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Bishwanath v. Surat Singh

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sep 9, 1942

1. The facts of this case are that one Mohbatsingh executed in 1925 a bogus sale deed of the property in suit in Favour of Darshansingh, respondent 2. Mohbatsingh died in 1929. The bogus sale deed was executed for the illegal purpose of cheating certain creditors. After Mohbatsingh's death the plaintiff purchased the property from Darshansingh in 1935, knowing that the sale deed was bogus, and has brought the present suit to eject Mohbatsingh's brother Suratsingh from the lands on the strength of his sale deed. He has in the alternative asked for refund of consideration from Darshansingh, who admits that he is liable to pay Rs. 175 if the claim on the sale deed fails.

2. Respondent 1, Suratsingh's plea was that the plaintiff knew the benami character of Darshansingh's title and had taken the sale deed simply to harass him.

3. He did not set up a title in himself by succession to his brother but claimed that the property was his own before his brother ever purported to dispose of it to Darshansingh, and relied on a registered deed dated 20th July 1900. It has been found by the trial Court that the question whether the property originally belonged to Mohbatsingh owing to partition or belonged to Suratsingh in view of the document of 20th July 1900 is concluded by res judicata based on the following facts. In a former suit Surat singh was sued by the plaintiff as heir and legal representative of Mohbatsingh and the property in suit was attached in execution by the plaintiff as the assets of Mohbatsingh in the hands of his legal representative, and it was decided on the objection of Suratsingh that the property was an asset of Mohbatsingh in his hands. The first appellate Court has dismissed the suit and the first contention of the appellants is that respondent 2, Darshansingh and his successor could maintain a successful suit against the vendor (if he were alive) to recover the property on the strength of a bogus sale deed for the reason that a defendant who has to plead fraud in such a case must fail. Further it is said that a transfer in fraud of creditors stands unless and until it is avoided by the creditors. A third contention is that a benamidar can give good title to his vendee and that a title so obtained will not be liable to attack at any rate by a “trespasser like Suratsingh who has not established his title.”

4. The Madras High Court has taken the view that the person who has to plead fraud must fail in this type of case. This has not been the view of the Judicial Commissioner's Court, Nagpur, in 7 C.P L.R 601 or in 5 N.L.R 146.2 The whole matter has been exhaustively discussed in 13 Lah. 713. (’32) 19 A.I.R 1932 Lah. 503 , 139 I.C 17 , 13 Lah. 713 , 33 P.L.R 851 (F.B) I agree with the view expressed in that Full Bench ruling. It appears to me that in a suit for possession which rests on a fraudulent sale deed it is not correct to regard the plaintiff as suing for possession on the strength of something which is, so to speak, separate from the fraud. Moreover, when the sale deed was bogus it is clear that Darshansingh did not pay the consideration mentioned in the sale deed and that the so-called transfer was no transfer at all. In any case I consider that the maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis and the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio and the maxim so far as this Court is concerned of stare decisis should prevail against the principle “nemo suam turpetudinem est audiendus.” The next line of argument taken by the appellants is that as transfers in fraud of creditors are voidable only by creditors under the Transfer of Property Act, the defendant has no locus standi to question the alleged sale. As this transfer was no real transfer this argument has no application, and it is unnecessary for me to consider the effect of S. 206, Penal Code, on those transfers in fraud of creditors which are usually understood to be voidable only by creditors.

5. The next contention of the learned advocate for the appellants is that the benamidar can give a good title which cannot in any case be questioned by a “trespasser like Suratsingh.” Reliance is placed on 26 N.L.R 277. (’30) 17 A.I.R 1930 Nag. 273 , 124 I.C 453 , 26 N.L.R 277 What was decided in that case was that a benamidar could pass a good title in view of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, and moreover, if the benamidar has assigned a mortgage deed to another person and the latter transaction is also benami, the latter person can sue on the mortgage. The facts of the case were that a mortgage in favour of A was assigned to B, a benamidar, who in turn assigned it to the plaintiff K. It was found as a fact that K took the assignment in good faith after reasonable enquiry. One case relied on was the Privy Council case, 46 Cal. 566, (’18) 5 A.I.R 1918 P.C 140 , 49 I.C 1 , 46 Cal. 566 , 46 I.A 1 (P.C) where it was laid down that an action may be maintained by a benamidar who represents the real owner and is a mere trustee for him. 22 Bom. 6726 also relied on, lays down that a benamidar can sue, 24 Cal. 347 lays down that a benamidar may sue and 21 ALL. 3808 lays down the same proposition. But I am quite sure that these decisions were never intended to suggest that when a real owner of the property had died, a benamidar under a bogus sale deed could transfer a valid title to a third person, aware of the bogus nature of the benamidar's sale deed with a view to the purchaser's suing a relative who had entered on the property when the original owner died.

6. Their Lordships of the Privy Council I have indicated that the benamidar is a trustee in the decision quoted. On the death of Mohabatsingh who retained possession Suratsingh entered into possession. The plaintiff and Darshansingh put their heads together and consorted a breach of trust designed to deprive the heirs of Mohabatsingh of the property. The contention that Suratsingh is a stranger is absurd and this conclusion cannot be drawn simply from the fact that, Suratsingh has not chosen to set forth a title by inheritance to his brother. If it is to be held that Suratsingh is precluded from setting up a title of his own in view of the previous litigation, then obviously it would not lie in the power of the plaintiff to resile from the position that this property was an asset of Mohabatsingh in the hands of a legal representative Suratsingh. The nearest case to the present one which I have been able to find is that reported in A.I.R 1931 Bom. 227. (’31) 18 A.I.R 1931 Bom. 227 , 133 I.C 265 , 33 Bom. L.R 356 In this case A executed a sale deed in favour of B in order to defeat creditors and A retained possession. B sold to C who did not establish his good faith in respect of the transaction. It was ruled that the Court would give no assistance to the plaintiff whose title depended on the fraudulent deed to which his vendor was a party, executed in fraud of the creditors of the father of the defendant from whom possession was sought. The case may be differentiated from this case on the point that the defendant in possession was the son of the original owner, whereas here the defendant is a brother who has not claimed in the suit by inheritance from his brother.

7. I consider that the suit has been rightly dismissed and the plaintiff who has secured his so-called title without good faith from the “transferee” by a sham deed, knowing that the title of his vendor is a sham title and thus knowing that he is assisting a breach of trust against the heirs cannot succeed in this suit. The claim for possession stands dismissed, but plaintiff is entitled to a decree for Rs. 175 against Darshansingh on Darshansingh's admission. Plaintiff will bear his own costs throughout and pay the costs of Suratsingh throughout.

8. Suit dismissed.