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A.L Rama Patter And Brothers By Partner A.L Rama Patter . v. Manikkam Alias Lingappa Gounder .

Madras High Court
Sep 6, 1934
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (appellants) are a family of landlords and money-lenders in Palghat who had been lending to defendants 1 and 2 for some years. Defendants 1 and 2 are brothers and were adjudicated insolvents in 1932; the 3rd defendant is their nephew. The plaintiffs sued for recovery of about Rs. 58,000 as per account book Exhibit A. The 3rd defendant was the only contesting defendant at trial; the appeal concerns his liability. The plaintiffs limited their claim in the appeal to Rs. 15,000.

Exhibit A is the plaintiffs' account book (beginning September 1928) showing entries of advances and an acknowledgment dated 29 September 1928 that 1 and 2 defendants owed a balance. In September 1929 the defendants obtained an Rs. 8,000 advance after the three defendants signed an entry in Ex. A. The 3rd defendant later disputed the validity of his signatures.

Procedurally, the lower (Subordinate) Judge found in favour of the 3rd defendant, holding that he had signed Ex. A under the influence of defendants 1 and 2, that he did not appreciate the magnitude of the liability, and that the plaintiffs had notice of the influence. The Subordinate Judge applied the decision of Venkatasubba Rao J. in Narayana Doss Balakrishna Doss v. Buchraj Chordia Sowcar. The plaintiffs appealed; the appellate court heard submissions and issued the present opinion dismissing the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the 3rd defendant's signatures on Exhibit A were obtained under undue influence (or similar circumstances described in his written statement), and if so, whether he is liable for the debts recorded in Ex. A.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs, who took the benefit of the transaction, can hold the 3rd defendant liable where they knew or had notice of the fiduciary/confidential relationship between defendants 1 and 3 and the circumstances surrounding the signing.
  3. Whether English equitable principles on undue influence are applicable in India and, if so, how they interact with S.16 of the Indian Contract Act and S.89 of the Trusts Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments — as advanced by Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Ayyar

  • The 3rd defendant's case amounts to an allegation of collusion/fraud between the plaintiffs and defendants 1 and 2 to procure his signature; since no such fraud was proved, the plaintiffs' claim should succeed.
  • The 3rd defendant had not been truthful on some points; this undermines his entire version and disentitles him to relief.
  • If the case is treated as one of undue influence, the onus lies on the 3rd defendant to prove the exercise of undue influence and he has not discharged that burden.
  • There is no proof that the plaintiffs themselves exercised undue influence; mere notice of circumstances is not sufficient to make plaintiffs liable for the consequence of influence exercised solely by defendants 1 and 2.
  • English equitable doctrines should not be applied; in India the question should be decided solely by reference to S.16 of the Indian Contract Act (and related Indian authorities), which addresses undue influence as exercised by a contracting party.

3rd Defendant's Arguments / Defence

  • His written statement and the notice (Ex. III, dated 22 October 1930) assert that he had lived with and under the protection of defendants 1 and 2 from infancy, was accustomed to sign papers when directed by the 1st defendant, and that he signed Ex. A without understanding it because he feared the 1st defendant.
  • He asserted that he later discovered he had been defrauded and that the plaintiffs, aware of the family circumstances, conspired with defendants 1 and 2 to involve him in the liability for their advantage.
  • He relied on undue influence/fiduciary relationship grounds to avoid liability for the liabilities recorded in Ex. A.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lord Chesterfield v. Janssen Equitable jurisdiction based on undue influence is a development of the principle of relief on the ground of fraud (per Lord Hardwicke). Used to show the conceptual link between fraud and undue influence in equity; court treats undue influence relief as related to fraud principles.
Lancashire Loans Ltd. v. Black Protects young/impressionable persons; examines how intention was produced; creditors with notice of relevant facts cannot take advantage. Relied upon as a leading English authority supporting the protection of a young person induced to act by family influence; used to support setting aside the transaction.
Narayana Doss Balakrishna Doss v. Buchraj Chordia Sowcar Once it is shown that a creditor had notice of a fiduciary relationship between parties, the creditor is under the same disability as the party in a position of confidence. The Subordinate Judge applied this decision in holding the plaintiffs could not hold the 3rd defendant liable; the appellate court referenced it in discussing the law.
Smith v. Kay (per Lord Cranworth) Relief in such cases often rests on inferences from the situation and nature of the transaction rather than direct proof of deception. Cited to justify that the 3rd defendant could obtain relief even though some direct evidence or truthfulness issues existed; court relied on situational inferences.
Bainbrigge v. Browne Illustrative of circumstances where creditors did not know about the vulnerable position of the person induced; outcome in favour of creditor where no notice existed. Court contrasted facts of that case with the present facts to show distinctions — here plaintiffs had notice of the relevant circumstances.
Cobbet v. Brock Referenced among English authorities (contextual). Mentioned in passing as part of the body of English equitable authorities; used to illustrate differences with Bainbrigge v. Browne.
Turnbull & Co. v. Duval Creditor who leaves everything to be managed by another "must abide the consequences." Quoted to support the proposition that a creditor who leaves management to a principal debtor cannot escape responsibility when influence is exercised.
Roop Laul v. Lakshmi Doss Recognition of application of English equitable rules in India via statutory provisions (Trusts Act). Used to show that Indian courts have applied the English rules and that S.89 Trusts Act makes them applicable in India.
Lakshmi Doss v. Roop Laul On appeal, the court observed it made no difference that the claim was by a person other than the one who exercised undue influence. Supported the proposition that a third party claiming under a deed can be affected by undue influence exercised by another if notice exists.
Maitland v. Irving Case where a guardian induced a young person to give a guarantee; guarantee held unenforceable where creditors had full knowledge and took advantage. Relied upon (via Stokes' notes) as analogous to the present facts; used to illustrate the principle that creditors with full knowledge must inquire and cannot profit from the defenceless situation.
O'Connor v. Foley One of the English cases cited supporting similar principles concerning transactions induced by family influence. Cited among authorities illustrating the English equitable approach adopted by the court in reasoning.
Kimpson v. Ashebee Another English authority collected with similar cases. Referred to as part of the body of English cases supporting the court's application of equitable principles.
Raj Cooner Roy v. Alfuzuddin Ahmed Contains an observation (by Broughton J.) about onus where a third party stands in no confidential relation to the promisor or grantor. Cited for discussion of when the onus shifts; court comments on this observation and aligns it with its view that notice triggers a shift of onus.
Poosathurai v. Kannappa Chettiar Judicial Committee observation about influence exercised "in conspiracy with or through the agency of others"; in that case the transferee obtained no unfair advantage. Discussed to show the possible scope of the doctrine and that "agency" might include cases where creditor knowingly leaves everything to the principal debtor; factual distinction noted.
Lala Balla Mal v. Ahad Shah One of several Indian cases cited regarding S.16 of the Indian Contract Act and the requirement that undue influence be shown as exercised by a contracting party. Quoted by appellants' counsel in support of limiting undue influence to parties to contract; court considered these authorities when reconciling statute and equity principles.
Raghunath Prasad v. Sarju Prasad Indian authority cited regarding S.16 of the Contract Act and undue influence. Referred to by appellants' counsel; court addressed the relationship between S.16 and English equitable rules.
Gafur Mohammad v. Mohammad Sharif Another Indian case mentioned in the context of S.16 and undue influence principles. Cited by appellants' counsel; court considered it among authorities on the statutory approach to undue influence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the facts and applied equitable principles and pertinent Indian statutory provisions as discussed in the record. Key factual findings and inferences (adopted by the appellate court) included:

  • The 3rd defendant lived with and under the management/control of defendants 1 and 2 from infancy; he attained majority in September 1928 but continued living with them until October 1930.
  • Defendants 1 and 2 were in a fiduciary or dominant position vis-à-vis the 3rd defendant and had access to extensive property and income: they could and did exercise influence over him.
  • The 3rd defendant signed Ex. A in circumstances where he did not appreciate the full nature and extent of the liability: the entry bound him not only for current advances but for past and future advances of defendants 1 and 2.
  • The plaintiffs were aware of the family circumstances, that the 3rd defendant had only recently come of age, and that it was at the plaintiffs' instance that the 3rd defendant was brought into the transaction.
  • The plaintiffs thereby obtained a substantial advantage from the inclusion of the 3rd defendant as a party liable for the debts of 1 and 2.

On legal principles, the court considered the parties' submissions about the applicability of English equitable doctrine versus the statutory regime under the Indian Contract Act (S.16) and the Trusts Act (S.89). The court's analysis:

  1. Recognised that S.16 of the Contract Act is directed to undue influence exercised by one contracting party on the other, which is the ordinary case of undue influence; appellants relied on this point.
  2. Observed that English equitable doctrine treats undue influence as an offshoot of fraud and that English authorities extend relief to transactions where a third party (including creditors or transferees for value) takes advantage when they had notice of the confidential/fiduciary relations or other relevant facts.
  3. Held that S.89 of the Trusts Act incorporates the principle embodied in the English authorities into Indian law (the opinion refers to Roop Laul v. Lakshmi Doss and related commentary to show that S.89 makes the English rules applicable in India).
  4. Concluded that where a creditor/transferee had notice of the relevant facts (a fiduciary/confidential relationship and the vulnerable position of the party), the creditor is in no better position than the party who exercised the influence; the creditor must therefore prove free consent or take the consequences.
  5. Applied these principles to the present facts: because the plaintiffs had notice of the 3rd defendant's situation and obtained substantial advantage by bringing him into liability, the plaintiffs could not enforce the obligation against him.

The court also addressed burden of proof: while the lower court had held the burden lay on the plaintiffs to show free consent, the appellants argued the onus was on the 3rd defendant. The appellate court accepted the approach that notice of the fiduciary relationship shifts the burden and that the plaintiffs, having notice and having obtained an advantage, could not enforce the transaction.

The court emphasised reliance on situational inferences (per Smith v. Kay) rather than only on direct proof of deception; it also drew a distinction from English authorities where creditors had no notice (e.g., Bainbrigge v. Browne).

Holding and Implications

 APPEAL DISMISSED.

Holding (direct effect): The court held that the plaintiffs cannot hold the 3rd defendant liable for the liabilities recorded in Exhibit A. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The 3rd defendant is therefore relieved of the liability claimed against him in this suit (at least to the extent challenged in the appeal).

Implications:

  • The decision applies English equitable principles regarding undue influence (and the protection of vulnerable persons influenced by family or fiduciaries) in the Indian context, consistently with the statutory framework (S.89 of the Trusts Act), when a creditor/transferee has notice of the relevant fiduciary/confidential relationship.
  • Where a creditor has notice of circumstances that give rise to a presumption or probability of undue influence, the creditor will be under a disability similar to that of the party who stood in fiduciary relation to the promisor; the creditor must show free consent or cannot enforce the transaction.
  • Direct consequence for the parties: plaintiffs lose their claim against the 3rd defendant on the grounds argued in this appeal and must pay costs; the decision vindicates the Subordinate Judge's findings on the facts and the application of equitable principles.
N. R. R. Appeal dismissed.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the text.

Show all summary ...

The plaintiffs—appellants—are a family of landlords and money-lenders in Palghat. Defendants 1 and 2 are brothers, and the 3rd defendant is their nephew. They too owned extensive properties in the neighbourhood of Palghat, but have latterly got into difficulties and 1 and 2 defendants were adjudicated insolvents in 1932. The suit was laid for the recovery of a sum of about Rs. 58,000,—due as per account Ex. A. The 3rd defendant was the only contesting defendant and the question in the appeal relates to his liability. The claim in the appeal has been limited to a sum of Rs. 15,000, on the ground, perhaps, that the 3rd defendant has not assets enough to yield anything more, or on the ground that the balance could be realised from the assets of 1 and 2 defendants. But this makes no difference, so far as the question to be decided is concerned.

The point in dispute was embodied in one comprehensive issue, viz., whether the 3rd defendant's signature (to Ex. A) has not been obtained under circumstances mentioned in his written statement and whether if so, he is not liable. The story in the written statement was that the 3rd defendant had from his infancy been living with and under the protection of defendants 1 and 2 till October 1930, that though he attained majority in 1928, he was in the habit of affixing his signature to any paper if so directed by the 1st defendant and he must have so signed in the plaintiffs book Ex. A, without understanding the matter or making any enquiry whatever, because he feared the 1st defendant and believed that there would be no fraud or deception in the matter. It further alleged that he subsequently discovered that he had been defrauded in the matter, and that the plaintiffs who were well aware of the circumstances of the family had conspired with defendants 1 and 2 to get the 3rd defendant involved in this liability, for their own better security.

Exhibit A is an account book beginning from September 1928. But it is clear from the evidence that the plaintiffs had been lending moneys to defendants 1 and 2 for at least two years before that date. Ex. A is headed as an account of plaintiffs' dealings with 1 and 2 defendants. It begins with an entry dated 29th of September 1928, whereby 1 and 2 defendants acknowledge liability for a sum of Rs. 13,702-11-0, said to be due for principal and interest under a pronote of earlier date. Between October 1928, and February 1929 there were further borrowings to a considerable extent; but no amount seems to have been repaid. In September 1929, 1 and 2 defendants wanted a further advance of Rs. 8,000; but as they were heavily indebted to plaintiffs even by that time, the plaintiffs refused to lend more, unless 1 and 2 defendants gave security. According to the evidence of P.W 1 (who is one of the plaintiffs), the first defendant then said that it was not possible to give security at that time and that he would get his brother's son also (3rd defendant) to sign. The witness adds, that, as the vakil whom he consulted, advised him that money might be advanced if 3rd defendant also signed, he intimated the same to the first defendant, that accordingly the three defendants came to the plaintiffs' shop on the evening of 22nd September 1929 and received Rs. 8,000 after signing an entry in the plaintiffs' book (Ex. A) in the following terms.—“Having admitted that I am liable for the balance of principal amount and interest and for future credit and debit found under this book, I have signed this.” 7 days later, the account for the Malayalam year was struck and the three defendants signed on a one anna stamp below the entry showing the debit balance due on that date. It is on the strength of these signatures of the 3rd defendant in Ex. A that the plaintiffs seek to hold him liable.

The evidence shows that the 3rd defendant's father had died in 1913, and the widow and the 3rd defendant, (then an infant) continued to live with defendants 1 and 2, who were in management of the family properties. The boy was at school up to March 1931, and in the partition suit (O.S No. 63 of 1922) which another uncle had filed against these defendants, the present 1 and 2 defendants were conducting a common defence on behalf of the 3rd defendant as well, though his mother was the guardian ad litem on record. He attained majority in September 1928 but continued to live with defendants 1 and 2 till October 1930. Though, in the plaint, it was alleged that defendants 1 and 2 had borrowed the amounts shown in Ex. A for the “common necessities” of the family of defendants 1 to 3, no serious attempt was made to prove this allegation. The onus of proving the same would by no means have been light, in view of the fact that the 3rd defendant was only a nephew of the defendants 1 and 2 and defendants 1 and 2 were in possession of extensive properties yielding a large income. There have, no doubt, been litigations since 1922, in which considerable sums must have been spent. But as no attempt has been made to bind the 3rd defendant on the ground of family necessity, we need not pursue this question. Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Ayyar (for the appellants) suggested that though the binding character of the loans could not be said to have been proved, the possibility of the utilisation of the loans for family purposes might have been one of the reasons that induced the 3rd defendant to take upon himself an express liability for these loans, and to this extent, the presumption or inference of undue influence would be negatived. But there are no materials on the record to afford sufficient basis even for this argument.

There appears to have been considerable discussion, in the lower Court, as to the exact nature of the plea raised by the 3rd defendant, whether it is one of fraud or one of undue influence. But, as the matter has really to be dealt with, on the facts appearing in the case, Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar did not press this objection as to the form of the plea. After all, as shown by the judgment of Lord Hardwicke in Lord Chesterfield v. Janssen the equitable jurisdiction based on undue influence is only a development of the principle of relief on the ground of fraud (see also Lancashire Loans Ltd. v. Black (2).

The defence of the 3rd defendant was in substance set forth in Ex. III, a notice which he sent to the plaintiffs, as early as 22nd October, 1930. This was sent within a few days after the 3rd defendant began to live separate from defendants 1 and 2. It has been suggested that it was sent at the instance of another uncle of the 3rd defendant who had quarrelled with defendants 1 and 2 and who is now helping the 3rd defendant. This might be true; but that is just the way the thing would have happened even if the 3rd defendant's plea of undue influence by defendants 1 and 2 is well founded. We have only got to see whether the facts proved in the case support that plea and we are not much concerned with the motives or circumstances that led the 3rd defendant to repudiate his liability.

The learned Subordinate Judge has found that

“the plaintiffs were anxious to get the 3rd Defendant also to sign the hand book as the money advanced was fairly large and as 1 and 2 defendants wanted more money. They must have therefore asked Defendants 1 and 2 to get the 3rd defendant also to sign the handbook……..That the 3rd Defendant signed the book when he was under the influence of defendants 1 and 2 cannot be doubted. I am of opinion that the 3rd Defendant did not appreciate the magnitude of the liability he was undertaking when he signed Ex. A……The plaintiffs can be said to have notice of the influence exercised on the 3rd Defendant by defendants 1 and 2. The 1st defendant was in a position to dominate the will of the 3rd Defendant……He has taken an unfair advantage over the 3rd Defendant.”

As to the law, he said that, in the circumstances, the burden lay on the plaintiffs to show a free consent, i.e, that the 3rd Defendant had such protection as would secure to him a free and unfettered judgment, independent of any sort of control. Following the decision of Venkatasubba Rao J. in Narayana Doss Balakrishna Doss v. Buchraj Chordia Sowcar the learned Subordinate Judge held that on the facts found, the plaintiffs could not hold the 3rd Defendant liable.

Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar contended that the 3rd Defendant sought to rely on the ground that the plaintiffs in collusion with defendants 1 and 2, fraudulently caused him to sign Ex. A and, no such fraud having been made out, the plaintiffs' claim against the 3rd defendant should have been upheld. He further pointed out that on more than one matter, the 3rd defendant had not spoken the truth and that his version of the transaction should not be accepted. Even if it were permissible to deal with the case as one of undue influence he maintained that the onus lay on the 3rd defendant to prove the exercise of undue influence and that it had not been discharged. In particular, he insisted that whatever might have happened between 1 and 2 defendants on the one hand and the 3rd defendant on the other, there was no proof that the plaintiffs exercised any undue influence over the 3rd defendant and thereby obtained an unfair advantage. As to the law, he argued that the decision of Venkatasubba Rao J. in Narayana Doss Balakrishna Doss v. Buchraj Chordia Sowcar ought not to be followed, because it is based upon the decisions of English Courts of Equity, in disregard of the warning contained in several pronouncements of the Judicial Committee, that, in this country, questions as to undue influence must be decided on the provisions of the Indian Contract Act alone and that the principles on which English Courts of Equity deal with similar questions are entirely inapplicable.

As we have already pointed out, the written statement of the 3rd defendant sets out all material facts and his claim to relief must be decided with reference to them, independently of their being labelled as fraud or undue influence: (see Smith v. Kay per Lord Cranworth). The mere fact that on one or two matters the lower Court was not prepared to accept the defendant's evidence, will not disentitle him to relief, for in such cases, the conclusion of the Court rests not so much upon direct evidence showing that any deception was practised, as upon inferences arising from the situation of the parties and the nature and effect of the transaction. That the transaction is seriously detrimental to the interests of the 3rd defendant can admit of no doubt. With very little thought as to and without due appreciation of its nature and effect, the 3rd defendant undertakes liability not merely for the amount actually advanced at the moment of his signing but also for all the advances taken by defendants 1 and 2 from the plaintiffs in the past and, what is more curious, for all loans which may be taken by them in the future. That defendants 1 and 2 stood in a fiduciary relation to the 3rd defendant can again, admit of no doubt; and that they used their influence to obtain an unfair advantage to themselves can scarcely be disputed.

It is noteworthy that 1 and 2 defendants have not been examined in this case. We are unable to agree with Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar, that it was for the 3rd defendant to examine them. It is true that at one stage the first defendant had been summoned on behalf of the 3rd defendant, but the plaintiffs could not have been misled by this step, because they began to lead evidence only after the 3rd defendant's case had been closed.

That the plaintiffs gained a substantial advantage by reason of the 3rd defendant making himself jointly liable for the amounts advanced and to be advanced to defendants 1 and 2, can scarcely admit of any doubt. It is also clear from the evidence on the plaintiffs' side that they knew of the circumstances of the defendants' family, and that the 3rd defendant had only recently come of age. It is also fairly clear that it was at their instance that the 3rd defendant was brought into the transaction.

With these indisputable circumstances, it will be instructive to compare the findings on which Justice Fry based his decision in Bainbrigge v. Browne in favour of the creditor. The learned Judge there found, that the creditors did not even know the age of the plaintiff who sought relief on the ground of undue influence, that they did not know that the plaintiff was resident under his father's roof or was in any way under his control, that they had reason to believe he was assisted by a Solicitor as well as by certain family friends and were led to believe that the plaintiff was acting independently of the father: (of Cobbet v. Brock .

As regards the part taken by the plaintiffs in the exercise of undue influence, there can be no doubt, that under the English authorities, the result will be the same, whether the plaintiffs themselves exercised the undue influence or took the benefit of a transaction with notice that that transaction was the result of undue influence, exercised by their debtors, defendants 1 and 2. As observed by Mr. Justice Venkatasubba Rao at page 842 of 53 M.L.J, once it is shown that the plaintiffs were aware of the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the 1st and 3rd defendants, they are under the same disability as the party who occupied the position of confidence.

Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar's main contention, therefore, was, that in this country, the question must be decided solely with reference to the terms of S. 16 of the Contract Act: Lala Balla Mal v. Ahad Shah Raghunath Prasad v. Sarju Prasad (3) Gafur Mohammad v. Mohammad Sharif (4), that, under that section, the undue influence must be shown to have been exercised by the other party to the contract, whether directly or in conspiracy with or through the agency of others: Poosathurai v. Kannappa Chettiar (5) and that mere notice or knowledge of circumstances raising a presumption or probability of undue influence, as between the defendants inter se did not throw on the plaintiffs, the onus of proving that they had derived no unfair advantage or that the 3rd defendant acted as a free agent.

It may be conceded that S. 16 of the Contract Act deals in terms with the exercise of undue influence by one party to the contract on the other. Indeed, this is the ordinary type of cases of undue influence. The question of the effect of undue influence exercised by somebody other than the grantee or promisee, does not seem to have arisen in the cafes that went up to the Judicial Committee from India, except in Poosathurai v. Kannappa Chettiar . We are not sure whether the observation of Lord Shaw in that case, about the exercise of influence ‘in conspiracy with or through the agency of others’; is not wide enough to take in the full scope of the doctrine as illustrated by the English Cases; for ‘agency’ may in such cases well include instances in which the creditor or transferee knowingly or intentionally leaves everything in the hands of his principal debtor. As observed by their Lordships in Turnbull & Co. v. Duval the creditor who conveniently leaves everything to be managed by another ‘must abide the consequences.’ Further examination of the question became unnecessary in Poosathurai v. Kannappa Chettiar because the Committee came to the conclusion that the transferee had obtained no unfair advantage and that the sale had not been shown to have been for an undervalue.

Confining ourselves however to the Statute law of India, it is clear, that the principle of the English Cases referred to by Mr. Justice Venkatasubba Rao, has been made applicable in this country by S. 89 of the Trusts Act. As early as in Roop Laul v. Lakshmi Doss the application of these rules in this country was recognised by Mr. Justice Sankaran Nair (see pages 21 and 22) and when that case went up on appeal before 3 Judges, they too observed that it made no difference that the claim under the deed was made not by the person who exercised the undue influence but by a 3rd party. See Lakshmi Doss v. Roop Laul . In that particular case, the third party was a volunteer and some of the earlier English Cases are also cases relating to volunteers, but numerous later decisions in England have applied the same principles even to creditors or transferees for value, provided they had notice of all the relevant facts.

In view of Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar's insistence on the inapplicability of the English rule, it is interesting to find, that in the foot note to S. 89 of the Trusts Act, in Stokes' Anglo-Indian Codes, reference is made to Maitland v. Irving though the reference is wrongly printed as 15 Simon 43. Its significance, lies in the fact that, as stated by him in the introduction, Dr. Whitley Stokes was the draftsman of the Trusts Act and the foot-notes refer to the English decisions, on which the sections were founded. Maitland v. Irving , thus relied on by him, was a case very much like the present. A and B consented to postpone the payment of £5000 due to them from C in consideration of C procuring and giving them the plaintiff's guarantee for that sum; and C at the same time informed A and B that the plaintiff was his niece and was possessed of considerable property, that she had resided with him for sometime, that he had been her guardian and that she had been of age for about a year and a half. The guarantee thus given was held unenforceable by the creditors. The Vice-Chancellor observed

“It seems very extraordinary that with full knowledge of those circumstances, they should have at once acceded to the proposal without making any enquiry or taking any pains to ascertain whether the young lady was a free agent and perfectly willing, with a full knowledge of the consequences, to do what the guardian said he would invite her or propose to her to do…… They must have perceived that by adopting the suggestion of McLean (the debtor) they relied on the influence that he had over the young lady………….. knowing the defenceless situation of the young lady, they combined with McLean, who disclosed it to them, in order that advantage might be taken of her defenceless situation for the benefit of all the three and my opinion is that they must all three be considered as standing in the same situation.”

When it is found that the principle of this decision has been adopted by the Indian Legislature, in enacting S. 89 of the Trusts Act, there is no substance in the contention that later English authorities of the same type, furnish no guidance to us in the application of the rule.

It is unnecessary to refer again to the cases reviewed by Mr. Justice Venkatasubba Rao. We therefore content ourselves with noting the latest decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Lancashire Loans Ltd. v. Black . A married daughter living with her husband and away from her mother had, at the mother's request, entered into transactions with the mother's creditors, with a view to help her. The Court of Appeal refused to hold the transactions binding on the daughter. Lawrence L. J. observed that, in cases of this kind.

“the question is not merely whether the son or the daughter knew what he or she was doing, had done or proposed to do, but how the intention was produced…………the law protects young persons of an impressionable age, when gratitude, affection and respect for a parent are fresh and strong, not by curtailing their capacity to deal with others but by binding the consciences of those who deal with them………the mother seems to have taken it for granted that she could get the daughter to comply with her request……and it never seemed to have occurred to the daughter to do otherwise than accede to whatever her mother asked her to do………the transaction was never properly explained to the daughter and she did not fully understand what she was doing.”

As to the position of the creditors, the Lord Justice said,

“it is plain that they knew or had notice of all the relevant facts………… they were permitting, if not inducing, a young woman……to enter into a transaction the whole burden of which they anticipated would fall on her…… they are in no better position than the mother would have been in, had the daughter assigned her reversion directly to her, instead of to the respondents for her benefit.”

(See also O'Connor v. Foley Kimpson v. Ashebee and the cases collected in the note in 16 M. L. J. 252 of the journal portion).

With reference to the observation of Broughton J. in Raj Cooner Roy v. Alfuzuddin Ahmed from which Venkatasubba Rao, J. dissents we may state that even there, the learned Judge does not seem to have felt any doubt as to the applicability of the English Rule. It does not even seem to us wrong to say, as he did, that where a third party stands in no confidential relation to the promisor or grantor, the onus does not in the first instance lie on the former, to show that no undue influence was used. It is only when he is found or could be assumed, to have had notice of the exercise of undue influence by another or at least of circumstances raising a presumption or probability of undue influence, that the onus will be shifted on to him.

We are of opinion that the principles followed by Courts of Equity in England in dealing with similar transactions are equally applicable in this country and judging the suit transaction by those principles, the plaintiffs cannot hold the 3rd defendant liable. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.

N. R. R.Appeal dismissed.