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Capt. G. Sarker & Anr. v. Nripendra Nath Dhar & Ors. Opp. Parties.

Calcutta High Court
Apr 15, 1948
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Six persons, with an endorsement of consent by the Collector of Hooghly, instituted a trust action under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code as Trust Suit No. 7 of 1947 in the Court of the District Judge at Hooghly; the suit was later transferred to Howrah and renumbered Trust Suit No. 11 of 1947 in the Court of the District Judge at Howrah.

The suit was brought against two defendants, Capt. G. Sarkar (Defendant No. 1) and his wife Mrs. Mary Alice Cunningham Sarkar (Defendant No. 2), concerning a house in the town of Hooghly. The plaintiffs' case alleged that the house belonged to Miss Alice Raikes, who died in 1929 having executed a Will in 1927. The Will appointed the defendants as executors; Defendant No. 1 took probate.

The Will contained directions to pay maintenance to the adopted daughter, Alice Hiranmay Raikes, if she married with the consent and approval of the testatrix or her executors, or if she led a chaste life in the event she remained unmarried. Upon failure of that disposition the Will provided that the properties would be appropriated and held in trust for certain charitable objects (Hindu, Moslem and Christian Girls Schools and similar objects).

The plaintiffs alleged that Alice Hiranmay Raikes did not satisfy the conditions of the Will and, therefore, the house had become the subject-matter of a public trust with Defendant No. 1 acting as trustee. The plaintiffs prayed for removal of Defendant No. 1 from the trust, framing of a scheme, and an account against Defendant No. 1.

The Collector of Hooghly had endorsed a written consent on the plaint providing consent "to the filing of this suit under Sec. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code" and stating the consent was given by virtue of powers conferred by "see. 96" (as endorsed on the plaint).

It was admitted in the proceedings below and before the court rendering this opinion that the Local Government had not, prior to that consent, given sanction to the Collector to give consent to the institution of this particular suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit was maintainable when the Collector of Hooghly had given written consent on the plaint but the Local Government had not previously sanctioned the Collector to give consent in respect of that particular suit, in view of Section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether a general notification (Notification No. 3592 L.R dated 15 April 1918) purporting to authorize Collectors and Deputy Commissioners to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General (outside specified Presidency towns and districts) obviated the need for a prior, specific sanction of the Local Government for the institution of this particular suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants raised a preliminary issue that the suit was not maintainable because the requirements of Section 93 of the Civil Procedure Code had not been satisfied.
  • It was contended (as recounted from the Privy Council argument in Premnarain) that where an officer (such as the Legal Remembrancer) or the Collector purports to exercise the powers conferred by Sections 91 and 92, a previous sanction of the Local Government for that particular suit is necessary; absence of such sanction renders the institution of the suit incompetent.

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs produced a general notification (Notification No. 3592 L.R dated 15 April 1918, Calcutta Gazette 1918 Part I p.650) which declared that, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 93 of the Code, the Governor in Council sanctioned the exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 91 and 92 upon the Advocate-General by all the Collectors and Deputy Commissioners in certain divisions and districts within the limits of their respective districts.
  • The position accepted by the learned District Judge was that, in view of that general notification, the Collector of Hooghly was competent to give the written consent endorsed on the plaint and therefore the suit was maintainable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Premnarain v. Ramcharan (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) The necessity of a previous sanction of the Local Government under Section 93 of the Code before a Collector or any officer appointed by the Local Government can exercise the powers conferred by Sections 91 and 92 in respect of a particular suit; that the phrase "with the previous sanction of the Local Government" qualifies both the Collector and any appointed officer, and that no suit outside the Presidency town may be brought without such previous sanction. The court adopted the construction in Premnarain as binding. It relied on Premnarain to hold that, because no previous sanction of the Local Government had been obtained in the present case, the requirements of the relevant statutory provision had not been complied with and the suit was incompetent.
Gulsar Lal v. The Collector of Etwah This earlier Board decision was distinguished on the facts in Premnarain; passages in that judgment were noted as supporting the argument that prior sanction is necessary, but the earlier case did not decide the exact point arising in Premnarain. The opinion records that Premnarain distinguished Gulsar Lal and observed that the point in issue had not been decided in Gulsar Lal; the court therefore followed the reasoning in Premnarain rather than treating Gulsar Lal as dispositive.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began its analysis by examining Section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it reads: "The powers conferred by secs. 91 and 92 on the Advocate General may, outside the Presidency towns be, with the previous sanction of the Local Government exercised also by the Collector or by such officer as the Local Government may appoint in this behalf."

The court emphasized that the qualifying phrase "with the previous sanction of the Local Government" attaches to both the words "Collector" and "the Officer as may be appointed by the Local Government to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General." On that textual basis the court concluded that a prior, specific sanction by the Local Government is required whenever the Collector or an appointed officer is to exercise the powers otherwise vested in the Advocate-General for a particular suit.

The court then adopted and applied the construction given to Section 93 by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Premnarain v. Ramcharan. That decision was summarized and quoted in some detail: the Privy Council held that no suit like the present, being one outside the Presidency town, may be brought without the previous sanction of the Local Government whether by the Collector or by an officer appointed for that purpose; and that the previous sanction is necessary whether the Collector or the appointed officer chooses to bring a suit himself or gives his consent to two or more persons to institute it.

The court distilled from Premnarain the following propositions (as set out in the opinion):

  1. Section 92 permits the Advocate-General to institute suits in respect of charitable trusts and to give sanction to two or more persons to institute such suits.
  2. Outside Presidency towns the Local Government may authorize the Collector to exercise the Advocate-General's powers, but that authorization must take the form of a previous sanction authorizing the Collector to exercise those powers in respect of the particular suit if the Collector himself files it.
  3. Outside Presidency towns the Local Government may appoint an officer other than the Collector to exercise those powers; in that instance both an appointment and a previous sanction (for that particular suit) are necessary when that officer chooses to file the suit himself.
  4. Where the Collector or appointed officer does not choose to file the suit but gives written consent to two or more persons interested to institute the suit under Section 92, the Collector or appointed officer must have obtained the previous sanction of the Local Government authorizing him to give consent to the institution of that particular suit.

Applying that construction to the facts at hand, the court observed (explicitly in the opinion) that the Local Government had not given the required previous sanction to the Collector in respect of this particular suit. On that ground the court concluded (using the language of the opinion) that "Sec. 90 of the Civil Procedure Code has not been complied with" (as stated in the text of the judgment) and that the defendants' contention must be upheld.

Holding and Implications

THE RULE IS MADE ABSOLUTE AND THE SUIT IS DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and case-specific implications explicitly stated in the opinion:

  • The suit instituted as Trust Suit No. 7 of 1947 (transferred and renumbered as Trust Suit No. 11 of 1947) was dismissed on the ground that the statutory requirement of prior sanction (as construed) had not been complied with.
  • Each party will bear their respective costs of the lower Court.
  • The Opposite Parties were ordered to pay to the Petitioners the costs of the Rule, the hearing-fee being assessed at two gold mohurs.

The court expressly applied and treated the construction given in Premnarain v. Ramcharan as binding; the decision turned on the application of that existing construction to the present facts (absence of prior sanction by the Local Government). The opinion does not purport to lay down a new generalized rule beyond adopting the Premnarain construction and applying it to these facts.

Judgment text signed: N.D.R

Show all summary ...

1. Six persons with the consent of the Collector of Hooghly instituted this suit being Trust Suit No. 7 of 1947 of the Court of the District Judge at Hooghly under Sec. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was subsequently transferred to Howrah and was numbered as Trust Suit No. 11 of 1947 of the Court of the District Judge at Howrah. It was filed against two persons Capt. G. Sarkar and his wife Mrs. Mary Alice Cunningham Sarkar. The subject-matter of the suit is a house situate in the town of Hooghly. The Plaintiffs' case is that it belonged to one Miss Alice Raikes who died in 1929, after having executed a Will in the year 1927. By the Will she appointed Defendants as executors but Defendant No. 1 Capt. G. Sarkar only took probate. The directions in the Will were that the executors were to pay maintenance to her adopted daughter Alice Hiranmay Raikes if the latter married with the consent and approval of the testatrix or the consent and approval of her executors or if she led a chaste life in the event of her choosing to remain unmarried; that in the case of failure of the said disposition her properties would be appropriated and held in trust for the purpose and benefit of Hindu, Moslem and Christian Girls Schools and any other similar object. The case of the Plaintiffs further is that Alice Hiranmay Raikes did not comply with the aforesaid conditions as laid down in the Will with the result that the house in question is now the subject-matter of a public trust and that Defendant No. 1 is the trustee. The prayers are for the removal of Defendant No. 1 from the trust, for the framing of a scheme and for accounts against Defendant No. 1. We have already stated that this suit was instituted with the consent of the Collector of Hooghly. That consent was endorsed by the Collector of Hooghly on the plaint in the following manner:—

“Consent to the filing of this suit under Sec. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code is given by me in writing to the Plaintiffs by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by the provisions of see. 96.”

2. It is admitted before us,— and that position is also quite clear from the proceedings in the lower Court,— that the Local Government did not, previous to the said consent of the Collector of Hooghly, give sanction to the Collector to give consent to the institutions of this particular suit.

3. Under these circumstances, the Defendants raised a preliminary issue before the trial Court. They said that the suit was not maintainable inasmuch as the terms of Sec. 93 of the Civil Procedure Code had not been complied with. Before the learned District Judge a general notification was produced by the Plaintiffs, namely, Notification No. 3592 L.R dated the 15th of April, 1918, published in the Calcutta Gazette of 1918, Part I, page 650. The Notification runs thus:

“In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) the Governor in Council is pleased hereby to sanction the exercise of the powers conferred by secs. 91 and 92 of that Code upon the Advocate-General by all the Collectors and Deputy Commissioners in the Presidency Division (excluding the town of Calcutta), Burdwan Division and tie District of Darjeeling within the limits of their respective districts.”

4. The learned District Judge held that in view of this general notification the consent given by the Collector of Hooghly to the filing of this suit was good in law. It appears from the order of the learned District Judge that the case of Premnarain v. Ramcharan(1) was cited before him. The learned Judge made the following observations in relation to that case.

“As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Premnarain v. Ramcharan there must be under see. 93 of the Code, a previous sanction of the Local Government to the institution of every such suit whether brought by the Collector or by an officer appointed by the local Government to exercise the powers of the Advocate General or by two or more persons with consent in writing of such Collector or Officer”.

5. Then he referred to the consent of the Collector as endorsed on the plaint. Thereafter he referred to the aforesaid notification and came to the conclusion that the Collector was competent to give consent to the filing of the suit in question. Against this order Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 moved this Court and obtained this Rule under Sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. We do not think that the learned District Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that Sec. 93 had been complied with that section runs as follows:—

“The powers conferred by secs. 91 and 92 on the Advocate General may, outside the Presidency towns be, with the previous sanction of the Local Government exercised also by the Collector or by such officer as the Local Government may appoint in this behalf.”

6. The phrase “with the previous sanction of the Local Government” qualifies both the words “Collector” and “the Officer as may be appointed by the Local Government to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General.” In Premnarain's case the Legal Remembrancer was the Officer who had been appointed by the Local Government under Sec. 93 to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General. With his sanction the suit was instituted by the persons who were interested in the trust. The Legal Remembrancer did not, however, obtain the previous sanction of the Local Government to the filing of that particular suit. In these circumstances, the Defendants who were the Appellants before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council raised the question as to whether the suit had been properly instituted. Mr. Raikes who appeared for the Defendants contended that under Sec. 93 the Legal Remembrancer must have the previous sanction of the Local Government in such case before he sanctions the suit and that contention of Mr. Raikes was accepted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. After distinguishing on the facts the earlier decision of that Board given in the case of Gulsar Lal v. The Collector of Etwah(2), Sir Lancelot Sanderson proceeded to observe as follows:—

“It is clear, therefore, that the point which now arises was not decided in that case. There are, however passages in the judgment which support the argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellant-Defendant.

7. Lord Blanesburgh delivered the judgment of the Board and when delaying with the construction of Sec. 93 of the Code he said as follows:—

“The effect of that section as it seems to the Board is that no suit like the present, being one outside the Presidency town, may be brought without the previous sanction of the Local Government, whether by the Collector or by any officer whom that Government may appoint for the purpose; so that the fact that the Legal Remembrancer is in the United Provinces invested as a rule with the duties elsewhere discharged by the Advocate General in this behalf is no reason why for the purposes off a particular suit the Local Government may not appoint the Collector or any other officer to prosecute it. The fact that there must be a previous sanction by the Local Government to every suit makes it impossible that two suits by separate officials will ever be concurrently instituted. Accordingly no inconvenience results from this construction of the section”.

Their Lordships agree with and adopt the construction upon Sec. 93 in the abovementioned case. In their Lordships' opinion sec, 93 provides for two distinct matters, the appointment of an officer to exercise the powers conferred by secs. 91 and 92 on the Advocate-General, and the previous sanction of the Local Government to the exercise of such power….”

8. Further on Sir Lancelot Sanderson made the following observation:—

“It is clear however that having regard to the terms of Sec. 93, the previous sanction of the Local Government is necessary, whether the suit is instituted by a Collector or by an officer appointed by the Local Government, or whether the suit is instituted by two or more persons with the consent in writing of such Collector or officer.

For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion, that the point relied upon by the Appellant-Defendant is a good one and that, in as much as the previous sanction of the Local Government to the suit had not been obtained, the objection to the competence of the suit must be uphold”.

9. In view of the decision given by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Premnarain's case the position seems to us to be as follows: (1) Sec. 92 deals with the powers of the Advocate-General. He can himself institute a suit in respect of a trust created for purposes of a charitable and religious nature and ask for any one of the reliefs mentioned in Sec. 92 and he can give sanction to two or more persons having an interest in the trust to institute a suit of that nature; (2) that outside the Presidency Towns the Collector can be authorised by the Local Government to exercise the powers — conferred upon the Advocate-General by Sec. 92 of the Code but that the authority must be conferred by a previous sanction authorising the Collector to exercise those powers in respect of that particular suit when he himself chooses to file the suit; (3) that outside the Presidency Towns the Local Government may appoint any officer other than the Collector to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General, but in that case also a previous sanction to the exercise of those powers by him in respect of that particular suit must also be given by the Local Government where that officer chooses to file the suit himself, that is to say, in the case of an officer other than the Collector who chooses to file the suit two things are necessary, (1) an appointment and (2) previous sanction of the Local Government entitling that officer to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General in that particular suit. (4) When the Collector or the officer appointed under Sec. 93 as the case may be, dues not choose to file the suit himself but gives his consent to the institution of a suit under Sec. 92 to two or more persons interested in the trust, the Collector or the officer, so appointed, must obtain the previous sanction of the Local Government authorising him to give consent to the institution of that particular suit.

10. The construction put upon Sec. 93 in Premnarain's case is binding on us and that construction is, as we have already stated, that the Collector of a District can exercise the powers of an Advocate-General given under Sec. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but in order that the Collector may be competent to exercise those powers it is necessary that he should act with the previous sanction of the Local Government authorising him to exercise those powers in respect of that particular suit. Inasmuch as no such previous sanction of the Local Government was given to the Collector in the case before us, we hold that Sec. 90 of the Civil Procedure Code has not been complied with and the contention of the Defendants Petitioners before us must be upheld.

11. The result is that this Rule is made absolute and the suit is dismissed on the ground we have stated above. Each party will bear their respective costs of the lower Court. The Opposite Parties must, however, pay to the Petitioners the costs of this Rule,— hearing-fee being assessed at two gold mohurs.

N.D.R