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Bhabhutmal Nathmal v. Khan Mohammad

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mar 23, 1945
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal is by defendants 3 and 4 (Bhabhutmal and his minor daughter-in-law Manohar Kunwar) against a preliminary decree for foreclosure passed by the Additional District Judge, Balaghat on 26 September 1939 in Civil Suit No. 8-A of 1938. The central dispute is whether plots in the possession of defendants 3 and 4 are liable to foreclosure under a mortgage dated 22 February 1929 in favour of Gafoor Mohammad (the plaintiff).

Relevant events set out in the opinion:

  • Premal (father of respondents Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal) was proprietor of certain shares in three villages and executed three mortgages in favour of Bhabhutmal. Bhabhutmal obtained preliminary decrees for foreclosure in earlier suits (Civil Suit Nos. 5 of 1926 and 67 of 1926).
  • On 22 February 1929 Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal executed a mortgage in favour of Gafoor Mohammad for Rs. 19,000 covering specific properties including 0-16-0 of Murjhad and sir land of 197-31 acres.
  • Out of the consideration of the 1929 mortgage, a decretal amount in favour of Bhabhutmal was fully satisfied on 28 February 1929.
  • Bhabhutmal later filed Civil Suit No. 48 of 1930 to enforce an earlier mortgage (5 March 1919) by foreclosure; a final decree was passed and he obtained possession on 23 February 1934, becoming proprietor of 0-16-0 of Murjhad and proprietor of shares in Khairlanji and Umri. The 197.31 acres of sir land remained mortgaged to Gafoor Mohammad and was not subject to that foreclosure.
  • By operation of law Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal became occupancy tenants in respect of the sir land. The sir plots were later partitioned between them (98.33 and 88.04 acres respectively).
  • Bhabhutmal obtained decrees for recovery of arrears of rent against each brother in 1936 (Civil Suit No. 94 of 1936 against Kanhaiyalal and Civil Suit No. 93 of 1936 against Sadanlal), execution of which led to ejectments and possession being delivered to Bhabhutmal (receipt dated 2 February 1937 appears in the record).
  • On 17 April 1937 Bhabhutmal executed a sale deed of the plots he obtained by ejectment in execution of those rent decrees in favour of his minor daughter-in-law Manohar Kunwar.
  • Gafoor Mohammad filed Civil Suit No. 8-A of 1938 to enforce his 22 February 1929 mortgage, restricting his claim to the 197.31 acres that had been sir land at the time of the mortgage (and two houses). The lower Court passed a preliminary decree for foreclosure; the central dispute in the appeal is whether the plots now in possession of defendants 3 and 4 are liable to foreclosure.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plots in possession of defendants 3 and 4 (having been sir land at the time of the mortgage but later becoming tenancy/occupancy land by operation of law and thereafter the subject of ejectment and sale) are liable to foreclosure under the plaintiff's mortgage dated 22 February 1929.
  2. Whether the decrees for arrears of rent and the ejectment/execution proceedings obtained and carried out by Bhabhutmal were fraudulent and collusive so as to defeat or preserve the plaintiff's rights under the mortgage.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (Gafoor Mohammad's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff sought enforcement of the 22 February 1929 mortgage only as against the 197.31 acres which were originally sir land at the time of the mortgage and two houses; he abandoned some interest and part of the principal and claimed Rs. 15,000 with interest (plea limited to specified property).
  • The plaintiff alleged that the decrees for arrears of rent obtained by Bhabhutmal and the resultant ejectment proceedings were obtained fraudulently and collusively to deprive the plaintiff of his mortgage security.

Defendants' (Appellants') Arguments

  • One defence (raised by Bhabhutmal) was that the plaintiff was not entitled to foreclosure by reason of the earlier foreclosure decree obtained by Bhabhutmal in Civil Suit No. 48 of 1930.
  • Defendant No. 5 (Bisahu) contended he had title to certain plots by virtue of a sale deed dated 2 July 1905 and an agreement dated 1 June 1909 and had obtained title before the plaintiff's mortgage was executed (but he failed to produce those documents or prove title).
  • Bhabhutmal denied that Kanhaiyalal was his mukaddam (though he did not dispute that Kanhaiyalal was his hawaldar) and generally disputed allegations of collusion or fraudulent conduct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
11 CPLR 133 Held that a mortgagee entitled to claim a decree expressly directing sale of the mortgagor's rights in sir land may bring those rights to sale notwithstanding that the mortgagor, by operation of law, became an occupancy tenant. Applied as key authority to support the proposition that the plaintiff mortgagee may obtain foreclosure of the cultivating/occupancy rights in sir land that had been mortgaged to him though the mortgagor later became occupier by operation of law.
8 N.L.R 123 Followed 11 C.P.L.R 133 with approval; a decree for foreclosure was passed in respect of ex-proprietary cultivating rights in sir land. Followed with approval to reinforce that foreclosure of cultivating/occupancy rights is permissible despite change in character of land.
19 NLR 26 Referenced among cases establishing principle about proprietary and cultivating/occupancy rights in sir land. Used as part of the series of authorities underpinning the legal characterization of sir land and occupancy rights.
26 NLR 464 at p. 48 Referenced among authorities concerning sir land and the consequences of transfer without sanction. Relied on as part of the body of case law explaining conversion of proprietary rights into occupancy tenancy by operation of law.
28 NLR 166 Held that a mortgagee was entitled to claim a decree against the mortgagor's remaining rights in sir land (occupancy right) and that Section 12(2) of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1920 did not prohibit such foreclosure in the circumstances. Applied to support the conclusion that the plaintiff mortgagee could foreclose the cultivating/occupancy rights in the 197.31 acres even though they had ceased to be sir land by reason of earlier events.
ILR (1941) Nag. 54 Referenced among cases that settled the rule distinguishing proprietary and cultivating/occupancy rights in sir land transfers. Included in the set of authorities explaining the legal effect of transfers with/without sanction on sir rights; supports the court's framing of the legal context.
11 C.P.L.R 57 Held that where a tenant grants a sub-lease without landlord's consent, determination of the tenancy also determines the sub-tenancy; but where sub-lease is legally granted, a voluntary surrender by the tenant cannot prejudice the rights of the sub-lessee. Relied on to draw a distinction between voluntary acts by a tenant (surrender) and termination by operation of law, and to analyze how subordinate rights are affected.
2 N.L.R 1708 Held that where an absolute occupancy tenant effects a valid mortgage, a voluntary surrender cannot prejudice the rights of the mortgagee. Used to support the proposition that certain voluntary acts by tenants do not defeat a mortgagee's entitlement.
10 N.L.R 1299 Held that if a tenant allows a decree for rent to be passed where no arrear is due, the decree and ejectment bind the tenant but cannot affect a mortgagee whose mortgage is not void as against the landlord; such a decree stands like a voluntary surrender. Applied to reason that not every rent decree and ejectment destroys a mortgagee's rights; distinction depends on bona fides and whether mortgagee's rights are void as against landlord.
14 N.L.R 10710 Mittra A.J.C Distinguished voluntary surrender from statutory surrender (under S. 35(4) in the cited context) and quoted the Ch. D. passage: voluntary surrender cannot prejudice rights of under-lessee or person claiming under lessee. Relied on for the legal proposition distinguishing voluntary surrender from other forms of termination and for invoking the principle embodied in Section 115 of the Transfer of Property Act (as a guiding principle).
28 N.L.R 93 Held that any transfer engrafted on the tenant right, whether by way of mortgage or sub-lease, comes to an end when the tenant right itself is determined by operation of law. Noted as an authority recognizing that termination by operation of law defeats subordinate transfers; used in the analytical balance between instances where subordinate rights survive and where they do not.
32 Cal. 285 at p. 286 Observed that if proceedings (rent decree and execution sale) were fraudulent and collusive, the plaintiff has rights: either to be paid off or to bring the mortgage property to sale; collusive transfer should not destroy the plaintiff's mortgage lien. Quoted and followed with approval as a direct precedent for holding that collusive ejectment cannot defeat the mortgagee's lien and that the mortgagee can seek relief against colluding parties.
10 N.L.R 129 and 13 N.L.R 1914 at p. 24 These observations (from 32 Cal. and related authorities) were followed with approval in subsequent reported rulings. Cited to show consistent judicial approval of the principle that collusive proceedings should not destroy a mortgagee's rights; used to bolster the final conclusion on fraud/collusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a step-wise analysis grounded in both the factual record and established authorities:

  1. Characterization of rights in sir land: The court explained the well-established distinction between proprietary rights and cultivating/occupancy rights in sir land. Transfers with sanction carry the transferor's rights to transferee; transfers without sanction make the transferee proprietor but not of the sir/cultivating rights, thereby converting the transferor into an ex-proprietary tenant and the land into tenancy land by operation of law. The opinion cites a series of authorities to establish this legal backdrop.
  2. Applicability of foreclosure to occupancy rights: Relying on precedents (notably 11 CPLR 133, 8 NLR 123 and 28 NLR 166), the Court held that a mortgagee who had mortgaged sir land may nonetheless obtain foreclosure of the mortgaged cultivating or occupancy rights even though, by operation of law, the mortgagor became an occupancy tenant. The Court applied that principle to conclude that Gafoor Mohammad (plaintiff) is entitled to foreclosure of the cultivating/occupancy rights in the 197.31 acres that were sir at the time of his mortgage.
  3. Rejection of defendant's "prior-foreclosure" objection: The appellants argued that an earlier foreclosure decree obtained by Bhabhutmal in Civil Suit No. 48 of 1930 barred the plaintiff's claim. The Court rejected this on the ground that the sir plots mortgaged to the plaintiff were not mortgaged to Bhabhutmal and were not the subject matter of Civil Suit No. 48; Bhabhutmal's prior foreclosure did not give him rights over the sir plots that were specifically mortgaged to Gafoor Mohammad.
  4. Examination of alleged fraud/collusion: The lower Court had found that the decrees for arrears of rent and the ejectments obtained by Bhabhutmal against Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal were fraudulently and collusively obtained to deprive the mortgagee of his rights. On the record, the appellate Court reviewed evidence supporting that finding: valuation and productivity of the land; admissions and conduct (receipts acknowledging possession, tenants' testimony showing Kanhaiyalal collecting rent for Bhabhutmal, evidence that crops were standing at the time of ejectment, material transfers such as a sale deed in favour of Manohar Kunwar for a nominal consideration, and alleged grants of cultivation land to Kanhaiyalal by Bhabhutmal).
  5. Inference of fraud from surrounding circumstances: The Court stressed that fraud may be inferred from surrounding circumstances and conduct. The combination of (a) the tiny decretal sums at issue, (b) Kanhaiyalal's employment/service relationship with Bhabhutmal and continued rent-collection/management activity after the ejectment, (c) the prompt sale to a close relation for nominal consideration, and (d) offers/agreements (as deposed by Sadanlal) that they should allow ejection to be later reconstituted as tenancy, all supported the inference of collusion. The Court also noted that critical documents or testimony (e.g., title deeds from defendant 5, or direct examination of Kanhaiyalal) were not produced or were missing, strengthening the inference that the ejectments were not bona fide.
  6. Legal consequences of collusive ejectment: Drawing on authorities (including 32 Cal. 285 and subsequent NLR decisions), the Court reasoned that where ejectment and subsequent transfer were collusive and intended to defeat the mortgagee, the mortgagee's lien should not be held destroyed by such collusion; instead, the mortgagee retains rights (to be paid off or to bring the mortgaged property to sale) against the parties who colluded.
  7. Conclusion on entitlement to foreclosure: On the combined factual and legal analysis the Court held that the ejectments were fraudulent and collusive and therefore could not defeat the plaintiff's right to enforce his mortgage as against the plots that passed into the hands of defendants 3 and 4. The Court therefore dismissed the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is dismissed.

The Court specifically held that:

  • The plaintiff mortgagee (Gafoor Mohammad, through his heirs/representatives) is entitled to foreclosure of the cultivating/occupancy rights in the 197.31 acres that were sir land at the time of the 22 February 1929 mortgage, notwithstanding intervening events that converted the land into tenancy by operation of law.
  • The decrees for arrears of rent obtained by Bhabhutmal against Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal, and the subsequent ejectments and transfers, were fraudulently and collusively obtained to deprive the mortgagee of his security; accordingly those decrees and transfers cannot affect the plaintiff's right to enforce the mortgage as against the plots that passed into the hands of defendants 3 and 4.

Direct consequences and orders recorded in the opinion:

  • The appeal by defendants 3 and 4 fails and is dismissed with costs.
  • Counsel's fee awarded: Rs. 150.

Implications beyond the parties: The Court applied existing authorities to the facts and did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle; the decision confirms the established rule that a mortgagee's right to foreclose cultivating or occupancy rights in formerly sir land can survive changes in the land's character, and that collusive ejectment cannot be used to defeat a mortgagee's lien.

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JUDGMENT

1. This is an appeal by Bhabhutmal and his minor daughter-in-law Manohar Kunwar, defendants 3 and 4, against the preliminary decree for foreclosure passed by the Court of the Additional District Judge, Balaghat, on the 26th September 1939 in Civil Suit No. 8-A of 1938. The question for decision in this appeal is whether the plots in possession of the defendants 3 and 4 are liable to foreclosure. In order to understand the dispute between the parties it is necessary to set out briefly a few relevant facts. Premal, father of Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal, respondents 2 and 3, was the proprietor of 0-16-0 of Murjhad, 0-8-0 of Khairlanji and 0-4-0 of Umri. Premlal executed three mortgages in favour of Bhabhutmal. Bhabhutmal obtained preliminary decrees for foreclosure in Civil Suit Nos. 5 of 1926 and 67 of 1926 which were filed on the basis of two later mortgages. The cases were fixed for hearing on the 26th February 1926. On the 22nd February 1929 Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal executed a mortgage in favour of Gafoor Mohammad, plaintiff, for Rs. 19,000. The property mortgaged in his favour was 0-16-0 of Murjhad with sir land 197-31 acres and house, 0-8-0 of Khairlanji without sir and house, and 0-4-0 Umri without sir. Out of the consideration of the mortgage deed the decretal amount in favour of Bhabhutmal was fully satisfied on the 28th February 1929.

2. Bhabhutmal filed civil Suit No. 48 of 1930 to enforce the first mortgage dated the 5th March 1919 by foreclosure. The property mortgaged was the share of the three villages already mentioned without the cultivating right in sir in mauza Murjhad and the two houses in Murjhad and Khairlanji. The defendants were Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal, the mortgagors, and Gafoor Mohammad, the subsequent mortgagee. The usual preliminary decree for foreclosure was passed. Money was not paid, a final decree for foreclosure was passed and Bhabhutmal obtained possession of the property foreclosed on the 23rd February 1934. The effect of the foreclosure decree was that Bhabhutmal became the full proprietor of 0-16-0 of Murjhad and a proprietor of the shares of Khairlanji and Umri. 197.31 acres of sir land was mortgaged in favour of Gafoor Mohammad and was not mortgaged in favour of Bhabhutmal. As Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal lost their right to occupy sir land 197.31 acres in mauza Murjhad as proprietors they became occupancy tenants by operation of law. After some time, the exact date is not known, the sir plots which had become occupancy plots by operation of law were partitioned between the two brothers Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal. Kanhaiyalal had 98.33 acres, and Sadanlal 88.04 acres. Bhabhutmal filed two separate suits, one against Kanhaiyalal and another against Sadanlal, for recovery of arrears of rent for the first Kist of 1935–1936. Civil Suit No. 94 of 1936 was for Rs. 80-6-0 against Kanhaiyalal. He admitted the claim and a decree was passed against him with costs on the 23rd May 1936. The judgment and decree in the case are exhibits P-22 and P-23. The execution of the decree was transferred to the Naib Tahsildar for ejectment of Kanhaiyalal. On the 21st November 1936 Kanhaiyalal asked for time for payment. The case was fixed for the 21st December 1936. On that date Kanhaiyalal was absent and the Court ejected the tenant from the occupancy holding. Possession was delivered to Bhabhutmal on the 2nd February 1987 who passed a receipt (Exhibit P-25) acknowledging delivery of possession. As the tenant was ejected and possession was delivered to Bhabhutmal the case was filed on the 20th February 1937. The same thing happened in the case of Sadanlal. Civil Suit No. 93 of 1936 was against him for recovery of Rs. 83-3-0. He was absent and the Court passed an ex parte decree for Rs. 83-3-0 on the 28rd May 1936. The judgment and decree are exhibits P-18 and P-19. Money was not paid. The decree was transferred to the Naib Tahsildar for execution. On the 21st November 1936 Sadanlal asked for time for payment. The case was adjourned to the 21st December 1936. He was absent and the Court ejected him. The decree, holder passed a receipt on the 2nd February 1937 acknowledging that possession was delivered to him and the execution case was filed.

3. Bhabhutmal executed a sale deed of the plots which he obtained by ejectment in execution of the decrees for arrears of rent against Kanhailal and Sadanlal, in favour of his minor daughter-in-law Manohar Kunwar on the 17th April 1937. Gafoor Mohammad, the plaintiff, filed Civil Suit No. 8-A of 1938 in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Balaghat, to enforce his mortgage dated the 22nd February 1929. The plaintiff abandoned interest which had accrued due and a portion of the principal and claimed only Rs. 15,000 with interest at 6 p.c.p.a from the date of the suit till the date of decree and from the date of decree to the date fixed for payment. The defendants were Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal, the mortgagors, Bhabhutmal, proprietor of mauza Murjhad, Manohar Kunwar, his daughter-in-law, and one Bisahu who was in possession of two plots 69/2 and 70. The plaintiff has restricted his claim for enforcement of the mortgage as against 197.31 acres which were originally sir and which were transferred with the sanction of the Deputy Commissioner obtained on the 6th October 1928 and the two houses at Murjhad and Khairlanji. The lower Court found that the mortgage dated the 22nd February 1929 was for consideration and was validly attested. It may be mentioned here that Bisahu defendant No. 5 was one of the attesting witnesses in the mortgage deed in suit which described the sir plots which were transferred and which included plots Nos. 69/2 and 70. The defense in the lower Court was that he had obtained title to these plots by virtue of the sale deed dated the 2nd July 1905 and the agreement dated the 1st June 1909 and had obtained title before the mortgage was executed in favour of the plaintiff.

4. Defendant No. 5 did not file the sale deed or the agreement or prove his title. He merely filed a copy of the Khasra for 1927–1928 (Exhibit 5 D-1) which records the transfer of plots in his favour. The lower Court has rightly pointed out that this does not confer any title on defendant no. 5. After a preliminary decree for foreclosure had been passed against him, Bhabhutmal in execution of his decree for arrears of rent against him ejected him from the sir plots and obtained possession. The defence of Bhabhutmal in the lower Court was that the plaintiff is not entitled to the foreclosure by reason of the decree for foreclosure in civil Suit No. 48 of 1930 obtained against him. There is no substance in this objection. The sir plots which had been mortgaged in favour of Gafoor Mohammad were not mortgaged in favour of Bhabhutmal and were not the subject matter of Civil Suit No. 48 of-1930. Bhabhutmal by foreclosure merely became a proprietor of 0-16-0 of Murjhad but did not obtain any right in respect of the sir plots which were not mortgaged to him. Though Gafoor Mohammad has lost the right to foreclose 0-16-0 of Murjhad he can still obtain a foreclosure decree in respect of the part of the mortgaged property covered by his mortgage deed and which is not affected by the foreclosure decree in Civil Suit No. 48 of 1930.

5. During the pendency of appeal in this Court Gafoor Mohammad, plaintiff, died and his heirs and legal representatives have been brought on the record as respondents 1(a) to 1(f). In sir there are two component rights; the proprietary right and the cultivating right or the right of occupancy. If a proprietor transfers a village without reservation of right of occupancy with the sanction of the Revenue Officer the transferee obtains the same right as the transferor has in the property. If, however, he transfers a village without the sanction of the Revenue Officer the transferee becomes the proprietor of the village transferred to him but does not get any sir rights. The transferor by operation of law becomes an ex-proprietary tenant of the sir plot; when he loses the right to occupy the plot as the proprietor, the sir plot loses its character and it becomes tenancy land. This has been settled in a series of cases: 11 CPLR 133, 1, 8 NLR 123,2 19 NLR 26,3 26 NLR 464 at p. 48, 28 NLR 166,5 ILR (1941) Nag. 54.6

6. The plaintiff mortgagee is entitled to the foreclosure of the plots which were originally sir at the time when the mortgage was executed in his favour but which had become tenancy plots by operation of law. In 11 C.P.L.R 133 it was held that a mortgagee who is entitled to claim a decree expressly directing the sale of the mortgagor's rights in the sir land may bring those rights to sale notwithstanding the fact that the mortgagor may, by operation of law, have become occupancy tenant of that sir land. The principle enunciated in the case will be applicable to a decree for foreclosure. In 8 N.L.R 123, 11 C.P.L.R 133 was followed with approval, and a decree for foreclosure was passed in respect of the ex-proprietary cultivating rights in the sir land mentioned in the mortgage deed. In 28 N.L.R 166 the two cases cited above were followed with approval, and it was held that the mortgagee was entitled to claim a decree against what is left lot the mortgagor's rights in sir land, namely his occupancy right, and that Section 12(2) of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1920, did not prohibit the foreclosure of the occupancy right in the circumstances of the case. The mortgagee is entitled to foreclose the cultivating rights in 197.31 acres which were sir at the time the mortgage was executed but which ceased to be sir by reason of the ??? losing the right to occupy these plots as a proprietor, under the foreclosure decree in civil suit No. 48 of 1930.

7. The next ground taken was that the effect of ejectment in the two rent decrees was that the tenancy was extinguished and anything engrafted on the tenancy automatically disappeared. The plea of the plaintiff was that these two rent decrees were obtained fraudulently and collusively in order to cause loss to the mortgagee. The lower Court has upheld this plea and held that the two decrees which were obtained by Bhabhutmal against Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal were fraudulently and collusively obtained in order to deprive the mortgagee of his right under the mortgage deed dated the 22nd February 1929. The area of the sir plot was 157.31 acres. Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal were in possession of 186.37 acres, and the rental assessment was Rs. 364. There is evidence on record to prove that this land yields two crops in a year. The several khasras and jamabandis which have been filed establish it. Md. Ishaq (P.W 1) is the agent of the plaintiff. He states that the sir land of mauza Murjhad yields two crops a year and urda crop is sown in the land while the dhan crop standing and the urda crop is reaped in the month of March. Phogal (P.W 4) is the tenant of Murjhad. He states that the land yields two crops. Nathekhan (P.W 9) was the Revenue Inspector of Lalbarra Circle in which Murjhad is situate. He states that the land yields excellent summer crop and it yields ordinary winter crop and that it yields double crop. The land is valuable. He estimates the value of the land at Rs. 80 to 100 per acre.

8. Sadanlal (P.W 12) is one of the mortgagors. He states that the land yields two crops and that the value of the share of each of the brothers would be about 2 to 3 thousand rupees. In the memorandum of appeal the appellant had valued the land at Rs. 4000 inclusive of the two houses. The case was remitted to the lower Court for a finding. The District Judge gave a finding on the 27th November 1940 that the valuation was Rs. 9865-8-0. This was accepted and the plaintiff was directed to amend the memorandum of appeal and pay court-fee on that valuation. This was complied with. Thus there is no doubt that the land was very valuable. The plaintiff in paragraph 4 of the plaint stated that the crops were standing at the time the ejectment took place. This fact has not been denied by Bhabhutmal either in his pleading or in his evidence. The plaintiff alleged that Kanhaiyalal was the hawaldar and mukaddam of Bhabhutmal. Bhabhutmal, defendant No. 3, denied that Kanhaiyalal was his mukaddam but he did not dispute that he was his hawaldar. It has been proved in the case that Kanhaiyalal was realising rent from tenants on behalf of Bhabhutmal. Bent receipt books of some tenants have been filed (Exhibits P-35 to P-39) and some of the tenants, Phogal (P.W 4), Patiram (P.W 5), Suka Chaku (P.W 6), Bodi (P.W 7), and Zadya (P.W 8), who have been examined, state that Kanhaiyalal was realising rent from them on behalf of Bhabhutmal.

9. It is a curious coincidence ‘that the receipt for delivery of possession by Bhabhutmal is dated the 2nd February 1937 and there is one receipt which has been passed by Kanhaiyalal for recovery of Tent on behalf of Bhabhutmal in favour of Bodi (P.W 7) is dated the 5th February 1937. The several receipts leave no room for doubt that Kanhaiyalal was employed by Bhabhutmal and was in his service at the time the suit for recovery of rent was filed and Kanhaiyal and Sadanlal were ejected. Phogal (P.W 4) states that in 1937–1938 Kanhaiyalal had cultivated about 12 acres out of the sir land from Bhabhutmal. This would suggest that there was some kind of understanding between Bhabhutmal and Kanhaiyalal under which Kanhaiyalal was to get some benefit under the arrangement under which Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal were ejected in execution of the decrees for arrears of rent. Patiram (P.W 5), another tenant, states that Bhabhutmal gave land of 6 khandi seed capacity out of the sir to Kahaiyalal for cultivation. He was not cross-examined on this point. There is no reason why his evidence should not be accepted. Prom the evidence of Suka Chaku (P.W 6) and Zadya (P.W 8) it appears that Kanhaiyalal had been looking after the entire management of the village after he lost his right. Bhabhutmal states that he had never engaged Kanhaiyalal in his service either as his hawaldar or mukaddam or for any other purpose. He does not explain why the rents were recovered by Kanhaiyalal on his behalf and receipts were passed by him and acknowledged in the receipt books of the several tenants. He was examined after the plaintiff's witnesses were examined and he did not deny the statement made by some of the tenants that Kanhaiyalal had been given land for cultivation by him.

10. The amount of rent was small and could have been easily paid by Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal. The property was valuable and they could have made attempts to preserve it by payment of rent. They did appear once before the Naib Tahsildar and asked for time but they did not appear at the subsequent stage. Under section 24 of the C.P Tenancy Act a Revenue Officer had power to extend time for payment by four months.

11. Sadanlal, mortgagor, as P.W 12.

12. “Prior to our ejectment Bhabhutmal was saying that he would give me land of 8 khandi seed capacity and that he would give land or equal area to my brother. He had said that we should allow ourselves to be ejected and that thereafter he would give us the land again in tenancy right on the rent already fixed on it but without any premium. He had not given us any reason why he was saying so.”

13. In cross-examination he states that he was not in a position to give the year or month in which the talk took place between him and defendant no. 3, and that Bhabhutmal had told him and his brother that they should let themselves be ejected and that he would give them land later. This circumstance has not been pleaded and that detracts from his evidence though circumstantial evidence indicates the truth in his evidence. But even if that evidence is ignored the circumstances of the case leave no room for doubt that there was some understanding between Bhabhutmal, the landlord and his tenants Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal that they should allow themselves to be ejected in execution of the decrees for arrears of rent.

14. Fraud cannot be directly proved but has to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties. Kanhaiyalal has not been examined as a witness. The learned counsel for the appellants strenuously contended that it was not his duty to examine Kanhaiyalal. Kanhaiyalal was working for Bhabhutmal and if there was no secret understanding between him and Kanhaiyalal he would have been an important witness to explain why he did not pay up the small decretal amount or arrange to preserve his tenancy.

15. Bhabhutmal admits that no suit for rent was filed against any tenant other than Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal during the 11th January 1936 to the 16th April 1936.

16. As Kanhaiyalal was serving Bhabhutmal he would not have sued Kanhaiyalal for recovery of rent or if he did so he would have accommodated him by granting him time for payment and would not have executed the decree by ejectment. Similarly Kanhaiyalal could have very easily obtained concession in the matter of payment of the decretal amount. The fact that Bhabhutmal sued Kanhaiyalal for arrears of rent-a small sum-and that Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal made no attempt to save their property would suggest that there was some secret understanding that they would be benefited as a result of the ejectment proceedings. Bhabhutmal executes a sale deed in favour of his minor daughter-in-law of the property in suit for a nominal consideration and gives a portion of the sir land to Kanhaiyalal for cultivation.

17. The lower Court found that the decrees for arrears of rent and subsequent ejectment proceedings were obtained by Bhabhutmal fraudulently and collusively in order to deprive the mortgagee of the benefit of his security. The finding is amply supported by the evidence and the probabilities in the case and is upheld.

18. A distinction has to be drawn between 41 voluntary act by which a tenant puts an end to his tenancy and an involuntary act by which the tenancy ceases by operation of law. Where a tenant makes a sub-lease or a mortgage and subsequently surrenders, the surrender does not affect the subordinate rights which he creates; but if the tenancy is extinguished by operation of law then anything engrafted on the tenancy automatically disappears.

19. In 11 C.P.L.R 57 it was held that in the case of a sub-lease granted by a tenant without the consent of his landlord the determination of the tenancy determines also the subtenancy. If however the sub-lease be legally granted a voluntary surrender by the tenant cannot operate to prejudice the rights of the sub-lessee.

20. In 2 N.L.R 1708 it was held that where a valid mortgage on his holding has been effected by an absolute occupancy tenant a voluntary surrender on the part of the latter cannot operate to prejudice the rights of the mortgagee.

21. In 10 N.L.R 1299 it was held that if a tenant allows a decree for rent to be passed in respect of such a holding on which no arrear is due, the decree and the subsequent order for ejectment are binding on the tenant, but cannot affect a mortgagee whose mortgage is not void as against the landlord, and that such a decree cannot be regarded in the same light as a forfeiture, but stands on the same footing as voluntary surrender.

22. In 14 N.L.R 10710 Mittra A.J.C drew a distinction between a voluntary surrender and a statutory surrender under S. 35(4) and quoted a passage from (1826) 2 Ch. D. 23511 which runs thus:

“It is a rule of law that if there is a lessee and he has created an under lease or any other legal interest, if the lease is forfeited, then the under lessee or the person who claims under the lessee loses his estate as well as the lessee himself; but if the lessee surrenders, he cannot by his own voluntary act in surrendering prejudice the estate of under-lessee or the person who claims under him.”

23. This principle is embodied in Section 115 of the Transfer of Property Act. Though the section is not applicable to agricultural tenancies yet the principle embodied in the section is applicable to agricultural tenancies.

24. In 28 N.L.R 9312 it was held that any transfer engrafted on the tenant right whether by way of mortgage or sub-lease comes to an end when the tenant, right is itself determined by operation of law.

25. In 32 Cal. 28513 at p. 286 it was observed:

“… if the proceedings in the rent decree and the execution sale were bona fide…. the plaintiff can certainly get no relief against either defendant. His rights are entirely gone. This is admitted by the learned pleader for the appellant. On the other hand, if the proceedings were fraudulent and collusive, we think that the plaintiff has a right to some relief. As against the defendant second party, his rights are either to be paid off or to bring the mortgage property to sale in execution of the mortgage lien; and it appears to us that if the defendant first party entered into collusive proceedings with the defendant second party and caused a transfer of the holding to him, then the plaintiff's mortgage lien should not be held to be destroyed, but should be held to continue to subsist upon the land, although it has now passed to the hand of the defendant first party.”

26. These observations have been followed with approval in 10 N.L.R 129 and 13 N.L.R 1914 at p. 24 and have our respectful concurrence.

27. Applying the decision to the present case we hold that the ejectment of Kanhaiyalal and Sadanlal in execution of decrees for arrears of rent were fraudulently and collusively obtained and cannot affect the right of the plaintiff to enforce the mortgage as against the plots which have passed into the hands of defendants 3 and 4. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 150

D.S/D.H

28. Appeal dismissed.