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Krishnabai And Others v. Parwatibai And Others
1. The plaintiffs' claim for possession of the house in dispute and for recovery of Rs. 48 as arrears of rent has been dismissed. So they have filed this appeal. The plaintiffs are four sisters, daughters of one Bhagirathi Bai who died about 21 years before suit. Of these, plaintiff 4, Gangoobai, alone took actual possession on the death of the mother. She managed the property, and when it was let out, took the rents for herself, and did not share them with her sisters. The others have had no connection whatever with the house, although there is evidence that they sometimes visited Gangoobai there. Gangoobai dealt with the house as her own, at any rate in 1926, when she sold it by an oral sale to Sadashivrao, the husband of defendant 1 and the father of the others, for a sum of Rs. 650. The sale is of course invalid, because it has not been reduced to writing, and because it has not been registered. But the lower appellate Court applies the doctrine of part performance, and upholds the defendants' title on that ground. This is manifestly wrong. The doctrine has no application in this case. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, of course, does not apply. It did not come into force till 1929, whereas the sale was in 1926, and the section has no retrospective application. But even if it did, it would make no difference, for under it the doctrine can apply only in cases of a written agreement.
2. Writing was perhaps unnecessary before the new section was enacted.
3. But in that case S. 54 would be a complete bar. Their Lordships of the Privy Council point out in 58 Cal 1235(1), that the doctrine cannot override express provisions of the law such as are contained in the Transfer of Property and Registration Acts. An oral sale is expressly prohibited by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act;, when the value of the property is over Rs. 100. Consequently, the doctrine was wrongly applied. The finding, that Gangoobai is estopped, is also wrong. There can be no estoppel in the face of the law, which in this case requires a registered instrument. But that does not matter, for the plaintiffs must, if they want to succeed, do so on the strength of their own title, and not on the weakness of the defendants. The lower appellate Court holds in this case that Gangoobai was in exclusive and adverse possession from at least the time of Bhagirathi's death. It is argued that this is wrong, for there is no finding of ouster and no plea, and a number of cases are cited to show that in the case of a co-owner there must be express ouster, and that mere non-participation in the profits and non-enjoyment of the property is not enough to destroy title. This is perfectly true, and the judgment of the lower appellate Court shows that the learned Judge has appreciated the law aright. The cases quoted before me on this point are all to be found in his judgment. But he also points out that although these facts do not necessarily indicate ouster, they may do so, especially when they are coupled with other circumstances. He points out that Gangoobai dealt with the property as her own, and in 1926 sold it to Sadashivrao without any protest from her sisters, and that this long course of conduct, coupled with the non-participation in profits and non-enjoyment of the property by others, is enough to establish ouster.
4. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held in 43 Mad 244(2) at p. 252 that ouster can be deduced from such circumstances. That being so, they formed a legal basis for the lower appellate Court's findings, and since the question is one of fact, I am precluded from interfering. Similar decisions are given in 29 Bom 300(3) and affirmed in 46 Bom 213(4); also in 11 NLR 164(5) at p. 168. It is argued that the principle enunciated in these cases can apply only in a very strong case. True, but that is a question of weight which is to be considered by a Court of fact and not by one of second appeal. Similar remarks apply to the argument that in the earlier Bombay case the period of exclusion was over 50 years. The length of ouster can make no difference to the principle, provided it is longer than the statutory period of 12 years. It is then for a Judge of fact to determine Whether the length of exclusive possession in the case before him was enough to establish ouster. As regards the lack of pleadings, the word ‘ouster’ has not been used, but the facts on which the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court has relied have all been pleaded. The rest is merely a legal deduction from these facts. So the findings are not vitiated on that ground. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
B.D/R.K
5. Appeal dismissed.
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