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Jitendra Nath Choudhury v. Bholanath Choudhury And Ors. Opposite Party
The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
This Rule is directed against an order, dated the 25th of November, 1939, under which the learned Munsif of Bolpur stayed certain execution proceedings pending the disposal of an appeal in this Court. Similar orders were also passed in connection with two analogous appeals.
It appears that the Petitioner in this case instituted a contribution suit against Opposite Parties Nos. 1 to 3 and obtained a decree in each of the suits on the 27th of July, 1938. The Opposite Parties then appealed to the learned District Judge of Birbhum who dismissed the appeals. Thereafter, the Petitioner started proceedings in execution on the basis of the decrees which he had obtained and, while these execution proceedings were pending,/the Opposite Parties appealed to this Court and obtained from this Court three Rules, namely Civil Rules Nos. 872(s) to 874(s) of 1939, to show cause why the execution proceedings should not be stayed. In due course these Rules came on for hearing before Mr. Justice Henderson on the 31st of August, 1939, and, after hearing the learned Advocates on both sides, the learned Judge discharged the Rules. Thereafter, the Opposite Parties applied for stay of execution to the learned Munsif of Bolpur who passed the orders staying execution against which these Rules are directed.
It is contended by the learned Advocate for the Petitioner in this case that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to stay the execution proceedings inasmuch as this Court had already refused to stay the execution when Mr. Justice Henderson discharged Civil Rules Nos. 872(s) to 874(s) of 1939 on the 31st of August, 1939.
The learned Advocate for the Opposite Parties has put forward a preliminary objection in this case to the effect that the orders dated the 25th of November, 1939, were in the nature of orders under sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in these circumstances appeals lay to this Court. It has, however, been held by this Court in the case of Ram Nath Singh v. Kamleshwar Prosad Singh that the High Court may interfere in revision in respect of an incorrect order under Or. 41, r. 6(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. So this preliminary objection must be overruled.
The learned Advocate for the Petitioner contends that Or. 41, r. 6 of the Code was not intended to be regarded as a mandatory provision of the law and in this respect he relies upon the decision of Mr. Justice Kendall in the case of Hamarain Sahi v. Sadhu Govind Rai . In a later case, however, Mr. Justice Kendall's decision was considered by the Madras High Court in the case of Rukmini Ammal v. Subra-mania Sastrigal and in that case their Lordships were not prepared to follow Mr. Justice Kendall's decision and they held that under Or. 41, r. 6(2) the Court which passed the decree had no option but to stay a sale on such terms as it thought fit if a proper application to that effect were made. Having regard to the terms of Or. 41, rr. 5 and 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure it appears that the intention of the legislature was that an application for stay of the execution of a decree should ordinarily be made to the Court which passed the decree. An exceptional discretion has, however, been vested in the Appellate Court by Or. 41, r. 5(1) of the Code which is to the effect that “the Appellate Court may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree.” In the case with which we are now dealing, it would appear that, having regard to the circumstances of the case generally, Mr. Justice Henderson when he passed his order, dated the 31st of August, 1939, did not think it necessary to exercise the exceptional discretion vested in the Appellate Court. However, the powers of the Court which passed the decrees remained unfettered by Mr. Justice Henderson's order and, having regard to the terms of Or. 41, r. 6(2), of the Code, the learned Munsif had no option but to direct a stay on suitable security being furnished inasmuch as the Petitioner had obtained an order for the sale of the judgment-debtors' immovable properties in execution of the decrees which he had obtained.
In this view of the case I consider that the orders made by the learned Munsif on the 25th of November, 1939, were correct. Those orders are, therefore, affirmed and these Rules are discharged with costs.
A consolidated hearing-fee of one gold mohur is assessed for these three Rules.
Let the hearing of Appeals from Appellate Decrees Nos. 1021 to 1023 of 1939 and 204 of 1939 be expedited.
P.C
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