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Satya Priya Ghoshal v. Barid Baran Mukherji

Calcutta High Court
Mar 10, 1936
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit instituted by the plaintiff for recovery of khâs possession of a 1/30th share of sixteen plots of land after partition, or alternatively for arrears of rent on that share if khâs possession was not granted. The defendants Nos. 1 to 10, represented by the Court of Wards, were co-sharers with defendant No. 7 holding a 1/30th proprietary share.

Four persons, the Dattas, carrying on business as P.N Datta and Company, took a lease (mourâsi mokarrari) of fifteen of these plots from the co-sharers in 1920. Rent was reserved under the lease and subsequently adjusted due to land acquisition and partial purchase of plots by some co-sharers. Defendant No. 7 mortgaged his right to receive rent under the lease to the plaintiff in 1924 for a loan.

A rent suit was initiated by the co-sharers against the Dattas in 1926, during which one partner died and the firm was adjudicated insolvent. A preliminary and then final decree for sale of the leasehold was passed in 1927. Defendant No. 7 sold his 1/30th share to the plaintiff in 1928 without the plaintiff's knowledge of the pending rent suit or decree.

The leasehold was sold in execution of the decree and purchased by the decree-holders (the co-sharers). The plaintiff instituted the present suit in 1931 claiming title to the share, alleging fraud and arguing that the disclaimer of the lease by the Official Assignee terminated the leasehold interest, merging it into the proprietary interest.

The Subordinate Judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff, declaring his title and ordering partition and khâs possession of the relevant share, except for specific plots held by other defendants or tenants. The defendants appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff, by purchase from defendant No. 7, acquired title to the arrears of rent and thereby the 1/30th share in the leasehold purchased in execution of the rent decree.
  2. Whether the disclaimer of the lease by the Official Assignee under s. 62 of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act operated to terminate the leasehold interest and merge it into the proprietary interest, thereby entitling the plaintiff to khâs possession free of the leasehold.
  3. Whether the disclaimer was valid and effective in law, including compliance with procedural requirements and the effect of the insolvency and death of a partner.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff claimed that the purchase (kabâlâ) from defendant No. 7 included arrears of rent and thus entitled him to the rent-decree share and corresponding leasehold interest.
  • He argued defendant No. 7 acted fraudulently by concealing the rent suit and decree, preventing the plaintiff from joining execution proceedings.
  • The plaintiff contended that the disclaimer by the Official Assignee ended the leasehold interest, merging it into the proprietary interest, making his purchase free of the lease.
  • He relied on ss. 82 and 88 of the Trust Act to argue a fiduciary relationship or trust existed, justifying his claim to the leasehold share.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants contended that the arrears of rent were not sold to the plaintiff, denying that the rent suit or decree was assigned to him.
  • They argued that the disclaimer only relieved the Official Assignee from personal liability and did not terminate the leasehold interest or affect rights between co-sharers.
  • The defendants challenged the validity of the disclaimer on procedural grounds, including compliance with Insolvency Rules and the effect of the death of one partner before insolvency.
  • They maintained that the lease was taken by the four brothers individually, not by the partnership firm, affecting the disclaimer's scope.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Finley, Ex parte Cloth Workers' Company Effect of disclaimer under s. 55 Bankruptcy Act 1883 on leasehold interests Explained that disclaimer determines insolvent's interest, accelerates reversion to lessor, and ends leasehold interest between lessor and lessee.
Ex parte Walton, In re Levy Rights of lessors after disclaimer under Bankruptcy Act 1869 Considered limited rights of lessor to distrain or re-enter despite disclaimer; court noted differences with newer statute provisions.
In re Isaac Hyams; Ex parte H.J Lindsay v. Isaac Hyams Effect of disclaimer under Bankruptcy Act 1914 and s. 62 Indian Act Held lease ends on disclaimer, property revests in landlord, and acceptance of rent prior does not revest interest in debtor.
Krishna Chinnoo v. Matubhai Kasanbhai Effect of disclaimer and reversion of leasehold interest Supported conclusion that leasehold interest ends upon disclaimer and reverts to lessor.
Falakrishna Pal v. Jagannath Marwari Nature of English mortgage under Indian law Indicated that mortgage does not transfer entire estate; relevant to rights of co-sharers and mortgagors.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the plaintiff's claim to arrears of rent and the rent decree under the kabâlâ. It found that while the arrears of rent were included in the sale, there was no assignment of the rent suit or decree itself to the plaintiff, nor was the plaintiff entitled to step into the decree-holder's place. The court rejected the contention that defendant No. 7 stood in a fiduciary position invoking ss. 82 and 88 of the Trust Act, concluding that the case was one of fraud without fiduciary obligations and that the plaintiff's remedy was limited to rent arrears lost through the decree and execution, not acquisition of leasehold interest.

Regarding the disclaimer by the Official Assignee under s. 62 of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, the court analyzed the statutory provisions and relevant English and Indian precedents. It held that the disclaimer operated to terminate the insolvent's interest in the leasehold as of the disclaimer date, accelerating the reversion to the lessors (the co-sharers). The absence of a vesting order did not affect this result. The court rejected arguments that the disclaimer only relieved personal liability without ending the leasehold interest.

The court further addressed procedural and substantive challenges to the disclaimer, including compliance with Insolvency Rules, the effect of the death of one partner before insolvency, and the nature of the leasehold interest held by the partnership. It found these challenges without merit, holding the disclaimer valid and effective.

Consequently, the court concluded that the leasehold interest had merged into the proprietary interest following disclaimer, and the plaintiff's purchase of defendant No. 7's share entitled him to khâs possession free of the leasehold. The decree in favor of the plaintiff was upheld.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED the appeal and upheld the decree of the Subordinate Judge in favor of the plaintiff.

The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiff is entitled to khâs possession of his 1/30th share in the sixteen plots, except for specific exceptions noted in the decree. The court confirmed that disclaimer under s. 62 terminates the insolvent's leasehold interest, merging it into proprietary rights, and that fraudulent concealment does not confer fiduciary rights absent statutory or contractual basis. No new precedent beyond the application of established insolvency and trust law principles was set.

Show all summary ...

The judgment of the Court was as follows:—

This is an appeal by the defendants Nos. 1 to 10, represented by the Court of Wards, in a suit, which was instituted for recovery of khâs possession of an 1/30th share of sixteen plots of land after partition, or in the alternative for recovery of arrears of rent due on that share, should it be found that the plaintiff was not entitled to khâs possession. The facts are the following:—

Defendant No. 7 had an 1/30th share in the proprietary right in the lands, the defendants Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 to 10 being his co-sharers. Four persons, Dattas, their names being Surendra, Purendra, Gokul and Banku, who had been carrying on certain businesses in partnership and had constituted themselves a firm under the name and style of P.N Datta and Company under a deed of partnership dated August 30, 1919, took a mourâsi mokarrari lease of fifteen out of the aforesaid plots, being plots Nos: 1 to 15 of the schedule to the plaint and comprising an area of about 80 bighâs, from the said co-sharers on March 31, 1920. The rent reserved under the lease was Rs. 16,008 per year; the proportionate amount thereof, as payable on account of the defendant No. 7's 1/30th share, would on calculation be Rs. 533-9-1½ gds. By an acquisition made under the Land Acquisition Act, the area of the leasehold was reduced by 1 bighâ and odd and the rent became Rs. 15,469-1-8p. Also in execution of a decree for rent obtained by some of the co-sharers against the Dattas in a suit instituted in 1922, two plots of land comprising an area of 2 bighâs and odd were purchased by the defendants Nos. 10 and 11 in February, 1926. The area and rent of the leasehold thus came to be 76 bighâs and odd and Rs. 14,763-9-8 p. respectively, 1/30th of the rent which was payable on account of the share of the defendant No. 7 thus came, to be Rs. 492-1-11 1/15 pies.

On May 19, 1924, the defendant No. 7 mortgaged in favour of the plaintiff his right to receive the rent of Rs. 533 and odd, per year under the lease-aforesaid for a loan of Rs. 2,000 carrying interest at the rate of Rs. 1-4 as per cent, per month.

On February 8, 1926, the co-sharers commenced a suit for rent against the Dattas for the leasehold for the period April, 1921, to January, 1926, less certain deductions. One of the Dattas, namely Banku, died within a few months of the institution of the suit; and thereupon his heirs and legal representatives were substituted in his place as defendants by an order dated September 28, 1926. On February 21, 1927, the firm of P.N Datta and. Company was adjudicated insolvents and their interest having vested in the Official Assignee the latter was made a party defendant in the suit by an order dated June 6, 1927. In that suit, on July 14, 1927, a preliminary decree was passed for a sum of Rs. 96 thousand and odd, to be realised, in case of non-payment by August 13, 1927, by sale of the leasehold as by way of enforcement of a charge thereon. Later on, on August 25, 1927, a final decree for sale was also passed.

In the meantime, on August 7, 1928, the defendant No. 7 sold to the plaintiff his 1/30th share in the sixteen plots of land described in the schedule to the plaint. The consideration for this transaction was the amount of Rs. 3,648 due on the mortgage already referred to, and a further amount of Rs. 1,300 now paid in cash, i.e, a total amount of Rs. 4,948. It is not disputed, certainly not at this stage, that the plaintiff was wholly unaware of the rent suit or the proceedings in connection therewith.

In pursuance of the final decree for sale made on August 25, 1927, as aforesaid, the leasehold was put up to sale on October 9, 1928, and purchased by the decree-holders for a lakh of rupees. The decretal dues had by this time come up to over that amount and by a petition filed on that day they obtained an order setting off the purchase money against the decretal dues. On November 15, 1928, the sale was confirmed, the execution case was dismissed on part satisfaction and a sale certificate was issued in the names of the ten co-sharers as purchasers.

P.N Datta and Company had mortgaged for a loan of Rs. 4,40,000 with the Karnani Industrial Bank, Limited, certain immovable properties including this leasehold by deposit of title deeds on September 2, 1920. In 1924, the Bank had instituted a suit on this mortgage and by a settlement arrived at between the parties a mortgage decree on consent was passed on March 18, 1926. One of the terms of this decree was that the Dattas would convey and assign unto the Bank all the mortgaged properties then existing including the leasehold in question.

As already stated, P.N Datta and Company were adjudicated insolvent on February 21, 1927. The Official Assignee on June 2, 1927, applied under s. 62 of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act (III of 1909) to the High Court for leave to disclaim the lease. In this petition he referred to the mortgage in favour of the Bank and the claim to the extent of a lakh of rupees that was pending decision in the suit for rent which the co-sharers had commenced, and he also stated that one of the co-sharers through his solicitor had enquired of him whether he desired to keep on the said lease. Notices of the disclaimer in terms of the relevant Insolvency Rule was served on the co-sharers, the Bank and also on the three surviving partners of the firm, namely, Surendra, Purendra and Gokul; Banku, as already stated, having died before the adjudication order had been made. The Bank entered opposition, challenging the application as not made bona fide, but made at the instance of the co-sharers with the object of helping the co-sharers at the expense of the creditors. The Court made an order containing observations, the meaning and effect of which has been a matter of some controversy, but all the same declaring,—

There is nothing, therefore, which the Official Assignee is entitled, to disclaim. If, however, the view which I have expressed be not correct, the Official Assignee, who has appeared and claims to be entitled to disclaim on the ground that the lease is set out in the schedule and that he may be personally liable for the rent, may disclaim, and there will be an order in that case that the lease be disclaimed. I see no objection to such a course, for nobody opposes the right of the Official Assignee to disclaim, if the circumstances are such as entitle him to do so.

It appears that the co-sharers and the Bank appeared through counsel at the hearing of the application and there was no application for vesting order under s. 66 of the Act on behalf of any of the parties. And, in the result, an order was drawn up which said,

It is ordered that the lease be treated as disclaimed.

Upon these facts the plaintiff, on February 24, 1931, instituted the present suit. He based his claim upon two broad grounds: Firstly, he alleged that by the purchase that he made from the defendant No. 7 he acquired title to the arrears of rent due on the properties including the arrears for which the co-sharers had obtained the decree against the Dattas, that he was fraudulently kept out of knowledge of suit for rent, the decree therein and the execution that followed, and that therefore he could not get into the execution proceedings as a party: and that as the co-sharers had purchased the lands of the leasehold in execution of the decree the purchase of the defendant No. 7 which was to the extent of an 1/30th share in the leasehold enured to his benefit. Secondly, he alleged that by the disclaimer of the lease by the Official Assignee the lease was determined and the leasehold interest became merged in the mâliki interest of the co-sharers, and so the defendant No. 7's 1/30th share in the leasehold was merged in his 1/30th share in the proprietary interest and was extinguished, with the result that by his purchase he acquired that share free of the lease. On these two broad contentions the plaintiff claimed khâs possession and partition; and in the alternative that in case it was held that he was not entitled to khâs possession, he prayed for a decree for Rs. 5,100 together with interest thereon. This figure was arrived at upon the following calculation: 1/30th share in the lakh of rupees, which was the amount of the decree, was deemed to have been realised by the co-sharers by purchase of the leasehold; to that was added the amount of interest due thereon, and the amount of rent due on account of the plaintiff's share together with interest thereon; and on the total thus obtained an amount of remission was allowed in order to bring the total within that figure.

The defences taken were all overruled. It was found that two specific parcels of land within the lease belonged, one to the defendant No. 11 and the other to the defendant No. 1, on purchase from the defendant No. 12. It was also found that plot No. 16 which was not a part of the leasehold was in the possession of a tenant.

The Subordinate Judge has made a decree in plaintiff's favour, the terms of which that are now relevant are the following: Declaring the plaintiff's title to an 1/30th share in the sixteen plots of land in suit; ordering that the said share in the said lands with the exception of the two plots in possession of the defendant No. 11 and the defendant No. 1 be partitioned and demarcated; ordering that the plaintiff do get khâs possession of the said demarcated share except in so far as it relates to plot No. 16 which is in the possession of a thikâ tenant and that so far as the said plot is concerned the plaintiff will get his share but no khâs possession at present. There are other terms in the decree which do not concern us in this appeal. The decree is a preliminary decree for partition.

The first contention of the plaintiff, as already stated, was that by virtue of the kabâlâ under which he made his purchase he was entitled to get the back-rents due from the tenants and so to the plaintiff's 1/30th share in the rent-decree and consequently to the corresponding share in the leasehold which was purchased in execution of the said decree and for that reason should be taken as representing that share. One of the contentions of the defendants was that as a matter of fact the back-rents were not sold. This contention, however, cannot be upheld. The kabâlâ opens with words expressly stating that it was for the lands together with arrears of rent; it states that the agreement was for sale and purchase of the properties together with rent in arrears and that the price fixed upon was for the same and on that basis, it also states that the entire consideration so fixed was received and on such receipt the sale was being made. It is true that there was a passage in the deed saying—

I sell to you the properties described in the schedule below with all rights appertaining to them,

and in the schedule it was only the plots of land that were described. These alone, however, do not, having regard to the form in which the deed is drawn up, constitute the whole of the operative part of the deed. The whole of the deed should be taken together to determine what was intended to be conveyed by it. It is clear from the tenor of the deed that the expression “with all rights appertaining to them” in the passage quoted above was not intended to be understood in its ordinary sense, but also as including the right to realise the arrears of rent. This construction is strengthened by the further statement that is to be found in the deed:—

Be it further known that I have received rent for one year only from the said Surendra Nath Datta and others for the said properties, and rent for the remaining period is in arrear. If my aforesaid statement prove to be untrue in any respect, etc., etc.

Though, however, the back rents must be taken as having been included in the kabâlâ there is no mention in it of the suit for rent that was pending, nor any reference to the decree, and I am therefore unable to see how the plaintiff can claim to have acquired any interest in the suit or the decree. Nor is it possible to hold that there was any assignment of the decree, either in writing or by operation of law, such as would have entitled the plaintiff to step into the decree as a decree-holder in the place of the defendant No. 7 and apply for or proceed with its execution (vide O. XXI, r. 16, Code of Civil Procedure). On behalf of the plaintiff it has been urged that the defendant No. 7 was in the position of a trustee or at any rate held a fiduciary position analogous to that of a trustee and that, in any case, he utilised the money which belonged to the plaintiff, namely, the arrears of rent for which the decree had been obtained and which he had already transferred to the plaintiff by the kabâlâ, in purchasing the leasehold; and that therefore the purchase must enure to the plaintiff's benefit. Reliance in support of this contention has been placed upon ss. 82 and 88 of the Trust Act (II of 1882). In my opinion it cannot be held that the defendant No. 7 stood in any fiduciary relationship in relation to the plaintiff so as to justify the application of s. 88 nor that the plaintiff paid or provided the consideration of the purchase so as to attract the operation of s. 82. The case is a simple case of fraud perpetrated by the defendant No. 7 upon the plaintiff; and keeping the plaintiff entirely in the dark, the defendant No. 7 proceeded with the suit which was pending, obtained a decree and acquired the property. However immoral and reprehensible his conduct may have been, the defendant No. 7 did not hold any fiduciary character which bound him to protect the interest of the plaintiff so that the principle of s. 88 may operate. He intercepted the rents the right to which he had already transferred in plaintiff's favour and utilised the same in making the purchase at the auction-sale. But even so, it cannot, in my opinion, be said that the plaintiff paid or provided the consideration; for the plaintiff, though he had the right to realise the rents, was not the owner of the decretal amount with which the purchase was made. Section 82 therefore cannot have any application to the case. If the defendant No. 7 had undertaken to have the arrears of rent realised for the plaintiff or had bound himself to the plaintiff by an indemnity in case the plaintiff was unable to realise them, and if in such circumstances he had himself got the rent converted into property by his purchase at execution so that the rents were no longer available to the plaintiff, the plaintiff could possibly have pursued his remedy against the property. But on the facts, such as they are as regards this part of the case, the plaintiff's remedy against the respondents, in my judgment, is confined to the rents which have been lost to him by reason of the decree and the execution, and does not extend to recovery of the share in the leasehold.

To turn now to the second contention of the plaintiff, namely, the contention based on the disclaimer by the Official Assignee. It would be useful to repeat here some of the relevant dates in connection with this matter. The disclaimer was on June 2, 1927, the preliminary decree for sale on July 14, 1927, the plaintiff's purchase on the August 7, 1928, the final decree for sale on August 25, 1927, and the sale on October 9, 1928. The effect of the disclaimer, if it was in order, has first to be considered. In this case no vesting order as contemplated by s. 66 of the Act was asked for or made and the complications that might otherwise arise are not present. So far as s. 63 of the Act is concerned it is not disputed that the Court did grant the leave that was necessary, and that the notices necessary to be given under the circumstances were as a matter of fact given; and it is also clear that no terms were imposed by the Court as a condition of granting the leave that was in fact granted. We are, therefore, concerned only with s. 62 of the Act and only with the question as to what was the effect of the disclaimer upon the leasehold and only as against the defendant No. 7, or, it may be, as against the ten co-sharers under whom the lease was held by the Dattas. It has been contended on behalf of the defendants that the only effect of the disclaimer was to discharge the Official Assignee from all personal liabilities in respect of the property as from the date when the property vested in him and that it did not affect the rights or liabilities of any person other than the insolvent and the Official Assignee except to the extent that the same be necessary for the purpose of releasing the insolvent and his property and the Official Assignee from such liability. This contention is obviously based upon the words to be found in sub-s. (2) of s. 62 of the Act; but it is obvious that it overlooks another equally important clause in the same sub-section, namely, the first clause, which must also be given effect to in construing the sub-section. The clause runs in these words:—

The disclaimer shall operate to determine, as from the date thereof, the rights, interests and liabilities of the insolvent and his property in or in respect of the property disclaimed.

The effect of the disclaimer of a lease as between the lessor and the insolvent lessee under s. 55 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which included within it almost verbatim the provisions contained in ss. 62 to 67 of the Indian Act has been explained by Lindley L.J in the case of In re Finley. Ex parte Cloth workers' Company in these words:—

Now the operation of these clauses in the simple case of a lease is not very difficult to ascertain. If there is nothing more than a lease, and the lessee becomes bankrupt, the disclaimer determines his interest in the lease under sub-s. (2). He gets rid of all his liabilities, and he loses all his rights by virtue of the disclaimer. There is no need of any provision for vesting the property in the landlord, but the natural and legal effect of sub-s. (2) is that the reversion will become accelerated. There is nothing that I can see to be vested in the landlord. But he may require delivery of possession, and, if so, he can get it under sub-s. (6).

Then, under sub-s. (7), the lessor, if he is injured by the disclaimer, can prove against the bankrupt's estate for such damages, if any, as he has sustained, by the disclaimer. This is the operation of s. 55 in the simple case of a lease.

Later on dealing with a more complicated case of a lessor, lessee and sub-lessee where the lessee becomes bankrupt, his Lordship made it clear that in such a case also, as between the lessor and the lessee, the, consequences will be the same as if there was no sublease. This is important as indicating that in the present case the fact that there was a mortgage in favour of the Bank and in view of the consent decree which the Bank had obtained the Bank had certain rights as against the mortgagors, the co-sharers, in respect of the leasehold which was one of the mortgaged properties, would not affect the consequences of the disclaimer as between the lessors and lessees inter se. The effect of the disclaimer as between the co-sharers (including the defendant No. 7) and the insolvents, the Dattas, was, to quote the words of the decision aforementioned, that the interest of the insolvents in the lease was determined, the reversion became accelerated, there was no need for a vesting order in favour of the lessor though he might require delivery of possession and he could prove against the insolvents' estate for such damages, if any, as he might have sustained by the disclaimer.

On behalf of the defendants it has been contended that even as between themselves and the insolvents certain rights and liabilities remained in spite of the disclaimer, and for this purpose reliance was placed upon the observations of Jessel M.R in Ex parte Walton In re Levy:—

It appears to me * * * * that it will not affect the right of the lessors to distrain upon the property for the rent reserved by the original lease, or to re-enter for breach of the covenants contained in it.

The case was one in which there was a sub-lessee and it was the original lessee who had become bankrupt. It was decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 and the Bankruptcy Rules of 1871. And as Lindley L.J has pointed out in the case above cited—

Section 55 is framed more or less upon the old lines, but it contains some clauses which are not to be found in the old Act. It is important to bear that in mind in considering what weight ought to be attached to decisions upon the old Act. Section 55 is an entirely new enactment.

In the present case we are not considering the rights of the Bank nor was there any application for or the making of any vesting order and so such cases as In re Cock. Ex parte Shilson, In re Baker. Ex parte Lupton or In re Carter & Ellis. Ex parte Savill Brothers are of no assistance. On the other hand in the case of In re Isaac Hyams; Ex parte H.J Lindsay v. Isaac Hyams decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1914, it has been held referring to the case of In re Finley(5), that after a debtor has been adjudicated bankrupt and his trustee has disclaimed a lease belonging to him the property thereby demised revests in the landlord under s. 54, sub-s. (2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914 (which is the same as s. 62 of the Indian Act) and he may obtain an order for delivery of possession, and that neither the subsequent annulment of the bankruptcy nor the acceptance by the landlord from the debtor of rent for the period ending before the disclaimer operates to revest any interest in the lease in the debtor. If s. 62 is to be taken by itself, as in my judgment it should be in the present case where the rights as between the lessors and the lessees have to be considered, the lease came to an end with the disclaimer, the consequence being that the leasehold reverted to the lessors. [See In re Abubaker(6), Krishna Chinnoo v. Matubhai Kasanbhai(7).] After the disclaimer and so after the leasehold had reverted to the lessors, if they put up the leasehold to auction in execution of the decree for rent as they did in the present case, even though that decree created and declared a charge on the leasehold, they could not resuscitate the leasehold, as it were, and acquire a title to it by their purchase. The plaintiff, therefore, in my judgment, was entitled to a decree for khâs possession as against the defendants Nos. 1 to 10.

It has been contended that the disclaimer was bad in law. One ground on which this contention is based is that r. 197, cl. (4) of the Insolvency Rules has not been complied with. There was no such plea in the written statement and such materials as are on the record suggest that there was such compliance. Secondly, it has been urged that the lease was taken by the four brothers, the Dattas, and not by the firm of partnership of which they were members. The Subordinate Judge has referred to certain materials and has found that the contention has no substance and we agree with him in the view he has taken of this matter. Another ground on which the contention has been pressed is that the firm of P.N Datta and Company consisted of four persons who jointly took the lease and of them one, namely, Banku, having died before the firm was adjudicated insolvent his interest must have devolved on his heirs and so the disclaimer by the Official Assignee was not a complete disclaimer. The answer to this contention is to be found in para. 22 of the partnership deed. The clause “subject to the payment to the outgoing partner or his heirs etc.,” in that paragraph, in my judgment, does not mean that such payment is a condition precedent to the devolution of the share on the surviving partners, but only specifies how the share is to be assessed, and in that respect it merely reproduces the general law on the point (vide Lindley on Partnership, 10th Ed., pp. 416 and 712). The disclaimer was in respect of the entire interest in the leasehold which at the time had devolved on and belonged to the three insolvent Dattas who were the surviving members of the firm, and so was a good disclaimer. Fourthly, it has been argued that because the two out of the fifteen plots which constituted the leasehold had gone out of it, therefore the disclaimer was only a partial disclaimer. The two plots had been lost to the leasehold; and so long as the entire interest of the insolvents in the leasehold was disclaimed there could possibly be no objection. Moreover there are cases reported showing that even where a lease was taken by more persons than one and only some of them were adjudicated insolvents the Official Assignee was allowed to disclaim to the extent of the Interest of the insolvents only. Though a disclaimer is somewhat in the nature of a surrender and though the two terms are often indiscriminately used, a disclaimer, being a creature of statute with statutory consequences, is not quite the same as a surrender which is governed by the law as between landlord and tenant. Lastly, it has been contended that the disclaimer was not in accordance with law. Certain observations in the order granting leave are relied on in this connection. It is true that the learned Judge, whose order it is, did express the opinion that there was nothing to disclaim. Whether he was right in the view that he took of this question is not a matter for our consideration, though speaking for myself I would venture to note my dissent on it. For, in my opinion, an English mortgage under the Indian law does not transfer the entire estate of the mortgagor to the mortgagee [Falakrishna Pal v. Jagannath Marwari] and the fact that by the consent decree the Dattas had been ordered to assign the mortgaged properties including the household to the Bank did not, in the absence of an actual assignment, extinguish the rights of the co-sharers to the leasehold. But whatever may be the correct view to take of the matter, leave was in fact granted and it was ordered that the lease be treated as disclaimed. That being so, the disclaimer was one which must be regarded as having been made in accordance with law.

The result is that it should be held that the decree which the Court below has made is right, and the appeal therefore should be dismissed with costs.

A.K.D
Appeal dismissed.