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Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar v. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dec 10, 1942

Vivian Bose, J.:— This order refers to Civil Revn. No. 715 of 1940 and Civil Revn. No. 152 of 1941. I think they are suitable cases to refer to a Bench of two or more Judges, (a Full Bench case is also involved) as my Lord the Chief Justice may direct, to enable the much debated question about the High Court's powers in Small Cause Court revisions to be authoritatively decided. Similar difficulties arise under Section 75 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, where the same phrase “according to law” is used. The two cases are substantial ones so far as Small Cause Court revisions go. The value in one is Rs. 400 and in the other Rs. 695. Also, one of them in particular, namely, Civil Revision No. 715 of 1940, is to my mind suitable from another angle as well because, though I do not decide that at the moment as the whole question is whether I have power to go into the matter at all, the law appears to be all on one side while “justice” seems prima facie to be on the other. I say ‘seems’ advisedly because Judges differ about the justice of the law of limitation. As to the position in revision generally, Judges take such widely differing views about their powers that it has become exceedingly difficult for both the Bench and the Bar to know where they stand. Single Judges are particularly affected because at every turn a decision which prima facie binds them is, or can be, quoted. Some Judge at some time can always be found to have been lenient. (I have not been without fault myself). His decision operates as a precedent. Others follow him and then the flood gates are opened up until a position is reached when it becomes almost impossible for a Judge sitting alone to stem the tide.

2. Thus, there is a reported Nagpur decision which binds Single Judges which states that the High Court can interfere even with a pure finding of fact if the finding is based on “little evidence.” See, 19 N.L.R 72 (’23) 10 A.I.R 1923 Nag. 292 , 73 I.C 1055 , 19 N.L.R 72 at p. 73. This was followed in A.I.R 1927 Nag. 77 (’27) 14 A.I.R 1927 Nag. 77 , 100 I.C 406. There is also a decision of mine under the Provincial Insolvency Act which, though it does not actually say so, appears to suggest that the High Court's powers in these revisions are wide. At any rate it is often quoted in support of such a position. The decision is 28 N.L.R 295 (’33) 20 A.I.R 1933 Nag. 39 , 141 I.C 48 , 28 N.L.R 295 at p. 297. In addition there is a Full Bench case, 28 N.L.R 44. (’32) 19 A.I.R 1932 Nag. 1 , 135 I.C 414 , 28 N.L.R 44 (F.B) which interfered in a Small Cause Court's revision on a point of limitation. Then again, on this very question of limitation there is at least one reported decision which decides that interference is possible even in revisions under Section 115 of the CPC: see, 27 N.L.R 251 (’31) 18 A.I.R 1931 Nag. 17 , 130 I.C 145 , 27 N.L.R 251 at p. 257. This, read with my decision in 28 N.L.R 295 (’33) 20 A.I.R 1933 Nag. 39 , 141 I.C 48 , 28 N.L.R 295 at p. 297 and the Full Bench makes it obligatory on Single Judges to entertain such questions in Small Cause Court revisions and in revisions under the Provincial Insolvency Act. It is true I took a different view in I.L.R (1936) Nag. 73 (’36) 23 A.I.R 1936 Nag. 157 , 164 I.C 848 , I.L.R (1936) Nag. 73 but even so there is a conflict between two Single Judges which requires to be resolved. And, if revisions can be entertained, on questions of limitation, why not on other questions of law? Where is the line to be drawn? What is there particularly sacred about limitation? It will be observed that in 27 N.L.R 251 (’31) 18 A.I.R 1931 Nag. 17 , 130 I.C 145 , 27 N.L.R 251 the law of limitation was applied in revision to defeat a claim which the lower Court had considered “just” on the merits—or so we must presume — at any rate it had allowed the claim. The facts in Civil Revision No. 715 of 1940 are as follows: (I do not intend to set out the facts in the other revision as they are not really necessary. It is enough to say that similar questions, namely, deposit or loan, and the law of limitation, are involved.) The plaintiff sues for recovery of a sum of Rs. 400 which, according to the plaint, he deposited with the defendant for safe custody. The deposit is not said to have been subject to any terms but, according to the plaintiff, demands “from time to time” were ignored until finally a registered notice was sent at a date not specified in the plaint. The dates of these demands are not given but the cause of action is stated to have arisen in November 1936. The plaint was filed on 1st May 1940, three and a half years later. If Article 60, Limitation Act, applies, then the claim is beyond time because limitation runs from the date of the demand. As I have said, that date is not given in the plaint but one gathers that November 1936 was intended. If not, according to the other side, the suit should have been dismissed summarily because, under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff must in every case show on the face of the plaint that the claim is within time.

3. It is not clear that Article 60 does apply because that article is limited to cases in which money is deposited “under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand,” and no such agreement is pleaded. Cases were cited to show that in the absence of any express agreement one to that effect will be implied, but a case was also cited to show that when there is no agreement the matter is a loan and not a deposit and therefore Article 67 applies. That of course is highly debatable, but short of applying Article 120 with its six years, or Article 145 with its 30 years, the choice must lie between Articles 57 and 60, and on either view the claim would appear to be barred.

4. The written statement merely states: “It is denied that the plaintiff deposited Rs. 400 or any amount with the defendant 3½ years ago.” It is not pleaded that assuming the money was given it was a loan and not a deposit, though the deposit is denied. The point of limitation was also taken. The lower Court finds that the Rs. 400 actually passed hands and that it was a deposit, but though it sets out the question of limitation as one of the points for determination it gives no finding on the point and merely decrees the claim observing that the plaintiff is “a simple fellow” and a “fool.” As I say, the merits appear to me on the plaintiff's side: the law on the defendant's. Prima facie, the lower Court appears to have allowed its heart to rule its head. What is the High Court to do?

5. Now it is clear, and has been held by the Privy Council and this Court in many cases that no appeal lies unless expressly conferred by statute. A right of appeal is conferred under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by S. 24, but it is to the District Court and is very limited in scope. No other appeal is allowed or contemplated and it seems to be beyond dispute that was done deliberately and that the Legislature did not intend an appeal to lie in cases not covered by S. 24. Whether this was just or right or expedient or politic, is not for the Courts to judge, though the Civil Justice Committee gives powerful reasons for delimiting the scope of interference in petty matters. The point which concerns Judges is that no appeal is allowed, and that to my mind is fundamental. But a revision is allowed under S. 25 and the question is whether there is any difference between revisional and appellate jurisdiction and powers, and if so, exactly where the difference lies. I think the matter is fundamental and that it touches the very roots of jurisdiction. If no appeal is allowed, then the High Court has no more jurisdiction to exercise appellate powers under the guise of something else than the lower Courts have. Is there then any difference or distinction between revision and appeal?

6. Section 25 has been so widely interpreted by some High Courts, and in particular by the late Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur, that matters have reached such a stage here that not only are revisions freely entertained on questions of law but also on questions of fact — even to the extent of determining whether one set of witnesses should be believed or another, and that even after the lower Court has fully weighed the evidence. Nor have matters stopped there. A number of references have recently been made to the Division Bench on disputed questions of law. With the utmost respect, it seems to me that any distinction which the Legislature had intended to draw between appeal and revision has been so slurred over in practice as now to be almost non-existent. Matters appear to have reached such a pass that very often, for all practical purposes, there is now hardly any difference between a Small Cause Court revision and a first appeal. That the Legislature intended that there should be a distinction is, I think, admitted on all hands, but when one begins to enquire into what the distinction is, a vast vagueness emerges and it seems to me, speaking with all respect, that much loose thinking also reveals itself. Thus, one body of opinion appears to consider that the distinction lies in the matter of discretion. It is said that an appeal lies as of right whereas in revision the High Court is not bound to interfere but it can exercise a discretion and need only interfere in “deserving cases,” or so as to further “the ends of justice,” and so on. See for example, A.I.R 1929 Nag. 70. (’29) 16 A.I.R 1929 Nag. 70 , 114 I.C 288

7. I can hardly think that can be the point of distinction. A discretion of that kind can only be exercised judicially — not arbitrarily—and if that is so, then where is line to be drawn? It has been suggested that the answer is that if on investigation the High Court is of opinion that a mistake resulting in injustice has been made either in law or on the facts it ought to interfere. But that puts us back to the position in first appeal, the only difference being that in the one case the Legislature expressly empowers interference, in the other it is deemed to do so indirectly by leaving it to the consciences of Judges to do that which the Legislature itself is not prepared to do straightforwardly and openly. Clearly that is an impossible conclusion. From one point of view, there is always injustice when a mistake is made and therefore the High Court must always interfere. But that raises the question what is “injustice”, a matter with which I shall deal in a minute. Another point of view along these lines but looking at the matter from another angle is that the High Court is not bound to interfere if it feels that though a legal mistake has been made, no & substantial injustice has been done. That again is a point of view which does not commend itself to me because the words “justice” and “injustice,” though high sounding and often used, are so vague and indefinite that they can mean all things or nothing.

8. What do we mean by justice? If the law says that in a given set of circumstances A should get a certain sum of money and the lower Court gives it to B, and if in appeal A would indubitably win, can Judges in revision withhold the money from A simply because he has driven, shall we say, a hard bargain?—or because A is a rich man and can afford to lose while B is a poor man and cannot?—or because A is a bachelor with no dependents and B a married man with a large family?—or because, as here, A has lost his rights because of the law of limitation or for some other technical reason?—or because A is a simple minded fool? Then again, what standards of justice are we to apply? Social justice? Moral justice? Legal justice? Or what? It seems tolerably clear to me that sitting as Judges we can only apply that justice which the law enforces and applies and which obtains in the Courts, and to do otherwise would be to act unjustly from a judicial point of view. If that is so, then we are driven back to the position that every time there is an error of law, or even of fact, the High Court must interfere and yet that can hardly be so because that at once sweeps away all pretence of distinction between revision and appeal and that brings me to something even more fundamental. What is error? Who is to decide what is right and what is-wrong? Whether a Judge had made a mistake and when?

9. It seems to me that the fallacy underlying this line of thinking, even though it is backed by a mass of authority which I am bound to respect, lies in the failure to realise that there is no such thing as absolute justice or absolute right and wrong, at any rate in the practical ordinary everyday affairs of life with which the Courts have to deal. In an ultimate analysis, the matter always turns upon the opinion of some one man or body of men. There is no other way in which “justice” can be administered and this is recognised by every State or body of men, however elementary, which makes any attempt to administer justice. That is why Courts are established, Judges set up, and tribunals constituted. It by no means follows that the opinion of these men set up in authority over others is right or sound or just. The many differences of opinion which exist among them show that they cannot all be right; and the number of decisions which are reversed in appeal is frightening if that is the goal.

10. In my opinion the principle which underlies the system with which we deal is plain. All disputed matter is graded according to its importance in the eye of the State—and I stress that this is not necessarily the same as importance to the individual. The State has to think broadly and devise that which is for the greatest good of the greatest number and to that end the rights of the individual often have to give way. It is true that every attempt is made to balance these broader necessities against the narrower rights of the individual but many matters which seem right and proper and just from a narrow individual standpoint might well engender injustice on a large scale when viewed from a wider angle. There is, in my opinion, real danger that an endeavour to do what appears to be “justice” (from the individual's point of view) to one man, may result in a practice which will operate harshly against a large range of wholly innocent and unoffending persons. It is the danger which has been stressed by the Civil Justice Committee in its report.

11. But to return to the principles. All contentious matter is graded by the State according to its importance and that which falls in one category is sent to one type of tribunal for despatch while that which falls within another to another. In some classes of case the opinion of those who preside over the tribunal trying the matter is made final. There is neither appeal, nor revision, nor review. “Eight” is what that tribunal decides. “Justice” is what it decrees. In other classes an appeal is allowed and the opinion of the first Court is only provisional. If an appeal is launched, then it is the opinion of the second tribunal which counts though only on matters open to appeal. In all else the original decree remains supreme and when the higher tribunal differs from the lower the lower is deemed to be in error and the higher Court is given the privilege of correcting the error and setting right the mistakes. But actually there is no absolute guarantee that they are really mistakes. They are only deemed to be so because the higher tribunal thinks them to be so. They are not necessarily so from any abstract or absolute standpoint. In fact when a still further appeal is allowed it often turns out that the final tribunal of appeal considers the appellate Court is wrong and the first Court right.

12. It is to my mind clear that it is impossible to speak of “justice” and “right” as abstract quantities which are final and immutable. In every case they are just what some particular person or body of persons happen to think. Therefore, in every case what we have to look for is which body or person has been entrusted by the Legislature with the privilege of saying the final word. It is like an umpire at a cricket match. What he says goes. His word is law within the ambits of his authority: not because he is infallible, nor because he is necessarily right. But because somebody must decide or else the game cannot go on. If there is an appeal to the Board of Control (if there is such an authority and such an appeal) it cannot decide whether the umpire was right or wrong. All it can enquire into is whether the man who gave the decision was the umpire or whether he was some stranger or fieldsman masquerading as an umpire in a white coat and if he was the umpire, was his decision according to the laws of cricket? That is to say, was the batsman given out because he was in the opinion of the umpire bowled, or caught or stumped or run out, or just because the umpire did not like the colour of his hair or a certain wild look in his eyes.

13. In my opinion, comparing small things with great, the position is similar in the case of these Small Cause Court revisions, and also in revisions under the Provincial Insolvency Act. The Court can no more consider whether the lower Court was right or wrong than can the Board of Control in the case of the umpire. All it can consider is whether that was the proper Court to try that sort of issue, and if it was, whether any reasonable Judge could have given the decision which is challenged, that is to say, whether he acted “according to law.” In my opinion, that is the meaning of these words. I grant that it is impossible to be precise. There is always a margin for differences of opinion. But viewed in this light the margin is very considerably narrowed and it is possible to proceed upon some logical principle. As I see it the Court of revision is not there to set right errors of either law or fact in the lower Court but merely to see whether there has been a fair and proper trial according to standards which obtain in courts of justice, ignoring petty errors in procedure and trivial technicalities, and to see whether a judicial mind could have arrived at the conclusion reached. All else seems to me to be foreign to a revision. Any other conclusion seems to me either to slur all distinction between revision and appeal or else to break down on a close analysis.

14. The crux of the matter, to my mind, is this. No one can really say what is right and what is wrong, what is just. That can only be determined when all the facts are known and omnipotence alone can know all. Judges are not omnipotent, not even High Court Judges. Courts of justice have to apply rules, which, comparatively speaking, are only rough and ready, and the Legislature has to decide what degree of refinement is to be made in the drawing up and application of those rules. For example, Courts are obliged to excluded as “irrelevant” facts which philosophers would consider vital and which even to the ordinary lay mind appear to be material; and without going as far as that, facts which modern medical science would regard as the prime disposing cause. Also, looked at from the narrow individual standpoint why is it just to punish the innocent members of a rogue's family for sins committed by him (and that happens many a time when a decision is given in a Court of law), especially in cases where the result can make little or no practical difference to the other side. The truth of the matter is that high sounding phrases like “justice” and “right” and “wrong” are impossible to appreciate and apply without a clear understanding of what they import. When used in relation to matters arising in the Courts, they mean in every case, and can only mean, the opinion of some one man or body of men. It is true the opinion is that of experienced minds specially trained to gouge these problems and to solve them in accordance with settled principles after applying established rules, but every case, when analysed, comes back to the same thing: “justice” is what A thinks or what B thinks and it is for the Legislature to say who shall be A and who B. Judges can only give effect to what the Legislature intends, and if the Legislature intends that a revision is not to be same thing as an appeal, Judges must loyally accept that position and faithfully carry out its wishes.

15. If I am right in what I say, then it would appear that a revising authority cannot interfere with the decision of a lower Court on a point like limitation, unless the error is so gross that no judicial mind could have reached it, as for example when a lower Court refuses to be bound by a decision of its own High Court or of the Privy Council, or refuses to follow a plainly worded section in an Act about which there could be no reasonable difference of judicial opinion. In view therefore of the wide differences of opinion on these questions, and in particular because of the conflict of authority in this Court between 27 N.L.R 251 (’31) 18 A.I.R 1931 Nag. 17 , 130 I.C 145 , 27 N.L.R 251 at p. 257 and I.L.R (1936) Nag. 73 (’36) 23 A.I.R 1936 Nag. 157 , 164 I.C 848 , I.L.R (1936) Nag. 73 and because of 19 N.L.R 72 (’23) 10 A.I.R 1923 Nag. 292 , 73 I.C 1055 , 19 N.L.R 72 at p. 73, and the Full Bench in 28 N.L.R 44, (’32) 19 A.I.R 1932 Nag. 1 , 135 I.C 414 , 28 N.L.R 44 (F.B) I refer the following question: Can the High Court enter into questions either of law or of fact, such as limitation, or whether a transaction is a loan or a deposit, in a Small Cause Court revision, and if so, when and to what extent?

OPINION

Niyogi, J.:— I have had the advantage of perusing the opinions of Pollock, J. and Bose, J. While both of them appear to agree that the High Court ought to interfere to correct manifest injustice, they have sought to indicate the limits of that authority somewhat differently. The position as regards Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act, appears to me to be as follows. The law divides the Courts into two classes: the regular Courts and Courts of summary jurisdiction. The High Court has been given the power to hear appeals, first or second, as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. This appellate power of the Court is correlative to the right of the party to file an appeal and invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court is bound to hear the appellant before disposing of the case. The cases which are not appealable may be brought to the notice of the Court under Section 115 of the CPC, which applies to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it, or the illegal assumption of it: 40 Mad. 793 (’17) 4 AIR 1917 P.C 71 , 40 I.C 650 , 40 Mad. 793 , 44 I.A 261 (P.C). Thus, as regards the decrees or orders of the regular Courts, the High Court is invested by law with defined powers.

16. A Small Cause Court is a Court of summary jurisdiction. Its decrees or orders are finally binding on the parties. The litigation concludes in the Small Cause Court. The law gives no right to the parties aggrieved by the decrees or orders of that Court to invoke the jurisdiction of the superior Courts including the High Court. Since, a right of appeal is a substantive right and that right is not granted to any party, the High Court cannot exercise any power of the first or second appellate Court. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, only permits an aggrieved party to bring any decided case to the notice of the High Court as the Court of the last resort and as a Court having a discretionary power of control over all Courts subordinate to it. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, is wider than s. 115 which covers only points of jurisdiction. While the High Court is not bound to exercise the first or second appellate or revisional Court's powers, it appears to me that it has been endowed with the residuary powers such as are contemplated by Section 161 of the CPC to be exercised as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.

17. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, gives an opportunity to a party to bring any case decided by the Small Cause Court to the notice of the High Court so that if the decision is not in accordance with law, it may be corrected by the High Court, if it thinks necessary to do so for the ends of justice. The phrase “according to law” appears to imply according to the forms of law prescribed for ensuring a fair trial. It may primarily include questions regarding jurisdiction and the legality or regularity of the procedure. It cannot include decisions on points of fact or law even though they may appear to be erroneous but will include such decisions as are manifestly per-verse and unreasonable. The word “justice” is no doubt difficult to define. The justice that is administered in Courts is justice according to law which may be taken to mean legal or formal or conventional justice. It may or may not accord with moral or substantial or real justice. It is for this reason that S. 25 leaves it to the discretion of the High Court to pass such order as it thinks fit. In some cases the High Court may find that the decision, though not in accordance with the forms of law, may nevertheless be substantially just. There will, indeed, again arise the question as to the criterion for determining the standard of substantial justice. It will necessarily have to be left to the judicial sense of the High Court, for any person acting in his judicial capacity in that Court can safely be trusted not to import his caprice or his personal and private predilections into the decision of the case. I agree with Pollock, J. in the answer proposed by him.

Pollock, J.:— The point referred to us for decision is:

Can the High Court enter into questions either of law or of fact, such as limitation, or whether a transaction is a loan or a deposit, in a Small Cause Court revision, and if so, when and to what extent?

18. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, runs as follows:

The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according of law, may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit.

19. There are several possible interpretations of this section and much authority can be found to support almost every view except the extreme contention made by Mr. Dabir that the High Court is bound to interfere in every case, even after the lapse of any length of time, if it differs from the view of the Small Cause Court on any question of law or fact. As authority may be found to support almost every view, I think it unprofitable to discuss the vast mass of case-law cited at the Bar. In 11 Cal. 69 the Privy Council explained in 1884 the narrow limits within which the High Court can interfere in revision under S. 662 of Act 10 of 1877, which corresponds to Section 115 of the present CPC. When the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was enacted in 1887 a wide departure was made from the wording of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it may be assumed that the Legislature intended that the High Court should have wider powers under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act, than it has under Section 115 of the CPC. I think however that it is very clear that S. 25 was not intended to confer a right of appeal on any question of fact, still less on any question of law. As Bose, J. has pointed out in his referring order, the Act provides for no appeal, except within the very limited scope of S. 24, and I agree with him that this omission was deliberate. The position has been forcibly and, if I may say so, admirably expressed by the Civil Justice Committee in their report:

In this section the most important word is the word “may” which is used first to make it a matter of option or discretion on the High Court whether to call for the case or not. Of almost equal importance and simplicity is the phrase “according to law” a phrase which we understand to be intended in the Widest and most general sense. No one supposes that the High Court is intended to be or could possibly undertake the duties of a Court of first appeal from the decisions in so large a mass of cases. The provisions of O. 5, R. 5 and O. 20, R. 4 of the Code show that small causes are to be decided in a summary fashion, and that the reasons for the decision are not required to be set out in the judgment… The materials requisite for an appeal are not intended to be obligatory. Moreover, any right of appeal that could be intended in such cases would hardly be given to the High Court but would presumably be given to the District Court as in the case of appeal-able orders.

We mention these matters because we think that S. 25 gives an overriding power, the presence of which does much to justify the placing of final powers in the hands of the lower Courts, but that, if it is not very sparingly applied, it readily becomes an engine of oppression against respondents successful in the Small Cause Court, and a copious source of rank injustice by bringing small cases up to the highest Court at the cost of inordinate delay, trouble and expense. We think that there is a tendency in some quarters to regard S. 25 as though it gave a right of appeal on points of law much after the manner of that defined by S. 100 of the Code. This appears to be an error, and in practice a grave error. The materials intended to be available are of the scantiest and are insufficient altogether in most cases for the purpose of an appeal whether on fact or law. It seems fairly clear that the wide discretion given by S. 25 is given as an ultima ratio, a security held in reserve against the sort of injustice and illegality that can be detected from a mere summary record …. The Judge of the High Court cannot, one would think, fail to feel the force of the consideration that in small money claims, the moment the plaintiff has to defend his decree in the High Court, then whatever the result, there is small chance of justice, inasmuch as the trouble, delay and irrecoverable costs are likely to nullify the benefit to him of his decree and to leave him wishing that he had never sought justice from the Courts at all …. But the evil of the practice of treating S. 25 as giving in effect a right of appeal on law is apparent in the much more numerous cases in which respondents are vexed and delayed for naught. The policy of the law is that there should be no appeal (this for the most cogent reasons): not even in these small cases to the District Court: not even on a point of law. The High Court can doubtless decide some cases better than the Small Cause Court: but the system whereby small causes are summarily decided without appeal on law or fact will give, year in and year out, better justice than a system of appeals. If in order to effect a certain amount of good in a comparatively few cases, the respondents are hauled up to the High Court, then it may be said with some confidence that section does much more harm than good.

20. There are two points to be decided: first, the meaning of “according to law”, and secondly, in what sort of cases the High Court should interfere. Where the question is purely a question of fact and the finding is one that a Judge could reasonably reach, it is, in my opinion, quite impossible to say that the decision of the Small Cause Court is not according to law merely because the High Court would have taken a different view of the evidence. Whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a finding of fact is a question for the Small Cause Court and not for the High Court to decide; and, in so far as the decision in 19 N.L.R 72 (’23) 10 A.I.R 1923 Nag. 292 , 73 I.C 1055 , 19 N.L.R 72 suggests that the High Court is entitled to interfere where a finding of fact is opposed to the evidence on record or is based on meagre or little evidence, it cannot be considered good law.

21. It has next to be considered whether a finding on a question of law, which in the opinion of the High Court is incorrect, is a decision not according to law. I have myself taken the view in the past that where the Small Cause Court has followed a reported decision of this Court, as it was bound to do, then it cannot be said that its decision is not according to law, though I observe that in 28 N.L.R 44 (’32) 19 A.I.R 1932 Nag. 1 , 135 I.C 414 , 28 N.L.R 44 (F.B) the Judicial Commissioner's Court did interfere in a case of that sort. On further consideration, however, I have come to the conclusion that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to make any distinction between the words cannot ccording to law” and the words “contrary to law” used in Section 100 of the CPC. If a decision is contrary to law, the Court of appeal has to interfere and it will consider the lower Court's decision contrary to law if it disagrees with the lower Court's view of the law. My conclusion then is that the High Court cannot say that the decision of the Small Cause Court is according to law if the High Court itself takes a different view of the law, and I agree with the Civil Justice Committee that the phrase is intended in its widest and most general sense.

22. That leaves the question whether the High Court is bound to interfere in every case or has discretion to interfere in such cases as it thinks fit. It has been argued that a discretion has been given to the High Court to interfere in cases where the decision is not according to law and that power must be exercised. With that view I entirely disagree. Section 25 gives the High Court discretion to send for the record of the case and to pass such orders as it thinks fit. In (1880) 5 A.C 214 (1880) 5 A.C 214 , 49 L.J.Q.B 577 , 42 L.T 546 , 28 W.R 726 , 44 J.P 600 the House of Lords considered the interpretation of the Church Discipline Act which provides that in certain circumstances it shall be lawful for the bishop of a diocese to issue a commission of inquiry, and Lord Blackburn at page 247 observed:

I certainly cannot see any sufficient ground for saying that the object of the statute is such as to lead to the conclusion that the Legislature must have intended to oblige the bishop to exercise the power which, prima facie, he is entitled to refuse to exercise and certainly, if discretion is to be entrusted to anyone, the bishop is the fittest person to whom to trust it.

23. The law is summed up in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes at page 216 of Edn. 8:

Following the decision of the House of Lords in (1880) 5 A.C 214 (1880) 5 A.C 214 , 49 L.J.Q.B 577 , 42 L.T 546 , 28 W.R 726 , 44 J.P 600 it was said that from the nature of the British language the word ‘may’ can never mean ‘must,’ that it is only potential, and when it is employed there is another question to be decided, viz., whether there is anything that makes it the duty of the person on whom the power is conferred to exercise that power. If not, the exercise is discretionary.

24. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, gives the High Court, in my opinion, power to interfere in revision on a point of law if it considers that the point was incorrectly decided by the Small Cause Court. It is however extremely undesirable that the High Court should interfere in every such case, and the Legislature has given the High Court discretion to interfere in such cases as it thinks fit. That is not a power that the High Court is bound to exercise. It is a power that is to be exercised only when the High Court thinks fit. The discretion must be a judicial discretion. I agree with the remarks of Bose, J. in his referring order that the High Court is not there to set right errors of either law or fact of the lower Court but merely to see whether there has been a fair and proper trial according to standards which obtain in Courts of justice, ignoring petty errors in procedure and trivial technicalities, and to see whether a judicial mind could have arrived at the conclusion reached. The Civil Justice Committee suggested that the section is there as a reserve against the sort of injustice and illegality that can be detected from a mere summary record. That, I think, amounts to much the same thing as Bose, J. has said. Unless, it is possible to say that no Judge could reasonably come to the decision reached by the Small Cause Court, then I would say that this Court ought not to exercise its discretion under S. 25, even if it considers that decision is wrong. To say otherwise would be in effect to constitute this Court a Court of appeal on any question of law, and that was never intended.

25. Many Courts have refused to interfere under S. 25 on the ground that “substantial justice” has been done or that the decision is in accordance with the merits. It may be difficult to give any satisfactory definition of “justice” as opposed to “law.” A plea of limitation may be a perfectly fair plea if the suit has been delayed and the defendant's evidence has been destroyed by the lapse of time or it may be a plea devoid of all merit, to use the words of the Privy Council in A.I.R 1986 P.C 171. (’36) 23 A.I.R 1936 P.C 171 , 162 I.C 454 , 17 Lah. 557 , 63 I.A 279 (P.C) I do not think however it impossible to lay down any standard by which “substantial justice” can be measured. Courts of law have constantly to decide whether an ordinary reasonable man would or would not have acted in a certain way, and it should not be too difficult for them to decide whether an ordinary reasonable man, unversed in the law, would call the decision a fair one or an unfair one. If he would call it a fair one, then I would say that the High Court is not bound to exercise its discretion and interfere. The High Court would naturally be slow to hold that a decision not according to law has done “substantial justice,” but there may be cases where such refusal would be proper, e.g, where, in the words of Bose, J. there have been petty errors in procedure or technical irregularities. My answer to the question referred to us is that the High Court cannot interfere under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, with a finding of fact and should not interfere with a finding of law if the finding is one that a Judge in the present state of the law could reasonably reach or if there has been a fair trial and substantial justice has been done.

Vivian Bose, J.:— My opinion will be found in my referring order. I see no reason to modify it. All I intend to do here is to outline my reasons, supplement my previous views in the light of the arguments addressed before the Full Bench and answer the question referred. It was argued before us that there is no difference between an appeal and a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. One counsel said that all questions of every kind were opened up in these cases and that the High Court was in effect a Court of appeal on questions of law and of fact. The other counsel who argued the reference said he could not go as far as that but said that the High Court was really a Court of appeal on questions of law but that it could not go into facts. In my opinion, this is fundamental. There is a fundamental difference between a Court of revision and a Court of appeal and I think it will be impossible to construe the words “according to law” used in S. 25 without bearing this in mind. The Small Cause Courts Act itself draws a distinction between the two. Section 24 confers a right of appeal but limits it drastically. Section 25 says nothing about appeal and the marginal note speaks of revision. Section 27 says that save as provided by the Act decisions of the Small Cause Court shall be final. Section 32(d) again emphasises the distinction.

26. The Code of Civil Procedure applies to Small Cause Courts except in so far as its provisions are expressly excluded. Among the excluded provisions are Ss. 96 to 112, that is to say, the sections dealing with appeal. So also, S. 115 is excluded: see S. 7. Then again, we find from O. 50, R. 1(b), that Orders 41 to 45 which deal with appeals are also excluded. I am, therefore, clear that the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act draws a distinction between appeal and revision and that except in so far as a right of appeal is conferred by S. 24 no other right of appeal is given or intended. I am of opinion that if the High Court was intended to act as a Court of appeal either on questions of law or of fact or both, the Legislature would have said so expressly, as it always does when a right of appeal is conferred, and as it has not, it is not permissible for the High Court to exercise appellate powers in the guise of a revision. The distinction between a Court of appeal and one of revision is to be gathered from the Code of Civil Procedure. But before passing on to that, it will be as well to see the position of the trial Court. Its jurisdiction (S. 3) is to try the suit and its powers are to pass a judgment and a decree (S. 33), the decree determining finally, so far as that Court is concerned, the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit, (S. 2(2)). Under S. 107 the appellate Court has similar powers with some additional ones (e.g, of remand). Its power is “to determine a case finally” and sub-s. (2) provides that subject as aforesaid the appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein.

27. Now, the appellate Court does not re-try the case in the sense of re-hearing the witnesses but it does re-assess the evidence, and it cannot do that unless it has a full record before it. So also it cannot well sit in judgment over a conclusion of law unless it has the reasons which prompted the decision before it. Therefore, in order to enable the appellate Court to discharge these functions the Code provides that in appealable cases a full record of the evidence shall be maintained (O. 18, R. 5) and that reasons for the decision shall be recorded: see S. 2(9) defining “judgment” and O. 20, R. 4(2) and (5). But in non-appealable cases a full record is not necessary—only a memorandum of the substance of the evidence is required, and not the full deposition (O. 18, R. 13). In Small Cause Court cases even reasons are not necessary. Order 20, R. 4(1) provides that:

Judgments of a Court of Small Causes need not ??? contain more than the points for determination and the decision thereon.

28. Now, clearly it is impossible for a revisional Court under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act, with such a scanty record before it, to discharge the functions of an appellate Court. It cannot place itself in the position of the first Court as can an appellate Court and proceed “to determine” the case as S. 107 requires. This, in my opinion, strengthens the view that an appeal and a revision under s. 25 are not the same thing and that the revisional Court cannot and is not expected to discharge the functions of a Court of appeal in the guise of a revision. Reference was made to Section 100 of the CPC, and it was urged that the words “the decision being contrary to law” mean the same thing as the words “decree or order was according to law” in S. 25. But I do not think they do. The difference lies, not in these words, but in the words which precede them. Section 100 says that a second appeal shall lie on these among other grounds, S. 25 does not confer a right of appeal. The duty of the appellate Court is “to determine the case finally,” that is to say, finally to decide such issues of law or of fact as arise, and of the second appel-late Court finally to decide such issues of law as are raised. The revisional Court is not asked to decide or to determine the case but merely to satisfy itself that the decree or order was “according to law.”

29. I agree that the meaning of these words standing by themselves is not free from difficulty, but viewed in the background I have suggested they do not, in my opinion, empower the High Court to interfere on questions of law, still less on questions of fact, except in the limited circumstances which I shall define. I have pointed out in my referring order that there is no such thing as an absolute standard of right and wrong. In every case right is what A thinks or B and that it is for the Legislature to decide who shall be A, so as to give him the final word, and who B. “According to law” does not therefore, in my opinion, mean “according to the opinion of law which the revisional Judge reaches,” because he is not asked “to determine the case,” but “according to the usual forms and usages which prevail in Courts of justice.” It is more procedural than anything else. I will illustrate what I mean.

30. It is well established that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree unless the objection is jurisdictional (though there is a difference of opinion about that), or the decree is a nullity; not even the High Court can go behind the decree when the matter comes up to it in execution. The decision may, in the opinion of the High Court, be as wrong as you please but that will not entitle it to interfere, because though wrong it was “according to law—the law which states that Court A or B or C, as the case may be, shall finally determine the matter at issue. On the other hand, if the Court had no jurisdiction (according to one view—I say nothing about it), or the decree is a nullity, the decision is not “according to law” and therefore interference would be warranted. As I have said before, the Privy Council says that a Court has jurisdiction to decide eight as well as wrong and it is impossible so hold that the Court which decided wrong did not act “according to law.” Of course it lid. The law empowered it to act. The law entitled it to decide this way or that, and the law invests its decision with finality; and what is more, the law will uphold this wrong decision in given circumstances and enforce it. It is, in my opinion, impossible to say in such circumstances that the Court did not act “according to law.”

31. So also on questions of res judicata. The previous decision may have been wrong but it is final and is binding. How then can one say that it was not “according to law” when the law itself upholds it and enforces it and invests it with finality? Another instance is this. The lower Courts, and indeed even Judges of the High Court, are bound to follow the decisions of their own High Court. Let us say a Full Bench of the High Court decides a particular question in a particular way and the lower Courts and other judges of the High Court follow that decision. Save they not acted “according to law,” and indeed has the Full Bench itself not acted “according to law” just because the Privy Council in another and a later case decides that particular view of the law was wrong?

32. In my opinion, these words do not entitle the High Court to interfere on questions of law any more than they do on questions of tact. In my opinion, they merely give the High Court a sort of general superintendence such as the Privy Council has over the Courts in India in criminal cases. The Judicial Committee does not interfere merely to set right errors of fact or of law but when there has been a disregard of the proper forms of legal process, grievous and not merely technical in character, or a violation of principle in such a fashion as amounts to a denial of justice: see, 13 N.L.R 100 (’17) 4 A.I.R 1917 P.C 25 , 39 I.C 311 , 18 Cr. L.J 471 , 44 Cal. 876 , 44 I.A 137 , 13 N.L.R 100 (P.C) at p. 102.

33. It will be observed that the “justice” contemplated here is not the view of the facts or the law which the Privy Council might take if they went into the matter but the view of the Court invested with jurisdiction to say the final word, provided that Court has acted in a proper manner. In 13 N.L.R 100 (’17) 4 A.I.R 1917 P.C 25 , 39 I.C 311 , 18 Cr. L.J 471 , 44 Cal. 876 , 44 I.A 137 , 13 N.L.R 100 (P.C) their Lordships said that the Judicial Committee do not interfere in such cases “merely on the question whether the Court below has come to a proper conclusion as to guilt or innocence,” nor because “they them-selves would have taken a different view of the evidence.” The position under S. 25 is, in my opinion, very similar with, however, this difference. The Judicial Committee undoubtedly has the power and the right to interfere though under the “unwritten principles of the Constitution of the Empire” their Lordships do not do so. In my opinion, the High Court has not the right nor does it possess the power unless the decision was not “according to law,” and these words mean, not an error of law or of fact, but what I have suggested above.

34. The reasons are, in my opinion, good and sound, though that is immaterial on a matter of construction, and are the same as those set forth by the Judicial Committee in 13 N.L.R 100 (’17) 4 A.I.R 1917 P.C 25 , 39 I.C 311 , 18 Cr. L.J 471 , 44 Cal. 876 , 44 I.A 137 , 13 N.L.R 100 (P.C) referred to above. I quote their Lordships' words:

The Constitution of the Empire is tending to develop in the direction of regarding as final decisions given in the local administration of criminal justice. The general principle is established that the Sovereign in Council does not act, in the exercise of the prerogative right to review the course of justice in criminal cases, in the free fashion of a fully constituted Court of Criminal Appeal.

35. I am not enamoured of the view that the High Court has the right to interfere on questions of law but that it need not do so unless it thinks fit and that it will not think fit unless there has been “substantial injustice” and the like, because in my opinion, the High Court, unlike the Board of the Judicial Committee, is a Court which has to decide and determine such matters as are within its province, and not merely a Board to tender advice: see as to this 17 Cal. 59013 at p. 598. Accordingly, if the matter falls squarely within the ambit of its powers it cannot shirk a decision and it must act and decide according to the principles and laws which are administered in Courts of justice. It cannot pick and choose. It cannot say that sitting as a Court of Appeal it would have decided in favour of A but as it is a Court of revision it will decide in favour of B. I agree with Sundara Ayyar, J. in 37 Mad. 385 (’15) 2 A.I.R 1915 Mad. 635 , 26 I.C 181 , 37 Mad. 385 at p. 386 that a Court of revision has no power to consider justice apart from such justice as the law recognises. I agree also with the argument that the word “may” used in S. 25 is not permissive. It has the force of “shall.”

36. Once it is shown that the decision was not “according to law” the High Court is, in my opinion, bound to send for the record and is then bound to decide just as it would if it were an appellate Court. I cannot agree that a Court can administer or tolerate one form of justice when sitting as a Court of appeal and another as a Court of revision. There is nothing arbitrary or whimsical in the powers conferred. The limitations lie, not in the manner of exercise, as with the Judicial Committee, but in the powers them selves. “According to law” does not mean an error of law in the opinion of the High Court but a conclusion which no Judge could reasonably reach either in law or in fact. That, in my opinion, is the test: not whether the High Court, or the particular Judge presiding over the Court in revision would have reached the same conclusion, but whether a Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached it. If he could, then the decision is according to law and the High Court cannot interfere. If he could not, then the case is opened up and the High Court is bound to interfere and itself to decide “according to law” that is to say, to decide just as it would if it were sitting in appeal. If I am right, then the High Court's powers are wider on facts than in second peal, because, in my opinion, the High Court can interfere even on facts if the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. In second appeal, on the other hand, as I see it, the High Court has no jurisdiction to go into facts, however wrong or perverse the decision may be or however “gross and inexcusable” the error provided there is evidence on which the findings can be based. But of course cases in which interference on facts would be possible in revision would be extremely rare because it is exceedingly difficult for a Judge who has not seen and heard the witnesses to say that no reason able Judge could have believed or disbelieved one rather than another. This is particularly so when no reasons for the conclusions need be given. The same remarks apply to an estimate of documents. As the Privy Council has said, though the construction of a document going to the root of title is a question of law, the inference to be drawn from documents is one of fact. See, 48 Mad. 254 (’25) 12 A.I.R 1925 P.C 49 , 87 I.C 333 , 52 I.A 83 , 48 Mad. 254 (P.C) at p. 259 and 11 Lah. 199 (’30) 17 A.I.R 1930 P.C 91 , 122 I.C 316 , 57 I.A 86 , 11 Lah. 199 (P.C) at p. 207. On the other hand, the High Court's powers on questions of law are, in my opinion, much narrower because, unlike on appeal, the High Court cannot decide the issue, however errroneous it may appear to be to the Judge hearing the revision, unless the decision is not “according to law.” It can only decide in the first instance whether a Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached the decision sought to be revised.

37. Illustrative instances of cases in which interference would, in my opinion, be possible are when the Small Cause Court deliberately refuses to follow a decision of its own High Court or of the Privy Council or a plainly worded and unambiguous statute. But, in my opinion, interference is not possible when the Court merely comes down on one side or the other of a debatable question of law; particularly when rulings other than of its own High Court are available to support its view, and this whether the rulings are quoted by the Judge or not, because, as I have said, in a Small Cause Court decision the Judge need not give reasons. This view excludes interference on questions of limitation and on whether a transaction is a loan or a deposit unless the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. That is my answer to the question referred. By the Full Bench.—In view of the fact that we have reached substantial agreement in our conclusions, though our reasons differ, we think it desirable for the sake of clarity to set out those conclusions. We are agreed that there should be no interference on a question of fact or of law, even though the decision may appear to be erroneous, unless the conclusion of the Small Cause Court is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably reach.

38. Reference answered.