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Narayanaswami Naidu v. Rangasami Naidu

Madras High Court
Feb 5, 1926
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

A Razinamah decree was passed on 22 October 1914 in O.S. No. 11 of 1913. The decree provided that if the 1st defendant or the 4th defendant paid Rs. 17,000 to the decree-holders within two years, the property should be reconveyed to the 1st defendant; if payment was not made, the decree-holders would enjoy the properties with absolute rights. The plaintiffs (decree-holders) entered into an agreement on 19 April 1916 with the 2nd defendant by which they relinquished their interest in the property for Rs. 7,000.

The 2nd plaintiff applied to the lower Court for execution of the decree. The learned District Judge held that the decree had been adjusted by an arrangement (referred to in the opinion as evidenced by Exhibits A and B) and that the 2nd plaintiff was not entitled to execute the decree. The District Judge also held that the 2nd plaintiff released his right to the property by another document (Exhibit E dated 15 July 1922). Plaintiffs 2 to 4 appealed against that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Razinamah decree in question is a decree "where any money is payable" so as to bring it within Order 21, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  2. Whether an out-of-Court adjustment of the decree (evidenced by Exhibits A and B) can be recognised without being certified to the Court under O.21, R.2.
  3. Whether the 2nd plaintiff was entitled to execute the decree in view of the arrangement and related documents.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Mr. Srinivasagopalachariar for the appellants contended that the decree was a money decree and that any adjustment made out of Court and not certified to the Court should not be recognised.
  • He argued that the terms of the Razinamah decree did not create a decree under which the plaintiffs could recover Rs. 17,000 by execution if the defendants chose not to pay; hence there was no enforceable money decree for Rs. 17,000 that came within O.21, R.2.
  • According to the appellants' argument, because the defendants could decline to pay, the plaintiffs had no right to realise the 17,000 by execution, and therefore the decree did not fall within the scope of Rule 2.

Other Contention Addressed in Opinion

  • A contention (relied upon decisions such as Gharry v. Gowrya) was that O.21, R.2 applies to all kinds of decrees regardless of the nature of the relief; i.e., that the words "of any kind" mean the rule covers adjustment of any decree, not only money decrees.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gharry v. Gowrya Held (per the opinion) that O.21, R.2 applied to decrees of all kinds — i.e., the words "of any kind" mean any decree. The Court explicitly rejected this broad view, observing there was no adequate discussion of prior decisions in that case and holding that the wording should be read as referring to decrees under which money is payable.
Ramakrishna Rao v. Balakrishna Rao Held that O.21, R.2 applied to partition decrees which provided for payment of money as well as other reliefs, and that such adjustments could not be recognised unless certified. The Court cited and accepted this principle: where money is payable under a decree, even if other reliefs are present, an out-of-Court adjustment must be certified within the prescribed time or cannot be recognised.
Baba Mohamed v. Webb Calcutta High Court bench (as summarized) held that the corresponding section (Sect. 258 of Code of 1877) was applicable to all decrees. The opinion notes this as one view in the historical conflict of authorities; the present Court did not accept that view as applicable to the current formulation of O.21, R.2 except insofar as money is payable under a decree.
Sankaran Nambiar v. Kanara Kurup Held that Sect. 258 (Code of 1877/1882) referred only to execution of decrees under which money was payable and not to decrees for possession of immovable property. The Court relied on this view as supporting the narrower interpretation that O.21, R.2 applies to decrees under which money is payable.
Abdul Latif Saheb v. Bathula Bibi Ammal Held that where a decree provided for delivery of immovable property and for payment of money, it was not open to the Court to recognise any uncertified adjustment under O.21, R.2, Cl. 3. The Court cited this authority as consistent with the proposition that if money is payable under a decree (even alongside possession), an uncertified adjustment cannot be recognised.
Sethurama Sahib… v. Chotta Raja Sahib… Followed Abdul Latif Saheb; Mr. Justice Sadasiva Aiyar held that a complex decree under which money is payable (including where possession is also marked) falls within O.21, R.2. The opinion cites this as supporting authority for the narrower reading that money-payable decrees (even complex ones) require certification of adjustments.
Kelu Nair v. Meenakshi Earlier authority noted; Mr. Justice Sadasiva Aiyar (in a later decision) altered his earlier view and followed Abdul Latif Saheb. Referred to by the Court as part of the chain of decisions showing the evolution of the view that O.21, R.2 applies where money is payable under a decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a textual and historical analysis of Order 21, Rule 2 (O.21, R.2) to determine its scope. The key reasoning steps in the opinion are:

  1. Textual interpretation: The Court examined the phrase "where any money payable under a decree of any kind is paid out of Court" and concluded that the definite article "the decree" and the surrounding wording indicate the rule refers to a decree under which money is payable. The Court read "of any kind" as qualifying the word "decree" to include complex decrees (i.e., decrees under which money is payable even if other reliefs are present), not to extend the rule to decrees where no money is payable.
  2. Historical context: The Court reviewed the historical evolution of the statute and prior analogous provisions (Sect. 206 of Act VIII of 1859; Sect. 258 of the Code of 1877 and the Code of 1882). It noted that the earlier Act's language required certification of all adjustments irrespective of the nature of the decree, but later codes narrowed or altered the scope and produced conflicting High Court decisions.
  3. Precedent reconciliation: The Court considered prior conflicting authorities — including Baba Mohamed v. Webb (broader application) and Sankaran Nambiar v. Kanara Kurup (narrower application) — and concluded the addition of the words "of any kind" in the present Code was intended to resolve the conflict by making clear that the rule covers decrees under which money is payable even if there are other reliefs, but not decrees where no money is payable at all (e.g., pure possession decrees).
  4. Clarification of "payable": The Court emphasized that "payable under a decree" means money recoverable by execution against the party liable to pay it, not money which a party may optionally choose to pay. Thus, where the decree does not empower the decree-holder to realise money by execution (because the other party may simply decline to pay), the rule does not apply.
  5. Application to facts: Applying this legal framework to the present Razinamah decree, the Court found that the plaintiffs could not execute the decree to realise Rs. 17,000 against the 1st and 4th defendants (the defendants could refuse to pay), and therefore the decree was not one "under which money is payable" in the sense required by O.21, R.2. Consequently, the out-of-Court adjustment evidenced by Exhibits A and B (and the related promissory note Ex. B which was sued upon and realised) constituted an adjustment of the decree that could be pleaded and recognised.
  6. Result on other findings: Because the Court concluded the decree did not fall within O.21, R.2, it held that the learned District Judge was correct in determining that the decree had been adjusted by Exhibits A and B and that the plaintiffs could not seek execution of the decree which had already been adjusted. The Court did not need to decide whether Exhibit E amounted to a release.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Implications and consequences:

  • The Court held that Order 21, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to decrees under which money is payable (including complex decrees that also provide other reliefs), but does not apply to decrees where no money is recoverable by execution. The phrase "payable under a decree" was interpreted to mean money that is enforceable by execution against the party liable to pay it, not optional payments by a party.
  • On the facts, because the plaintiffs could not realise Rs. 17,000 by execution against the 1st and 4th defendants, the decree did not come within O.21, R.2; the out-of-Court adjustment evidenced by Exhibits A and B was therefore recognized by the Court and barred execution.
  • The direct effect on the parties is that the 2nd plaintiff (and plaintiffs 2 to 4) cannot execute the decree; the arrangement with the 2nd defendant (Exs. A and B) amounted to an adjustment that precluded execution. The Court did not decide whether Exhibit E effected a release; that question was unnecessary to the decision.
  • The opinion interprets and clarifies the scope of O.21, R.2 as explained above. The judgment does not purport to set out any broader novel rule beyond this statutory interpretation and its application to the present facts; the Court confined its decision to the textual and precedential analysis described in the reasoning section.
K. V. S. — Appeal dismissed.
Show all summary ...

A Razinamah decree was passed on 22nd October, 1914, in O.S No. 11 of 1913 in which it was provided that in case the 1st defendant or the 4th defendant were to pay to the decree-holders, Rs. 17,000 within two years the property should be reconveyed to the 1st defendant, but if default be made in such payments the decree-holders themselves should enjoy the properties with absolute rights. The plaintiffs-decree-holders entered into an agreement on 19th April, 1916, with the 2nd defendant whereby they relinquished their interest in the property for Rs. 7,000. The 2nd plaintiff applied to the lower Court for execution of the decree. The learned District Judge held that the decree had been adjusted by the arrangement of 1st April, 1916, evidenced by Exs. A and B and that the 2nd plaintiff was not entitled to execute the decree. He also held that the 2nd plaintiff released his right to the property by another document Ex. E dated 15th July, 1922. Against his order plaintiffs 2 to 4 have preferred this appeal.

The contention of Mr. Srinivasagopalachariar for the appellants is that the decree was a money decree, and any adjustment out of Court not certified to the Court should not be recognised. The sole question in this case is whether the decree is a decree coming within O. 21, R. 2, Civil Procedure Code. The terms of the Razi decree are such that the plaintiffs could not recover Rs. 17,000 from the defendants if the latter did not choose to pay the amount. There is no decree in favour of the plaintiffs for Rs. 17,000. What is stated in the decree is that if the 1st defendant or the 4th defendant were to pay Rs. 17,000 to the decree-holders; they should; reconvey the property to the 1st defendant. It is open to the defendants 1 and 4 not to pay the amount in which case the decree-holders will not be bound to reconvey the property. If the 1st defendant or the 4th defendant did not choose to pay the amount to the plaintiffs the decree did not empower them to realise the amount by execution. The decree is not one “where any money” is payable under a decree and, therefore, does not come within the provisions of O. 21, R. 2.

The next contention is that R. 2 applies to all kinds of decrees whatever may be the nature of the relief granted and reliance is placed upon Gharry v. Gowrya(1) in that case the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Shah held that R. 2 applied to all kinds of decrees. With very great respect to the learned Judges we are unable to accept this view. There is no discussion in the case of the decisions bearing on the question. The learned Judges contented themselves by merely saying the words “Where any money payable under a decree of any kind is paid out of Court or the decree is otherwise adjusted” as justifying their view that the words did not confine the provisions of the rule to money decrees and that any decree was provided for. The rule says ‘where any money payable under a decree of any kind is paid out of Court, i.e, where any money payable under a decree, whatever may be its nature, is paid out of Court, it has to be certified or if the decree is otherwise adjusted either in whole or in part that also has to be certified The words ‘the decree’ can only mean the decree under which any money is payable. The use of the definite article clearly indicates that the decree can only mean a decree where any money is payable, and the rule means any decree under which money is payable whether there be other reliefs or not if adjusted out of Court should be certified to the Court within the time allowed bylaw. But where no money is payable under a decree as for instance in the case of recovery of immoveable property or grant of injunction or any other relief in which the plaintiff is not entiteld to enforce by execution payment of money, that decree does not come within the purview of R. 2.

In Ramakrishna Rao v. Balakrishna Rao it was held by Oldfield and Seshagiri Aiyar J., that O. 21, R. 2, applied to partition decrees which provided for payment of money as well as other reliefs such as partition of immoveable property and adjustments with regard to such property and that such adjustment could not be recognised unless certified or recorded as required by the rule. The learned Judges considered the previous cases on the point and came to the conclusion that if money was payable under a decree, and if there were other reliefs, any adjustment of that decree out of Court should be certified within the time prescribed and if not certified to the Court then such an adjustment could not be recognised.

We may briefly refer to the history of the rule in order to understand what it really means. Under Sect. 206 of the Act VIII of 1859 all adjustments whatever may be the nature of the decree, had to be certified to the Court and any adjustment not certified could not be recognised. The latter portion of Sect. 203 was in these terms:—“No adjustment of a decree in part or in whole shall be recognised by the Court unless etc.” In the Act of 1877, the chapter on execution of decrees was greatly expanded and in some respects altered and Sect. 258 of the Code of 1882 was practically the same as that contained in the Code of 1877. Under the Code of 1877 it was not necessary that all the adjustments of decrees, whatever may be the nature should be certified to the Court. In Baba Mohamed v. Webb(2) a Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the rule contained in the Sect. 258 was applicable to all decrees. The learned Judges observe at p. 788 referring to Sect. 258 of the Code of 1877 ‘that section corresponds in all material respects, and carries with it the same meaning as Sect. 206 of the former Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859) which manifestly deals with the adjustment of any decree.” Under Sect. 258 of the Code of 1882 which is a verbatim copy of the corresponding section of the Code of 1877 it was held that it applied only to money decrees. That was the view of the Madras High Court in Sankaran Nambiar v. Kanara Kurup. The learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Benson held that Sect. 258, Civil Procedure Code, referred only to the execution of decrees under which money was payable and was not applicable to decrees for possession of immoveable properties. The section was further amended in the present Code by the addition of the words “of any kind” in order to reconcile the conflicting views of the different High Courts. In Abdul Latif Saheb v. Bathula Bibi Ammal it was held by Wallis and Ayling, JJ., that where there was a decree for the delivery of certain immoveable property and for the payment of money it was not open to the Court to recognise any uncertified adjustment under O. 21, R. 2, Cl. 3, Civil Procedure Code. This was followed in Sethurama Sahib… v. Chotta Raja Sahib….(3) where Mr. Justice Sadasiva Aiyar who held in Kelu Nair v. Meenakshi(4) that O. 21 R. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply to the relief of possession of immoveable properties given by a decree, altered his view and following the decision in Abdul Latif Saheb v. Bathula Bibi Animal held that where the decree provided for payment of money as well as other reliefs the adjustment of such a decree could not be recognised unless certified to the Court within the time allowed by law and observed that

“the word ‘the decree’ in the second sentence of that rule meant a decree of any kind under which money is payable including a complex decree under which possession is also marked, and that as regards execution of that portion also of the decree which relates to possession of immoveables an uncertified adjustment cannot be recognised”.

From the position of R. 2 in the present Code and from the heading and the marginal note, the intention of the legislature can be clearly gathered. Though the headings and marginal notes should not be held to govern the clear text of a section, yet they can be taken as an indication of what the legislature meant. Under the Code of 1859 Sect. 206 was in the chapter relating to execution generally. In the Code of 1877 and in the Code of 1882 Sect. 258 was in the chapter relating to execution under the heading ‘mode of execution’ and in the present Code, O. 21, R. 2 relates to execution of decrees and orders and the heading over R. 1 is payment under decree. If the contention of Mr. Srinivasa Gopalachari is correct, the legislature should have said in plain terms that the adjustment of any decree out of Court should not be recognised unless certified to the Court within the time allowed by law. That was the clear expression in the Code of 1859 and if the legislature intended to re-enact that provision it would have done so in very simple language. The addition of the words ‘of any kind’ after the word ‘decree’ in the second line of O 21, R. 2 was intended to set at rest the difference of view between the Madras High Court and the Calcutta High Court and the conflicting views as regards the meaning of Sect. 258 of the Code of 1882. By the addition of the words ‘of any kind’ it cannot be said that the legislature intended that the adjustment of any decree, whatever may be the relief claimed, should be certified to the Court. We are clearly of opinion that O. 21, R. 2 refers to a decree under which money is payable whether there are other reliefs or not and if no money is payable under a decree then R. 2 cannot be held to apply to such a decree. The words ‘payable under a decree’ do not mean any money which the party may, if he chooses, pay but money which is recoverable by a party in execution against the party liable to pay it. In this case, as already observed, the plaintiffs could not execute the decree against 1st and 4th defendants.

1st plaintiff died before the date of the Razi decree and plaintiffs 2 to 4 entered into the agreement evidenced by Ex. A. The recital in the document is:—

“As we have on this date got from you a note of bond executed in our favour for this sum of Rs. 7,000 stipulating interest at Rs. 0-6-0 per cent per mensem, you yourself shall take the karar and all other properties and also you yourself shall take from the said properties the income including the old arrears and the new income”.

A promissory note was executed on the same day by the 2nd defendant in favour of the plaintiffs which is Ex. B. A. suit was filed in the Pudukotta Court for the amount due under the promissory note and was realised by the plaintiffs. The arrangement evidenced, by Exs. A and B is, therefore, an adjustment of the decree passed in plaintiffs' favour, and such an adjustment could be pleaded as the decree does not come within the purview of R. 2 of O. 21. The learned Judge has correctly held that the decree was adjusted by the arrangement evidenced by Exs. A and B and the plaintiffs, therefore, could not ask for execution of the decree which had already been adjusted. It is not necessary to consider in this view whether Ex. E amounts to a release of the plaintiffs' right in the property in favour of the sons of the 2nd defendant.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

K. V. S.Appeal dismissed.