that acts of Inam Commissioners or similar administrative acts alone are insufficient to affect Zamindar rights.
  8. Plaintiff's status as landholder: The court applied the Full Bench decision in Brahmayya v. Achiraju, which held that a minor inamdar in a Mokhasa is a "landholder" within Section 3, Clause 5 of the Estates Land Act; that decision was binding and led to the conclusion that the plaintiff is a landholder under the Act.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF — The appeals are dismissed. (The opinion states: "The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.")

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The court found that the Mokhasas in question were treated as part of the Nuzvid Zamindari at the time of the Permanent Settlement and therefore form part of an "estate" within the meaning of the Estates Land Act; consequently, Civil Courts have no jurisdiction over the suits and the plaints were properly returned for presentation to the Revenue Court.
  • The plaintiff is a "landholder" within the meaning of Section 3, Clause 5 of the Estates Land Act (as the Full Bench decision in Brahmayya v. Achiraju is binding), and the plaintiff's status does not alter the jurisdictional conclusion.
  • The alleged exchange to patta lands, without shown consent of the Zamindar, does not alter the character of the lands or remove them from estate status.

Broader implications: The court applied existing principles and binding precedents to the facts and did not purport to lay down any novel legal principle; the decision turns on the historical and administrative facts (including Government Order No. 2374 dated 24th December 1861) demonstrating that the Mokhasas were included in the Zamindari assessment at the time of the Permanent Settlement.

This summary is strictly confined to the material and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

These appeals arise out of two suits filed by the plaintiff, in the District Munsif's Court of Nuzvid, to eject the defendants who are alleged to be his tenants.

The land in dispute is situate in Arungolanu Mukhasa, within the ambit of the Nuzvid Zamindari. It is alleged to have been exchanged for patta lands, under Government pattas. The defendants pleaded inter alia that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits, as the lands form part of an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act. The District Munsif found the fifth issue, namely, whether the suit village is an estate, in favour of the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff's suits, on the ground that the land in question was part of an estate, within the meaning of the Estates Land Act. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the village, in which the suit land is situate, forms part of the Nuzvid Zamindari and is an estate, as defined in Sect. 3, Cl. 2 (e) of the Estates Land Act, that the character of the land has not changed, by reason of the exchange, referred to in the plaint and that the plaintiff is therefore a landholder. He returned the plaints for presentation to the Revenue Court and against those orders the plaintiff has filed the present appeals.

The land in dispate was admittedly part of the Nuzvid Zamindari. The village of Arngolanu, in which the land is situate, appears to have been granted as Mokhasa in 1747 by the then holder of the Zamindari, Jagannatha Appa Rao. The original grant has not been produced; but the terms of the grant can be gathered from Ex. I, which is an extract from the Inam Register. The Inam is classed as personal Inam. The Ayakat is said to be 1781–1785, Poromboke 542-54 and the Inams 50 acres 91 cents. Under the column of the description of Inam, the entry is Bhata Vrithi. The original grantees were Desapandyas. It is admitted before us that Desapandyas were the persons, who were doing the duty of collecting the revenue. Under the heading of tenure, the entry is:

“The tenure is Chatur Bhagam now also settled on the same tenure on produce 450-0-0.”

The grant is said to be hereditary by prescription and is said to have been granted by Jagannatha Appa Rao, in Fasli 1156, or A.D 1747. The East India Company acquired the Government of the Circars in 1768 and the grant therefore was one made, not only before the Permanent Settlement, but also before the acquisition by the Company of the Government of the Circars. “Chatur Bhagam” is defined in Wilson's Glossary as the fourth part of the annual crop received by Government, from the holders of certain alienated lands. In Sri Rajah Sobhanadri Appa Rao Bahadur v. Sri Rajah Venkatanarasimha Appa Mao Bahadur the tenure known as Mokhasa has been defined, as one which is created by an assignment of village or land to an individual, either rent-free, or at a low quit rent on condition of service. It is argued for the appellant that the grant was on favourable quit rent, which means something less than the actual Melwaram, which the landlord would be entitled to, but for the grant, and that in case of Chatur Bhagam Mokhasas, the grant was on condition that only a fourth of the produce was paid to the Zamindar, that the very fact that the Mokhasa was granted for Bhata Vrithi, that is service, and that the grantees were Desapandyas or Collectors of revenue, shows that the benefit to the grantees by reason of the grant of the Mokhasa was the difference between the rent, which would ordinarily have been paid and the fourth, which the grantees have to pay. It seems to us to be clear that the grant being a pre-settlement grant, it would not form part of the Zamindari, unless it can be brought under any of the clauses of Sect. 3, Cl. 2 of the Estates Land Act and for this purpose it is necessary to see whether at the time of the Permanent Settlement this pre-settlement Inam was treated as part of the Zamindari assets and the income taken into account, for the purpose of the grant of the Sannad. In this connection, reference has to be made to Regulation XXV of 1802. Sect. 4 of the Regulation runs as follows:

“The Government having reserved to itself the entire exercise of its discretion of continuing or abolishing temporarily or permanently, the articles of revenue included, according to the custom and practice of the country, under the several heads of salt and salt-petre ot the Senjar, or duties by sea or land, of the abkari, or tax on the sale of spirituous liquors and intoxicating drugs, of the excise on articles of consumption, of all taxes personal and professional, as well as those derived from markets fairs, or bazaars of Lakhiraj lands (or lands exempt from the payment of public revenue) and of all other lands paying only favourable quit rents, the permanent assessment of the land tax shall be made exclusively of the said articles now recited.”

The contention of Mr. Ramadoss is that the Mokhasa being a pre-settlement Inam, granted on favourable quit rent, it must have been excluded by Sect. 4, at the time when the revenue of the Zamindari was taken into account, for the purpose of the Permanent Settlement and that even if it was included, it could not affect the rights of the Mokhasadars, as such inclusion would be opposed to the provisions of the Permanent Settlement Regulation. Reliance has been placed on Kuppa Reddi Nookayya v. Bheemanna. In that case, the Zamindar of Pittapur granted in 1800 an Inam of certain lands in the Zamindari. It was made free of Kattubadi and purported to be Sarva Dumbala or absolute. It was held that the Inam was not part of the Pittapur Zamindari, at, it was pre-settlement Inam, excluded from the assessment of the Zamindari. Oldfield and Ramesam, JJ., after referring to Regulation XXV of 1802, were of opinion that, in view of the unqualified terms of Sect. 4, there was no relevancy in the enquiry whether the Inam was in fact included in the assets of the Zamindari on which the peishcush was fixed, with regard to the circuit committee's accounts, prepared before 1786. In another Second Appeal, Varahaliah v. Suryanarayana Jagapathiraju, Ayliug and Odgers, JJ., held that though the fact of an inam having been granted prior to 1802 raised a presumption that the lands granted were excluded from the permanent settlement, that presumption was capable of being rebutted. As pointed out by their lordships of the Privy Council in Secretary of State for India v. Rajah of Venkatagiri, the draft of Sect. 4 “can by no means he commended for preciseness or lucidity.” Objection is now taken by Mr. Ramadoss that even assuming that the income from this Mokhasa was taken into account, for the Permanent Settlement, it should be ignored, because of the express provisions of the Regulation. The effect of Sect. 4 was considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council at page 875 of the report. After pointing out that so far as the actual settlement of the Venkatagiri Zamindari was concerned, the Government fixed a definite specific assessment on the whole Zaraindari, irrespective of the particular assets, derived from each particular unit of property within the estate, their Lordships observe:

“The question now is whether the action of the Government was, in view of the provisions of Regulation XXV of 1802, valid or otherwise As already stated, counsel for the appellant have strongly argued that in view of the provisions of Sect. 4 of that Regulation, excluding ‘Lakiraj lands (or lands exempt from the payment of public revenue) and all other lands paying only favourable quit rents' from the permanent assessment of the land tax, it was not competent for the Governor-in-Council to grant a sannad of the character that is in issue in this case.”

Their Lordships of the Privy Council were of opinion that the question had to be decided, with reference to Sects. 3 and 4 of the Act and the conditions of the Sannad and that where the Sannad contained no reference to Lakhiraj lands, Sect. 4 could have no application and the assessment fixed upon the Zamindari, by virtue of the arrangements adopted in 1802, was upon a basis quite different from that provided in Sect. 4 of the Regulation.

The question therefore in this case cannot be decided without reference to the terms of the Sannad, granted by the Zamindar and to what actually took place, at the time of the Permanent Settlement We are of opinion that where at the time of the Permanent Settlement lands which the Government might have excluded from assessment, by reason of the various grounds set forth in Sect. 4 of the Regulation, were as a matter of fact included in calculating the assessment payable by the Zamindar and where both the Government and the Zamindar from 1802, have acted on the footing that the Inam forms part of the Zamindari, the tenants who were subsequently introduced into the property have no right to question the acts of the persons entitled at the time of the Sannad to enter into those arrangements.

Reliance has been placed by the Subordinate Judge on the fact that at the time of the Inam Settlement an attempt was made to enfranchise the whole village, but that after some enquiry, the Government gave up the attempt and the matter went up to the Secretary of State, with the result that the enfranchisement proceedings were given up. It is argued that the fact that the Government gave up enfranchising the village, after so much correspondence, shows that the income of the village must have been included in the assets of the Zamindari. It was stated before us that the order of the Government at the time of the settlement was subpoenaed for, but that the order was not filed owing to objections taken by the Board of Revenue. As it appeared that copies were obtained by the Zamindar and were filed in other proceedings relating to the same village and as Ex. II, which is a judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Masulipatam, in A. S. No. 466 of 191, relating to another portion of the same village and where the Government order is referred to, was filed without any objection in both the lower Courts, we thought it desirable in the interests of justice, to call for the Government Order No. 2374, dated 24th of December, 1861. The order of the Government and the connected papers have now been produced. The letter from Mr. Taylor, the Inam Commissioner, to the Government, dated July 23rd, 1860, refers to the old Mokhasas of the old Masulipatam District and it states that the full value of the Mokhasas in the Nuzvid Zamindari was included in the accounts of the Permanent Settlement. After dealing with the several reports he states as follows:

“It was necessary to devote the most careful scrutiny to the above references, as the original nature of these Mokhasas and the circumstance of their being included in the assets of the Zamindaries had not been generally understood. The villages of the Zamindari estates are distinguished on the back of the permanent kaul as seri (i.e, under the direct management of the Zamindar) Mokhasas and Agraharams. But this distinction affords no ground for classing the Mokhasas with the Lakhiraj lands, excluded by the Sannad, whilst a different conclusion is fully established by the accounts upon which the Permanent Settlement was based, and which ought to explain the terms of the Kaul. Should the Government concur in the justice of these observations, I submit we possess no reversionary interest in the Mokhasas, nor can we claim to derive a quit rent by their enfranchisement.”

The Government on the 11th of August, 1860, after referring to Mr. Taylor's letter, were of opinion that as the question was one of importance, the letter of Mr. Taylor should he referred to the Board of Revenue for Report. An exhaustive enquiry was made by the Board though the Collector and the Board of Revenue agreed with the opinion of the Inam Commissioner and the Collector, that Mr. Taylor was right and the Mokhasas could not be enfranchised. On the 24th of December, 1861, the Government passed the following order:

“In their order of 11th August, 1860, No. 1335, the Government referred, to the Board of Revenue for report, a letter from the Inam Commissioner, relating to the Mokhasa villages of the Zamindaries in the Old Masulipatam District. Mr. Taylor was of opinion that these villages were not excluded from the assets of the estates, as had usually been supposed, and that therefore they would not come under his operations. (2) The Board of Revenue were at first doubtful on the matter and resolved to refer the subject for enquiry by the Collector. The result is now submitted with the proceedings recorded above. (8) Mr. Thornhill has conclusively shown that Mr. Taylor was correct in his surmise and the Board now agree both with him and the Inam Commissioner that Government cannot claim the reversionary right to the villages, and therefore that the rules for redeeming that right are inapplicable to them. (4) In this view the Government concur.”

It is now clear that these Mokhasas were not excluded from the Zamindari, at the time of the Permanent Settlement and that they were treated as part of the Zamindari. They are therefore part of an ‘estate,’ within the meaning of the Estates Land Act and Civil Courts have no jurisdiction.

As regards the exchange, alleged by the plaintiffs, we do not think that it would, even if true, change the character of the plaint lands. It has not been shown that the consent of the Zamindar had been obtained. The question is concluded by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council, in Parthasaradhi Appa Rao v. Raja Bommadevara Satyanarayana. The acts of the Inam Commissioners are not by themselves sufficient to affect the Zamindar: (See Sobhanadri Appa Rau v. Gopalkristnamma.

It is argued that the plaintiff is not a landholder, within the meaning of Sect. 3, Cl. 5 of the Estates Land Act, as he is a minor inamdar in a Mokhasa. It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court, in Brahmayya v. Achiraju, that such an inamdar is a landholder, within the meaning of the section. This decision is binding on us.

The decisions of the District Munsif and the Subordinate Judge are right. The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.

C.KAppeals dismissed.