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Sm. Arshay Kumari De... v. Nalini Ranjan Mukher...

Calcutta High Court
Jun 27, 1950
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was brought by the decree-holder against an order of Chunder, J. The decree-holder (Appellant) had obtained a decree on 23 March 1942 in the Presidency Court of Small Causes (4th Court) against Rati Kanta Mukherji for Rs. 1,127-10-9 pies. There had been an attachment before judgment (6 March 1942) which was confirmed, but on 18 June 1942 the attached properties were released and the execution case was dismissed.

The sole judgment-debtor, Rati Kanta Mukherji, died sometime prior to June 1944, survived by his widow and four sons (Nalini Ranjan, Anil Krishna, Ranjit Kumar and Sailen; the latter two were minors). On 26 June 1944 the decree-holder filed an application purporting to be for execution of the decree and praying, among other things, for (a) attachment and sale of the defendant's movables and (b) service of a notice on Nalini Ranjan Mukherjee to show cause why his name should not be substituted as defendant as son, heir and legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor.

The application led to notices, multiple adjournments and at one stage dismissal for default (2 December 1944). A further application was made in June 1945. On 25 August 1945 the Court directed issue of notice for substitution of the names of Anil Krishna, Ranjit Kumar, Sailen and Mrs. Rati Kanta Mukherjee (the minors represented by their mother). On 1 September 1945 the Court placed those names on record as heirs and legal representatives; no order was made then as to Nalini Ranjan. Later, the Court placed Nalini Ranjan on record as son, heir and legal representative and ordered execution to issue.

The decree was transferred to the Munsif's Court at Howrah (transfer steps in December 1945) and execution proceedings were initiated there. The judgment-debtors objected that execution was barred by limitation. The trial Court overruled the limitation objection and directed execution to proceed. The first Appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the execution. The decree-holder appealed to this Court (Appeal from Appellate Order No. 197 of 1947). The present opinion concerns the propriety of the first Appellate Court's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, when a judgment-debtor dies after a decree and no execution proceeding is pending at that time, a decree-holder's subsequent application (seeking substitution of heirs and the issue of notices under Order 21) can constitute a "step in aid of execution" that saves the decree from being barred by limitation under Article 182(5) of the Indian Limitation Act.
  2. Whether the specific application filed by the decree-holder on 26 June 1944 was an application for execution "in accordance with law" despite containing defects (notably, no inventory/list of movables attached) and thus whether it could extend the period of limitation.
  3. Whether steps taken by the decree-holder directed originally against one legal representative (an application against one heir) can save limitation as against other legal representatives/heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The decree-holder treated the application(s) filed (beginning 26 June 1944) as steps in aid of execution which should extend the life of the decree under Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act.
  • Counsel for the Appellant (Mr. Ghose) relied on precedents (including Saday Chandra Jana v. Pares Nath Ghose and other authorities) that an application which prays for relief the Court could grant — even if defective in particulars — amounts to a step in aid of execution and saves limitation.

Respondents' / Judgment-Debtors' Arguments

  • The judgment-debtors contended that the execution was barred by limitation and relied on decisions (including certain Bombay High Court authorities such as Mahomedbhai v. Dawoodbhai & Co.) to argue that defective applications could be fatal and not amount to steps in aid of execution.
  • Counsel for the Respondents (Mr. Sen) referred the Court to Pitambar Jana v. Damodar Guchait and other authorities that emphasised that an application must be in substantial compliance with law (i.e., must be such that execution could be issued upon it) to save limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gaur Chandra Ray v. Janardan Prasad Thakur That an order directing execution to issue decides between parties that execution is not barred by limitation and operates as res judicata. The Court relied on this case to hold that an order directing execution to issue is res judicata and cannot later be challenged on limitation grounds by those who were on record and did not set the order aside.
Promotha Nath Daw v. Habu Mia Supporting authority for the proposition that an order directing execution to issue operates as res judicata. Cited in the group of cases that the Court said support res judicata effect of an order directing execution to issue.
Satyanarain Banerji v. Raja Sri Sri Kalyani Prosad Singh Supporting authority for res judicata effect of an order directing execution to issue. Included by the Court among cases establishing that such an order cannot be challenged subsequently.
Kuppaswami Chettiar v. Rajagopal Aiyar Authority supporting the view that where decree-holder applies for execution after death of judgment-debtor (when no execution is pending), application under Order 21, r. 22 may be required. Cited as supporting the narrower view that a fresh application under Order 21, r. 22 is necessary when execution is not pending; Court discussed and contrasted this line with a more liberal line.
Amor Krishna Choudhury v. Jagat Bandhu Biswas Contains observations that a step in aid of execution can only be taken in the course of an execution proceeding which is pending or capable of being kept alive. Cited by the Court as expressing the narrower approach; the Court noted these observations but ultimately preferred a more liberal approach taken in other cases.
Sankara Nainer Pattai v. Thangamma; Mathankandi Kannan v. Thayyil Patkuthi Avvulla Haji; Chathengali Rarichan v. Puvvamparambath Kunhamu; Chanayalal v. Punjab National Bank; Jagdeo Narain Singh v. Rani Bhubaneswari Kuer; Gopal Shankar Jahegirdar v. Raising Premi Gotivala; Ramchandra v. Uka These cases represent a class taking a more liberal view of Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act (i.e., accepting that certain steps even when no execution is pending can be steps in aid of execution). The Court stated it was inclined to accept this liberal line of decisions and held that Article 182(5) should receive a fair, liberal construction to enable decree-holders to enforce decrees.
Sreenath Chakravorti v. Priyanath Bandopadhay Holds that an application for transfer of a decree is a step in aid of execution even though no execution is pending. The Court used this authority to reason that if transfer of decree is a step in aid, then an application for issue of a notice under Order 21, r. 22 can also be such a step.
Gopal Chunder Manna v. Gosain Das Kalay Held that an application for the issue of notice under Order 21, r. 22 can be regarded as a step in aid of execution; Full Bench affirmed view that such application is a step in aid where necessary. Cited as direct authority that a prayer for issue of notice under Order 21, r. 22 is a step in aid of execution; the Court relied on the Full Bench affirmation of Banerjee, J.'s view.
Abdul Aziz Abdulla v. Yakub Abdul Gani Held that even if there was no application for execution, a mere prayer for the issue of a notice under Order 21, r. 22 is a step in aid of execution (as per Chitty, J.). Used to support the view that a prayer for notice under r.22 can extend the life of the decree even absent a full execution proceeding.
Saday Chandra Jana v. Pares Nath Ghose Decision that an application for execution which contained appropriate prayers (including substitution and a r.22 notice) though defective in particulars could still be a step in aid of execution and extend limitation. The Court relied on the case as an example where a defective application containing proper prayers was held to be a valid step in aid of execution.
Pitambar Jana v. Damodar Guchait Explains that "in accordance with law" in Article 182(5) means the application must be such that execution could be issued upon it; if omissions make execution impossible, the application is not in accordance with law. The Court invoked the passage to articulate the test for whether an application saves limitation (i.e., whether execution could, in principle, be issued upon it).
Asgar Ali v. Troilokya Nath Ghose Example where application did not supply list of properties to be attached and thus was not in accordance with law (execution could not be issued on it). Cited as an example of an application so defective that it could not be treated as in accordance with law under Article 182(5).
Mahomedbhai v. Dawoodbhai & Co. Bombay High Court decision concerning propriety of an application for execution that lacked particulars (e.g., description of property). The Division Bench allowed amendment and held the defective application not to be a mere nullity. Mentioned by the Court as a case relied upon by the judgment-debtors; the Court observed that the decision was about amendment and that defect in describing property did not render the application a nullity.
Gopal Parsharam v. Damodar Janardan Discussed in the context of applications for execution and whether they are in accordance with law; treated by Sen, J. in review of cases. Referred to as part of the authorities reviewed on the subject; the Court noted that Sen, J. set out tests on whether an application is in accordance with law.
Vallabhdas Narandas v. Kantilal G. Parekh Contains observation (by Kania, J.) that a prayer for issue of notice under Order 21, r. 22 is not a mode of execution but a hurdle the decree-holder must cross; observations do not decide present question but support that r.22 prayer can be a step in aid in certain circumstances. The Court noted that this case does not decide the central question but supports the proposition that a r.22 prayer may be regarded as a step in aid of execution in proper circumstances.
Abdul Rafi Khan v. Maula Bux Dealt with an application for execution under Order 21, r. 12 (inventory rule) and therefore did not decide the point directly before the Court. Mentioned by the Court to show that the authority did not cover the exact question in the present appeal.
Birdhi Chand Dhondiram Marwadi v. Bade Saheb Babamia Held that Order 21, r. 12 did not apply where a decree was obtained against the legal representative of the judgment-debtor. Cited to show r.12’s scope and to support the conclusion that r.12 does not always require an inventory in all circumstances.
Nathmal Mathurdas Chandak v. Balkrishna Gangabisan Marwadi Authority holding that an application lacking a list of movables could still be valid in certain circumstances. The Court relied on this case to support the proposition that absence of a list does not necessarily render the application a nullity when movables are in possession of judgment-debtor.
Ram Anuj Sewak Singh v. Hingu Lal (Objector v. Decree-Holder) Held that an application filed against one legal representative can save limitation as against other legal representatives. The Court accepted this authority as supporting the view that steps against one heir saved limitation as against the others.
Krishnaji Janardan v. Murrarnav Similar principle as Ram Anuj Sewak Singh: an application against one legal representative saves limitation as to others. The Court relied on these authorities to hold that the application against one legal representative saved limitation as against the rest.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in several steps, closely following the facts and the applicable procedural rules:

  1. Res judicata point: The Court first observed that after the heirs were placed on the record and the Court made an order directing execution to issue (and the decree was transferred for execution), those heirs did not take steps to have that order set aside. Relying on earlier decisions (notably Gaur Chandra Ray and others), the Court held that the order directing execution to issue was an order "deciding as between the parties that the execution was not barred by limitation" and thus operates as res judicata — it cannot later be challenged on the ground of limitation by parties who were on record and did not seek to upset that order.
  2. Primary substantive question: The Court then addressed the principal legal question whether, where a judgment-debtor died after the decree but no execution was pending, the decree-holder must start an execution and make specific application under Order 21, r. 22 (when death took place more than one year earlier) or whether certain preliminary steps (including a prayer for issue of a r.22 notice) even in the absence of a pending execution can qualify as steps in aid of execution under Article 182(5).
  3. Review of authorities and adoption of a liberal view: The Court contrasted two lines of authority — a narrower line (represented by some Madras and other decisions) which required an execution proceeding to be pending to take steps in aid, and a more liberal line (a number of decisions from other High Courts) that treated certain applications (including those for transfer of a decree or for issue of notice under Order 21, r.22) as steps in aid even when no execution was pending. The Court explicitly stated it preferred the latter, liberal line and held that Article 182(5) should be given a fair and liberal construction so as to enable the decree-holder to enforce the decree.
  4. Concrete test — "in accordance with law": The Court examined what it means for an application to be "in accordance with law" (the phrase in Article 182(5)). It adopted the test articulated in authorities such as Pitambar Jana and Gopal Parsharam: an application is "in accordance with law" if it is such that it is possible, in principle, for the Court to issue execution upon it; if omissions make it impossible for the Court to issue execution (for example, where no list of property is supplied at all in a case where the rule requires it), the application is not in accordance with law.
  5. Application of test to the present facts — the 26 June 1944 application: The Court examined the 26 June 1944 application. The mode of execution asked for was "by attachment and sale of Defendant's movables as per list," but no list of movables was filed. The Court considered the requirements of Order 21, r.11(2)(j) and r.12: r.12 requires an inventory of movables where the judgment-debtor is not in possession, but there is no rule requiring an inventory where the judgment-debtor is in possession. The Court concluded that the application was defective but not a nullity: it could have been amended and, importantly, under conceivable circumstances (if movables were in the possession of the judgment-debtor) the application was sufficient in law. The Court cited Nathmal Mathurdas Chandak and other authorities to support that absence of a list does not necessarily render an application invalid.
  6. Conclusion on limitation: On the combined bases — (a) the Court's acceptance that a prayer for substitution and for a r.22 notice can be a step in aid of execution even if no execution proceeding was pending, and (b) the 26 June 1944 application being an application "in accordance with law" (not a nullity) — the Court held that the proceedings taken by the decree-holder were steps in aid of execution and therefore extended the life of the decree under Article 182(5). The Court further held that the application made against one legal representative saved limitation as against other representatives (relying on Ram Anuj Sewak Singh and Krishnaji Janardan).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The judgments of this Court and of the first Appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. The Appellant is entitled to her costs in all Courts and the hearing-fee before this Court is assessed at three gold mohurs.

Implications:

  • The Court adopts a liberal construction of Article 182(5) of the Indian Limitation Act: steps which are "in aid of execution" (including applications for substitution and prayers for issue of notices under Order 21, r.22, and even applications for transfer of decree) can extend the life of a decree even where no execution proceeding was pending at the time of the deceased judgment-debtor's death, provided the application is "in accordance with law" (i.e., execution could, in principle, be issued upon it).
  • The absence of an annexed list of movables does not automatically render an execution application a nullity in all circumstances; where movables are in the possession of the judgment-debtor or where the application otherwise permits execution to be issued in principle, the defect may be amendable and not fatal to the operation of Article 182(5).
  • The Court held that an order previously directing execution to issue operates as res judicata between the parties who were on the record and did not seek to set the order aside; such an order cannot later be challenged on limitation grounds by those parties.
  • Consequence for the parties: The trial Court's order allowing execution (i.e., overruling the limitation objection) is restored; the decree-holder may proceed to execution and recovers costs as directed.

Note: This summary is limited to and derived exclusively from the material contained in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion text.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Das, J.:— This is an appeal by the decree-holder against a decision of our learned brother Chunder, J.

2. The facts of the case were not fully placed before this Court. We have, therefore, to state those facts in some detail. On the 23rd March, 1942, the Appellant obtained a decree in the Presidency Court of Small Causes, 4th Court, against Rati Kanta Mukherji for a sum of Rs. 1,127-10-9 pies. It appears from the order-sheet which is on the record that there was an attachment before judgment on the 6th March, 1942, which was confirmed by the Court. On the 18th June, 1942, the attached properties were released from attachment and the order of that date goes on to state that the execution case was dismissed. On some date which it is not possible for us to discover from the records, but prior to June, 1944, the sole judgment-debtor Rati Kanta Mukherji died. He was survived by his widow and four sons, Nalini Ranjan Mukherji, Anil Krishna Mukherji, Ranjit Kumar Mukherji and Sailen Mukherji the latter two being minors. On the 26th June, 1944, the decree-holder made an application which purports to be one for execution of the decree passed on the 23rd March, 1942. In column 9 of the application which is headed as “Mode in which the assistance of the Court is required” the following statement occurs: “I pray that the total amount of Rs. 1,127-10-9 together with interest on the principal sum up to the date of payment and the costs of taking out this execution be realised by attachment and sale of Defendant's movable property as per annexed list and paid to me. A notice do issue upon Nalini Ranjan Mukherjee of village Nalta, P.O Maju, District Howrah, to show cause why his name should not be substituted in record in place of Defendant Rati Kanta Mukherjee now deceased and execution be issued against him and notice be sent under registered cover. Grounds: That Nalini Ranjan Mukherjee is the son, heir and legal representative of the Defendant Rati Kanta Mukherjee now deceased.” On the day following the following order was recorded: “On the Plaintiff's application for substitution of the name of Nalini Ranjan Mukherjee in place of Defendant, deceased, order ed: Issue notice returnable on the 1st August, 1944.” The order-sheet shows that the case was adjourned on the 1st August, 1944, 22nd August, 1944, 9th September, 1944, 11th November, 1944, on which date it was adjourned to 2nd December, 1944, when the application was dismissed for default. Sometime thereafter, on the 8th June, 1945, an application on terms similar to that which was filed on the 26th June, 1944, was presented to the Small Causes Court on behalf of the decree-holder. The Court thereupon issued a notice on the 13th June, 1945. The case was adjourned to the 7th July, 1945, 4th August, 1945, and then to the 1st September, 1945.

3. Meanwhile, on the 25th August, 1945, the following order was recorded: “On the Plaintiffs' application for substitution of the names of Anil Krishna Mukherjee, Ranjit Kumar Mukherji, Sailen Mukherjee and Mrs. Rati Kanta Mukherjee, the minors represented by their mother Mrs. Rati Kanta Mukherjee ordered: Issue notice returnable on the 1st September, 1945.” On the 1st September, 1945, it was ordered: “Ordered that the names of the Opposite Parties Anil Krishna Mukherjee, Ranjit Kumar Mukherjee, Sailen Mukherjee, the minors represented by their mother Mrs. Rati Kanta Mukherjee as guardian and Mrs. Rati Kanta Mukherjee, be placed on record as heirs and legal representatives of deceased Defendant. No order is made as to Nalini Ranjan Mukherjee.” Nothing further was done till the 1st October, 1945, when the following order is recorded: “On the Plaintiff's application for substitution of the name of Nalini Ranjan Mukherjee in place of deceased Defendant ordered: Notice do issue returnable on the 24th November, 1945.” On the 3rd October, 1945, notice was issued as prayed for. The matter was adjourned on the 24th November, 1945 to the 1st December, 1946, on which date the Court passed the following order: “Application granted: Let the name of Nalini Ranjan Mukherjee be placed on record as son, heir, legal representative of the Defendant since deceased. Execution to issue.” On the 12th December, 1945, an application was made by the decree-holder for transfer of the decree to the Munsif's Court at Howrah. On the 17th December, 1945, the decree was transferred under Letter No. 2736 dated the 20th December, 1945. The execution was thereupon started at Howrah. The judgment-debtors appeared and raised an objection to the effect that the execution of the decree was barred by limitation. The trial Court overruled the objection and directed execution to proceed. On appeal, the first Appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the execution case. Against this order a further appeal was taken to this Court being Appeal from Appellate Order No. 197 of 1947. This appeal was heard on the 11th August, 1949, and the appeal was dismissed. It is the propriety of this decision which is now in question before us.

4. The judgment of this Court proceeds on the following grounds: (1) In case the judgment-debtor dies after the decree and if an execution case is pending at the time, the decree-holder has merely to pray to carry forward the execution case. (2) If no such execution is pending, the decree-holder is required to make an application for execution in terms of Or. 21, r. 11 read with Sec. 50, C.P.C, if the judgment-debtor was dead within one year of the pasting of the decree but if the death took place before one year, a further prayer has to be made under Or. 21, r. 22, C.P.C As in the present case there was no proper application for execution, the steps taken by the decree-holder were not in accordance with law and did not save limitation. The view of the learned Judge was that there must be an application for execution started in which a prayer should be made under Or. 21, r. 22, C.P.C Before we deal with this question it is necessary to refer to a matter which was not placed before the Court. From the facts stated already, it appears that after all the heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor had been placed on the record, the Court made an order directing execution to issue and thereafter transferred the case for execution to Howrah. The heirs of the judgment-debtor who were then on record did not take any steps to have the order set aside. In these circumstances, it was not open to the judgment-debtor to raise the plea of limitation. As was observed in the case of Gaur Chandra Ray v. Janardan Prasad Thakur(1) the order directing execution to issue was an order “deciding as between the parties that the execution was not barred by limitation.” Such an order has been held to operate as res judicata and whether right or wrong, the order cannot be challenged in subsequent proceedings.” See also the cases of Promotha Nath Daw v. Habu Mia(2) and Satyanarain Banerji v. Raja Sri Sri Kalyani Prosad Singh(3). In this view, no further question arises. But as the matter has been argued at length on other points, we desire to record our opinion on these points.

5. The first point which fell to be decided before our learned brother Chunder, J., was whether when a judgment-debtor dies after the decree at a time when no execution case is pending against him, the proper procedure for the decree-holder is to take out an execution and pray for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor on record and if the judgment-debtor had died more than one year ago to pray for issue of a notice under Or. 21, r. 22, C.P.C The learned Judge answered the question in the affirmative. The view so taken is supported by the decision in Kuppaswami Chettiar v. Rajagopal Aiyar(4) and by some other cases of the Madras High Court. It is also supported by certain observations of Ghose, J., in Amor Krishna Choudhury v. Jagat Bandhu Biswas(5), where the learned Judge incidentally observed: “It must be remembered that a step in aid of execution can only be taken in the course of an execution proceeding which is pending or capable of being kept alive and there can be no step in aid of execution when the execution itself is already barred.” The above view, however, has not been taken in the cases of Sankara Nainer Pattai v. Thangamma(6), Mathankandi Kannan v. Thayyil Patkuthi Avvulla Haji(7), Chathengali Rarichan v. Puvvamparambath Kunhamu(8), Chanayalal v. Punjab National Bank(9), Jagdeo Narain Singh v. Rani Bhubaneswari Kuer(10), Gopal Shankar Jahegirdar v. Raising Premi Gotivala(11) and Ramchandra v. Uka(12). I have not been able to discover a direct Bench decision of this Court on this point. In my view, the latter class of cases which take a more liberal view of Article 182 (5) of the Indian Limitation Act should be accepted. The Article should receive a fair and liberal and not a technical construction so as to enable the decree-holder to reap the fruits of his decree. The view taken in the latter class of cases is also correct on principle. It is well-settled that an application for the transfer of a decree is a step in aid of execution even though no application for execution is pending [Sreenath Chakravorti v. Priyanath Bandopadhay(13)]. If, therefore an application for transfer of a decree can be regarded as a step in aid of execution even when no execution is pending, there is no conceivable reason why it is necessary that an execution proceeding should be pending when the decree-holder makes an application for the issue of a notice under Or. 21, r. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which step he has to take before he can obtain relief by way of execution. The question whether an application for the issue of notice under Or. 21, r. 22 is a step in aid of execution has been answered in the affirmative in the case of Gopal Chunder Manna v. Gosain Das Kalay(14). Banerjee, J., who was the referring Judge was of opinion that even if the application for execution be defective, regarded as an application for execution of a decree, if the application contained a prayer for issue of a notice under Or. 21, r. 22, the application would still be regarded as one to take some step in aid of execution, in cases where issue of such a notice was necessary, the decree having been passed more than a year before. The view of Banerjee, J., was affirmed by the Full Bench. In a later case, namely, Abdul Aziz Abdulla v. Yakub Abdul Gani(15), Chitty, J., was of opinion that even if there was no application for execution, a mere prayer for the issue of a notice under Or. 21, r. 22 is a step in aid of execution. Walmsley, J., agreed in the result but reserved his opinion on this point. Reference may be made to the case of Saday Chandra Jana v. Pares Nath Ghose(16) to which our attention was drawn by Mr. Ghose appearing for the Appellant. It is necessary to set out the facts of that case: In that case, the decree was obtained on the 2nd December, 1912. An execution was started within three years. Nothing came out of it. On the 2nd May, 1917, a second application for execution was filed. The application for execution was defective in three respects, namely, (1) the date of disposal of the previous application for execution was not correctly stated; (2) the sum due under the decree was wrongly calculated and (3) the 10th column which deals with the mode of execution was not duly filled up. It, however, contained the following prayers: (1) for substitution of the heirs of one of the decree-holders; (2) for a notice on the other decree-holders under Or. 21, r. 15 and (3) as one of the judgment-debtors was dead, for the issue of a notice under Or. 21, r. 22. It was contended that this application for execution did not save limitation. This contention was overruled. Mookerjee, J., observed that an application to take a step in aid of execution in order that it may be in accordance with law must pray for some relief which the Court can grant, and then proceeded to say that the three prayers which were made in the application were such as could be granted by the Court on the application then presented. It was, therefore, held that the application was a step in aid of execution and extended the period of limitation.

6. Before Chunder, J., reliance was placed on behalf of the judgment-debtors on certain decision of the Bombay High Court, namely, Mahomedbhai v. Dawoodbhai & Co.(17). The question, however, which arose for decision in that case was as regards the propriety of the application regarded as an application for execution. The application suffered from the defect that the particulars of the property to be attached under Or. 21, r. 54 were not specified. The case was heard by Engineer, J. The learned Judge granted an amendment of the application. Against his decision an appeal was taken under the Letters Patent which was heard by a Division Bench presided over by Beaumont, C.J In dismissing the appeal it was observed that the amendment was properly made. It was further observed that the application though defective was not a mere nullity merely because the application did not describe the property in detail. Reliance was also placed on the case of Gopal Parsharam v. Damodar Janardan(18). The question then before the Court was whether the application which prayed for rateable distribution but not against the same judgment-debtor was one in accordance with law. The question now before us did not arise in that case. Reference was also made to the case of Vallabhdas Narandas v. Kantilal G. Parekh(19). Our attention was drawn to the observation of Kania, J., to the effect that the prayer for the issue of a notice under Or. 21, r. 22 is not a mode of execution and is not a relief which a party asks for as one awarded by the decree. It is a hurdle which the decree-holder has to cross before he can get the relief awarded by the decree. It asks the Court to extend the life of the decree. The observations do not touch the question which are now before us. On the other hand, they support the view that the prayer for the issue of a notice under Or. 21, r. 22 can in certain circumstances be regarded as a step in aid of execution of a decree. The observations were made in connection with a contention then raised that this prayer for issue of a notice under Or. 21, r. 22 was one which came within the purview of Or. 21, r. 11(2)(j). It was this question which was decided by the learned Judge, the decision being that a prayer for issue of a notice as aforesaid was not a relief which the decree-holder can claim under Or. 21, r. 11(2)(j). The cases relied on on behalf of the judgment-debtor do not, therefore, assist us in deciding the question with which we have to deal.

7. In the present case, as already stated, the Court did act upon the applications presented on behalf of the decree-holder and the Court directed issue of the requisite notices in the proceedings which were taken by the decree-holder. For the reasons already given, the conclusion follows that the proceedings on which reliance is placed on behalf of the decree-holder must be regarded as steps in aid of execution of the decree within Article 182 (5) of the Indian Limitation Act and extended the life of the decree.

8. Concerning that it is necessary that there should be an application for execution and the step which is relied on by the decree-holder to extend the period of limitation should be taken in such proceedings for execution, before the same can be regarded as a step in aid of execution, we have to consider whether in the facts of the present case the application which was filed by the decree-holder on the 26th June, 1944, was an application for execution of the decree in accordance with law. The meaning of the expression “in accordance with law” has been debated in many cases both here and elsewhere. Mr. Ghose, appearing for the Appellant, referred us, as already stated, to the case of Saday Chandra Jonah v. Pares Nath Ghosh. The observations of Mookerjee, J., are that an application, even though it be deemed so defective as not to be an application for execution, must still be regarded as an application made to the proper Court in accordance with law to take some steps in aid of execution. In a later case, namely, the case of Pitambar Jana v. Damodar Guchait(20) to which Mr. Sen appearing for the Respondents drew our attention, the following passage at page 673 is relevant: “The expression in accordance with law in Article 182 (5) should be taken to mean that the application though defective in some particulars was such upon which execution could be issued. If the omissions were such as to make it impossible for the Court to issue execution upon it, as was the case in Asgar Ali v. Troilokya Nath Ghose(21), where the list of properties to be attached and sold was not supplied with the application for execution, it should be held that such an application is not in accordance with law.” In the same case Page, J., observed as follows on page 678: “The true view is that where an application for execution in substantial compliance with law is preferred to the Court, such an application will be effectual to stay the progress of limitation whether the Court admits or rejects or returns the application or allows such application to be amended. All the cases bearing on the point were reviewed by Sen, J., in the case of Gopal Parsharam v. Damodar Janardan(22). At page 358 the following statement of the law, is made: “The main test of an application for execution being in accordance with law would appear to be whether it is possible for the Court to issue execution upon it, that is, whether it is within the power of the Court to grant the kind of relief asked for, though in the particular case the relief may not, on the merits, be granted, for example, owing to some finding on facts, not to the nature of the application itself.”

9. Bearing the principles so enunciated, let us see whether the prayers made in the application with which we are concerned, satisfy the test laid down above. In the present case, the mode of execution prayed for was “by attachment and sale of Defendants' movables as per list.” No list of movables was, however, filed. The question is whether such an application for execution is one in accordance with law.

10. The content of an application for execution is to be found in Or. 21, r. 11 (2), C.P.C, cl. (j) which requires the statement of the mode in which the assistance of the Court is required whether (ii) by the attachment and sale, or by the sale without attachment of any property, (i), (iii) to (v) omitted. Rule 12 requires an inventory of movables in cases where the judgment-debtor is not in possession. In such cases, the decree-holder is required by the rule to annex to his application an inventory of his movables with a sufficient description. There is no rule requiring the decree-holder to annex such an inventory of movables when the judgment-debtor is in possession. The provisions in Or. 21, rr. 43 and 45 or Or. 21A relate to the mode of execution and do not specify the material content of an application for execution. The relevant application cannot, therefore, be said to be a nullity. The application was no doubt a defective one which could have been amended, if necessary, at the appropriate time, that is, after the legal representative had shown cause and further steps in execution were necessary to be taken.

11. Mr. Sen appearing for the Respondents referred us to the case of Abdul Rafi Khan v. Maula Bux(23). That case dealt with an application for execution directly coming within Or. 21, r. 12, C.P.C It did not decide the point now before us. The case of Birdhi Chand Dhondiram Marwadi v. Bade Saheb Babamia(24) to which Mr. Sen referred, merely held that Or. 21, r. 12 did not apply to a case where the decree was obtained against the legal representative of the judgment-debtor. In the present application there is no express statement whether the movables to be attached were in the possession of the judgment-debtor or not. If the movables to be attached were in the possession of the judgment-debtor, there is no rule which requires the decree-holder to specify these movables. It cannot, therefore, be said that the present application is so defective as to render it to be a nullity. Under one conceivable circumstance the application would be in compliance with the provisions of Or. 21, r. 11(2)(j). That such an application is a valid application was decided in the case of Nathmal Mathurdas Chandak v. Balkrishna Gangabisan Marwadi(25).

12. On all these grounds, my conclusion is that the application filed on the 26th June, 1944, and steps taken by the decree-holder in that application were steps in aid of execution in accordance with law. Limitation was, therefore, saved by these proceedings.

13. Assuming that the application which was presented on the 26th June, 1944, can be regarded as a step in aid of execution, a further question has got to be considered, namely, whether the steps taken by the decree-holder in those proceedings which were directed against one of the heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor saved limitation as against the rest.

14. This question was answered in the affirmative in the cases of Ram Anuj Sewak Singh…(Objector); v. Hingu Lal…(Decree-Holder).*(26) and Krishnaji Janardan v. Murrarnav(27) to which our attention was drawn on behalf of the Appellants.

15. The view taken in the above cases have been followed in later decisions. (See Rustomjee's Law of Limitation, 5th Edition, page 1824 where the cases are collected).

16. The reasons given in the case of Ram Anuj Sewak Singh…(Objector); v. Hingu Lal…(Decree-Holder).*, which have been followed in later decisions commend themselves to me and the application which was filed against one of the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor saved limitation as against the other legal representatives of the said deceased judgment-debtor.

17. My conclusion, therefore, is that the present application for execution is not barred by limitation.

18. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed. The judgment of this Court as also of the first Appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. The Appellant is entitled to her costs in all Courts. The hearing-fee before us is assessed at three gold mohurs.

Guha, J.:— I agree.