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Arun Prokash Boral v. Tulsi Charan Bose
Opinion Summary — Suit for Specific Performance (agreement dated 11 September 1946)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff sued the defendant for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 11 September 1946, alternatively seeking Rs. 10,000 as damages, an enquiry into damages, refund of a deposit of Rs. 500 with interest, and an enquiry as to title. The plaintiff alleges payment of Rs. 501 as earnest/part payment and that the defendant failed to take proper steps to eject a tenant and give vacant possession as stipulated in the agreement, which required vacant possession and sale free from encumbrances. The plaintiff pleaded readiness and willingness to perform and sought specific performance, compensation (claimed at Rs. 7,000) and a deduction from price for mortgage dues. The suit was filed on 3 April 1947.
The defendant filed a written statement on 28 May 1947, asserting that he had taken all possible steps for ejectment, that clause 6 fixed a six‑month period within which the sale was to be completed, that the agreement became incapable of performance within that period, and that he cancelled the agreement about 10 March 1947, returning Rs. 601 and settled costs of Rs. 64 as per clause 11. The defendant denied liability for compensation and stated that the subsisting mortgage had increased to Rs. 33,000, making specific performance inequitable.
The Court framed the following issues for determination (as numbered in the opinion): whether the suit is misconceived by reason of clauses 6 and 13; whether the defendant wrongfully failed to take steps to eject tenants; whether the agreement became impossible of performance within the time in clause 6; whether the defendant's repudiation on 10 March 1947 was wrongful; whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform; whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance (with or without compensation); and what reliefs the parties are entitled to.
Legal Issues Presented
- Is the suit misconceived by reason of clauses 6 and 13 of the agreement?
- Has the defendant wrongfully failed and neglected to take proper steps for the ejectment of the tenants for giving vacant possession?
- Has the agreement become impossible of performance within the time stipulated in clause 6 of the agreement?
- Was the defendant's repudiation of 10th March 1947 wrongful?
- Was the plaintiff ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?
- a) Is the plaintiff entitled to specific performance of the agreement? b) Is the plaintiff entitled to specific performance with compensation and if so what compensation?
- To what reliefs are the parties entitled?
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- Reliance on clauses 6 and 13 of the agreement: clause 6 fixed completion "within six months" and clause 13 permitted specific performance only after title approval; the defendant contended that because the contract could not be performed within six months time was of the essence and the agreement came to an end.
- The defendant asserted he had taken all possible steps to eject the tenant (including obtaining a decree for arrears in suit No. 593 of 1946 and filing suit No. 2111 of 1947 for ejectment) and that he cancelled the agreement on or about 10 March 1947 and returned Rs. 601 plus settled costs in accordance with clause 11.
- The defendant argued that mortgage dues had increased (stated as Rs. 33,000) so that specific performance would leave nothing for the defendant and would be an undue hardship.
- Reliance on authorities (Paul Gonvreur v. M.G. Shapiro; Kamu v. Gonda Ram) which, according to defendant's counsel, proceeded on the assumption that time was of the essence.
- Reference to Rustomali v. Sheikh Alider Rahamanmia to urge that the plaintiff must prove readiness and willingness to perform the contract as it actually was.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff paid Rs. 501 as earnest money and sought specific performance; pleaded readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.
- The plaintiff asserted the defendant failed to take proper steps to eject the tenant and thereby to give vacant possession as agreed.
- The plaintiff (through counsel) later elected to accept the property with the tenant and to accept the title as shown by the defendant, abandoning claims for compensation.
- Correspondence exhibited showed the plaintiff was actively investigating title and was willing to afford time and indulgence to the defendant to obtain vacant possession.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jamshed Kodaram v. Burjorji Dhunjjibhai, 43 I.A. 26 : A.I.R. (2) 1915 P.C. 83 | Specific performance may be granted despite failure to keep dates if justice permits; time is not of the essence unless expressly or unmistakably so; intention to make time of essence may be inferred only from pre-contract communications. | The Court relied on this authority to hold that clause 6 did not make time of the essence and that the mere stipulation of a six‑month period did not terminate the contract when that period expired. |
| Duncan Rutherford v. William Acton Adams, 1915 A.C. 866 : A.I.R. (2) 1915 P.C. 113 : 81 L.J.P.C. 238 | Equity looks at substance not merely the letter; purchaser can elect to take substantially what contracted for and claim compensation for small deficiencies; purchaser suing has a larger right to elect subject to hardship considerations. | The Court applied this principle to hold that the purchaser (plaintiff) could elect to take the property with the tenant and accept the title shown, and therefore could seek specific performance on that basis (the plaintiff in fact elected this course and abandoned compensation). |
| Besant v. Richards, (1830) 48 E.R. 203 | Recognised the principle that a purchaser may elect to take what he can get and claim proportionate abatement/compensation. | Cited in support of the proposition that the purchaser has an election to accept the property despite some deficiencies. |
| Rustomali v. Sheikh Alider Rahamanmia, 45 C.W.N. 837 | Rule that, in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must prove readiness and willingness to perform the contract as it actually is. | The Court found that Rustomali had no application to the facts because here the plaintiff had performed his part and it was the defendant's obligation to give vacant possession which he failed to perform. |
| Paul Gonvreur v. M.G. Shapiro, A.I.R. (35) 1948 P.C. 192 : 1948 M.W.N. 121 | Case proceeded on the assumption that time was of the essence of the contract. | The Court distinguished this decision on the ground that in the present case time was not shown to be of the essence. |
| Kamu v. Gonda Ram, A.I.R. (34) 1947 Lah. 352 : 49 P.L.R. 74 | Decision proceeded on the assumption that time was of the essence. | The Court held this authority inapplicable because time was not found to be of the essence in the present contract. |
| Krishna Chandra v. Khan Mamud Bepari, 63 Cal. 804 : A.I.R. (23) 1936 Cal 51 | Supportive authority for the proposition that time is not necessarily of the essence where not clearly intended. | The Court relied on this Calcutta decision to support its conclusion that time was not of the essence under clause 6. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analysed the contract clauses and the evidence as follows:
- Clause 6, which fixed completion "within six months," was considered in light of authority (Jamshed Kodaram). The Court held that mere mention of a time period does not make time of the essence; such an intention must be expressed unmistakably or inferred from pre‑contract dealings. The Court therefore concluded that clause 6 did not render time of the essence in this case.
- Clause 13 (relating to title approval and remedy of specific performance) was considered with respect to whether the plaintiff's suit was misconceived because title had not been approved. The Court held that a purchaser may maintain a suit for specific performance and seek an enquiry as to title even before formally communicating approval; the purchaser does so at his risk but has the right to the enquiry because of the equitable nature of specific performance jurisdiction.
- On the evidence concerning ejectment of the tenant, the Court found the defendant's conduct unsatisfactory. Although the defendant asserted steps had been taken (a decree for arrears and a filed ejectment suit), the ejectment suit remained pending without active steps to obtain an undefended decree or execution. The Court concluded the defendant had not made bona fide efforts to evict and had effectively used the ejectment suit as a pretext to defend against the present suit.
- Because time was not of the essence and because the defendant was responsible for delay, the Court rejected the defendant's contention that the agreement had become impossible of performance. The defendant could not rely on his own default to defeat specific performance.
- The Court accepted that the plaintiff had been ready and willing to perform, pointing to correspondence showing the plaintiff's active investigation of title and willingness to grant reasonable time and indulgence to the defendant; the plaintiff later elected to accept the property with the tenant and abandoned claims for compensation.
- Regarding alleged hardship arising from increased mortgage dues, the Court noted the agreement contemplated sale free from encumbrances and referred to provisions cited from the Transfer of Property Act (section 55(1)(b) and (g) as referenced in the opinion). The Court treated any increased mortgage dues as self‑induced hardship attributable to the defendant's conduct and therefore not a bar to specific performance.
- Applying established equitable principles (including those from Duncan Rutherford on substance over form and the purchaser's election), the Court found that specific performance should be granted on the terms that the purchaser elected — i.e., acceptance of the property with tenant and the title as shown — and that no compensation would be awarded because the plaintiff abandoned compensation claims.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court decreed the suit for specific performance.
Direct consequences and directions ordered by the Court:
- The plaintiff is directed to bring into Court the balance of the purchase money: Rs. 37,000 minus Rs. 601 (i.e., Rs. 36,499) within one month from the date of deposit.
- The defendant is ordered to execute a conveyance of the properties in favour of the plaintiff in terms of the agreement dated 11 September 1946. If the defendant defaults, the Registrar is authorized to execute the conveyance on the defendant's behalf.
- Upon execution of the conveyance, the defendant may withdraw the deposited money subject to his making payment to the mortgagee (Hindu Mutual Life Assurance Co. Ltd.) and obtaining the necessary title deeds to discharge the mortgage encumbrance; any application by the defendant to withdraw money from Court must be notified to the plaintiff.
- The defendant must pay the plaintiff one day's costs of the suit.
- An interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff will continue until the conveyance is executed in the plaintiff's favour.
- The money may be deposited with the Registrar.
Broader implications: The opinion applies and reiterates established equitable principles (as in the cited authorities) about when time is of the essence, the purchaser's right to call for enquiry as to title, and the purchaser's election to accept a property with deficiencies and claim abatement. The Court did not state that it was creating a new legal principle; it applied existing authorities to the facts and therefore the immediate effect is to grant specific performance on the terms set out above.
Final line in the opinion: "Suit decreed." (R.G.D.)
1. This is a suit by the plaintiff against the defendant for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 11th September 1946 between the plaintiff and the defendant alternatively for Rs. 10,000 as damages, enquiry into the damages and refund of the deposit of Rs. 500 with interest. The suit also claims for an enquiry as to title.
2. The plaintiff's case is that by reason of the agreement for sale to which I have referred he paid Rs. 501 as earnest money or as part payment of the price. The defendant thereafter failed or neglected to take proper steps for the ejectment of the tenant in the premises to be sold and to arrange for giving vacant possession as was stipulated in the agreement. The agreement provided for giving vacant possession and sale of the premises free from all encumbrances. The plaintiff pleads his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. The plaintiff also asks for specific performance of the agreement with compensation for the part unperformed by not giving him vacant possession and has claimed compensation for Rs. 7,000 and the plaintiff claims to deduct from the price the amount due on the mortgage. The suit was filed on 3rd April 1947.
3. The defendant filed his written statement on 28th May 1947. He pleads that he has taken all possible steps for the ejectment of the tenant in the premises to be sold. He also contends in the written statement that the time fixed was six months under the agreement and as it could not be performed by the defendant by giving vacant possession the agreement came to an end and he cancelled the agreement on or about 10th March 1947 and returned Rs. 601 the earnest money and the settled cost of Rs. 64 as provided by cl. 11 of the agreement. The claim to compensation is also denied. It is also pleaded that the subsisting mortgage has now increased to Rs. 33,000 and if specific performance is directed of the agreement for sale nothing will be left over for the defendant. The following issues were raised.
1. Is the suit misconceived by reason of cls. 6 and 13 of the agreement?
2. Has the defendant wrongfully failed and neglected to take proper steps for the ejectment of the tenants for giving vacant possession thereof?
3. Has the agreement become impossible of performance within the time stipulated in cl. 6 of the agreement?
4. Was the defendant's repudiation of 10th March 1947 wrongful?
5. Was the plaintiff ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?
6(a). Is the plaintiff entitled to specific performance of the agreement?
6(b). Is the plaintiff entitled to specific performance with compensation and if so what compensation?
7. To what reliefs are the patties entitled to?
4. Issue No. 1.— Learned counsel for the defendant has relied on cls. 6 and 13 of the agreement. Clause 6 provides that the sale shall be completed within six months from the date or as soon as the vendor will be in a position to give vacant possession of the two premises thereby agreed to be sold within the said period of six months. Clause 13 provides that if after the title being approved either party fails to perform his part of the contract the other party shall be entitled to enforce specific performance? thereof.
5. On the basis of cl. 6 of the agreements learned counsel for the defendant argued that as the contract could not be performed within the period of six months as stipulated the contract came to an end. He contended that time was of the essence of this contract and parties could not be asked to perform their parts of the-contract after the period of six months was over. A number of correspondence has been exhibited in this suit which is marked as Ex. A The letter dated 10th March 1947 was the letter relied upon by counsel for the defendant saying that the agreement was cancelled and it was rightly cancelled on that date. It is argued by him that six months expired on or about 10th March 1947 and on that very date the defendant; purported to cancel the agreement. The reason for doing so was that he could not deliver vacant possession under the agreement for sale.
6. In my view on a proper interpretation of cl. 6 of the agreement for sale, I do not consider time is of the essence of the contract in this case. The Judicial Committee in Jamshed Kodaram v. Burjorji Dhunjjibhai, 43 I.A 26 : (A.I.R (2) 1915 P.C 83), says that the specific performance of a contract will be granted although there has been a failure to keep the dates assigned by it if justice can be done be-tween the parties and if nothing in (a) the expressed stipulation of the parties, (b) the nature of the property or (c) the surrounding circumstances makes it inequitable to grant the relief. An intention to make time of the essence of the contract must be expressed in unmistakable language; it may be inferred from what passed between the parties before but not after the contract is made. I do not find in this case that the language is such from which I can construe that time was regarded as of the essence of the contract in this case; the mere fact that a contract is said to be performed within a period of six months does not in my judgment make time of the essence of the contract. In order to render time essential in that sense it must be clearly and expressly stipulated and must also have been really contemplated and intended by the parties that it shall be so and it is not enough when a time is merely mentioned during which or before which something shall be done (Fry on Specific Performance, 6th Edn., p. 503, Article 1077).
7. Clause 13 is called in and by the defendant and it is urged that the plaintiff failed to accept the title and as he had not accepted the title his suit for specific performance ought to fail. This is itself a suit which I find claims enquiry as to title. In fact it was during the investigation of title that the defendant tried to put an end to the contract by his letter dated 10th March 1947. The evidence is on this point that investigation actually was going on and although Mr. Dey a witness on behalf of the plaintiff said that he had accepted the title it appears from his evidence that he had not completed all the investigations and he had not sent his intimation of the approval to the defendant. I find from the authorities that it is legitimate for the plaintiff to bring a suit for specific performance even where title has not been approved and in the suit for specific performance to claim reference or enquiry as to title. The vendor in an suit for specific performance may be called: upon by the purchaser defendant to have an enquiry directed as to the title of the vendor. This right is derived from the extraordinary nature of the jurisdiction which the vendor seeks to put in action in consideration of which the purchaser has right not only to have such a title as the vendor offers upon the abstract but; the highest assurance upon the nature of his; title by the production of deeds, the directing of enquiries, and what is said to be the shifting of the vendor's conscience. The purchaser is also entitled to a reference as to title where he is the plaintiff in an action for specific performance as in the present case before me. But inasmuch as in the purchaser's suit he and not the vendor is calling on the Court to act he does so at his own risk. (Fry on Specific Performance, 6th Edn., p. 610, Article 1320).
8. If this was not the law then the purchaser would be without the remedy for specific performance when the defendant refused to satisfy the purchaser on the question of title and relied on his own default and failure as debarring the plaintiff from bringing in a suit for specific performance; in my judgment the purchaser in a suit for specific performance is entitled to call for an enquiry and reference with regard to title even before the stage of his acceptance of the title. It is common justice to allow a purchaser every opportunity to be satisfied on a question of title.
9. I therefore hold that the suit is not misconceived by reason of Rs. 6 and 13 of the agreement and I accordingly answer issue 1 in the negative.
10. Issue No. 2— The defendant has con tended that he has taken every possible step for ejecting his tenant so as to be in a position to give vacant possession to the plaintiff. I am not satisfied at all with the evidence on this point. The defendant has said that he had a decree for about Rs. 4,000 against his tenant for arrears of rent. This decree he obtained in a suit in this Court being suit No. 593 of 1946. The decree still remains unsatisfied. Then it is said that the defendant filed a suit for ejectment against his tenant. This was suit No. 2111 of 1947 filed on 24th July 1947. It is strange to find that this suit has not yet fructified in a decree. Appearance was entered in that suit by the tenant of the defendant but no written statement was filed and yet the suit is pending. The defendant has taken no steps to bring the suit to a hearing ami I find that neither he nor his attorney has taken any step to transfer the suit to the undefended list which he was entitled to do under the Original Side Rules of this Court and obtain his decree. If he had obtained his decree then he could have executed that decree and thus obtain vacant possession so as to be in a position to deliver the same to the plaintiff in terms of the agreement for sale. I have got the impression from the evidence of the defendant on this point that it was more or less a show of a suit of ejectment and he has made no bona fide attempt to evict his tenant and it appears that suit for ejectment was filed with a view to a possible defence on that ground to the present suit for specific performance.
11. On the evidence before me I hold that the defendant has failed and neglected to take proper steps for ejecting his tenant and I accordingly answer issue No. 2 in the affirmative.
12. Issue No. 3— Learned counsel has argued that the agreement has become impossible of performance by reason of (a) expiry of the period by two months (b) by reason of the inability of the defendant to deliver vacant possession within such period of six months on the ground of his inability to eject his tenant.
13. I have held that time is not of the essence of the contract in this case and therefore the expiry of the period of six months does not make the agreement impossible of performance. The agreement can still be specifically enforced and remains enforceable even though a time limit was given in the agreement. The Privy Council decision to which I have made a reference has said that an intention to make time of the essence of the contract may be inferred from what passed between the parties before and not after the contract is made. I therefore overrule the defendant's counsel's submission before me that I am entitled to look to what transpired after the contract although even on that point I find myself on the evidence and on the correspondence against the contention of the defendant. Looking at what passed between the parties before the agreement for sale was made I find from the correspondence from 11th September 1946, the date of the agreement for sale, and until the 10th March 1947, the date of the purported repudiation by the defendant, that the plaintiff was actually investigating the title and was anxious for such investigation and this does not show that there was any intention of the parties to make time of the essence of the contract.
14. On the question of the defendant's inability to eject his tenant I am satisfied on the evidence and as I have held under issue No. 2 that the defendant has himself to thank for the present situation. I am not satisfied with his evidence that he was bona fide in his attempts to eject his tenant.
15. I therefore hold that the agreement has not become impossible of performance on the grounds alleged by the defendant.
16. On this question learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff has stated that the plaintiff is prepared to accept the property with the tenant and he is prepared to accept the title as it is without further investigation. Mr. Talukdar appearing for the defendant has agreed that the plaintiff cannot do so as the contract was a contract to deliver vacant possession and not a contract to deliver the property with the tenant. I cannot accept the argument of Mr. Talukdar. For one thing I am of opinion that a party is not entitled to rely on his own default and failure to excuse himself from the performance of the contract of this nature. In the Privy Council decision in Duncan Rutherford v. William Acton Adams, 1915 A.C 866 : (A.I.R (2) 1915 P.C 113 : 81 L.J.P.C 238) Lord Haldane at pages 869-70 observed as follows:
“In exercising it a jurisdiction over specifics performance Court of Equity looks at the substance and not merely at the letter of the contract. If a vendor sues and is in a position to convey substantially what the purchaser has contracted to get, the Court will decree specific performance with compensation for any small and immaterial deficiency, provided that the vendor has not, by misrepresentation or otherwise disentitled himself to his remedy. Another possible case arises where a vendor claims specific performance and where the Court refuses it unless the purchaser is willing to consent to a decree on terms that the vendor will make compensation to the purchaser, who agrees to such a decree on condition that he is compensated. If it is the purchaser who is suing, the Court holds him to have an even larger right. Subject to considerations of hardship he may elect to take all he can get, and to have a proportionate abatement from the purchase money”.
17. This is a suit by the purchaser and in my opinion he is entitled to make his election. Mr. Meyer appearing for the plaintiff has elected to take the properties in suit with the tenant and with the title already shown by the defendant and which he accepts now. In such a case the option is with the purchaser and the plaintiff purchaser while at liberty to ask to be released from the agreement for the simple reason that he could not be asked to take a defective or a bad title yet he might at his election take what he gets and claim compensation. This principle was recognised by the Master of Rolls in Besant v. Richards, (1830) 48 E.R 203.
18. Mr. Talukdar has relied on a decision reported in Rustomali v. Sheikh Alider Rahamanmia, 45 C.W.N 837 but in my judgment that decision has no application to the facts of the present case. That was a decision which said that in a suit for specific performance it was incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that he was ready and willing to perform the contract as it actually was and not as he alleged it was. There the plaintiff alleged that he was ready and willing to purchase the property for Rs. 85 whereas in fact it was found that the contract was that he had agreed to purchase for Rs. 130, and there-fore it was taken that the plaintiff failed in his readiness and willingness to perform the contract as it really was. Here no such question arises. The plaintiff has performed his part of the contract; it was not part of his contract to deliver vacant possession; that was a part to be performed by the defendant and the defendant failed in performing it.
19. Reference is also made by Mr. Talukdar to two decisions, one in Paul Gonvreur v. M.G Shapiro, A.I.R (35) 1948 P.C 192 : (1948 M.W.N 121) the other in Kamu v. Gonda Ram, A.I.R (34) 1947 Lah. 352 : (49 P.L.R 74). These cases, I find, proceeded on the assumption that time was of the essence of the contract. I cannot hold in this case either on the language of cl. 6 or on the basis of what passed between the parties prior to the agreement for sale that time was intended to be of the essence of the contract. I find that the decision in Jamshed Kodaram v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai, 43 I.A 26 : (A.I.R (2) 1915 P.C 83) to which reference has already been made as well as another Calcutta decision in Krishna Chandra v. Khan Mamud Bepari, 63 Cal. 804 : (A.I.R (23) 1936 Cal 51), to be in support of the view which I have taken. I therefore answer issue No. 3 in the negative.
20. Issue No. 4. As I have held that time was not of the essence of the contract the purported repudiation by the defendant on 10th March 1947 was wrongful. I find the defendant is responsible for the delay in completion of the sale. He was at first not willing to produce municipal rate bills, and besides the title deeds could not be had and the plaintiff had to refer to the mortgagee. In the meantime the six months time expired and the defendant took the first opportunity to repudiate the contract. I am of opinion that as time is not of the essence of the contract such repudiation is wrongful and besides, the defendant could not rely on his own default as I hold he was responsible for the delay. I answer therefore the 4th issue in the affirmative.
21. Issue No. 6. The correspondence shows that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In fact he was anxious to complete investigation of the title and that will be apparent from the corresponence during the period from 11th September 1946 to 10th March 1947. Thereafter the correspondence shows that the plaintiff was willing to perform his part. It is said by Mr. Talukdar that the plaintiff was insisting on vacant possession. I do not see what else could the plaintiff do because that was the contract and he even said further that he was prepared to wait and extend time until such vacant possession was given. That is clear from the letter dated the 17th March 1947 from the plaintiff's solicitor to the defendant's solicitor. That only shows that the plaintiff was not only ready and willing to perform his part of the contract but was prepared to give every indulgence and even reasonable time to the defendant.
22. I therefore hold that the plaintiff was ready and willing and still is to perform his part of the agreement for sale and accordingly answer issue no. 5 in the affirmative.
23. Issue No. 6. On the findings of the issues hereinbefore mentioned and for the reason which I have given above, I answer issue No. 6(a) in the affirmative. It is said that the dues on the mortgage will create hardship and Mr. Talukdar has contended that such dues have increased since the date of the agreement for sale by reason of defendant's non-payment of interest. I cannot accept this argument of hardship. The agreement for sale itself refers to the mortgage. It also stipulates and provides that the defendant will sell the properties free from all encumbrances. To the same effect are the provisions of Section 55(1)(b) and (g) of the Transfer of 1 Property Act. If the defendant has not paid; interest it is his own fault and if there has been delay I have held that the defendant is responsible for such delay. This is therefore self-induced hardship, if hardship at all, and in my judgment a party cannot rely on a plea of I hardship which is self-induced as a defence to a suit for specific performance.
24. With regard to issue No. 6(b) Mr. Meyer appealing for the plaintiff has abandoned all claims for compensation. He has admitted before me that his client, the plaintiff, is prepared to accept the property with the tenants and he claims no compensation.
25. Issue No. 7. There will therefore be in my judgment a decree for specific performance of the said agreement but without compensation. I direct that the plaintiff should bring in the balance of the purchase money, that is Rs. 37,000 − Rs. 601 i.e Rs. 36,499 to the Court. Such money should be paid into the Court in this suit and within a month from the date of deposit of the money in Court. I order the defendant to execute a conveyance for the properties mentioned in the agreement for sale, dated the 11th September 1946, in favour of the plaintiff. In default of the defendant's execution of such conveyance in favour of the plaintiff the Registrar will execute such conveyance on behalf of the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. Upon such execution the defendant will be at liberty to withdraw such money subject to his making payment to the mortgagee, Hindu Mutual Life Assurance Co. Ltd., and obtaining the necessary title deeds in discharge of the mortgage encumbrance. The defendant will pay the cost of this suit for one day to the plaintiff.
26. If any application for withdrawal of the money from the Court is made, the defendant must give notice to the plaintiff. There is as interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff and that injunction will continue until the conveyance is executed in favour of the plaintiff.
27. The money may be deposited with the Registrar.
R.G.D
28. Suit decreed.
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