Kallugudi Rachappa

The petitioner in this petition, Kallugudi Rachappa, filed a plaint in the District Court of Bellary on the 2nd of August 1937. The plaint was returned to the petitioner-plaintiff with an endorsement raising various points, one of which was that the plaintiff being a party to one of the decrees sought to be declared as not binding on him, the suit had to be valued under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act in respect of such declaration and requisite Court-fee paid thereon. The plaint was re-presented with a reasoned argument by the plaintiff's Vakil the gist of which was that there was no necessity for the plaintiff to sue for the cancellation or setting aside of the decree in question and that the Court-fee already paid, viz., Rs. 477-7-0, was sufficient. Thereupon the learned District Judge, after hearing the arguments of the plaintiff's pleader as well as of the Government Pleader, passed an order to the effect that the plaintiff was bound to sue for the cancellation of the decree referred to above, viz., the decree in O.S No. 14 of 1926, on the ground that the allegations in the plaint if proved would not show that the minor was not a party to that suit. This order was passed on the 9th of September 1937, and on the 14th September 1937, the plaint was returned by the District Judge to the petitioner-plaintiff with the following endorsement: “In view of the order passed on 9th September 1937 this plaint is returned for necessary amendments. Returned. Time seven days.”

There has been no order by the District Judge rejecting the plaint for non-payment of the deficit Court-fee but only an order returning the plaint directing that it should be amended. The procedure adopted by the District Judge does not appear to be one which is fair to the litigant who wants his suit to be filed and dealt with according to law. It was no doubt open to the learned District Judge to have required payment of a particular amount as deficit Court-fee within a particular time and, if such payment was not made, to reject the plaint, thus giving the prospective plaintiff the right to appeal from the order rejecting the plaint. The present order returning the plaint for “necessary amendments” compels the party to accept the view of the District Judge as to the Court-fee payable; otherwise he loses his right of appeal. On the merits, I am of opinion, after hearing the arguments not only on behalf of the petitioner but also on behalf of the Crown, that the view of the learned District Judge is not according to law. The plaint, as it stands, does not ask for setting aside of any decree; in any case, it is not the duty of the Court to advise the prospective plaintiff as to what relief he should ask for. If he is satisfied with a mere declaration, he has to pay Court-fee on the relief that he actually prays for, and not on the footing of the relief which according to the Court he ought to ask for. If it is found later that the prayer is not sufficient, the plaintiff will have to blame himself if he gets what he asks for and nothing more. On the other hand, if he changes his mind and wants to ask for further relief, he will have to obtain the Court's permission to amend the plaint accordingly and pay the additional Court-fee required. It is not right to say that the allegations in the plaint do not show that the plaintiff was not a party to the suit in question or that his contention is merely that his father who was acting for him did not act with due diligence and honesty in prosecuting the suit. The plaintiff's father was himself a plaintiff in that suit, O.S No. 14 of 1926, along with the present plaintiff who was then a minor. The objection taken to the compromise decree in that suit is that the plaint itself was one in which the present plaintiff could not have been properly represented by his father and not that there was any lack of diligence or honesty in the conduct of that litigation. That was a suit to enforce the terms of a compromise in a previous suit in which the plaintiff's father, the present third defendant, had admitted the validity of the adoption of the present first defendant. It is therefore obvious that the father could not in the same plaint allege that the adoption was valid on his own behalf, and allege the contrary in his capacity as next friend of his minor son, the present plaintiff. It is, however, unnecessary to rely on this aspect of the matter. It is enough to say that in the present suit there is no prayer to set aside any decree but only for a declaration in respect of the two decrees for which the requisite Court-fee has been paid. In my opinion it was not right on the part of the Court below to have insisted that the petitioner-plaintiff should make certain amendments which would necessitate the payment of additional Court-fee. The Court's power to direct amendment of plaints should not be exercised for the purpose of imposing a burden on the plaintiff which he is not willing to accept as has been done in this case.

The petition is therefore allowed and the Court below is directed to take the plaint on its file and dispose of it according to law, if the original plaint, which has been filed in this Court, is re-presented to the Court below within 14 days from the date of the actual return of the plaint to the petitioner by this Court.

Petition allowed.

N.R.R