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Goods Of Lilian Singh, In Re

Calcutta High Court
Feb 2, 1942
Smart Summary (Beta)

Court Opinion Summary — Sen, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

One Lila Singh (also referred to as Lilian Singh) died intestate on 30 July 1941 at Bhagalpur within the jurisdiction of the District Court of that district. She left behind certain property, including Government securities, shares and debentures.

The petitioner, Prabhabati Debi, and the respondent, Ajit Mallik, each applied for letters of administration to the estate of the deceased. Prabhabati applied in the Court of the District Judge of Bhagalpur; Ajit Mallik applied in this Court. The petitioner claims to be the heiress of her step-mother (alleging Lila Singh was the second wife of Deep Narain Singh), while the respondent claims to be the sole heir as the son of Lila Singh by Sisir Kumar Mallik.

The present application by Prabhabati Debi seeks (1) a stay of the proceedings in this Court under section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code until disposal of the Bhagalpur proceedings, and (2) alternatively, an injunction restraining Ajit Mallik from proceeding here on grounds of convenience.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to proceedings for letters of administration (i.e., whether this Court must stay its proceedings because a previously instituted proceeding on the same matter is pending in Bhagalpur).
  2. Whether the Bhagalpur application is a legally instituted proceeding given that the court-fee required by the Court-fees Act had not been paid.
  3. Whether the Bhagalpur Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in this Court (in particular in respect of property — Government securities, shares and debentures — lying in Calcutta of value over Rs. 80,000), which is an element necessary for the applicability of section 10.
  4. Whether, on grounds of convenience and the balance of convenience, this Court should restrain Ajit Mallik from proceeding here and instead require the matter to be heard at Bhagalpur.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Prabhabati Debi)

  • The substantial issue in both applications is identical: whether Prabhabati or Ajit Mallik is the heir of Lila Singh; the Bhagalpur application was instituted eleven days earlier, so section 10 CPC should apply to stay proceedings here.
  • By virtue of section 141 CPC, the procedure in suits should be followed as far as applicable to proceedings like letters of administration; thus section 10 applies to applications for letters of administration.
  • Regarding the alleged Calcutta-held securities: a safe custody receipt was allegedly found at Bhagalpur, indicating the properties should be considered situate at Bhagalpur and within that Court's competence.
  • Alternatively, even if the properties are outside Bhagalpur, the relief claimed is the grant of letters of administration and the question of the situation of the property is irrelevant to the identification of the relief claimed; thus section 10 should still apply.
  • On convenience grounds: the petitioner is a woman residing at Bhagalpur with no residence in Calcutta and no local assistance, and would be seriously prejudiced if proceedings in Calcutta were not stayed.

Respondent's Arguments (Ajit Mallik)

  • Section 10 CPC is limited to "suits" and does not apply to proceedings for letters of administration.
  • The Bhagalpur proceeding is not legally instituted because the requisite court-fee (under the Court-fees Act) had not been paid; therefore section 10 cannot apply.
  • The Bhagalpur Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in this Court because significant estate property (Government securities, shares and debentures) of value over Rs. 80,000 is lying with Messrs Grindlay & Co., Bankers, at Calcutta; thus one of the necessary elements for a stay under section 10 is absent.
  • On convenience grounds: the respondent is an officer of Bengal and Assam Railway engaged in special war work necessitating his being at Calcutta and would find it extremely difficult or impossible to obtain leave to go to Bhagalpur.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each of the respondent's three primary contentions and the petitioner's alternative convenience argument in turn.

  1. Applicability of section 10 CPC to letters of administration

    The Court interpreted section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (which prevents a Court from proceeding with the trial of a suit when the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties or parties under whom they claim, where the earlier suit is pending in a Court having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed). The Court held that section 10 applies to applications for letters of administration by reason of section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that "The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction."

    The Court rejected the respondent's narrower reading (that section 141 only imports internal trial procedure) and explained that section 141 embraces wider matters of procedure "in regard to suits," including procedural rules that govern whether a Court should proceed when a previously instituted proceeding exists. Therefore section 10's rule about staying proceedings is procedural in the relevant sense and applies to original proceedings in the nature of suits, such as applications for probate or letters of administration.

  2. Effect of non-payment of court-fee under the Court-fees Act (section 19-I)

    The respondent argued that because the fee prescribed by the Court-fees Act had not been paid at Bhagalpur, there was no competent application pending there. The Court examined the provision (section 19-I) and concluded that it prevents a Court from making an order granting probate or letters of administration until the fee is paid, but it does not state that the Court may not try or entertain the application before payment. Consequently, the failure to pay the fee did not mean there was no properly constituted application before the Bhagalpur Court. The Court held that the second ground of the respondent failed.

  3. Jurisdiction of the Bhagalpur Court in respect of property situated outside the province (s. 273 Indian Succession Act)

    Affidavits showed Government securities, shares and debentures worth over Rs. 80,000 belonging to the estate were lying with Messrs Grindlay & Co., Bankers, at Calcutta. The respondent contended that Bhagalpur could not grant letters for these properties and hence section 10 could not apply.

    The petitioner attempted two responses: (a) that a safe custody receipt was found at Bhagalpur so the properties should be regarded as situate there; and (b) that the situs of property is irrelevant to the relief claimed (letters of administration).

    The Court rejected the safe custody receipt point: either such a receipt was not shown to exist in the Collector's inventory, or, if it existed, the receipt itself does not represent the securities and does not bring the securities within the Bhagalpur Court's jurisdiction. The receipt is merely evidence only that the bank possesses certain property; it does not transfer situs.

    Relying on section 273 of the Indian Succession Act, the Court noted that a District Judge's letters of administration take effect over all property within the province and only such property without the province as is certified by the District Judge to be of value not exceeding Rs. 10,000. Because the property outside the province was admitted to be over Rs. 80,000 in value, the District Judge of Bhagalpur could not grant letters of administration in respect of that property.

    The Court emphasized that two conditions are required for section 10 to apply: (i) the matters in issue must be substantially the same; and (ii) the Court in which the earlier proceeding is pending must have jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the later proceeding. Although the first condition was met (both proceedings concerned who was the heir), the second was not met because Bhagalpur lacked jurisdiction over the large Calcutta-situated portion of the estate. The Court reasoned one cannot conceive of letters of administration independently of the property for which they are sought—letters are intimately connected to the property concerned. Therefore section 10 could not be invoked to stay proceedings here.

  4. Alternative application for injunction on grounds of convenience

    The Court evaluated convenience factors: the petitioner resided at Bhagalpur and asserted difficulty litigating in Calcutta; the respondent was an officer engaged in special war work stationed at Calcutta and would have great difficulty obtaining leave to go to Bhagalpur. The Court found that the principal questions were mainly legal, with most facts admitted, and that the evidence for facts not admitted could be produced as easily in this Court as at Bhagalpur. Moreover, this Court could deal with the entire estate whereas the Bhagalpur Court's jurisdiction was restricted by statute.

    Balancing these considerations, the Court found the balance of convenience favored trial in this Court (where the respondent was located and where the entire estate could be dealt with), and therefore refused the injunction restraining the respondent from proceeding here.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition: The application by Prabhabati Debi for a stay of proceedings in this Court under section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code and for an injunction restraining Ajit Mallik from proceeding here was dismissed. The dismissal was with costs.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • This Court will not stay its proceedings; Ajit Mallik may proceed with his application here.
  • The District Court at Bhagalpur has a properly constituted application pending, but it lacks jurisdiction to grant letters of administration over estate property situated in Calcutta and valued at over Rs. 80,000.
  • The petitioner’s alternative claim for an injunction based on convenience was refused because the balance of convenience favored trial in this Court.

Broader implications:

The opinion applies provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (notably ss. 10 and 141) and the Indian Succession Act (s. 273) to clarify that (a) section 10 can apply to applications for letters of administration via section 141 where the conditions of section 10 are met, and (b) the situs and statutory limits on a District Court's powers (s. 273) are material to whether the earlier proceeding is capable of granting the relief claimed. The opinion does not set out any newly stated precedents beyond the statutory interpretation and does not purport to establish broader doctrinal changes beyond the case's direct effect on the parties.

Practical Notes Recorded in the Opinion

  • Statutes explicitly relied upon in the Court's reasoning: section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code; section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code; section 19-I of the Court-fees Act; section 273 of the Indian Succession Act.
  • The Court recorded that Government securities, shares and debentures of value over Rs. 80,000 were lying with Messrs Grindlay & Co., Bankers, at Calcutta.
  • Attorneys recorded in the opinion: for petitioner — Mitter & Bural; for respondent — Manual Agarwala & Co.

Order recorded in the opinion: "Application dismissed."

Show all summary ...

Sen, J.:— The facts leading to this application, briefly are as follows:—

One Lila Singh, otherwise known as Lilian Singh, died intestate on July 30, 1941, at Bhagalpur within the jurisdiction of the District Court of that district. She left behind certain property.

The petitioner, Prabhabati Debi, and the respondent Ajit Mallik have both applied for letters of administration to the estate of the deceased. The petitioner has applied in the Court of the District Judge of Bhagalpur and the respondent in this Court. The petitioner is the daughter of Deep Narain Singh by his wife Ramanundi Debi. She alleges that Lila Singh was the second wife of Deep Narain Singh and claims to be the heiress of her step-mother. The respondent Ajit Mallik is the son of Lila Singh by her husband Sisir Kumar Mallik who divorced her. He claims to be the sole heir of his mother.

The present application by Prabhabati Debi is for a stay of the proceedings in this Court till the disposal of the proceedings in the Court at Bhagalpur. This prayer is based on s. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the alternative, Prabhabati claims that Ajit Kumar Mallik should be restrained from proceeding with the application in this Court till the disposal of the application in the Court at Bhagalpur on grounds of convenience.

I shall first deal with that portion of the application which is based on s. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code.

It is pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that the substantial issue in both applications is the same, viz., whether Prabhabati or Ajit Mallik is the heir of Lila Singh and that the application in the Bhagalpur Court was commenced eleven days prior to the application in this Court; it is argued that for these reasons s. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code applies and that this Court is bound to stay the proceedings here.

On behalf of Ajit Mallik, Mr. Banerjee resists the application on three grounds. First, he says that s. 10 of Civil Procedure Code is limited to suits and has no application to proceedings for letters of administration. Secondly, he argues that there is really no legally instituted proceeding at Bhagalpur, inasmuch as the court-fees have not yet been paid and, consequently, s. 10 has no application. Thirdly, he contends that, as the Bhagalpur Court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the proceedings in this Court, one of the elements necessary for a stay under s. 10 being granted is absent, and consequently no stay should be granted.

In my opinion, the first two grounds cannot be sustained, but the last ground must prevail. Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code is as follows:—

No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in British India having, jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed or in any Court beyond the limits of British India established or continued by the Governor General in Council, and having like jurisdiction or before His Majesty in Council.

I am of opinion that the section applies to applications for letters of administration by reason of the provisions of s. 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which enacts that the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction. The term “all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction” has been the subject of judicial interpretation and it is now well settled that it includes all proceedings relating to original matters in the nature of suits such as an application for probate or letters of administration.

Mr. Banerjee admits that this is so, but he argues that all that s. 141 has laid down is that the procedure provided for the trial of suits is to be followed in the trial of applications relating to original matters like applications for probate or letters of administration. Section 10, he argues, does not deal with such questions of procedure; it deals with the right of a party to get a suit stayed which is a substantive right and not a matter of procedure.

I am unable to accept this argument. Section 141 runs thus:—

The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction.

Its terms are wider than what is suggested by Mr. Banerjee. The section is not limited to the internal procedure regulating the conduct of the trial of a suit, but it embraces wider matters of procedure, viz., “procedure provided in this Court in regard to suits”. Now, let us examine the provisions of s. 10. It lays down that when a suit is pending before a Court, it shall not proceed with its trial if certain circumstances are present. True the section has nothing to do with the mode in which the trial of a suit is to be conducted, but it does deal with the procedure which the Court is to follow in respect of a pending suit when the existence of certain matters is brought to its notice. In other words, it deals with a question of “procedure in regard to suits”. That being so, by virtue of the provisions of s. 141, s. 10 is applicable to an application for letters of administration.

In support of the second point, my attention was drawn to the provisions of s. 19-1 of the Court-fees Act, which provides that no order entitling a petitioner to the grant of letters of administration shall be made until the petitioner has paid the fee mentioned in the schedule to the Court-fees Act. It is pointed out that this fee has not been paid, and it is argued that there is, therefore, no competent application before the Court. In my opinion, the provisions of s. 19-I of the Court-fees Act, instead of supporting Mr. Banerjee's contention, destroys it. The section says that the Court shall not grant probate until the fees are paid. It does not say that the Court shall not try an application for probate or letters of administration until the fees are paid or that the payment of the fees is a condition precedent to the making of the application.

I hold, therefore, that there is a properly constituted application for letters of administration before the Bhagalpur Court.

I now come to the last objection which has been raised on behalf of the respondent.

It is quite clear from the affidavits that Government securities, shares in companies, and debentures to the value of over Rs. 80,000 belonging to the estate of Lila Singh are lying with Messrs Grindlay & Co., Bankers, at Calcutta.

The contention on behalf of the respondent is that the Court at Bhagalpur cannot grant letters of administration with respect of these properties, and that as it has not got jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed by him, s. 10 can have no application.

On behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Ray meets the objection in two ways; first, he says that, although these shares and securities are in the custody of Messrs Grindlay & Co. at Calcutta, the safe custody receipt is at Bhagalpur and, therefore, it must be held that these properties are situated at Bhagalpur. In these circumstances, he asserts that there can be no difficulty in the way of the District Court of Bhagalpur granting letters of administration which would include these properties.

The second contention on behalf of the petitioner is that, even if it be held that these properties are not situate at Bhagalpur, nevertheless s. 10 would apply, inasmuch as the relief claimed is the granting of letters of administration and the question as to the situation of the property in respect of which letters are applied for has nothing to do with the relief claimed.

I shall now deal with the first point raised by Mr. Ray on behalf of the petitioner. I might mention in passing that the respondent does not admit that there was any such safe custody receipt found at Bhagalpur, and it seems to me that no such safe custody receipt was found. The inventory of the Collector of Bhagalpur indicates that certain letters from Messrs Grindlay & Co. were found at Bhagalpur, but there is no mention of any safe custody receipt in this inventory. Be that as it may, even it be held that a safe custody receipt relating to the properties was found among the effects of the deceased at Bhagalpur, I fail to see how that would bring the properties to which the safe custody receipt relates within the jurisdiction of the Bhagalpur Court. The receipt does not represent the securities or the shares. It is merely a documejit granted by the bank to its constituent to evidence the fact that the bank possesses certain property of the constituent in its safe custody. The position, therefore, is that property to the extent of over Rs. 80,000 is lying at Calcutta outside the juridiction of the Court at Bhagalpur.

Now, it is clear from the provisions of s. 273 of the Indian Succession Act that the District Judge of Bhagalpur cannot grant letters of administration in respect of these properties. The section provides that the letters of administration granted by a District Court shall take effect over all property within the province, and such property without the province as is certified by the District Judge to be of value which does not exceed Rs. 10,000. Here the property outside the province is admittedly over Rs. 80,000 in value and consequently the District Judge of Bhagalpur could not grant letters of administration in respect of it. This disposes of the first branch of Mr. Ray's argument.

I now take up the second line of his argument. Before s. 10 can apply, two circumstances must co-exist: first, the matter in issue in both the applications must be substantially the same; and, secondly, the Court in Bhagalpur must have the jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in this Court. It may be said that the question involved in both the applications is whether Prabhabati or Ajit Mallik is the heir of Lila Singh, and that substantially the issue is the same in both the applications. The first element necessary for the application of s. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code is present, but is the second element present? I am of opinion that it is not. The relief claimed by Ajit Mallik in this Court is the grant of letters of administration to the entire estate of Lila Singh, which includes, as I have held, property of over Rs. 80,000-in value situated in Calcutta. The District Court of Bhagalpur cannot grant such letters of administration. I cannot accept Mr. Ray's argument that, in deciding what the relief claimed is, one must not consider the property with respect to which the letters of administration are sought. I cannot conceive of letters of administration independently of the property with respect to which they are sought. One cannot apply for letters of administration in vacuo. The relief sought in this Court is, inter alia, in respect of the abovementioned shares and securities. The Court at Bhagalpur not having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed by the respondent in the application before this Court, s. 10 can have no application. The prayer for stay must, therefore, be dismissed.

I now take up for consideration the alternative relief claimed, namely, an injunction restraining Ajit Mallik from proceeding with his application here on the ground that it would be more convenient to have the application heard at Bhagalpur. It is said that the petitioner is a woman residing at Bhagalpur, that she has no residence in Calcutta, and nobody here to advise her or look after proceedings on her behalf, and that she would be seriously prejudiced if the proceedings in Calcutta are not stayed. This is the only ground stated in the petition for an injunction. Other grounds are mentioned in the affidavit in reply.

On the other hand, it is established by the affidavit of Ajit Kumar Mallik that he is an officer of the Bengal and Assam Railway, who is doing special war work, necessitating his being at Calcutta. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for him to get leave to go out of Calcutta. The question to be decided is mainly one of law, most of the facts being admitted. The evidence to prove the facts which are not admitted can be adduced as easily here as at Bhagalpur. Further, this Court can deal with the entire estate left by the deceased, whereas the Bhagalpur Court has restricted jurisdiction. In these circumstances I consider that the balance of convenience is in favour of the application being tried here.

This application must, therefore, be dismissed with costs.

Attorneys for petitioner: Mitter & Bural.

Attorneys for respondent: Manual Agarwala & Co.

Application dismissed.
A.C.S