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Ghanaram And Others v. Balbhadra Sai And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The three plaintiffs obtained a preliminary decree for foreclosure against the defendants based on a mortgage executed by the defendants. The defendants appealed to this Court with all three plaintiffs as respondents. During the appeal, the third plaintiff (respondent 3) died and no steps were taken to bring his legal representatives on record. Consequently, the appeal abated as against the deceased plaintiff, and his legal representatives cannot be affected by any decision in the appeal. The issue now is whether the defendants can continue the appeal against the two surviving respondents, who claim the entire appeal has abated.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appeal can continue against the surviving respondents after the death of one respondent without bringing his legal representatives on record.
- Whether the partial abatement caused by the death leads to abatement of the entire appeal under the general principles of law.
- Whether the indivisibility principle of a mortgage for an entire sum prevents partial redemption or severance of interests among mortgagees.
- Whether the surviving plaintiffs, who claim to represent a joint Hindu family, can continue the appeal without involving all legal representatives of the deceased.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' Arguments
- The defendants argued that the appeal should continue against the two surviving respondents despite the death of the third plaintiff.
- They sought severance of the interests of the mortgagees and requested a right of partial redemption upon payment of a proportionate part of the decretal amount.
- They contended that since the plaintiffs formed a joint Hindu family, the death of one plaintiff does not affect the others and the surviving plaintiffs represent the estate, making it unnecessary to bring all legal representatives on record.
Respondents' Arguments
- The surviving respondents claimed that the entire appeal has abated due to the death of the third plaintiff and the absence of his legal representatives on record.
- They emphasized the principle of indivisibility of the mortgage and the necessity of all parties or their representatives being joined in the suit and appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 51 All 2671 at p. 273 | Abatement of appeal against deceased respondent and effect on legal representatives. | Confirmed that the appeal abates as against the deceased respondent and his legal representatives cannot be affected by decisions in the appeal. |
| 10 Lah 72 at p. 10 | General principles governing partial abatement of appeals. | Supported the proposition that whether partial abatement leads to entire abatement depends on general principles and facts of each case. |
| 27 NLR 220; 3 10 Lah 7; 10 Pat 3414; 53 Cal 752.5 | Principles relating to continuation or abatement of suits/appeals where parties die or are not represented. | Used to illustrate fundamental propositions about indivisibility of rights and necessity of all parties being before the court. |
| 48 All 2516 | View that rights of claimants in joint possession suits can be severed and disposed of individually. | Distinguished and respectfully disagreed with by the court, emphasizing the need for distinct severance in deed or decree. |
| 22 Mad 209.7 | Indivisibility of mortgage for entire sum and its effect on mortgagor and mortgagee rights. | Applied to hold that the mortgage is indivisible and partial redemption is not permissible without consent of all parties. |
| 47 Cal 1758 at p. 179 | Mortgage as conveyance to mortgagees as tenants-in-common and prohibition of partial redemption. | Held that redemption of part of the property by paying one mortgagee's separate debt is not allowed. |
| 4 Pat 6111 at p. 66 | Rights and liabilities fixed on making of a decree until varied or set aside. | Supported the conclusion that the deceased plaintiff acquired rights under the decree enforceable independently of joint Hindu family rules. |
| 51 Mad 347.9; 59 Mad 66010; 10 Pat 341 | Effect of death in joint Hindu family and representation of estate in legal proceedings. | Considered but not accepted as controlling in this case due to the specific rights acquired under the decree by the deceased plaintiff. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by acknowledging that the appeal abated as against the deceased plaintiff because his legal representatives were not brought on record, a point uncontested by the parties and supported by precedent. The central question was whether the appeal could continue against the two surviving respondents.
The Court referred to general principles stating that if a decree can be executed with respect to parties before the Court without affecting others' interests, the appeal may continue; otherwise, it abates entirely. The Court emphasized that these principles must be applied based on the facts of each case.
The Court analyzed the nature of the mortgage decree, which granted the deceased plaintiff the right to obtain the entire decretal amount and possession of the entire mortgaged property. The defendants sought partial redemption rights, which the Court found incompatible with the indivisibility of the mortgage.
The Court relied on established legal principles and precedents confirming that a mortgage for an entire sum is indivisible and that suits or appeals involving such mortgages require all parties or their representatives to be joined. Without the deceased plaintiff's legal representatives, the appeal cannot properly continue.
The Court rejected the defendants’ argument that the surviving plaintiffs, as members of a joint Hindu family, could represent the entire estate without bringing all legal representatives on record. It held that the deceased plaintiff had acquired separate rights under the decree, enforceable independently of joint family rules, and these rights passed to his sons, who must be represented.
Concluding that the absence of the deceased plaintiff’s legal representatives rendered the appeal incapable of proper adjudication, the Court dismissed the appeal on this technical ground.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed.
The Court held that due to the death of one plaintiff and the failure to bring his legal representatives on record, the entire appeal abates. Consequently, the defendants cannot continue the appeal against the surviving respondents alone. The dismissal was on a technical point and not on the merits of the case. Costs were awarded only in respect of the preliminary objection, with a counsel's fee fixed at Rs. 75 payable by the appellants to the surviving respondents.
This decision directly affects the parties by requiring the presence of all parties or their representatives in suits and appeals involving indivisible mortgage rights. No broader precedent beyond the application of established principles was set.
1. The three plaintiffs in this suit obtained a preliminary decree for foreclosure against the defendants upon a mortgage executed by them. The defendants thereupon appealed to this Court making all the three plaintiffs respondents. During the pendency of the appeal plaintiff 3, who figured as respondent 3 here, died and no attempt was made to bring his legal representatives on record. The appeal has consequently abated as against him and his legal representatives cannot be affected by any decision made in it. There is no doubt about that and the parties before us are all agreed on this point. In any case the matter is concluded by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 51 All 2671 at p. 273. The question now at issue is whether the defendants appellants can continue the appeal as against the other two respondents who claim that the whole appeal has abated. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to abatement do not assist us much. Under O. 22, R. 4(3), read with O. 22, R. 11, the appeal, so far as the statute is concerned, abates only as against the deceased respondent. But that does not solve the problem, for, as observed by Shadi Lal, C.J in 10 Lah 72 at p. 10:
The question whether the partial abatement thus caused leads to an abatement of the appeal in its entirety depends upon general principles.
2. A great deal of case law has grown around this question and the decisions are not uniform, but the difficulty, in our opinion, arises not so much because of any doubt about the general principles but because of their applicability to particular cases. There can be no question that it is impossible to lay down any general rule which will be of universal application. Each case must be decided on its own facts and it is here that Judges differ. The underlying principles can, we think, be stated simply as follows: (1) “If a decree can be passed and given effect to in so far as the right of the parties actually before the Court are concerned without interfering with the interests of others, then the suit or the appeal can continue; if not, it abates as a whole. (2) The Court must see that it does not pass a decree which it may find itself incapable of executing owing to the circumstances that the lower Court's decree in favour of the deceased respondent has become final in consequence of the partial abatement of the appeal against him”.
3. These two propositions which have our respectful concurrence are to be found in one form or another in the following cases: 27 NLR 220, 3 10 Lah 7, 10 Pat 3414 and 53 Cal 752.5 In our opinion they go to the root of the matter. It is not necessary to make more than a passing reference to cases which illustrate these propositions. One obvious case is that in which two or more persons jointly obtain a mandatory injunction enjoining the defendants to, say, pull down a wall. If the defendants want to challenge such a decree, they would naturally have to join all the plaintiffs, or in the case of those who have died their legal representatives. Otherwise there would be this inconsistent position; the same decree in respect of the same joint cause of action would give plaintiff A a right to pull down the wall on behalf of all the plaintiffs, for be it remembered A's right under O. 21, B. 15 is not merely to act on his own behalf but on behalf of all, and the distinction is of importance; cases may arise where A's action on behalf of all may give rise to a right to contribution; at the same time the decree would give the defendants, if they succeeded in their appeal, the right to maintain the status quo as against plaintiffs B, C and D: an impossible position. Similar questions appear to arise in cases of partnership, partition and pre-emption. It seems to be conceded in all but the last of these cases, where there is some difference of opinion, that the proceedings cannot continue unless all the parties interested are before the Court. Administration suits afford another example.
4. The learned Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court in 48 All 2516 dealing with a suit for redemption which he treated as being in essence one for joint possession of property, takes a contrary view and holds that the rights of the claim, ants in such a case are distinct and so can be separated and disposed of individually. We do not doubt that such cases may occur. 10 Lah 7 is a case in point. But with the utmost respect we cannot agree that this can be done unless the interests are distinctly severed in either the deed or the decree. If they are not, and a joint decree is passed which is executable under O. 21, R. 15 by one decree holder on behalf of all, even when his co-decree-holders do not want to proceed and have perhaps compounded with their adversary, are cannot see how he can be deprived of this right by proceedings to which be is not a party. As we say, it is a question of substance and may make a considerable difference to him in the end. Therefore in our opinion the two propositions with which we started are fundamental and on them hangs the fate of the issue we are now considering.
5. What rights did the decree in the present case give to the deceased plaintiff? First of all the right to obtain the entire decretal amount on behalf of all the decree-holders by a given date; secondly the right to get possession of the entire mortgaged property if the entire amount decreed was not paid within the time allowed. The date fixed for payment was 10th July 1934 and has long since passed. What do the judgment-debtors want in this appeal: at the very least an extension of the time allowed. Even if that were granted and no more, the right of the deceased plaintiff's legal representative to obtain possession of the entire property, which has now accrued, would be affected; and that is the very least that can be done. But the defendants want much more. They want the interests of the mortgagees to be severed and they ask for a right of partial redemption upon payment of a proportionate part of the decretal amount. How can this be done without affecting rights which are now unalterable under the decree? That in itself concludes the matter. But this being a suit on a mortgage for foreclosure, we are able to rest our decision on another ground as well. It is now well settled that:
A mortgage for an entire sum is from its very purpose indivisible; and that character of indivisibility exists with reference not only to the mortgagee, but also to the mortgagor; save by special arrangement between all the parties interested, neither mortgagor nor mortgagee, nor persons acquiring a partial interest through either, can obtain relief under the mortgage except in consonance with that principle of indivisibility: 22 Mad 209.7
6. Because of this principle, their Lordships of the Privy Council held in 47 Cal 1758 at p. 179 that when, as here, a mortgage effects the conveyance of the real estate to the mortgagees as tenants-in-common, then no redemption can be effected of part of the property by paying to one of the mortgagees her separate debt. It is not a mortgage to each of a divided half but a conveyance to them of the whole property.
7. They then proceeded to add:
Where a mortgage is made by one mortgagor to two mortgagees as tenants-in-common, the right of either mortgagee who desires to realize the mortgaged property and obtain payment of the debt, if the consent of the co-mortgagee cannot be obtained, is to add the co-mortgagee as a defendant to the suit and to ask for the proper mortgage decree which would provide for all the necessary accounts and payments, excepting that there could be no decree for money entered as between the mortgagee defendant and the mortgagor.
8. We think, it follows from this, as well as from Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, that a suit on a mortgage cannot lie unless all the parties, or their representatives are joined. The same thing also appears from Section 45 of the Contract Act; one of several mortgagees cannot, without the consent of the others, release his rights under the mortgage or give a valid discharge to the extent of his share. There may possibly be exception when the mortgage deed itself makes their rights divisible, or when there has been an express severance with consent in the manner contemplated by Section 67(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, but we can envisage no other possibility. Even a splitting up of the mortgage security under S. 60 would not have that effect, for all the parties to the mortgage would still have to be there. If then a suit cannot proceed in the absence of a party to the transaction, it is difficult to see how an appeal can. The principles must be the same in both cases and indeed, if we understand it aright, that seems to have been the test applied in 27 NLR 220. Any other view would lead to this incongruity: The legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff would have the right to execute the entire decree on behalf of all the plaintiffs qua mortgagees, whereas the same decree would decide, if the defendants succeed, that they are not mortgagees or at any rate that some of them are not and that consequently the mortgage cannot be enforced in its entirety. We hold therefore that because of the abatement with respect to the deceased plaintiff-respondent, the whole appeal abates. It was argued however on behalf of the appellants that the plaintiffs formed a joint Hindu family and so the death of one of them does not affect the others, the whole right survives to them. Founding on this hypothesis it was urged that as the two surviving plaintiffs now represent the estate, and as they are already on record it is not necessary to bring them on record again in a different capacity: 51 Mad 347.9 In reply to the objection that the surviving plaintiffs are not the only members of the family, even if it be assumed that they are joint (a position which the plaintiffs do not admit because the deceased plaintiff left two sons) it was argued that it is not necessary to bring all a man's legal representatives on record, it is enough if those who are there represent the estate: 59 Mad 66010 and 10 Pat 341. There is support for these propositions in those rulings but they are not beyond question. There is for example a difference of opinion on the first point between the Madras and the Patna High Courts in these very rulings, but we need not enter into that here, for, in our opinion, the hypothesis on which the two subsequent propositions are based is wrong.
9. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have pointed out in 4 Pat 6111 at p. 66 that once a decree is made in a suit, the parties acquire rights and incur liabilities on the making of it which are fixed unless or until the decree is varied or set aside. The deceased plaintiff consequently acquired rights under the decree in suit which he could have enforced in defeasance, if necessary, of all rules which normally govern the conduct of affairs in a joint Hindu family. Even if the other two plaintiffs had compounded with the defendant against his wishes, he would still have been entitled to execute the whole decree on behalf of all under O. 21, R. 15 as we have already observed. Therefore his rights in this respect were something over and above the usual rights of a mere member of a joint Hindu family. They resembled, though not in all respects, the rights which a co-parcener has of acquiring separate property of his own without forfeiting his position as a member of the co-parcenary. We do not mean to imply that he would thereby have had the right to consider the money or the property as his own self, acquisition: that would depend upon a number of factors about which we know nothing in this case. But he would have been entitled to enforce execution whether the others wanted it or not. To that extent he had acquired a right, and consequently an “estate” within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the CPC, which was peculiarly his own. If that is so, then, in our opinion, his sons would succeed to this separate and individual right which he had thus acquired in the same way as they do to the rest of his separate estate. They are the ones therefore who now represent the “estate” which had become so peculiarly his own under the decree, and in their absence the appeal cannot succeed. It is dismissed. But since the dismissal is on a technical point and not on the merits, we award costs only in respect of the preliminary objection which has just succeeded. We fix counsel's fee at Rs. 75 for this purpose and direct the appellants to pay this sum to the surviving respondents in respect of costs.
D.S/R.K
10. Appeal dismissed.
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