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Bhagirthi v. Babvo
1. The only question in this case is whether a plaintiff, who has been allowed to withdraw a suit under O. 23, R. 1 of the CPC, with liberty to bring a fresh suit, on condition that he pays the defendant's costs, can be allowed to institute the second suit until the costs have been paid, and whether that can be done after, the period of limitation for the suit has expired. The lower Courts have held that he cannot because the previous order creates a condition precedent which must be fulfilled before the fresh suit can be filed. There is a difference of opinion among the High Courts on this point. The view of this Court is given by Macnair, A.J.C, in 1929 Nag 135 1929 Nag 135 , 118 IC 54 , 25 NLR 171. He holds that
“the law does not require dismissal of the fresh suit and the Judge has power to allow a fresh suit to proceed after the plaintiff has paid the costs of the former suit;
and with that I respectfully agree. But that does not settle the matter in this case. It is clear some time limit must be fixed for tender or payment of these costs, and the question is whether it can-be done beyond the period of limitation-for the suit. In my opinion it cannot. The matter cannot be determined without analysing the basis of this Court's decision in the ruling just quoted. All the High Courts, including our own, appear to be agreed that the previous order operates as a condition precedent; but they are not agreed as to either the effect or the extent of it. Jenkins, C.J held in 1914 Cal 307 1914 Cal 207 , 23 IC 210 that the first suit remains pending until the costs are paid, and so Section 10 of the CPC, operates as a bar to the trial of the second suit until the disability is removed. That was followed in 1926 Pat 409 1926 Pat 409 , 96 IC 942 , 5 Pat 306 even to the extent of allowing an extension of the time already fixed by the first Court under S. 148. In 29 Mad 270 (1906) 29 Mad 370 also, time was extended, but no reasons are given, so it is not possible to determine why. This view of Sir Lawrence Jenkins has been dissented front in 1924 Mad 877 1924 Mad 877 , 82 IC 499 and 1931 Bom 257 1931 Bom 257 , 133 IC 256 , 55 Bom 206 also by Macnair, A.J.C, in 1929 Nag. 135 1929 Nag 135 , 118 IC 54 , 25 NLR 171. I respectfully agree with them. Therefore the basis of the Nagpur view allowing payment after the institution of the second suit is not that given by Sir Lawrence Jenkins, and the-reason for it must be sought elsewhere.
2. In my opinion the only ground on, which 1929 Nag. 135 1929 Nag 135 , 118 IC 54 , 25 NLR 171 can be supported, is to regard the matter as a curable irregularity, as was done in 31 Cal. 965 (1904) 81 Cal 965.
3. If the order operates as at condition precedent, as all the authorities seem to agree it does, then it follows the second suit cannot be launched until the condition has been fulfilled; and if it is, the matter must be either an illegality or an irregularity. 33 Mad. 258 (1912) 33 Mad 258 , 6 IC 288 took the stricter view and dismissed the second suit. Of course that Page: 57ruling is distinguishable on the ground that the order allowing withdrawal had itself fixed a time for payment and the money was not paid until the time fixed had expired. But, 1931 Bom. 257 1931 Bom 257 , 133 IC 256 , 55 Bom 206 cannot be distinguished on any such ground. No time was fixed for payment there, and the learned Judges dismissed the second suit pushing the doctrine of conditions precedent to its strict and logical conclusion. But what follows from that? A dismissal of that kind would not prevent the filing of a third suit after fulfilment of the condition precedent, provided of course it was still within time and there was no other bar. For when a suit is dismissed on some purely technical ground not affecting the merits a subsequent suit is not barred: 1919 Nag. 15 1919 Nag 15 , 47 IC 909 , 16 NLR 206 3 C.P L.R 3 (1890) 3 CPLR 3 and 7 C.P L.R 63 (1894) 7 CPLR 63. Therefore all the plaintiff would have to do would be to pay or tender the costs and then file his suit afresh. Now whether the money should be paid first and the suit filed later, or the suit be kept pending until the money is paid is clearly a matter of procedure; and irregularities in procedure which do not affect the merits, and which do not result in prejudice or injustice, are curable either under Section 99 of the CPC, or the principle underlying it: 1928 P.C 162 Limited, 1928 PC 162 , 109 IC 417 , 55 IA 227 , 3 Luck 314 (PC). The only prejudice which can possibly arise under this view would be to Government, for if the second suit were dismissed and the plaintiff forced to bring a third, it is possible Government would benefit in the shape of additional court-fees. But that is capable of adjustment under Section 28 of the Court-fees Act. The question has not arisen hitherto, and does not arise here because of the view I take about limitation. But should it arise it is capable of adjustment and forms no bar to treating the irregularity as curable.
4. This, however, necessarily presupposes that the correct procedure is to pay the money first and file the suit after. I can find no other meaning to the words “condition precedent.” It also presupposes that the second suit must be treated as having been instituted on the day the money, is paid, even though it has remained on the files of the Court till then. Otherwise prejudice would result on the question of limitation as here. It follows the second suit must be dismissed unless, the money has been paid or tendered before limitation for the suit expires. In the present case the suit is for cancellation of a deed, of surrender dated 18th October 1926 and for a declaration of title. The cause of action is said to have arisen on 18th October 1926. The money has not been paid or tendered, and it is now long past limitation. Even before me no tender was made: all that the learned pleader for the plaintiff could say was that he would advise his client to pay the money. It is urged that the plaintiff was not given an opportunity to pay. That is entirely incorrect. No sanction or order of a Court is required to tender money due. It is not even necessary that the tender should be made in Court or through its agency. Therefore there was no lack of opportunity. On the other hand it is abundantly evident that the plaintiff had no intention of paying. He has contended throughout, even up to this Court, that he is not bound to pay. Now it is too late, even if he wants to pay. So his suit was rightly dismissed.
5. I want, however, to safeguard myself on two points. I do not mean to indicate that a Court, is bound to keep the second suit pending until the period of limitation expires. That is a question which does not arise here and I express no opinion on it. I also do not mean, to decide that a Court is bound to afford an opportunity for payment after the institution of the fresh suit and before limitation, even after a period fixed in the previous order has expired. That question also does not arise here. My decision is confined to a case in whick the order fixes no date for payment. I observe in passing that I agree with Baker, J., in 1931 Bom. 257 1931 Bom 257 , 133 IC 256 , 55 Bom 206, that it is always desirable in such cases that the order permitting withdrawal should itself fix a time for payment of the costs. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
6. Appeal dismissed.
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