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Jamila Khatun v. Kshetra Mohan Biswas

Calcutta High Court
Jul 30, 1946
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was brought by the Hindu inhabitants of Hazra-Para and Hengumia-Para (described as two wards of the village Bania-chong) seeking a declaration of their right to cremate the bodies of their adult dead in two specified plots and to bury deceased infants in those plots. Ancillary reliefs were also claimed. The Plaintiffs pleaded immemorial user and relied on both a presumed (lost) grant and customary right as bases for relief.

The Defendants did not wholly deny the asserted user; one Defendant's written statement admitted user since Bengali year 1329, and certain defense witnesses likewise admitted user. The Defendants sought to limit the period of user and to establish that it was permissive rather than as of right.

The trial Court and the lower Appellate Court both entered decrees for the Plaintiffs. The trial Court found continuous, public, and as-of-right exercise of the burial/cremation rights for at least 45 years and grounded its decree on both a lost grant and custom. The lower Appellate Court concurred as to facts but rested its decision solely on a presumption of a lost grant and did not consider custom.

The Defendants appealed to the present Court, and Mr. Chatterjee argued, inter alia, that a lost grant could not legally be presumed in favor of an indeterminate body such as "the inhabitants" of a place.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the presumption of a lost grant can support a declaration of a right when the purported grantee is an indeterminate body described as "the inhabitants" of a place.
  2. Whether, on the facts found by the lower Courts, a customary right to cremate and bury on the two specified plots existed and was reasonable.
  3. Whether the matter should be remanded to the lower Appellate Court for further consideration of custom, given that the Appellate Court decided on the lost-grant basis only.
  4. Whether the form of the decree (including a grant of possession for the purpose of cremation and burial) was erroneous or misleading.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments (as represented by Mr. Chatterjee)

  • The lower Appellate Court erred in relying on a presumption of a lost grant because a grant could not legally be made in favour of the "inhabitants" of a place (an indeterminate body).
  • It would be unreasonable to permit invasion of another's land to cremate or bury dead bodies.
  • The evidence showed the right was not exercised by all Hindu inhabitants of the two Paras nor on all occasions (for example, the Gopes had their own cremation ground), undermining the existence of a customary local right.
  • A particular sentence in the evidence of P.W.1 ("We are not cremating dead bodies in the disputed land after the purchase of Kalikishore Dhar.") was relied upon to argue that the custom had been discontinued after a purchase by Kalikishore Dhar.
  • The decree granting possession (even if limited) might be misleading because it could be read as transferring ownership rather than a limited right to use for cremation/burial.

Plaintiffs' Contentions (as presented in the pleadings and findings)

  • The Plaintiffs asserted immemorial user and claimed rights on the basis of a presumed lost grant and also as a custom permitting cremation of adult dead and burial of infant dead in the two specified plots.
  • The trial Court and the Appellate Court found, on the evidence, that the right had been exercised continuously, publicly and as of right for at least 45 years.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Asrabulla v. Kiamat-ulla Haji Choudhury The proposition that a presumption of a lost grant cannot be applied where no valid grantee capable of taking a grant exists (e.g., an indeterminate body such as "the inhabitants"). The Court relied on this Division Bench decision to hold that a lost-grant presumption cannot be used to create rights in favour of an indeterminate class like "the inhabitants" and therefore the lower Appellate Court's reliance on lost grant was erroneous.
Abdul Hosain v. Sadai Gobinda Deb Demonstrates that where a right claimed by a fluctuating body could not be supported by a lost grant, an appellate court may nevertheless uphold the decree on the basis of custom from the findings already recorded. The Court followed the course adopted in that case: although the lost-grant basis was invalid for an indeterminate grantee, the decree could be sustained on the basis of custom if the facts found supported it, avoiding remand.
Jogesh Chandra Roy v. Niranjan De Illustrates that when a right of cremation in lands is established, a land-owner's claim for khas possession may be refused; it shows the practical effect when cremation rights are recognized. The Court noted the case to observe that the present decree, while different in posture, produced the same practical effect as in that case (i.e., owner's claim for possession may be ineffectual in face of an established right of cremation). This supported the conclusion that the decree did not give Plaintiffs more than they were entitled to.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first analysed the doctrine of lost grant. It explained that the doctrine is a legal fiction applied where a right has been exercised for a long period to the detriment of another's rights: the law presumes that the best legal beginning for that user is a grant which has since been lost. However, the presumption is inapplicable where "it is clear that no grant could legally be made at all."

Applying that principle, the Court concluded that a grant cannot be presumed in favour of the "inhabitants" of a place because such a grantee is indeterminate and unascertainable; a valid grant requires a grantee capable of taking. The Court relied on Asrabulla v. Kiamat-ulla Haji Choudhury for this proposition and held that the lower Appellate Court was wrong to base its decision solely on a lost-grant presumption.

The Court then turned to whether it should remand the matter to the lower Appellate Court to decide the question of custom. It observed that the trial Court had found a customary right as well but the Appellate Court had not considered it. The Court determined that remand was unnecessary because:

  • The trial Court's findings and the Appellate Court's findings were elaborate and established the factual matrix.
  • The three certainties required for a valid custom (certain land, definite nature of the right, and identifiable persons whose rights are derogated) were present: the two plots are precisely described, the nature of the right is precisely defined, and the persons derogated are named.
  • The period of exercise—found by the Courts below to be at least 45 years—was sufficient to support the growth of a custom; the Court also noted evidence (including admissions from defense witnesses) showing at least 25 years of existence.
  • Reasonableness was assessed in context: the plots were the banks of an old, abandoned tank, historically not brought under actual possession and allowed to run wild; use for cremation or burial in such circumstances was not an unreasonable invasion of another's property because any owner had not treated the banks as an asset in active possession.
  • Non-universality of practice did not negate custom: a custom need not be universal or compulsorily followed on every occasion; the existence of alternate cremation grounds for some groups (e.g., the Gopes) did not defeat the customary right.
  • A disputed sentence in P.W.1's evidence relied on by the Defendants was interpreted as a denial of the defence's assertion (i.e., P.W.1 denied that cremation commenced only after a particular purchase) and thus did not establish discontinuance of the custom.
  • After facts have been found, the question of the existence or reasonableness of a custom is a question of law, and therefore appropriate for decision in a second appeal; the Court found the evidence sufficient to support a customary right possessing necessary incidents.

On the decree's form, the Court examined the trial Court's declaration of the Plaintiffs' right and its provision that the Plaintiffs "will get possession in the disputed land ... for the purpose of cremating and burying their dead bodies therein." The Court concluded that the reservation and qualification in the decree avoided misleading implications of ownership: the Plaintiffs were given a right to exercise the customary use throughout the two plots, but title remained with the Defendants. Any use by the owner that would interfere with Plaintiffs' right would be impermissible.

The Court also referenced Jogesh Chandra Roy v. Niranjan De to show the consistent practical effect where cremation rights are recognized against landowner's claims for possession.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The Court dismissed the appeal. It held that the lower Appellate Court was wrong to rely on a presumption of a lost grant in favour of an indeterminate body ("the inhabitants"), but that the decree in favour of the Plaintiffs could and should be sustained on the basis of a customary right established by the facts.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The Plaintiffs' decree is upheld on the basis of a valid customary right to cremate adult dead and to bury infants in the two specified plots; the right is supported by at least 45 years of exercise and the three certainties of a custom.
  • The Plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the disputed land for the specific purpose of cremating and burying their dead, but this does not amount to transfer of ownership; title remains with the Defendants.
  • No order as to costs was made against the Defendants because they had reasonable grounds to bring the appeal.

Broader implications: The Court did not purport to create any new general precedent beyond applying established principles (including those in the cases it cited). It followed prior authority in holding that a lost-grant presumption cannot operate in favour of an indeterminate body and that a customary right, once factually established, can be upheld in a second appeal as a question of law.

End of summary — composed strictly from the information contained in the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

1. The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by the Hindu inhabitants of Hazra-Para and Hengumia-Para, which appeared to be two wards of a village called Bania-chong, for a declaration of their title to cremate the bodies Of their adult dead in the two plots of land mentioned in the schedule to the plaint and, in the case of deceased infants, to bury the dead bodies; there. Certain ancillary reliefs were also asked for. As usual in suits of this kind, after pleading immemorial user, the Plaintiffs based their right both on a presumed grant and custom, as also several other matters less precisely defined.

2. The defence did not altogether deny the user of the land as alleged by the Plaintiffs. It was admitted in the written statement of one of the Defendants that such user had been going on since the Bengali year 1329. Further admissions came from the witnesses called by the Defendants themselves. The sole attempt of the Defendants seems to have been to reduce the; period of user and to establish that it had been permissive. Both the Courts below have decreed the Plaintiffs' suit. They have found concurrently that the Hindu inhabitants of the two Paras have been exercising the right of burial and cremation on the two plots of land for at least the last 45 years continuously, publicly and as of right, without the permission of the Owners of the plots. The trial Court on that finding held that the right claimed by the Plaintiffs must be declared on the basis of both a lost grant and custom. The lower Appellate Court, however, considered that the basis of a lost grant was quite sufficient and it was not necessary to consider the question of the acquisition of the right by custom.

3. In the present appeal on behalf of the Defendant it has been contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the lower Appellate Court was in error in holding that the right claim-ed by the Plaintiffs could be declared in their favour on the basis of a presumption of a lost grant. He contended that there could not be a grant in favour of the inhabitants of a certain place.

4. This contention, in my view, is plainly right. The principle underlying the doctrine of lost grant is that when a certain right is found to have been exercised for a long period of time without interruption to the derogation of the right of someone else, the law, instead of disturbing such possession, supposes for it the best beginning that the law can give. It is, therefore, presumed as a kind of fiction that although no legal origin of the user which has been established as a fact can directly be proved; it may legally be presumed that the origin lay in a grant made, but since it was made, lost. It is true that when the facts attract the doctrine of a lost grant, it is not permissible to give evidence to prove that such grant was never made, but the presumption cannot be drawn when it is clear that no grant could legally be made at all. In order that there could be a grant, it is necessary that there must have been a grantee capable of taking. Clearly the inhabitants of the village, who are an indeterminate and unascertainable body of persons, could not be grantees of any kind. This has been laid down in cases too numerous to mention, both in England and in India. It is sufficient for me to refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Asrabulla v. Kiamat-ulla Haji Choudhury(1).

5. The ground upon which the lower Appellate Court based its decision being an erroneous one, the next question is whether I should remand the case for the purpose of a re-hearing of the appear on the question of custom. As I have stated already, the trial Court found in favour of the Plaintiffs on the ground of custom as well, but the lower Appellate Court did not consider this question at all. I think, however, that having regard to the elaborate character of the findings arrived at and recorded by both the Courts below it is not necessary for me to order remand of the appeal; on the other hand, it would be legitimate for me to follow the course which Mr. Justice jack followed in the case of Abdul Hosain v. Sadai Gobinda Deb(2), a case which was cited by Mr. Chatterjee himself. In that case too, the learned Judge held that the right there claimed by a fluctuating body of persons could not be supported on the basis of a lost grant. Nevertheless; he upheld the decree which had been made by the Court of Appeal below on the basis of a custom from the findings already recorded in the judgment under appeal.

6. In the present case, the two plots of land, in respect of which the custom is claimed to have been exercised, are precisely described. The nature of the right said to have been exercised is defined with equal precision. The persons, in the derogation of whose rights custom was exercised, are also certain and named. The three certainties which a valid custom requires are, therefore, all present. As regards the period over which the right has been exercised, the finding of the Courts below is that it has been exercised at least for the space of 45 years. That period is quite sufficient to support the growth of a custom and it is not necessary to go further back in order to find immemorial user.

7. There remains, however, the question of reasonableness. Mr. Chatterjee argued with some plausibility that it could not be reasonable to invade somebody else's land and cremate or bury dead bodies there. Stated broadly in that fashion, that proposition would appear to be correct. But one has to judge the present case in the context of its own facts. The finding here is that the two plots of land are situated on two banks of an ancient tank which was excavated by someone at some date which is unknown. The banks of that tank, although they may have belonged to some one; were never brought under actual possession and were allowed to run wild and any one who chose might cut and remove the grass that grew thereon. Here was; apparently one of those old abandoned tanks, of which one sees so many in Bengal, and the abandoned banks of an abandoned tank. With respect to lands of this character, it cannot be said that if it is used for the purpose of cremating the dead bodies of the people of the locality, or for the burial of their dead infants, the custom would be unreasonable. There would really be no invasion of the right of property of any one, because whoever the real owner might be, did not obviously treat the property as an asset of his in any real sense.

8. Mr. Chatterjee also contended that the evidence showed that the right was not exercised by all the Hindu inhabitants of the two Paras, nor by them on all occasions. He referred specifically to the evidence to the effect that the Gopes of the place had their own cremation ground. He referred also to the fact that there is some evidence to the effect that only the bodies of those persons were burnt or cremated in the two plots of land of whom no memorial was desired to be kept. It is only necessary to point out with regard to this contention that a custom need not be universal nor compulsory. The fact that the people of a locality have and have enjoyed a custom does not mean that they are bound to exercise and follow it on every possible occasion and that if they do not do so on some occasions, the existence of the custom is negatived. In my opinion, the objections raised by Mr. Chatterjee are without substance.

9. Mr. Chatterjee also referred to a sentence occurring in the evidence of P.W 1 which reads as follows:

“We are not cremating dead bodies in the disputed land after the purchase of Kalikishore Dhar.”

10. Basing himself on this sentence of the evidence. Mr. Chatterjee contended that on the Plaintiffs' own admission the custom had been discontinued since the lands were purchased by Kalikishore Dhar. On a reference to the evidence, however, it appears that the sentence does not bear the meaning which Mr. Chatterjee would attribute to it. It was stated in the written statement of one of the Defendants that the practice of cremation and burial had commenced only after the purchase by Kalikishore Dhar. The sentence which I have quoted is obviously an answer to a question put to the witness with reference to that statement of the defence. He was asked whether it was not a fact that the people of the locality had been cremating their dead bodies only since the purchase by Kalikishore Dhar and he replied in the negative.

11. With regard to this matter, I have only to add that it is quite futile to contend at this time of the day that the custom of cremation and burial is not one of a fairly ancient origin or that its exercise has been irregular and spasmodic. As both the Courts below have pointed out in their judgments, there is evidence coming from the side of the Defendants themselves that the custom has been in existence for at least 25 years. The admission contained in the statement has already been referred to.

12. On the findings which I have above referred to, it is, in my opinion, unnecessary to remand the appeal to the lower Appellate Court for a fresh finding on custom. As was pointed out in the decision of the Division Bench to which I have already referred, namely, the case of Asrabulla v. Kiamatulla Haji Choudhury after the facts have been found, a question of the existence or reasonableness of the custom is a question of law. It cannot, therefore, be improper to decide the question of law in second appeal. In my view, the evidence recorded by the Court below are quite sufficient to support their decree on the basis of a customary right, possessing all the incidents necessary to make it valid.

13. Mr. Chatterjee, in the last place, complained of the form of the decree made by the trial Court.

14. The decree, after declaring the right of the Plaintiffs, goes on to say that they will get possession in the disputed land as shown in the Commissioner's map for the purpose of cremating and burying their dead bodies therein. Mr. Chatterjee contended that even if the Plaintiffs were given a decree as respects the rights claimed by them, they would not thereby become owners of the two plots of land and a decree for possession in their favour was erroneous, or, at any rate, might prove misleading. I think, the Courts below have done all that was necessary to avoid a misleading impression by qualifying the order with the reservation that the possession of the Plaintiffs would be only for the purpose of cremating and burying dead bodies therein. Since the Plaintiffs were given a decree with regard to the entirety of the two plots of land, they were thereby declared entitled to exercise the right in every inch of the land. That being so, although the title of the land would remain with the Defendants, any user by them which would interfere with the exercise of the Plaintiffs' right, wherever they might choose to exercise it within the two plots, would be impossible. In the circumstances, I do not think that the decree gives the Plaintiffs anything more than they were entitled to. It is useful to notice that in the case of Jogesh Chandra Roy v. Niranjan De(3) the owner of certain lands sued for khas possession against the persons who claimed a right of cremation therein and such right having been established, the owner's claim for khas possession was refused. The present case is a converse one, but the effect is obviously the same.

15. For the reasons given above, the appeal fails and is dismissed. As, however, the Defendants had every reason to come up to this Court, I make no order as to costs against them.