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Mt. Jamunia Partap Lohar v. Emperor
Factual and Procedural Background
Mt. Jamunia, wife of Partap Lohar, was sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge, Saugor, for murdering Jayabai, a 12-year-old girl, and was also convicted under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code for robbing her ornaments. [1]
Jayabai disappeared from Khajuria on 12 November 1935 after being seen travelling with Jamunia towards Mudia-Dehra. Her remains were discovered two days later, together with blood-stained clothing and bangles. Ornaments identified as Jayabai’s were recovered from a field belonging to Jamunia’s brother, following information given by Jamunia. [2][3][4]
Jamunia denied the prosecution case, but the trial court convicted her. Two assessors supported convictions for murder and robbery, while the third supported robbery alone. She appealed against the conviction and sentence. [5]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Jamunia’s convictions for murder and robbery. [5]
- Whether the recovery of Jayabai’s ornaments could be relied upon under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and as evidence of Jamunia’s knowledge and possession. [6][7][8]
- Whether the death penalty should be confirmed in the circumstances of the case. [9]
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Counsel argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and suggested that witnesses might have mistakenly identified Jamunia and Jayabai travelling together. [5]
- It was argued that the recovery of the ornaments was inadmissible because Jamunia was not in police custody and because the Sub-Inspector did not prove the statement leading to the discovery. [6]
- Counsel further contended that the ornaments were found in an open field and therefore could not be treated as being in Jamunia’s possession. [7]
- Reliance was placed on authority for the proposition that unexplained possession of stolen property, by itself, does not justify conviction. [8]
Accused's Position
- Jamunia denied the prosecution evidence, denied making the discoveries, and explained the blood on her shoes as possibly originating from a boil on her leg. [5]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 29 NLR 251 1933 Nag 136, 1933 Cr C 610, 143 IC 17, 34 Cr LJ 505, 29 NLR 251 at p. 265 | Custody may exist in substance even without formal arrest. | The Court held that Jamunia was, for practical purposes, in police custody when the ornaments were recovered. [6] |
| 31 NLR 256 1936 Nag 23, 1936 Cr C 130, 161 IC 8, 37 Cr LJ 460, 31 NLR 256 | Section 27 should not be used to prove recovery of common articles having no demonstrated connection with the crime; a connection such as blood-stains may make the section applicable. | The Court explained the proper use of Section 27 and criticised the failure to prove Jamunia’s statement more clearly. [6] |
| 30 NLR 269 1934 Nag 71, 1934 Cr C 276, 150 IC 623, 35 Cr LJ 1097, 30 NLR 269 at p. 281 | It addressed the scope of statements admissible under Section 27. | The Court referred to it in explaining that Section 27 permits proof of qualifying statements despite the general exclusion of confessions made to or in the presence of police. [6] |
| 50 Mad 274 1926 Mad 638, 93 IC 42, 27 Cr LJ 394, 50 Mad 274 | A statement admissible under Section 27 may be admitted as a whole insofar as it leads to discovery; unexplained possession alone is insufficient where it is the only incriminating circumstance. | The Court distinguished the possession principle and relied on the surrounding circumstances showing Jamunia’s knowledge of the burial place. [7][10][8] |
| 23 NLR 62 1926 Nag 119, 89 IC 516, 26 Cr LJ 1380, 23 NLR 62 | Unexplained possession of stolen property alone does not warrant conviction. | The Court accepted this principle but held that possession was not the only circumstance against Jamunia. [8] |
| 56 Mad 231 1933 Mad 233, 1933 Cr C 389, 143 IC 46, 34 Cr LJ 481, 56 Mad 231, 64 MLJ 88 | A presumption of complicity in murder may arise from possession of property where that inference is reasonable in the circumstances. | The Court used the surrounding evidence to support an inference connecting Jamunia with the murder. [8] |
| 31 All 592 (1909) 31 All 592, 3 IC 26, 8 Cr LJ 26 | Conduct relevant to knowledge and discovery is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. | Jamunia’s conduct in identifying and digging up the buried ornaments was treated as evidence of her knowledge and was considered with the other circumstances. [8] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court accepted the evidence of several witnesses who saw Jamunia and Jayabai proceeding together towards Mudia-Dehra. It rejected the suggestion that all the witnesses had been mistaken, noting that no reason had been shown for deliberate false testimony and that Jayabai had been present in the village for several days. [5]
The discovery of the remains, clothing, bangles, and identified ornaments supported the conclusion that Jayabai had been murdered. The ornaments were recovered from a field connected with Jamunia’s brother, and blood was found on several ornaments and articles recovered during the investigation. [4]
The Court held that Jamunia had been arrested before the recovery and was in police custody in substance. Although the trial judge relied on the recovery itself rather than expressly invoking Section 27, one witness proved Jamunia’s statement that she would recover Jayabai’s ornaments from the field. [6][11]
The fact that the ornaments were buried in an open field did not prevent the Court from treating Jamunia as possessing or knowing their location. Her precise knowledge of the spot and her act of digging up the ornaments strongly indicated that she had placed them there. This conduct was admissible under Section 8 and had to be considered with the evidence placing her with Jayabai and the discovery of the remains nearby. [7][8]
The blood-stains on the shoes and scythe were treated as supportive but not independently decisive: the source of the blood on the scythe was not established, and the blood on the shoes might have come from Jamunia’s boil. Even without relying on those articles, the Court found sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction. [8]
The Court found no extenuating circumstances. Although Jamunia’s age, sex, and recent delivery in jail could be considered by the Local Government, they did not persuade the Court to reduce the sentence. [9]
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed and death sentence confirmed. The Court upheld Jamunia’s convictions and concluded that the murder of the child for her ornaments was properly punishable by death. [9][12]
The direct effect was that Jamunia’s conviction and sentence remained in force. The opinion did not state any broader implication beyond its application of the evidentiary principles to the circumstances of this case.
1. The appellant in this case, Mt. Jamunia, wife of Partap Lohar of Khajuria, has been sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge, Saugor, for murdering a girl, 12 years old, Jayabai, daughter of Pannalal Bania of Malt hone. She was also convicted of robbing Jayabai of her ornaments at the time of murdering her and a conviction under S. 392, I.P.C, was recorded although no separate penalty was passed. We have already pointed out to this same Additional Sessions Judge in a recent case the advisability of imposing separate sentence in such cases.
2. According to the prosecution this little girl disappeared from Khajuria on Tuesday, 12th November 1935, and must have been murdered on the same day.
3. The events leading up to the disappearance are hardly in dispute. She had been brought to Khajuria by her father Pannalal Bania who had business there, a few days before Diwali, and was staying at the house of his Bataidar, Umrao Singh, P.W 25. On 29th October 1935 she was taken by her father to visit her maternal uncle Chhalonelal, P.W 29, at Pandho, a village one mile distant. He left her there and visited other villages in connection with his business. After staying 12 days at Pandho, Jayabai herself returned to Khajuria on Saturday, the 9th November, along with Dwarka Prasad, P.W 3. She again stayed at Umrao Singh's house. On Tuesday, after having bathed at a Nala, she had meals, and borrowing a comb from Umrao Singh's mother she went to the house of Mt. Ganeshi, P.W 28, to have her hair dressed. When she arrived there, she was accompanied by the accused whose house is close to that of Mt. Ganeshi. The latter dressed Jamunia's hair, but was called away by her husband. She was not able to perform the same office to Jayabai. This same witness, some time after noon, saw Jayabai and Jamunia crossing the stream and going in the direction of Mudia-Dehra. The two were also seen together by Motisingh, P.W 4, at the corner of one Gora's house, and three other witnesses, Halka, P.W 5, Mehgu, P.W 6, Mt. Sona, P.W 7, speak to seeing them going along together by the Mudia-Dehra way. These witnesses prove that Jayabai was wearing a Dhoti and a laced Polka, that her hair was loose and that she was wearing four silver ornaments, Todal, Bankey, Ohhoora and Khangoria, and a glass bangle on each hand. Mt. Jayabai was not seen again, but two witnesses, namely, Banjan, P.W 8, and Garaibahu, P.W 9, met the accused returning to the village. Banjan, P.W 8, says that Jamunia came up to her a little before sunset from the side of Mudia-Dehra while she was cutting grass. The accused was trembling and asked the witness whether she, would go home. Ranjan refused and asked the accused why she was trembling and got the reply that she had fallen into a pit. Then the accused went away towards the basti. She was noticed by Garaibahu, P.W 9, as she entered the outskirts of the village.
4. The girl's disappearance was reported at the police station on 16th November 1935 and a search was made, but no trace was found until the 18th when a skull and some other bones were found lying about a mile from Khajuria village near the way to Mudia-Dehra. Pieces of Dhoti and Polka smeared with blood, a yellow bangle and four pieces of green bangle were found close by. The Civil Surgeon reported that the skull was probably that of a female about 12 years old. As the girl was last seen in this direction, and as no one else was reported missing, the evidence of identification seems to justify the conclusion that the remains were those of the girl and that she had met her death by foul means. This conclusion receives corroboration from the recovery of the ornaments which she is proved to have been wearing. They had been buried in the field of accused's brother Gora at point 13 on the map which is a little off the track between the two villages and about half-way between Khajuria and the spot where the remains were found. These ornaments were recovered at the instance of the accused. They have been identified to belong to Jayabai and it is proved that the pair of Bankeys (Article B), the Chura (Article C) and the Hasli (Article D) were stained with human blood. On further information given by the accused a Roy the (Article J) and a pair of shoes (Article K) were recovered from her brother's house. Article K is proved to be stained with human blood. Article J was also blood-stained, but the nature of the blood on it could not be determined. Human blood was also found on the Dhoti, Polka and clods of earth seized on the spot.
5. The accused denied entirely the truth of all of the points brought out in the evidence against her, except that she admitted that the scythe and the shoes belonged to her. She denied making discovery of any articles and explained the blood on her shoes by Baying it might have come from a boil which she had on her leg. Two of the assessors found her guilty both of murder and robbery and the third assessor would convict her of robbery only. The appellant's learned Counsel contends that the evidence on record is insufficient to sustain a conviction. It is somewhat faintly argued that the witnesses who say they saw the girl and the accused going along together may have been mistaken. It is not said that they have deliberately given false evidence, and, in fact, no reason has been brought out as to why they should. It is only suggested that Halka, P.W 5, for instance, could not have identified the girl from where he was, which was some 220 yards away, especially as the girl was a stranger to the village. But she had been there for some days and in a small village people are quick to observe strangers. We do not think it possible that all these witnesses could have mistaken and we feel bound to accept their evidence. Two points in the deposition of Motisingh, P.W 4, are seized upon, that he was going to answer the call of nature at an unusual time and that he had no Lota with him. The explanation appears in the cross-examination itself. His stomach was out of order and as he went to the side of a Nala to relieve himself, he evidently chose to dispense with a Lota.
6. The evidence about the recovery of the ornaments is also attacked. It is said that the accused was not in the custody of the police at the time. It is clearly proved that she had been arrested before the went to the field. Even if she was not formally arrested at the time when she gave the information, she was obviously for all practical purposes, in police ens tody, as has been held in 29 NLR 251 1933 Nag 136 , 1933 Cr C 610 , 143 IC 17 , 34 Cr LJ 505 , 29 NLR 251 at p. 265. The next argument if that Section 27 of the Evidence Act, is inapplicable as the Sub-Inspector has not proved what statement was made by the accused leading to the discovery of the ornaments. The learned Judge, as a matter of fact does not purport to make use of S. 27 at all. He relies on the actual recovery itself as showing knowledge and possession at the same time we are at a loss to understand why the statement which the accused made about the ornaments on the previous evening does not appear in the Sub-Inspector's evidence. We have noticed in another case also what seems to be a tendency to avoid the use of S. 27. This may be due to a misapprehension about the import of certain Nagpur rulings. The most recent reported case, 31 NLR 256 1936 Nag 23 , 1936 Cr C 130 , 161 IC 8 , 37 Cr LJ 460 , 31 NLR 256, condemns the practice of proving the recovery of common articles, such as this, which are not shown to have had any connexion with the crime; but where some connexion can be inferred, for instance, by the finding of blood-stains on the weapons, then the section does become applicable. Courts should remember that it is an enabling section, providing an exception to the previous ones, which exclude confessions made to or in presence of the police. If the conditions of the section are fulfilled, it allows even a confession to be proved the scope of the statements admissible in the section has been adverted to in 30 NLR 269 1934 Nag 71 , 1934 Cr C 276 , 150 IC 623 , 35 Cr LJ 1097 , 30 NLR 269 at p. 281. In the present case however one witness does prove the accused's statement, and it can be taken into account against her. Jagannath, P.W 27, deposes as follows:
On Wednesday evening the accused was arrested. She said she would recover Mt. Jayabai's-ornaments from the field of Gora.
7. The evidence further shows that the ornaments were buried half a cubit deep and that she herself dug them up. But it is said that the discovery was made in an open field accessible to any one and that the ornaments cannot be said to have been in Jamnnia's possession. The case in 50 Mad 274 1926 Mad 638 , 93 IC 42 , 27 Cr LJ 394 , 50 Mad 274 is relied on. That case, it may be observed in passing, reinforces what we have said above about the proper use of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. At p. 294 it is held:
If an accused makes a statement which is admissible under S. 27, the whole of the statement which leads to the discovery of the stolen property is admissible and sentences should not be cut up so as to reduce the statements only to the actual words which the accused may use to express the fact that he has hidden the properties.
8. Again at pp. 280 and 281 of the same ruling it was pointed out that the question put by a police officer and the answer given by the accused must, if necessary, be taken together. But the case was quoted by counsel for the other proposition in it that unexplained possession of stolen property is not enough to warrant a conviction. That however is clearly said to be when the unexplained possession is the only circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused. It was so held in 23 NLR 62 1926 Nag 119 , 89 IC 516 , 26 Cr LJ 1380 , 23 NLR 62, and we accept the principle there enunciated. The same principle is really stated in a slightly different form in 56 Mad 231 1933 Mad 233 , 1933 Cr C 389 , 143 IC 46 , 34 Cr LJ 481 , 56 Mad 231 , 64 MLJ 88, where it is said that a presumption of complicity in murder can be drawn from such possession of property if it appears reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. The question is not so much whether the accused was in physical possession of the ornaments buried in the field, though, as a matter of fact, a person who buries treasure in a spot unknown to others is really in possession of it whether it is in a field or in his own house. The important point is rather that the circumstances and the conduct of the accused point clearly to her knowledge of the exact spot where the ornaments were, and in the absence of any explanation, the reasonable inference is that she put them there herself. Such conduct is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act: see 31 All 592 (1909) 31 All 592 , 3 IC 26 , 8 Cr LJ 26. This fact also is not to be taken alone, but must be taken in conjunction with the evidence of her being seen with the girl not far away, and the evidence showing that the girl must have been murdered a few hundred yards off. The finding of blood-stains on the shoes and scythe fit in with the rest of the prosecution case, but in themselves are of little cogency, because those on the scythe are not proved to be of human source, and those on the shoes may just possibly have come from the boil from which the accused was suffering. However, leaving these articles out of account, there is ample evidence and indication in the case to justify the conviction, and we have no hesitation in upholding it.
9. There are no extenuating circumstances in the case, and the revolting crime of murdering a child for the sake of its ornaments is properly punished by the penalty of death. The age and the sex of the accused (she is about 22) and the fact that she has recently been delivered in jail may be taken into account by the Local Government, but we do not consider that these are circumstances which should weigh with us in this Court. We consider it our duty to confirm the penalty of death and we do so accordingly.
V.B/R.K
10. Appeal dismissed.
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