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Dharamrajsingh v. Chandrashekhar Rao

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Feb 2, 1942
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit for foreclosure on a mortgage executed by members of a joint Hindu family, including a non-father manager who mortgaged family property to satisfy antecedent debts of a minor member's paternal grandfather. The minor member's share was exonerated by the trial court on the ground that the non-father manager lacked authority to alienate it merely to pay off the grandfather's antecedent debts. The plaintiffs-mortgagees appealed against this decision. The case involves questions about the authority of a non-father manager to alienate the share of a minor member in joint family property to discharge debts incurred by ancestors under the pious obligation rule. Due to a difference of opinion between two judges, the appeal was referred to a third judge under Section 98 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a non-father manager of a joint Hindu family can alienate family property so as to bind the share of a minor member when the consideration consists of antecedent debts of the minor's paternal grandfather which the minor is bound to discharge under the pious obligation rule.
  2. Whether such alienation by a non-father manager requires justification by legal necessity.
  3. Whether debts incurred by ancestors constitute family debts binding on all members or personal debts binding only on specific members under Hindu law.

Arguments of the Parties

Stone, C.J.'s Opinion

  • A non-father manager can bind a family share only if the alienation is for a family necessity.
  • The manager represents the family as a whole, not individual members, and cannot alienate a member's share to discharge that member's personal pious obligation.
  • A father may alienate a son's share to discharge antecedent debts binding on the son, regardless of necessity, but a non-father manager cannot impose such liability unless there is family necessity.
  • The debt incurred by the grandfather is a personal obligation on the minor, not a family debt, and thus the non-father manager cannot alienate the minor's share to discharge it.

Bose, J.'s Opinion

  • The non-father manager is empowered to manage family property but his authority to alienate is limited by the doctrine of legal necessity.
  • A father-manager can alienate shares to satisfy antecedent debts without restriction, but a non-father manager must act only when there is legal necessity affecting the family estate.
  • Legal necessity requires both that the debt was incurred for a family purpose and that there is no other reasonable course to satisfy the debt without alienation.
  • In the case of a minor member, the non-father manager can act similarly to a guardian and alienate the minor's share to satisfy antecedent debts of the father if necessary.
  • The mortgage debt in question was largely antecedent debt of the minor's grandfather and binding on the family under the pious obligation rule.
  • The lower court erred in not deciding the issue of necessity; the appeal should be allowed partially, holding the minor liable for a specified portion of the debt.

Niyogi, J.'s Opinion

  • The non-father manager can alienate a minor member's share to satisfy antecedent debts of the minor's grandfather only if the debt is a family debt and the alienation is justified by legal necessity.
  • Distinction between family debts and personal debts is crucial; only family debts bind all members and justify alienation by the manager.
  • The debts incurred by the grandfather were binding on all sons and grandsons under the pious obligation rule, thus constituting family debts.
  • The manager had full authority to mortgage the family property, including the minor's share, to discharge these debts.
  • Debts not antecedent to the grandfather or not proved to be incurred for legal necessity do not bind the minor.
  • The manager must satisfy himself that debts are antecedent and that alienation is necessary; mere antecedent debt is insufficient if alienation is not necessary.
  • The decree was modified to hold the minor liable for the portion of the debt proved to be antecedent and binding, with interest and costs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
46 All. 95 Authority of father vs. non-father manager to alienate shares; father can alienate for antecedent debts without necessity; manager requires legal necessity to bind family property. Used to distinguish powers of father and non-father manager; established that manager cannot bind family property without compelling cause.
25 All. 407 No guardian of a minor's share in joint family property exists under Hindu law. Supported the proposition that manager's authority is limited and not agency proper for minors' shares.
12 N.L.R 123 Followed the principle that no guardian can be appointed over a minor's share in joint family property. Reinforced limitations on manager's authority over minor members' shares.
6 M.I.A 393 Manager's alienation powers justified by legal necessity; manager acting for benefit of estate can alienate minor's property. Provided basis for non-father manager acting as de facto guardian to alienate minor's share when necessary to satisfy antecedent debts.
I.L.R (1940) Nag. 205 Legal necessity requires no other reasonable course for alienation by manager. Supported the interpretation of legal necessity as a limiting principle on manager's powers.
55 All. 370 Non-father manager cannot alienate for antecedent debts unless justified by legal necessity. Clarified that antecedent debts alone do not justify alienation by non-father manager without proof of necessity.
48 All. 518 Pious obligation rule extends liability to sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons equally. Supported that debts of grandfather bind minor member and justify family debt classification.
44 All. 368 Antecedent debt must be independent of the mortgage itself to bind heirs. Used to determine the nature of debts binding on minor members.
39 All. 437 Antecedent debt must be distinct from debt incurred by mortgage. Clarified the concept of antecedent debt relevant to alienation authority.
A.I.R 1937 Nag. 327 Manager must inquire into necessity and antecedency of debt before alienating minor's share. Supported requirement that alienation by non-father manager be justified by necessity and antecedent debt.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the scope of authority vested in a non-father manager of a joint Hindu family to alienate family property, especially the share of a minor member, in satisfaction of antecedent debts of ancestors. It distinguished between family debts, which bind all members, and personal debts, which bind only the debtor and his heirs under the pious obligation rule.

Stone, C.J. emphasized that a non-father manager cannot alienate a minor's share to discharge personal debts unless there is a family necessity, as the manager represents the family as a whole, not individual members.

Bose, J. elaborated that the non-father manager's powers are limited by the doctrine of legal necessity, requiring that alienation be the only reasonable course to satisfy the debt for the benefit of the family estate. He recognized that in the case of minors, the manager acts akin to a guardian and can alienate shares to discharge antecedent debts binding on the minor.

Niyogi, J. reconciled the differing views by clarifying that the manager's authority depends on whether the debt is a family debt or a personal debt and whether legal necessity justifies alienation. He found the debts of the grandfather to be family debts binding on all members, thus authorizing the manager to execute the mortgage including the minor's share. However, debts not proved to be antecedent or incurred for legal necessity do not bind the minor.

The court relied on established precedents to define "legal necessity" as a situation where no other reasonable course is available to satisfy the debt, and that the non-father manager's alienation powers are confined within this principle. The pious obligation rule was recognized as extending liability to sons and grandsons equally, making certain antecedent debts family debts.

The trial court's omission to decide the issue of necessity was criticized, and the appellate court modified the decree to hold the minor liable only for the portion of the debt that was antecedent and binding, with interest and costs.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final decision was to MODIFY THE DECREE of the lower court. The minor defendant (defendant 7) was held liable to the extent of Rs. 6811-14-6 representing the antecedent debts of his grandfather, which constituted a family debt binding on all members under the pious obligation rule. The mortgage executed by the non-father manager was thus valid to that extent, subject to the condition that the alienation was justified by legal necessity.

This decision clarifies that a non-father manager of a joint Hindu family may alienate the share of a minor member to satisfy antecedent family debts when no other reasonable course exists, effectively acting in a capacity similar to a guardian. However, alienation to satisfy personal debts not qualifying as family debts requires stricter justification and is generally not permitted.

No new precedent was established beyond the interpretation and application of existing principles. The ruling directly affects the parties by imposing partial liability on the minor member and confirming the limited but significant authority of non-father managers under Hindu law.

Show all summary ...

Stone, C.J:— This raises a question which must have been of constant recurrence and upon which there is little authority. This usually means that the law is generally regarded as so obvious as to be susceptible of only one answer. Take the following genealogical table:

2. A incurred a debt. There was a mortgage by B (to pay off the debt of A) of joint family property. Question: Is D's share bound? In my opinion B can bind D's share if the alienation (mortgage) was for family necessity: he has no authority to alienate to discharge D from his pious obligation. Fundamentally I regard the position as follows: Under Hindu law a manager represents a family; a father and son are linked in many ways. One way is that a father may, by incurring debts, impose a liability on a son. That liability may arise even though there was no necessity to incur the debt (assuming that the debt was not of a particular class.) On the other hand a manager cannot impose on the family liability for a debt unless there be necessity. (I disregard, as really founded on estoppel, the case where liability is founded on representation and enquiries). As a father may burden the son so he may alienate the son's share to discharge the burden (father's right to alienate to discharge antecedent debts). The manager may alienate a coparcener's share to save that share being taken by a creditor who has a debt binding on that share if the liability and the risk and the threat is to the family and not merely to a member of the family. A manager does a not, in my opinion, represent an individual member of a family. He represents the family. He cannot for example, sell away the whole share of a particular member (X) even to pay debts binding on that member personally. His authority is not as agent for X. He does not represent X before the world. He represents the whole family. A father might have been placed in the same position vis-a-vis his family. The position was finally settled in 46 All. 95,1 which decided that a father might alienate his son's share to pay an antecedent debt binding on the son, necessity or no necessity. A manager on the other hand does not bind a family or a share in family property unless there is necessity established and unless the necessity is a family necessity. To bind the family it would be necessary to show that the debts paid off were incurred for necessity; to bind the son's share it would merely be necessary to show that the antecedent debts were the cause of the sale. Assume a debt owing to a creditor. Assume the greatest possible pressure, the most remorseless creditor. Assume no money at all and no credit so far as the family is concerned. Can the creditor get at the non-contracting member's share? If he can, that member's share is in danger. If he cannot, that member's share cannot be lost. He can if the debt was for necessity; he cannot if it was not. Now suppose the contracting party, the person who incurred the debt, be a father and the member be the son. The son, qua son, can be made liable under the pious obligation rule. But the son, qua son, is not represented by the manager (who may or may not be the father). The only person who can save him by alienating his share is the father (or grandfather) whose debts created the obligation binding on the son. He can alienate to, or to pay the creditor. The manager cannot. It is not a family affair. The necessity, if there be necessity, is not a family necessity. Different considerations arise if the debt was for necessity. Is it a family necessity that D should pay A's debts? In my opinion it is not. It is a personal, pious need imposed not on the family but on D. As this results in a difference of opinion the appeal will go to a third Judge (Niyogi J.) and will abide the decision of the majority.

Vivian Bose, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit for foreclosure on a mortgage, and the main question is whether a non-father manager of a joint Hindu family can alienate family property so as to bind the share of a minor member when the consideration consists of antecedent debts of the minor's paternal grandfather which the minor is bound to discharge under the pious obligation rule. The mortgage was executed by the first three defendants and the father of defendants 4, 5 and 6 all of whom were brothers. Defendant 7 (with whom we are concerned in appeal), is a nephew of the executants being the son of a predeceased brother. His share has been exonerated and the plaintiffs-mortgagees appeal. The following tree will show the relationship:

3. The recitals of the deed set out that debts were owing as follows:

(1) Rs. 4000 to Guman Behna.

(2) Rs. 2000 to Dalchand Singhai.

(3) Rs. 2000 to other creditors.

4. Guman Behna's debt is traceable to a mortgage (Ex. P-1) executed by Sheoram Bhau and others and so this Rs. 4000 is antecedent so far as defendant 7 is concerned because it is the debt of his grandfather. Dalohand's debt is traceable to a & decree (Ex. P-5) which he obtained against Gopalrao, Makundrao and Bhikajirao. Govindrao, P.W 2, a separate member of the family who is not interested in this dispute, and Dalchand, P.W 8, the creditor in question, tell us that the debt was one of Sheoram's debts. It appears to have formed part of a larger family debt which was split up at a partition effected in Sheoram's time. Responsibility for the part with which we are concerned here was assigned to Sheoram and the rest to Govindrao. I see no reason to doubt this evidence. The remaining debts are described by Gopalrao (P.W 1), who was the manager of the family, as debts owing to petty creditors. He enumerates three of them; Badhaballabh Rs. 227-4-0, Thakur Mangalsingh Rs. 878 and Sadashive Rao Hardikar Rs. 250. He states that all three debts came down to him from his father's time. These debts are all shown in the family account books which have been filed. I find it proved that, except for Rs. 644-12-0, the debts were all of Sheoram's time. Thus, in my opinion, the whole of the consideration (except for Rs. 644-12-0) is shown to have been for the payment of the antecedent debts of defendant 7's paternal grandfather. There is no suggestion that these debts were incurred for illegal or immoral purposes, and so defendant 7 was liable for them under the pious obligation rule. The question is whether Gopalrao, as the non father manager of the family, had authority to alienate defendant 7's share in the family property in order to discharge that obligation.

5. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have examined and contrasted the non-father manager's powers of alienation with those of the father in 46 All. 95. The manager's authority is evidently based on some sort of principle of implied agency. I recognise that it is not agency proper, especially when minors are involved, because a minor cannot appoint an agent, and their Lordships of the Privy Council have held in 25 All. 4072 at p. 416 (followed by the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court in 12 N.L.R 123 at p. 15) that there can be no guardian of a minor's-share in joint family property. But fundamentally the principle that no man can deal with another's property, or share in property, unless he is in some way clothed with authority to do so holds good in Hindu no less than in other systems of law. In the Hindu law the manager is clothed with this authority because he is appointed such (minors apart) either with the express consent or the tacit understanding of the family as a whole, and under the Hindu law he is empowered to manage its property and to do all things necessary for the existence and well-being of the family and the preservation of its estate. But the limits of the authority rest in the doctrine of legal necessity. He cannot alienate for his own purposes. What those limits are I shall examine later. The father-manager, on the other hand, is not hampered by any such restrictions so far as his sons are concerned and can alienate not only his own share in the family estate, but also those of his sons, for private purposes of his own, provided such purposes are neither illegal nor immoral, and provided there is a debt antecedent in time and in fact. The problem lies not in the enunciation of these principles but in their application. What does “necessity” import? Can the father alienate for the satisfaction of his antecedent debts even when in the language of their Lordships (p. 101) there is no “compelling cause”? In other words, can he alienate for an antecedent debt even when there are ample funds in the family exchequer to enable him to liquidate these debts without alienation.

6. Necessity can, and indeed has to be viewed from two angles, each of which raises its own problems. First, the object for which the debt was incurred. Was that a family necessity? Was it something necessary for the existence or well-being of the family or the preservation of its estate, and if so, of the family as a whole or of some individual member? Second, was it necessary to incur the debt? Was it necessary to alienate? Or were there enough funds in the family till to achieve the object aimed at without borrowing and without alienation? I conceive that both aspects must be present before an alienation by a non-father manager can be justified. In 46 All. 95 at p. 101, quoted above, their Lordships state that the manager as such cannot bind the estate “without any compelling cause,” and in 6 M.I.A 3934 at p. 423, they speak of “pressure on the estate,” and the “danger to be averted,” and at page 424 they state that “the lender is bound to inquire into the necessities for the loan, and to satisfy himself as well as he can, with reference to the parties with whom he is dealing, that the manager is acting in the particular instance for the benefit of the estate.”

7. All these concepts predicate a certain degree of helplessness on the manager's part. They paint the picture of a man with no other reasonable course left to him; and that was the sense in which legal necessity was interpreted by a Division Bench to which my Lord the Chief Justice was a party in I.L.R (1940) Nag. 205 at p. 26. Whether a father manager is bound by the same limitations in the matter of his antecedent debts is open to question. In 46 All. 95 their Lordships observed at p. 102:

“On the other hand, there is the obligation of the son to discharge his father's debts, based on the doctrine of pious duty, but perhaps reflecting a remnant, as suggested by Sadasiva Ayyar, J. in 42 Mad. 7116 from the older laws of Manu under which the son had no interest during the father's life-time.”

8. If that is the basis of the rule, then no aspect of the law of necessity would appear to be involved, but it is by no means certain that it is and their Lordships did not decide that it was; nor do I, because that question does not arise in this case. Turning back however to the non-father manager's powers, the next question is whether, assuming that the element of pressure is present, that is to say, assuming that the debt cannot be paid without alienation, the other aspect of necessity, namely the nature of the debt as opposed to the manager's ability to pay it, requires that the purpose for which it is borrowed should be one which affects the family as a whole, or whether it is enough if it relates to an individual member? I have not been able to obtain much assistance on this point from the authorities. I think their Lordships of the Privy Council settled broadly in 46 All. 95 at page 104 that the non-father manager's powers are not the same as the father's in respect of an antecedent debt, but they were not concerned with the narrower aspects of the problem which confront us here and have not dealt with them.

9. In 55 All. 3707 the present question arose before a Full Bench, and the decision was that the existence of an antecedent debt would not justify a non father manager in alienating. He can only act for necessity and it was assumed that this would not be a necessity. I went further in 1941 N.L.J 2778 at p. 282 and assumed that it might be a necessity if the debt would not be repaid in any other way. But the observations were not necessary for the decision of that case and beyond this passing reference, the question was not examined further. In my opinion the true rule lies midway between these two extremes and a distinction has to be made between a minor and a major son. I. think the rule is too widely stated in 1941 N.L.J 277 where, though a minor son was involved, no distinction was drawn between a minor and a major in the obiter remarks referred to. I think the manager cannot, qua manager, alienate the family properties, or burden the family estate, except for a necessity which affects the family as a whole as distinct from some individual member. Thus, family cultivation, food, marriage expenses, funeral ceremonies, and the like, are matters with which the family as a whole are concerned even though the actual matter (e.g, the marriage of one of its members) may be a matter of more immediate personal concern to only one of the members. But these are all things with which the family as a whole are concerned under the Hindu law, however personal they may be in other ways. As regards other matters which the Hindu law does not look upon as matters of family concern, for example, a the personal debt of one of the members, the manager has no more concern with it, if the member in question is a major, than any other coparcener. The person concerned can, of course, alienate his own share in this province but whether he chooses to do so or not is his affair. The manager cannot act on his behalf unless he is authorized in other ways, in which case he would not be acting qua manager but in some other capacity. If, however, the person concerned is a minor, then I think the position is different and I think that the manager can then act in much the same way as a guardian of an infant can act when there is no joint family. The leading case on the question of necessity is 6 M.I.A 393. It will be observed that there was no joint family there. The infant heir was the sole owner of the property and the acts were the acts of his mother acting as the de facto & manager of his estate. The plaint had described her as the de facto guardian and had set out that she was managing in that capacity, and their Lordships stated at page 414 that it is “a strained and untrue construction to assign any other character to her acts than that which the plaint ascribes to them, notwithstanding the use of terms inconsistent with it.”

10. But in the alienation complained of she had not purported to act as “guardian” but as “proprietor” and so it was not a case of a guardian of a minor's estate purporting to alienate her ward's property on his behalf for a necessary purpose, and that was the view of the case which had been taken in the Suddar Dewanny Adawlut (see p. 413). Their Lordships, however, took the view that though she had purported to act as “proprietor” she had not there by intended to set up title in herself and was only purporting to manage her son's property and they treated her accordingly as the “de facto manager,” and their remarks were directed to the powers of a de facto manager to alienate. As I have said, these observations have been extended to managers of joint Hindu families and now, in a sense, form the basis of the law applicable to such managers. It seems obvious to me that some one must have the right to manage the personal affairs of a minor member of a joint Hindu family, and as no guardian can be appointed of his share in the joint family property, the only person in whom these powers can rest is the manager, and the limits of his authority are, I think, as set out in 6 M.I.A 393 To hold otherwise would put these minors to great loss. For example, as in their Lordships' case, the alienation might take the shape of a mortgage at a low rate of interest made to pay off an earlier mortgage of the father at a much higher rate. This, as their Lordships remarked, would prima facie be beneficial. Unless this could be done the debt on the old mortgage would go on swelling at a high rate of interest and in the end the minor might well lose all because it is clear that at some point of time he would have to pay and his share in the joint family estate could then be reached. But in any case, whatever the reason, I think their Lordships have settled this point. In 6 M.I.A 393 one of the items of consideration was the satisfaction of an antecedent debt of the father and their Lordships clearly recognized that would justify alienation pro tanto provided it was otherwise “for the benefit of the estate,” by which I understand their Lordships to mean that the manager has no other reasonable course left. At p. 420 their Lordships say, “and as to part, at least — namely, the ancestral debt — there is, in the opinion of their Lordships, ground to raise a prima facie presumption in the appellant's favour of a consideration that binds the estate.”

11. My conclusion then is that the non-father manager can alienate the minor son's share to satisfy an antecedent debt of the son's father, binding on the son, provided it is necessary for him to do so in the sense that owing to the circumstances in which the family is placed there is no other reasonable course open to him. (His Lordship after discussing evidence concluded as follows): I desire to animadvert on the omission of the learned Judge of the lower Court to decide this question. The matter was raised in issue 6 and the learned Judge merely remarked that the issue required no finding because of his conclusion on other points. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have commented on this practice on more than one occasion and this Court is frequently obliged to criticise Judges in the Courts below for omitting to decide important issues in appealable cases. It throws, as it has thrown in this case, an unnecessary burden on the appellate Court and wastes much of its time, I consider that the appeal should be allowed, but only partially. In my opinion the minor defendant 7 is only liable for Rs. 6811-14-6 of the debt. This should therefore be treated as the principal so far as he is concerned and interest should be calculated on that. The decree of the lower Court should, in my opinion, be modified accordingly.

(On difference of opinion between Stone, C.J and Bose J., the appeal was referred to Niyogi, J. who delivered the following judgment):

Niyogi, J.:— This appeal has come to me under Section 98 of the CPC, in consequence of difference of opinion between the learned Judges of the Division Bench on a point of law. The question which I have to decide is whether a manager of the joint Hindu family, who is not a father can alienate the share of a minor member to satisfy the antecedent debts incurred by the minor member's grandfather and whether his alienation requires justification by legal necessity. The following pedigree shows the relationship of the parties.

12. The mortgage was exeouted by Gopalrao, Makundrao, Nilkanthrao and Bhikajirao affecting the share of all the members of the joint family, including defendant 7, Chandrashekar Rao. The mortgage had been executed to satisfy the debts and liabilities incurred by Sheoram Bhau except a small amount of Rs. 644-12-0. The trial Court exonerated defendant 7 from liability to pay the mortgage debt on the ground that Gopalrao, who was the manager of the joint family but not the father of defendant 7, was not competent to mortgage the share of defendant 7 merely for the purpose of paying off antecedent debt of defendant 7's grandfather. It found that so far as defendant 7 was concerned the mortgage executed by Gopalrao had not been proved to have been justified on the ground of legal necessity or benefit to the estate. On appeal Bose, J. was of opinion that a non-father manager was competent to alienate the share of a minor member to satisfy the antecedent debts incurred by the latter's grandfather provided that the circumstances of the family were such as to leave no other reasonable course to satisfy the debts. The learned Chief Justice was of opinion that the non-father manager was not competent to alienate the minor member's share for discharging the antecedent debt of his grandfather as the debt did not constitute a family debt but only imposed a pious obligation on defendant 7 to discharge it. The point in controversy appears to be whether or not the debts which had been incurred by Sheoram Bhau, the grandfather of the minor member, and the father of the alienating members, constituted the debts of the family or were merely personal debts, of the alienating members. The distinction between a debt which is a family debt and a debt which is a personal debt may be elucidated with the aid of the following illustration:

13. If A inours debt which is not tainted with illegality or immorality, A's sons B, C and D and grandson E would be under a pious obligation to pay inasmuch as the family consists of a father, sons and grandson. The antecedent debt of A would also be a family debt since there is no one in the family who is not either son or grandson of A, the borrower. Let us take another instance. Instead of A borrowing the debt, B, C and D borrowed it. In such a case also, the debt so far as E is concerned, would be a family debt although he is bound to pay the debt by reason of his pious duty to pay off his father's debt. Let us take a third instance. The debt is borrowed by B and C only. That debt, not being the debt of D, would not be binding on E unless it is proved to be for legal necessity, i.e, it was necessary to incur it for a certain family purpose of a binding nature. If the debt is proved to be for legal necessity then it becomes a family debt-which every member of the family would be bound to pay. Let us take one more instance and the last one. The debt is incurred by D alone. That debt would be binding on his son under the rule of son's pious obligation. It would not be a family debt.

14. It is only in the last instance that the question would really arise as to the competency of B to alienate E's share only to satisfy the debt of his father D. That is purely a personal debt of D which is binding only on his son E, but on no other member. Consequently, it is not a family debt. Not being a family debt, it is not incumbent on the manager of the family to discharge it. If D is alive he can dispose of his and E's share to satisfy his antecedent debt. If D is dead, E, if he is a major, is entitled to do so. It is only when D is dead and E is a minor that the manager of the family would be required to arrange for payment of the personal debt of E. He cannot dispose of E's share for the simple reason that the debt is one that was incurred by D, E's father. He can do so only if D's debt cannot be satisfied except by alienating E's share, that is to say, to remove the pressure of that debt on E's share. The present case is of the type described in the first illustration. Sheoram Bhau had incurred the debts. Those debts were binding on all his sons and grandsons as they were not proved to have been tainted with illegality or immorality. The rule affecting the son's liability was declared by their Lordships to extend equally to grandsons and great-grandsons in 48 All. 5189 at p. 527. The/pious obligation rule affects the grandsons and great-grandsons no less than the sons. The principle was stated by their Lordships at p. 524 ibid in these words:

“The law of the Mitakshara proceeds on a logical basis; rights are created by birth up to the third generation, viz., son, grandson and great-grandson; the son of a grandson is entitled equally with his father to question the validity of debts contracted by the ancestor after his birth. His obligation to discharge the valid debts of that ancestor is therefore co-extensive with the rights.”

15. It is clear that the pious obligation rule extends over three generations because they acquire interest and rights by birth. Since the Hindu law makes no distinction whatever between the rights and liabilities of sons and grandsons, it must follow that the debts borrowed by E's grandfather (turning to the illustrative pedigree) stand on the same footing as those borrowed by E's father. E and his uncles would be under a common liability to satisfy that debt out of their respective shares in the joint Hindu family property. Turning to the facts of the case, it is incontestable that the mortgage debt to the extent that it included the antecedent debts of the grandfather of defendant 7, was binding on every member of the above pedigree (para. 3) under the pious obligation rule and as the family consisted of no other members but the sons and grandson of the borrower, and obviously constituted the family debt which the manager of the family would be competent to discharge as representing the family as a whole. It is, therefore, clear that Gopalrao as the manager of the family had full and unquestionable authority to execute the mortgage for discharging Sheoram Bhau's debts affecting defendant 7's share.

16. That part of the mortgage debt under consideration which was not the antecedent debt of Sheoram Bhau would manifestly not be binding on defendant 7 unless it was justified by legal necessity and there is no disagreement on the point. The learned Judges of the Division Bench do not dissent from the trial Court's finding that they were not proved to have been incurred for legal necessity. The mortgage therefore would be binding upon defendant 7 to the extent of Rs. 6811-14-6 as indicated in Bose J.'s opinion. On behalf of defendant 7 much stress is laid on 55 All. 370 and it is urged that the manager had no power at all to mortgage his share as he was not the father. Their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court nowhere say in that case that a non-father manager is not competent to alienate the share of a minor member under any circumstances. If that had been their view, they would not have remanded the case for further enquiry on the point of legal necessity affecting the two mortgages executed by Chiranjilal's father. Beading the judgment as a whole, I have no doubt that the competency of the manager to alienate a minor member's share for debts binding on the minor member was never in question. Their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court, no doubt, say that the question whether the debt is antecedent debt or not arises only when the father makes a transfer. As I understand it, it means that a manager, unless he is a father, cannot impose an obligation on the other members of the family to pay the debt incurred by himself previous to the transfer. That is clear from the observation made at page 374 “that it is the privilege of the father alone to burden the family estate by a mortgage, by discharging an antecedent debt, which must be a debt of his own.” I cannot accede to the interpretation sought to be put on that judgment that in regard to a debt borrowed by the father for the satisfaction of which the transfer is made by the manager the father's debt, even though independent of the family property, must be proved to have been incurred for legal necessity. That would be contrary to the principle on which the rule of pious obligation to pay father's debt is founded. The pious obligation of the son or grandson arises from the mere relation of the father and son or grandfather and grandson and the legal duty flowing from it is independent of the question whether the debt was incurred to meet the family necessity or only to satisfy debt of father or grandfather. It must be conceded on the authority in 46 All. 95 that the debt to be antecedent must be independent of, and severable from, the property on which its burden is laid by the father. That means that if the father borrows debt on the security of mortgage of joint family property, the debt so borrowed is not antecedent because it forms part and parcel of the transaction of the mortgage and is not independent of it. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 44 All. 36810 at p. 374 the antecedency is antecedency to the mortgage itself, i.e, a mortgage executed by the father and must be disconnected with the mortgage in fact as well as in time. In 39 All. 43711 also it was pointed out that an antecedent debt must be quite distinct from the debt incurred on the mortgage itself. So, when a non-father manager alienates joint family property to satisfy the debts incurred by the father of the member whose share is included in the alienation it must be shown that the father's debts answer the definition of antecedent debt, that is to say, that the father had incurred the debt independently of any joint family property, i.e, on his personal security when he executed a mortgage to secure that debt. If that is proved, the father's mortgage would be binding on the minor member. If the father himself alienates the property, the alienation would bind his sons if it is merely shown that it was to satisfy his antecedent debt. If, however, the transfer is not by the father then to justify the alienation the proof of mere existence of father's antecedent debt will not suffice, but it must be coupled with the existence of legal necessity for the alienation. The transferee will have the burden on him of proving that antecedent debt of the father could] not be satisfied otherwise than by transfer of the minor member's share. The judgment in 55 All. 370 can be properly understood with the aid of the following illustration:

17. If B borrows a debt in 1920 and transfers the joint property including the shares of C and D, in 1922, his transfer cannot bind CD simply because it was an antecedent debt at the date of the transfer. That is plain enough. If C borrows a debt in 1920 and dies with the result that B has to take steps to discharge it, though it is solely binding on D (minor), there will arise the consideration whether O's debt was borrowed on his personal security or on the security of joint property. If it is the former, it is an antecedent debt for which the father, C, could himself have transferred the property. It would therefore bind his son (D) unless it was tainted by illegality or immorality. If on the other hand O's debt was borrowed on mortgage of joint property, that debt would not bind his son (D) because it is only antecedent in time and not in fact. In 55 All. 370 it was proved that Chiranjilal's father had executed mortgage in 1916 and 1919 presumably to secure debts which were not then pre-existing but borrowed as a part of the mortgage transaction. This point does not clearly 9 appear in the judgment but it arises by necessary implication from the reference made to the propositions laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 46 All. 95. The principle laid down in 55 All. 370 was that when a non-father manager alienates family property to satisfy a debt incurred by the father of any member of the family, he must inquire whether the father's mortgage was for payment of his pre-existing debt or to secure a debt he borrowed at the time of the mortgage. If the debt was of the latter kind, he must satisfy himself that the debt was justified by legal necessity. This was the view I took in A.I.R 1937 Nag. 327.12

18. Bose, J. has found that out of the consideration of the mortgage in suit, Rs. 6811-14-6 represented the debt which had been incurred by and binding on Sheoram Bhau, the grandfather of defendant 7. He would therefore be bound to pay that amount as it was clearly the antecedent debt of the grandfather. Inasmuch as the family at the date of the mortgage, consisted of none but the sons and grandsons of Sheoram Bhau, who were all under a pious obligation to pay that debt, it became the family debt which it was imperative on Gopalrao, as manager, to discharge. It has been found by Bose and not disputed that the debt could not be discharged otherwise than by executing the mortgage. For the foregoing reason I agree with Bose, J. that the plaintiffs' suit should be decreed with costs against defendant 7 to the extent of Rs. 6811-14-6 with interest allowed by the trial Court on the amount decreed against the other mortgagors. The trial Court will now draw up a fresh decree against defendant 7 as indicated above providing three C months' time for payment. Defendant 7 will pay the costs of both the Courts.

19. Decree modified.