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Chintamanrao v. Vithal

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jul 28, 1930

1. The plaintiff attached the stock-in-trade of a shop in execution of a decree against Laxman Wagh and his brothers. The defendants successfully objected to the attachment relying on a sale-deed executed by Laxman Wagh. The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought for a declaration that the moveables attached were liable to attachment and sale. The lower appellate Court has held that the sale in favour of the defendants was genuine and for consideration; that the vendees are not shown to have known that the transaction would defeat or delay any creditors; that the property sold belonged to Laxman Wagh alone; and that even if it did not belong to him, he was the managing partner and could transfer the interest of the other defendants. The plaintiff's suit was therefore dismissed.

2. In second appeal it was first urged that the transaction of sale was sham or bogus or, at all events, made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the transferor.

3. I have first to consider whether I can interfere in second appeal with the finding that the transfer was genuine, being in reality satisfaction of the debt of one creditor, though it may have prejudiced the other creditors. The appellant urged that this is a finding regarding the legal inference to be drawn from proved facts. Now their Lordships of the Privy Council in Wali Mohammad v. Mohammad Bahsh, A.I.R 1930 P.C 91, explain the meaning of the words “legal inference to be drawn from proved facts” which appear in previous reported decisions. The meaning of the words is “the legal effect of proved facts.” A decision of a question of fact based on consideration of the facts proved and admitted cannot be said to be a decision regarding the legal effect of facts proved and admitted. I venture to supply an illustration to make clear what, in my opinion, their Lordships mean. If a fact in issue is the possession of certain land the facts proved are that the land has not been actually enjoyed by anyone but that a certain person has a title to the land; the decision of the fact in issue depends upon the legal effect of the proved facts. But if the fact in issue is whether or not there was a sale and the facts proved certain entries furnishing some support to the contention that there was a sale existing, the question whether there was a sale or not depends not on the legal effect of these entries but on their evidentiary value: these were the facts which their Lordships considered in Wali Mohammad v. Mohammad Baksh. Again in Ramji Patel v. Rao Kishoresingh A.I.R 1929 P.C 190 , 117 I.C 1 , 56 I.A 280 , 25 N.L.R 121 (P.C) their Lordships of the Privy Council held that a finding that a bargain was fair was a finding of fact. It seems quite clear that this finding must be reached by an inference drawn from other admitted and proved facts.

4. In the case I am now considering it was found that the vendors did owe Rs. 9,385 to the vendees. It was found that the value of the goods sold was such that the vendors might, in good faith, accept Rs. 9,385 in exchange for them. On the other hand, it was found that the suit of the plaintiff was in progress at the date of the transaction and that the vendors did not put the vendees in possession of the account-books, though they had transferred some of the debts. From a consideration of these and other facts found it was held that the vendors did not agree to receive any benefit as a result of their payment of the vendees' debt by sale of the goods, and that the transaction was genuine and was not made with intent to defeat or delay other creditors. These are findings of fact with which I cannot interfere. It is not material whether the learned Judge omitted to consider certain evidence or failed to attach due importance to other evidence. I cannot therefore interfere with the findings that the sale was genuine and was not made with intent to defeat or delay other creditors.

5. I remark that it might be possible for me to interfere with the finding of fact that the vendees were not aware that other creditors would be prejudiced by the sale. This cannot be said to be a finding based on evidence and there is, in my opinion, strong evidence that they were aware of this fact: the debt was satisfied in a very unusual way, namely by the sale not only of the stock-in-trade of a shop but also of the furniture of the debtors' house: the transaction was completed in great haste, no care being taken to check the value of the property transferred. But the question is not of importance for the purpose of a finding that the sale was in reality the satisfaction of the debt of one creditor at a time when many creditors existed.

6. The other ground urged is that Laxman Wagh had power to transfer only one-third share of the shop. The case of the plaintiff was that the shop had been started by the three brothers Wagh. The defence was that, so far as the defendants knew, the brothers of Laxman Wagh had no interest in the shop. No specific issue on the point raised by these pleadings was framed, but there was an issue regarding the liability of the property to attachment. The trial Judge considered that the defendants' own evidence showed that the cloth shop was a continuation of a former cloth shop and that Laxman and his brothers formed a joint family. For a reasons which appears unsound, he considered it immaterial whether or not the other judgment-debtors had any interest in the attached moveables. In first appeal it was urged that, on the conclusions of the trial Judge, the sale-deed was inoperative to the extent of two-thirds of the property. Before the appellate Judge, the facts found by the trial Judge do not seem to be attacked and the question whether property in all the goods was transferred was apparently-considered material. The Judge of first appeal held it proved that the brothers of Laxman had ceased to be partners in the shop before the date of sale and therefore the shop in reality belonged to Laxman. This finding seems to be based on misapprehension. The shop, a continuation of the former shop, was joint family property; the brothers would not lose their interest in it except by partition. The shop then was joint family property at the time of the transfer.

7. The Judge of first appeal next states that in any case Laxman was the managing partner and the sale should be held to be on behalf of all the partners. Now Laxman was a member of the joint family; he may have been managing the shop on behalf of the family but this would only give him power to perform acts of management. Clearly he could not sell the entire stock-in-trade to his creditor in satisfaction of a debt.

8. I hold therefore that, by the sale-effected by Laxman, the purchasers obtained rights only to one-third of the property; the remaining two-thirds continued to be the property of his brothers, the co-debtors. The plaintiff then was entitled to a declaration that two-thirds of the property attached at his instance on 7th October 1923 belonged to the judgment-debtors Brahmadeo and Mahdea and was rightly attached. Decree will be passed accordingly; the plaintiff-appellant will bear one-third of the costs throughout and the defendants will bear the other two-thirds.

K.N/R.K

9. Order accordingly.