Emperor v. V.B Kolte And Another Opposite Party.

1. These proceedings have been submitted by Mr. B.P Pathak, Magistrate, first class, Nagpur, for action to be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act against the non-applicants, Mr. V.B Kolte, Assistant Professor, King Edward College, Amraoti, and his counsel, Dr. P.S Deshmukh, Advocate, Amraoti. A case under Section 7 of the Copyright Act, was pending in that Magistrate's Court. The complainant was one B.S Pandit, and the accused was N.K Behere who moved the Magistrate to take the present proceedings. In the course of his written statement he had stated that this non-applicant (Professor Kolte) and one other gentleman had an interest in the book in question, and in that connexion he made certain allegations about the nature of the interest, which were considered by them to be insulting and defamatory. Accordingly Dr. Deshmukh acting on behalf of his client sent to Mr. Behere a notice, which it is said amounts to contempt of Court. In that notice after reproducing the offending part of the statement it is set out that the statement is thoroughly irrelevant for the purpose of a decision of the case, was made deliberately and maliciously with the intention of harming and knowing that it would harm the reputation of Professor Kolte, etc. Behere was therefore called on by it to make amends within four days by paying a sum of Rs. 2500 damages and publishing a public and unconditional apology in three newspapers. The notice concludes: “If you fail my client would be forced to take such civil and criminal action as he may be advised.”

2. On being asked to show cause, the non-applicants contend that their action did not amount to contempt of Court as they were justified in protecting Mr. Kolte's interests and they had no intention of obstructing the pending proceedings. Dr. Deshmukh in his written statement has also tendered an unconditional apology in the event of the Court finding that in fact he has been guilty of contempt.

3. The learned Magistrate in his order of reference relies on two cases, AIR 1940 Nag 110 : ILR (1940) Nag 691 and 57 ALL 573.2 It is not possible to give a comprehensive definition of what amounts to contempt of Court, but as the learned Judges state in 57 ALL 573 interference with the administration of justice is one of the well-recognized heads of contempt. What has to be seen is whether in the present case by sending that notice the non-applicants did interfere or did intend to interfere with the administration of justice. The Allahabad case is distinguishable from the one before us on several important points. In the first place, in that ruling it was the plaintiff himself in the pending proceedings who sent a notice by his advocate to the defendant. Here, non-applicant 1 is no party to the copyright proceedings at all and did not wish to be a party. He only objected to his name being dragged in by the accused. If he had been a party, he could as in the Allahabad case have applied under the Code of Civil Procedure (O. 6, R. 16) for having irrelevant or scandalous pleas struck out. Not being a party he had no such remedy. Secondly, in the notice in the Allahabad case there was a direct threat that unless the plea were withdrawn and a certain sum paid as damages there would be a criminal prosecution for defamation. In the present case there was no demand for withdrawal of the statements: the demand was for compensation and an apology out of Court for having made it. The accused Behere did not withdraw it and incidentally it has been found by the Magistrate in his judgment that the plea was neither very material nor was it substantiated. The other case, ILR 1940 Nag 69, is also distinguishable on the above two grounds. The offending letter was written by one of the parties himself to his adversary's counsel and it demanded withdrawal of certain passages in the statement filed in that civil suit.

4. Learned counsel for the non-applicant 2 relies on several other cases which are certainly more in point. The first is AIR 1940 ALL 114.3 There the son of a party A objected to a defamatory and abusive epithet by which he was described in the written statement of the opposite party B. A applied to the Court to have the defamatory epithet struck out, and A's son gave a notice to B that damages for defamation should be paid within a certain time or he would bring an action against B for defamation. The Judges held that neither the application nor the notice amounted to contempt of Court. The case in 57 ALL 573 was distinguished and the Judges said that to put pressure on a party to withdraw a plea in a civil suit is quite a different matter from a notice stating that a suit for defamation or libel will be brought. It was conceded that the opposite party would be within its rights in bringing a suit for libel and it was held that if the filing of the suit itself would not amount to contempt of Court neither would the notice for such a suit. This case is referred to with approval in a later Allahabad case reported in ILR (1940) ALL 710.4 There the party said to be guilty of contempt was himself an applicant for appointment as guardian in which proceedings his opponent filed an affidavit containing various imputations against his character and conduct. The applicant filed an application under Section 476 of the Cr PC, and also filed a complaint under S. 500, I.P.C It was held that there was nothing to show that his motive in seeking these legal remedies was to harass and handicap the opponent in the prosecution of his case in the guardianship proceedings and so to interfere with the administration of justice. 57 ALL 573 was again distinguished. A still later case is to be found in AIR 1941 ALL 955 which was heard by the same Bench consisting of Collister and Bajpai, JJ. There in an insolvency application, A made statements defamatory of B, who thereupon instituted a complaint under S. 500, Penal Code, against A. It was held that B was entitled to sue for defamation and that he had done nothing from which it could be inferred that if A withdrew the allegations B would drop the complaint. This case is not such a good parallel to the present one where a demand was made not directly to withdraw the allegations but to apologize for them. In the present case the defamation suit, I understand, was not brought at all. Reference in this last ruling is made to one other case, AIR 1939 Oudh 225.6 In that case it was the complainant in criminal proceedings who filed the complaint under S. 500, Penal Code, against the accused who as a witness in that case had defamed him. It was held that the complainant was not bound to wait till the conclusion of the case and was entitled to make a complaint under S. 500: he did so in good faith with the intention of protecting his own good name.

5. The circumstances in the present case then are such that it should be governed by these latter rulings, which have my respectful concurrence. Courts, no doubt, have to be jealous to guard against any interference with their functions, but, on the other hand, they should not be too sensitive where no harm has been caused or was intended to be caused. It might have been wiser if the non-applicants had delayed action for some time until the criminal case had terminated, but as held in AIR 1941 ALL 95 the non-applicants were not bound to do so, especially where the criminal case might have gone on for some time and a suit for defamation might finally have been barred by limitation. I find that no contempt of Court has been committed. The rule is, therefore, discharged. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.

K.S/R.K

6. Application dismissed.