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S. Avudayammal (Deceased) And Others v. Ambasankar Davay And Others
Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The first respondent filed a suit to enforce a mortgage originally executed by defendants 1 to 3 on 25 June 1915, the mortgage money being due on 23 June 1916. The appellants (who were defendants 10 and 11 in the original suit) purchased some of the mortgaged items on 17 January 1923. The first respondent obtained an assignment of the mortgage from the original mortgagee (the twelfth defendant) and instituted the suit on 24 June 1940.
The trial Court dismissed the suit against the appellants on the ground that the claim in respect of the items they purchased was time-barred. On appeal, the lower appellate Court reversed that part and passed a decree even as against the appellants. The present judgment arises from this second appeal by the appellants.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a payment of Rs. 10 made on 26 June 1928 and endorsed on the bond as paid "towards the principal and interest accrued due under this deed" operated as a part payment for purposes of S. 20(1) of the Limitation Act and thereby saved the suit from the bar of limitation.
- Whether, in the absence of proof of appropriation by the creditor (or of an appropriation by the debtor explicitly indicating payment of interest), such a payment should be treated as an "open" or "general" payment and thus ineffectual to extend the period of limitation under the law as expounded by Rama Shah v. Lalchand.
- Whether the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1942, which altered the law relating to part payments, applied so as to revive or validate the contested debt in the present suit (i.e., whether the amending Act could be applied retrospectively to a debt which had already become unenforceable before the amendment came into force).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (as represented by Mr. Rangaswami Ayyangar)
- The first respondent's plaint itself alleged that the Rs. 10 payment was made towards interest; that allegation demonstrates there was no proof of appropriation of any part of the sum to principal before the period of limitation expired.
- Relying on Rama Shah v. Lalchand (Privy Council), the appellants argued that a payment on general account (an "open payment") is ineffectual to save limitation unless there was appropriation by the creditor within the period of limitation; absent such appropriation, the payment cannot be treated as part payment of principal for the purpose of S. 20.
- On the point of the 1942 Amendment, implicitly the appellants contended that the amendment could not operate retrospectively to revive a debt already barred before the amendment came into force.
Respondent's Arguments (as represented by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri)
- The endorsement on the bond expressly recorded payment "towards the principal and the interest accrued due under this bond," and therefore the payment should be regarded as a payment of interest as such within the meaning of S. 20 of the Limitation Act.
- Relied upon precedents (including Het Rambodh Raj v. Aya Ram Tolaram, Subraya Kamti v. Pakayya, Mohan Shaha v. Lakshmi Karikar, and Ramakriskna Annavi v. Pichandi Chettiar) that were said to support treating such endorsements as sufficient to attract S. 20.
- The respondent also invoked the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1942, contending that the amendment made a payment "on account of a debt" sufficient for the purposes of S. 20 and thereby could save the claim.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rama Shah v. Lalchand (Privy Council) | The principle that a payment made on general account (an "open payment") is ineffectual to save limitation unless it was appropriated by the creditor within the period of limitation; payments must be appropriated to principal to be treated as part payment for limitation purposes. | The Court relied on Rama Shah to hold that the Rs. 10 endorsement, being an open payment not showing appropriation to principal (and with the plaint alleging payment was towards interest), did not operate to save the suit from limitation. |
| Het Rambodh Raj v. Aya Ram Tolaram (Judicial Committee) | Authority for the proposition that where facts show a payment was necessarily made in respect of principal and interest (e.g., payment exceeded what was due on principal including interest), it may be treated as payment of interest as such. | The Court distinguished Het Rambodh Raj on its facts, noting that the decision turned on circumstances which necessarily implied part-payment of interest; the Court refused to apply the passage broadly to all payments "in respect of principal and interest" absent such facts. |
| Subraya Kamti v. Pakayya | Decision holding that a payment described as "Rs. 4 out of the entire amount payable on account of principal and interest" was a payment of interest as such for S. 20 purposes. | The Court observed this and similar earlier decisions supported the respondent's contention but noted they were decided before the Privy Council's exposition in Rama Shah and therefore did not control the present conclusion. |
| Mohan Shaha v. Lakshmi Karikar | Followed the view that certain descriptions of payments on a bond could operate as payment of interest for S. 20 purposes. | Noted as an earlier authority supportive of the respondent's approach but treated as pre-Rama Shah and thus not decisive against the Rama Shah principle applied by the Court. |
| Ramakriskna Annavi v. Pichandi Chettiar | Another decision endorsing the view that some endorsements describing payments as towards "principal and interest" might attract S. 20. | Referenced as supporting authority but similarly characterized as decided before Rama Shah; the Court did not treat it as sufficient to displace the Rama Shah principle. |
| Ramaswarup Prasad Singh v. Harihar Prasad Singh | Contained observations (by Dhavle J.) distinguishing general/open payments from payments where the debtor contemplated payment "not merely on account of principal ... but also on account of interest" and left exact appropriation to the decree-holder. | The Court considered these observations but rejected the view that a payment "towards principal and interest" necessarily negatives the possibility of no appropriation; the Court held that leaving appropriation to the creditor can still result in an open payment. |
| Krishnaswami Naicker v. Thiruvengada Mudaliar | Authority concerning the non-retrospective operation of statutory changes affecting enforceability of debts (cited for the proposition that an amendment cannot revive debts already unenforceable before it came into force). | The Court invoked this decision to reject the argument that the 1942 Amendment could be applied retrospectively to revive the already barred debt in this case. |
| Babu Durga Prasad v. Kishuni | Addressed questions about the amendment and procedure; clarified limits on taking advantage of amendments in revision petitions versus appeals. | The Court said this authority did not support the respondent's contention that the 1942 amendment revived barred debts; the case only held the amendment could not be taken advantage of in revision though an appellant might benefit by change of law during appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a text-based and contextual analysis of the Rs. 10 endorsement and the authorities. The reasoning proceeded in the following steps:
- Identification of the central factual record: an endorsement dated 26 June 1928 reading "Paid Rs. 10 this day towards the principal and interest accrued due under this deed through Sankaranayakar on behalf of Shanmugham Pillai Vagairai in the presence of Shanmugham Pillai," signed by the mortgagors.
- The lower Court had treated the endorsement as indicating that part of the Rs. 10 was applied to principal (and part to interest), thereby satisfying S. 20(1) and rendering the suit timely. The present Court focused on whether the endorsement, read alone, amounted to an appropriation that would operate as a part payment of principal for limitation purposes.
- The Court applied the principle from Rama Shah v. Lalchand that an "open" or "general" payment is ineffectual to save limitation unless appropriation to principal (for the purpose of S. 20) is shown or was made by the creditor within the period of limitation. The Court emphasized that a payment described merely as being "towards principal and interest" where both are due, and the amount is not in excess of either, does not by itself demonstrate that any part was intended by the debtor to be applied to interest or principal specifically.
- The Court analyzed the respondent's reliance on Het Rambodh Raj and other pre-Rama Shah authorities. It accepted that Het Rambodh Raj was correctly decided on its facts — there, the payment circumstances clearly implied a portion was for interest — but rejected reading that decision as broadly establishing that every payment described "in respect of principal and interest" is necessarily a payment of interest as such.
- The Court rejected the respondent's argument that the endorsement by itself showed appropriation to interest. It reasoned that payment of interest "as such" by the debtor requires express intimation by the debtor or circumstances that indicate the debtor intended the payment to reduce interest (i.e., appropriation by the debtor), which excludes leaving appropriation to the creditor. In the present case no such appropriation by the debtor was shown; indeed, the plaint alleged the payment was towards interest but there was no evidence to support that allegation.
- The Court addressed the submission about the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1942. While acknowledging that the amendment intended to make a payment "on account of a debt" sufficient for S. 20, the Court held that where, under the law as it stood prior to the amendment, the payment was ineffectual and the debt became unenforceable before the amendment came into force, the amending statute could not be applied retrospectively to revive the barred debt. The Court cited Krishnaswami Naicker v. Thiruvengada Mudaliar for that proposition and rejected reliance on Babu Durga Prasad v. Kishuni as not supporting retrospective revival.
- On these bases, the Court concluded the Rs. 10 endorsement was an "open payment" and did not satisfy the requirements of S. 20 to save the suit from limitation as against the appellants.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed; the first respondent's suit is dismissed with costs as far as the appellants (defendants 10 and 11) are concerned.
Direct implications for the parties:
- The decree in the lower appellate Court insofar as it was passed against the appellants is set aside and their appeal succeeds.
- The first respondent's claim against the appellants is dismissed with costs in this Court and the lower appellate Court.
- Leave to appeal (or other leave sought) was refused (the opinion records "Leave refused").
Broader legal implications: The Court applied and reaffirmed the non-retrospective operation of the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1942, in circumstances where the debt had already become unenforceable before the amendment came into force. The Court followed the principle in Rama Shah v. Lalchand that an unappropriated or "open" payment does not save limitation; it limited the applicability of other pre-Rama Shah decisions to their specific facts and did not treat them as overriding the Privy Council exposition.
The appellants in this second appeal were defendants 10 and 11 in a suit brought by the first respondent to enforce a mortgage. The mortgage was executed by defendants 1 to 3 on 25th June 1915, but the mortgage money became due on 23rd June 1916. The appellants purchased some of the items comprised in the mortgage on 17th January 1923. The first respondent obtained an assignment of the mortgage from the original mortgagee, the twelfth defendant, and brought the suit on 24th June 1940. The first Court dismissed the suit as against the appellants holding that the claim on the mortgage against the items purchased by them was time-barred. On appeal by the first respondent the lower appellate Court passed a decree even as against them and hence this second appeal.
The only question argued in the second appeal related to the plea of limitation raised by the appellants. In answer to that plea the first respondent relied on a payment of Rs. 10 made on 26th June 1928 on behalf of the mortgagors and endorsed by them on the bond. This sum was less than the principal or interest due on that date. The endorsement runs as follows:
“Paid Rs. 10 this day towards the principal and interest accrued due under this deed through Sankaranayakar on behalf of Shanmugham Pillai Vagairai in the presence of Shanmugham Pillai,”
and is signed by defendants 1 to 3, the mortgagors. The Court below took the view that on the language of this endorsement, the amount must be taken to have been paid partly towards principal and partly towards interest, and that as the payment towards the principal satisfies the requirements of S. 20(1) of the Limitation Act, the suit was in time against all the defendants.
Mr. Rangaswami Ayyangar, the learned Counsel for the appellants, contests this view pointing out that the first respondent himself alleged in his plaint that the payment was made towards interest due under the bond, and that it could not be regarded as a part payment of principal in the absence of any appropriation proved to have been made by the mortgagee before the expiry of the period of limitation. His contention was that a payment in such terms could only be regarded as a payment on general account, which, according to the decision of the Privy Council in Rama Shah v. Lalchand (1) was by itself, ineffectual to save limitation. This decision clearly lays down that a payment made towards a debt cannot be regarded as a payment towards the principal of the debt for purposes of limitation unless such payment was appropriated by the creditor within the period of limitation so as to make it a part payment of principal. Their Lordships definitely indicated their view that the decisions of the Courts in India holding that a payment on general account must necessarily have been made either towards interest or towards principal and in either case would save limitation provided the other requirements of S. 20 were satisfied did not correctly lay down the law. Here, no appropriation of the payment or any part of it to principal was put forward or proved and in tact the plaint, as already observed, alleged that the payment was made towards interest. In such circumstances, it is difficult to uphold the conclusion of the lower Court that the payment in question was a part payment of principal for purposes of the Limitation Act. Indeed, Mr. Viswanatha Sastri for the respondents did not attempt to support this view. He urged, however, that the payment having been made in express terms towards “the principal and the interest accrued due under the bond,” it should be regarded as payment of interest as such within the meaning of S. 20. Apart from the terms of the endorsement Mr. Viswanatha Sastri did not rely upon any other evidence tending to show that the debtor paid the amount specifically towards the interest. That no doubt was the allegation in the plaint, but there is no evidence in support of it. The question therefore has to be decided solely with reference to the language of the endorsement. Notwithstanding the existence of some authority in support of the contention of Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, it seems to me that a payment made merely towards principal and interest without the debtor specifying what part of it was to go towards principal and what part towards interest is no more than a payment generally on account of the debt or an “open payment” as it is called by their Lordships and cannot be regarded as a payment towards interest as such within the meaning of the section. Any payment made on account of a debt must be a payment made towards the principal and accrued interest, unless the whole of principal or the whole of interest has already been paid, in which case no difficulty can arise as the payment must be taken to have been made towards interest or principal as the case may be. The mere fact, therefore, that the payment is said to have been made towards principal and interest where both are due and the sum paid does not exceed the one or the other, cannot involve the implication that any part of the payment was intended by the debtor to go towards interest. Payment of interest as such by the debtor clearly implies a payment made either with express intimation or under circumstances indicating that the payment is to be applied in reduction of the interest or, in other words, it implies an appropriation of the payment to interest by the debtor himself and excludes the creditor's right of appropriation. Can it be said in this case that the mortgagee was bound to apply any part of the sum of Rs. 10 towards interest? I think not, as no part was specified by the mortgagors as applicable in reduction of interest. He could have appropriated the whole of it to principal. In such circumstances, the payment must be regarded as an open payment notwithstanding that it was in terms made towards principal and interest as evidenced by the endorsement and it cannot operate to save the bar of limitation.
Mr. Viswanatha Sastri relied in support of his contention on the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Het Rambodh Raj v. Aya Ram Tolaram . That was a case where a debt had to be paid in certain instalments, the first of which, namely, Rs. 13000 had to be paid with a year's interest to that date on 27th January 1929. After various payments had been made, the debtor sent a sum of Rs. 825 on 15th February 1929 with an intimation that the creditor should “deduct from this the amount that is due to you for my first instalment according to accounts and keep the rest in my name….Send me a formal receipt of the amount of the first instalment together with interest.” This clearly showed that the payment made was in excess of what was due in respect of the first instalment including interest, and this necessarily implied that a part of the sum was paid for interest as such. It was with reference to a payment made in such circumstances that their Lordships said:
“The payment was made and was necessarily made in respect of principal and interest. It was therefore a payment of interest on a debt as such by the person Liable to pay the debt.”
This passage on which Mr. Viswanatha Sastri placed strong reliance must be understood with reference to the facts stated above which clearly implied payment of interest as such. It would be misleading if it were taken out of its context and read as applicable to all payments made “in respect of principal and interest” as Mr. Viswanatha Sastri attempted to do. The other decisions cited by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, namely, Subraya Kamti v. Pakayya , Mohan Shaha v. Lakshmi Karikar (2) and Ramakriskna Annavi v. Pichandi Chettiar (3), do, however, support his contention. In Subraya Kamti v. Pakayya , Jenkins C.J held that a payment of “Rs. 4 out of the entire amount payable on account of principal and interest due under this bond” was a payment of interest as such by the person liable so as to attract the provisions of S. 20. This decision was followed by the Calcutta High Court in Mohan Shaha v. Lakshmi Karikar and by Phillips J. of this Court in Ramakriskna Annavi v. Pichandi Chettiar . These cases, however, were all decided before the exposition of the true meaning and effect of S. 20 of the Limitation Act by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Rama Shah's Case (4). No decision on the point after Rama Shah's case was brought to my notice except Ramaswarup Prasad Singh v. Harihar Prasad Singh (5), where Dhavle J., in deciding the case on another point, made the following observations after referring to the earlier decisions,
“The difference between what is called a general or an open payment and a payment towards principal, interest and costs such as we have in the present case, is no doubt rather fine, but lies in the fact that unlike the former the latter negatives the last of the four possibilities (regarding intention of the debtor who makes the payment) pointed out by Sir George Rankin in Rama Shah's Case namely, the possibility (common enough in the former) that there was no intention of appropriation as between interest and principal. The mortgagor in the present case appears clearly to have contemplated payment not merely on account of principal with or without costs but also on account of interest, though he left the exact appropriation to the decree-holder.”
With all respect, it does not seem correct to say that a payment towards principal and interest negatives the possibility that there was no intention of appropriation as between interest and principal. So long as the debtor has not specified what part of the sum paid should be applied in reduction of the interest, he cannot be said to have appropriated any part of it towards interest. If he left the “exact appropriation” to the creditor the latter must be within his rights if he appropriated the whole of the payment towards the principal, and this could only be on the footing of an open payment. In my opinion a payment towards principal and interest of a sum which is not in excess of the principal or the interest then due can no more be regarded as appropriated to interest by the debtor than a payment towards the debt.
Another point raised by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri can be disposed of in a few words. He contended that the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1942, was applicable here and that the payment in question was sufficient, under S. 20 as amended, to save limitation. The amendment was intended to supersede the law as expounded in Rama Shah's case and to make a payment “on account of a debt” sufficient for the purposes of the section. But it is to be observed that if under the old section, the payment was ineffectual to extend the time as I have held it to be, the debt in suit became unenforceable long before the amending Act came into force, and the amendment cannot operate retrospectively so as to revive barred debts [See Krishnaswami Naicker v. Thiruvengada Mudaliar (6)]. There is nothing in Babu Durga Prasad v. Kishuni (7) cited for the respondent to support his contention. All that the Court there decided was that the amendment in question could not be taken advantage of by an applicant for revision although an appellant might be entitled to the benefit of a change of law made during the pendency of an appeal. As the learned Judges were dealing with a revision petition it was not necessary for them to decide and they did not decide, whether the new S. 20 had the effect of reviving barred debts.
In the result, the appeal is allowed and the first respondent's suit is dismissed with costs in this and the lower appellate Court so far as the appellants are concerned. Leave refused.
N.R.R
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