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Jamila Khatun Plft. Applt. v. Kasim Ali Abbas Ali Deft. Resp.

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sep 5, 1950
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal by a Muslim wife challenging the dismissal of her suit for dissolution of marriage against her husband, Kasim Ali. The appellant, married on 23-4-1944, initially lived with her husband in Bemetara but returned to her adoptive father's house in Raipur due to illness and stayed there despite the husband's requests to return. The husband did not send maintenance money after her departure. The appellant served a notice demanding divorce and dower, which the husband declined, stating he was willing to maintain her if she returned. The suit was filed on 5-4-1947, and the courts below dismissed her claim on various grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant is entitled to a decree for dissolution of marriage under clause (ii) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, on the ground that the husband failed or neglected to provide maintenance for two years.
  2. Whether the husband's failure to send maintenance money during the period the wife voluntarily stayed away constitutes neglect or failure under the statute.
  3. The interpretation and application of Muslim law principles concerning maintenance obligations and grounds for dissolution of marriage under the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that her husband failed to provide maintenance for two years, entitling her to divorce under clause (ii) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.
  • Relying on the decision in Noor Bibi v. Pir Bux, she argued that failure to maintain during her absence from the husband's house amounted to neglect under the statute.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent maintained that the appellant voluntarily stayed away from his house without justifiable cause despite his willingness to maintain her there.
  • He argued that under Muslim law, maintenance is owed only if the wife obeys and lives with the husband, and since she refused to live with him, he was not liable to maintain her.
  • He relied on precedents holding that failure to maintain must be wilful and that a wife’s refusal to live with her husband negates the husband's obligation to maintain.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Noor Bibi v. Pir Bux, A.I.R (37) 1950 Sind 8 Failure to maintain wife during her absence can amount to neglect under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act. Considered but distinguished; the court favored other precedents holding maintenance obligation depends on wife’s conduct and cohabitation.
Khatijan v. Abdulla, A.I.R (30) 1943 Sind 65 Husband’s obligation to maintain wife is conditional on wife’s obedience and cohabitation; failure to maintain must be wilful. Followed; the court agreed that maintenance obligation is limited and wife’s refusal to live with husband negates husband’s duty.
Mt. Badrulnisa Bibi v. Mohammad Yusuf, I.L.R 1944 All. 27 Neglect implies wilful failure; wife’s conduct causing cessation of maintenance prevents claim for dissolution. Relied upon; court held that absence of wilful failure by husband negates claim under clause (ii).
Zafar Hussain v. Mt. Ahbari Begum, I.L.R (1945) Lah. 517 Wife refusing to live with husband without valid reason disentitles her to maintenance; no neglect by husband. Applied; court found appellant voluntarily stayed away without justifiable cause, so no failure by husband.
Umat-ul-Hafiz v. Talib Hussain, A.I.R (32) 1945 Lah. 56 Supports principle that wife’s wrongful conduct negates husband’s obligation to maintain. Noted as following the same principle as above cases.
Fazal Mahmud v. Mt. Umatur Rahim, A.I.R (36) 1949 Pesh 7 Reiterated view that maintenance obligation depends on wife’s conduct and cohabitation. Preferred over conflicting earlier decisions; court aligned with this view.
Najiman Nissa Begum v. Serajuddin Ahmed Khan, A.I.R (33) 1946 Pat 467 Wife entitled to dissolution if husband fails to pay prompt dower and maintenance despite demand. Distinguished; facts differ as appellant did not allege non-payment of prompt dower or justified refusal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the statutory ground under clause (ii) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, which allows a wife to seek divorce if the husband fails or neglects to provide maintenance for two years. The court emphasized that such failure must be wilful and without reasonable cause.

It noted that the appellant voluntarily stayed away from her husband's house despite his requests and offer to maintain her, choosing instead to live with her adoptive father. Under Muslim law, the husband's duty to maintain his wife arises only if she obeys him and lives with him. Since the appellant refused to live with the husband without justifiable cause, the husband was not obligated to maintain her during that period.

The court critically analyzed conflicting precedents, preferring the view that the obligation to maintain is conditional and that failure to maintain must be wilful. It rejected the appellant’s reliance on Noor Bibi v. Pir Bux, aligning instead with decisions from Allahabad, Lahore, and Peshawar courts which held that a wife’s wrongful refusal to live with her husband negates the husband’s duty to maintain, and thus no ground for divorce arises under clause (ii).

The court also discussed the nature of Muslim marriage as a covenant imposing mutual duties and rights, emphasizing that dissolution is not a remedy for enforcement of maintenance obligations but is based on principles like suspension of marriage or injury to the wife. The court found no statutory or legal basis to grant divorce solely because the wife does not want to live with her husband.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower appellate court’s decree dismissing the suit, holding that the appellant was not entitled to divorce under the cited provision.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The court held that the appellant, having voluntarily and without justifiable cause refused to live with her husband, is not entitled to a divorce under clause (ii) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, despite the husband's failure to send maintenance money during her absence. The decision affirms that under Muslim law and the statute, the husband's obligation to maintain the wife is conditional on her obedience and cohabitation. The ruling directly affects the parties by upholding the marriage and dismissing the appellant's claim, without establishing any new precedent beyond the interpretation of existing law.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a second appeal by a Muslim wife from the dismissal of her suit for dissolution of her marriage with the reap Kasim Ali.

2. It is common ground that the applt. who belongs to Raipur, was married to the resp. who is a business man at Bemetara, on 23-4-1944. After her marriage the applt. went with her husband to Bemetara & lived with him for some time. She has no parents but one Hazrat Cul of Raipur treated her as his own daughter. (I would refer to him as her adoptive father). He brought her back to Raipur from Bemetara on 20-5-1944. Then some time in the month of June, her husband fetched her back to his house. In the month of September she took ill & so she returned to her adoptive father's house at Raipur. That was towards the end of September. It may be mentioned that she was actually taken there by her father-in-law. Ever since then, she has-stayed at Raipur & despite the request of her husband, has refused to return to Bemetara & live with him. On 30-10-1946 the applt. served a notice on the resp. calling upon him to grant her a divorce & pay her dower but the latter declined to grant her a divorce & stated that he had not abandoned her & was willing to maintain her in his house. He, however, did not send any money to her for her maintenance ever since she went to her adoptive father's house in September 1944. Thereupon, she brought the suit, out of which this second appeal arises, on 5-4-1947.

3. She founded her suit on a large number of grounds but as the Cts below found against, her on all of them she now rests her claim for divorce only on one ground, & that is that, in point of fact, her husband did not provide her with maintenance for a period of two years & that therefore under cl. (ii) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, VII [8] of 1939, she is entitled to have a divorce.

4. Section 2 of the Act sets out the various-grounds on which a woman married under Muslim Law can claim a decree for the dissolution of her marriage. The ground specified in cl. (ii) of S. 2 is the husband's failure or neglect to provide maintenance to the wife for a period of two years. The question is as to whether on the facts found in this case it can be said that there has in fact been neglect or failure on the part of the resp. to maintain the applt. for a period of two years.

5. It must be borne in mind that the applt. voluntarily stayed away from her husband's house & that despite the respt.'s request to return to his house & live with him & despite also his offer of maintaining her there, she chose to stay in the house of her adoptive father. Can it, therefore, be said that these circumstances indicate neglect or failure on the part of the resp. to maintain the applt. merely because he did not send any money to her during this period?

6. Relying on the decision of a Division Bench of the Chief Ct. of Sind reported in Noor Bibi v. Pir Bux, A.I.R (37) 1950 Sind 8 : (Pak Cas. 1950 Sind 18) the learned counsel for the applt. argued that the failure of the resp. to provide the applt. with maintenance during the time she stayed away from him does amount to a neglect or failure on the part of the husband to maintain the wife & therefore furnishes a ground for divorce. In that case, Tyabji, C.J, who delivered the judgment of the Ct. expressed his dissent from the view taken by Lobo, J. in Khatijan v. Abdulla, A.I.R (30) 1943 Sind 65 : (ILR 1942 KAR 535) also with that taken in some decisions of other Cts. & reiterated the view which he had himself taken in a previous unreported case.

7. In Khatijan's case, A.I.R (30) 1943 Sind 65 : (ILR 1942 KAR 535), Lobo, J. laid down that Act VIII [8] of 1939 was never intended to Abrogate the general law applicable to the Muslims & that a husband cannot be said to have neglected or failed to provide maintenance for his wife as contemplated in cl. (ii) of S. 2 unless under the general Mahomedan law he was under an obligation to maintain that wife. Lobo, J. pointed out that under Mahomedan law a husband is bound to maintain his wife (unless she is too young for matrimonial intercourse) so long as she is faithful to him & obeys his reasonable orders. He further pointed out that the husband is not bound to maintain his wife who refuses herself to him or is otherwise disobedient unless the refusal or disobedience is justified as in the case before him by non-payment of prompt dower in support of his view, he relied on the statement of law contained in Mulla's Mahomedan Law, 11th Edn at p. 215, para. 213 (equivalent to p. 244, para. 277 of the 16th Edn). Thus, according to Lobo, J., a wife in order that she may be able to avail herself of the provisions of cl. (ii) of S. 2, has to show that it was not she who refused to live with the husband as his wife but that it was the husband who refused to live with her & maintain her.

8. Tyabji, C.J has observed in the course of his judgment:

“It was clear that Lobo, J. had found the two propositions: (1) that a Muslim wife is not entitled to maintenance unless he is capable of rendering conjugal rights & places herself or offers to place herself in the husbands' power so as to allow him free access to her at all lawful times, & (2) that a Muslim wife, even when she had refused to live with her husband & was not entitled to maintenance was entitled to a dissolution on the failure of her husband to maintain her for two years, as irreconcilable; & had, therefore, felt compelled to hold that the failure to maintain in case (2) was not a failure to maintain within the meaning of Cl. (ii). In my view, this supposed irreconcilability lacked any real foundation, & was based on an erroneous conception of the principles on which the law relating to dissolution in Muslim jurisprudence was based, & that these principles were entirely distinct & different from those on which maintenance during the subsistence of a marriage was enforced.”

9. He then quotes the following from his previous judgment:

“At present I am mainly concerned with the difficulty which I feel in accepting the view that there was no failure to maintain in a case where admittedly no payments were made & nothing had been done by the husband to provide for the wife's maintenance. Among the meanings of the word ‘fail’, the Oxford Dictionary includes, to leave undone, omit to perform, miss (some customary or expected action). Maslim morals & religion ‘undoubtedly’ expect & require a husband to maintain a wife during the subsistence of the marriage, even though the law will not enforce such payment under certain conditions. A husband may maintain a wife whether she is or is not entitled to maintenance, & similarly not maintain a wife whether she is or is not entitled to maintenance. Whether a husband maintains or fails to maintain a wife is a question entirely distinct from, & so far as I can see in 110 way dependent upon the question whether the wife is or is not entitled to enforce the payment of maintenance to her in law. The terms of S. 2(ii) do not require that the failure to maintain should have occurred under circumstances when the wife was entitled in law to claim maintenance.”

10. No doubt, the liability of the husband to maintain his wife & his conditions upon which a wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband are laid down by Muslim morals & religion but they are also laid down by Muslim law. Whore, therefore, the question arises whether there has been failure on the part of the husband to maintain his wife, the question must necessarily arise whether the wife was at the relevant time entitled to be provided with maintenance. It is true that Act VIII[8] of 1939 crystallises a portion of the Muslim law as stated by the learned Judge in his previous decision but it is precisely for that reason that it must be taken in conjunction with the whole of the Muslim law as it stands.

11. Under the Muslim law, it is the duty of the wife to obey her husband & to live with him unless he refuses to live with her or unless he makes it difficult for her to live with him or unless there is some justifiable cause for her not doing so. When the law enjoins a duty on the husband to maintain his wife, it is obvious that the wife can only be maintained at the place where she ought properly to be. Normally, the place must be the husband's house. Since her right to claim maintenance is limited to this extent by the Mahomedan law, it must necessarily follow that in cl. (ii) of S. 2 of Act VIII [8] of 1939 the Legislature intended to refer only to this limited right & to no other to hold otherwise would be to regard the right of maintenance of a wife as an unqualified one even though under the general Mahomedan law it is only a qualified right. As, according to the learned Judge, Act VII [8] of 1939 only crystallises the Mahomedan law on the subject, it must after its enactment be regarded as part of the general Mahomedan law how then could the right of maintenance be regarded as of one type for the purposes of certain portions of the law & of another typo for the purpose of some other portion of the law? It would be against all canons of judicial interpretation to told that a wife's right of maintenance, in so far as Act VIII [8] of 1939 is concerned, is different from that contained in the rest of the Mahomedan law.

12. In the previous case, it was argued before the learned Judge that the wife's claim for dissolution must be regarded as based on a breach of the marriage contract & that the claim, cannot be allowed when the alleged broach was of a term which had become unenforceable & that consequently there was no real breach. While considering this argument the learned Judge has examined the Muslim attitude towards marriages A divorce A the principles upon which a dissolution is allowed under the Mahomedan law. This is what lie has observed in that case:

“A Muslim marriage is a covenant by which the parties enter the state of marriage. The parties are permitted to stipulate the conditions upon which they will do so, provided the conditions are not illegal according to Muslim law. The subsistence of the marriage confers certain essential rights & imposes certain duties upon the husband & the wife. These rights & duties are state in the Quran which speaks of them as ‘the limits of Allah’ (Cf. e.g verse II, 229), within which the husband & the wife have to live. The conditions of the covenant of marriage have also to be fulfilled Not only does the Quran repeatedly exhort every Mislim to fulfil the covenants which he enters into, but the Prophet has particularly emphasised: ‘Of all the conditions which you have to fulfil, those most entitled to fulfilment are the conditions upon which yon enter the union of marriage’ (Bukhari 67 : 53). The Muslim marriage differs from the Hindu & from most Christian marriages in that it is not a sacrament. This involves an essentially different attitude towards dissolution. There is no merit in preserving intact the connection of marriage when the parties are not able & fail ‘to live within the limits of Allah’, that is, to fulfil their mutual marital obligations & there is no desecration involved in dissolving a marriage which has failed. The entire emphasis is on making the marital union a reality, & when this is not possible, & the marriage becomes injurious to the parties, the Qaran enjoins a dissolution. The husband is given an almost unfettered power of divorce, the only restraints upon him being those imposed by the law relating to dower & by his own conscience. He has to remember the Prophet's words: ‘Of all things permitted by the law, the worst is divorce.’ The Quran enjoins a husband either to render to hm wife all her rights as a wife & to treat her with kindness in the approved manner, or to set her free by divorcing her & enjoins him not to retain a wife to her injury (Cf. verses II, 229 & 231). Any suspension of the marriage is strongly condemned (Cf. e.g, Quran IV, 129. The attitude of the Prophet is illustrated by the well-known instance of Jameela, the wife of Sabit Bin Ka's, who bated her husband intensely although her husband was extremely fond of her. According to the account given in Bukhari (Bu. 68 : 11) Jameela appeared before the Prophet & admitted that she had no complaint to make against Sabit either as regards this morals or as regards his religion. She pleaded, however, that she could not be whole heartedly loyal to her husband, as a Muslim wife ought to be, because she hated him, & she did not desire to live disloyally (‘in kufr’). The Prophet asked her whether she was willing to return the garden which her husband had given to her, & on her agreeing to do so, the Prophet sent for Sabit, asked him to take back the gar en, & to divorce Jameela. From the earliest times, Muslim wives have been held to be entitled to a dissolution when it was clearly shown that the parties could not live ‘within the limits of Allah’, when (1) instead of the marriage being a reality, a suspension of the marriage had in fact occurred, or (2) when the continuance of the marriage involved injury to the wife. The grounds upon which a dissolution can be claimed are based mainly on these two principles. The grounds stated in Section 2 of Act VIII [8] of 1939 in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) are based on the principle that a suspension of the marriage had occurred which justified a dissolution, & in sub-cls. (v) to (viii) on the principle that the continuance of the marriage in those cases would be injurious to the wife. It is important to remember that the breach of a valid condition the marriage covenant does not as such give the wife a right to claim a dissolution. The law regarding the enforcement of the terms of a marriage contract is entirely distinct & is governed by entirely different principles from the law regarding the dissolution of a marriage. When a husband A wife have been living apart, & the wife is not being maintained by the husband, a dissolution is not permitted as a punishment for the husband who had failed to fulfil one of the obligations of marriage, or allowed as a means of enforcing the wife's rights to maintenance. In the Muslim law of discolutions, the failure to maintain when it has continued for a prolonged period in such circumstances, regarded as an instance where a cessation or suspension of the marriage had occurred it will be seen, therefore, that the wife's disobedience or refusal to live with her husband does not affect the principle on which the dissolution is allowed.”

13. Briefly, the principles of Mahomedan law on which, according to the learned Judge, the grounds stated in Section 2 of Act VIII [8] of 1939 (clauses i to iv) are based are (1) that a Muslim marriage is a covenant by which the parties enter the state of marriage & is not a sacrament like the Hindu or most Christian marriages, (2) that the subsistence of the marriage confers certain essential rights & imposes certain duties upon the husband & the wife which are referred to in the Quran as “the limits of Allah” within which the husband & the wife have to live, (3) that the parties to the marriage must fulfil the conditions of the covenant of marriage, (4) that the husband is given almost unfettered power of divorce, the only restraints upon him being those imposed by the law relating to dower & by his own conscience, (5) that the husband must either render to his wife all her rights as a wife & to treat her with kindness or set her free by divorcing her; he cannot retain a wife to her injury, & (6) that suspension of the marriage is strongly condemned.

14. Bearing all these principles in mind, it is difficult to appreciate how the particular conclusion at which the learned Judge has arrived follows from the principles set out by him. No doubt, he gives the illustration of Jameela, wife of Sahit Bin Kais, & points out that finding that Jameela found it impossible to live with her husband even though nothing could be said against him, the Prophet asked her husband to give her a divorce. But even here, it was the husband who gave her a divorce & it was not the wife who could compel him to give her a divorce. The husband no doubts accepted the command of the Prophet but that is quite different from the right claimed now on behalf of the wife to have a divorce just because she desires to have a divorce.

15. Towards the concluding portion of the above quotation the learned Judge has accepted the position that the breach of a valid condition in a marriage covenant does not as such give the wife a right to claim a dissolution. If that is so, it is difficult to understand how a wife can claim a divorce in the circumstances such as those present in this case. It may be, as the learned Judge states, that the law regarding the enforcement of the terms of a marriage contract is entirely distinct & is one governed by different principles from the law regarding the dissolution of a marriage. But even so, it is difficult to understand the conclusion at which the learned Judge has arrived that the wife's disobedience or refusal to live with her husband does not affect the principle on which the dissolution is allowed. I can find nothing in S. 2 which entitles the wife to claim a divorce from her husband simply because she does not want to live with him. According to the learned Judge, where this attitude of the wife continues for a long period, there occurs a cessation or suspension of the marriage. But even where there is cessation or suspension of the marriage, unless the case falls under any of the clauses of S. 2, how can the wife claim a divorce? One of the principles of the Mahomedan law which the learned Judge has pointed out merely condemned cessation & dissolution of marriage, but just because of that it cannot he inferred that a wife will be entitled to claim a divorce. It may, if I may use an expression which finds place in the Constitution, be a directive principle, but until such principle is incorporated in a positive law, how can it be given effect to by a Ct. of law?

16. The learned Judge then refers to the decision in Mt. Badrulnisa Bibi v. Mohammad Yusuf, I.L.R 1944 All. 27 : (A.I.R (31) 1944 All. 23) and quotes the following from that judgment:

“The submission is that cl. (ii) does not use the words ‘without any reasonable cause’ & the wife is entitled to a dissolution of the marriage on the mere neglect or the failure of the husband to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years, & this may be with reasonable cause or without reasonable cause. We have given this part of the argument our anxious consideration, & we are of the opinion that the word ‘neglect’ implies wilful failure it cannot, be said that in the present case there was any wilful failure on the part of the husband to provide for the maintenance of his wife. The words ‘has failed to provide’ are not very happy, but even they imply an omission of duty. Where the wife through her own conduct leads the husband to stop the maintenance, the Ct. will not allow dissolution of marriage for that. would be giving her a benefit—if benefit it can be called—arising from her own wrongful acts. It may be that the husband is too poor to maintain the wife & then perhaps it will be open to the wife to claim dissolution of marriage for even in that case there might be some omission of duty on the part of the husband although such omission may be due to circumstances beyond his control. It is to cover such cases that the words ‘without reasonable cause’ have been omitted from cl. (ii), but where the wife or her parents are entirely to blame & no blame attaches to the husband it is not possible for the Cts. to say that the husband has failed to provide for the maintenance of the wife.”

17. What the learned Judges of the Allahadad H.C have said there disposes of the argument which has been advanced before me to the effect that cl. (ii) does not contain the words “without reasonable cause” similar to those inch (iv) & that therefore such words cannot be read into it. In addition to what the learned Judges have said, I would point out that the words “to provide for her maintenance” occuring in cl. (ii) imply maintenance only in such circumstance as is allowed under the general Mahomedan law.

18. The learned Judge has also referred to the decision in Zafar Hussain v. Mt. Ahbari Begum, I.L.R (1945) Lah. 517 : (A.I.R (31) 1944 Lah. 336) & quoted the following passage in the judgment of Harries, C.J:

“In the present case, as I have already stated it is abundantly clear that the pltf. for no valid reason has refused to live with her husband & to perform her marital obligations. That being so, it must be held that the deft, husband was not liable to maintain the pltf. As there was no duty to maintain, it cannot be held that the husband had either neglected to provide maintenance for his wife or had failed to do so for a period of two years. The view which I take of sub-s. (2) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, is the same as that taken by a learned Single Judge of the Sind Chief Ct. in Khatijan v. Abdulla, A.I.R (30) 1943 Sind 65 : (ILR 1942 KAR 535), Further, a Bench of the Allahabad H.C in Badrulnisa v. Mohammad Yusuf, I.L.R (1944) All 27 : (A.I.R (31) 1944 All. 23), came to same conclusion. In that case it was held that the word ‘neglect’ in Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, implied wilful failure & that the words “has failed to provide” though not very happy words, implied an omission of duty. Consequently, where the wife through her own conduct led the husband to stop maintenance, the Ct. would not allow dissolution of marriage for that would be giving her a benefit—if benefit it could be called—arising from her wrongful acts. Where the wife or her parents were entirely to blame & no blame attached to the husband, it could not be said that the husband had failed to provide for the maintenance of the wife. The facts of this Allahabad case are very similar to the facts of the case before us. To hold otherwise would result in a somewhat startling state of affairs.”

19. Though he has not approved of the view taken there, he has not commented upon it. I may point out that this decision has been followed by Abdul Rahman, J. in Umat-ul-Hafiz v. Talib Hussain, A.I.R (32) 1945 Lah. 56 : (46 P.L.R 343).

20. I may also mention that recently the Ct. of the Judicial Comr., Peshawar, has also taken the same view as the Allahabad & Lahore High Courts in preference to that taken in some previous decisions of that very Ct. The decision I refer to is Fazal Mahmud v. Mt. Umatur Rahim, A.I.R (36) 1949 Pesh 7.

21. Finally, I will refer to the decision in Najiman Nissa Begum… v. Serajuddin Ahmed Khan…., A.I.R (33) 1946 Pat 467 : (228 I.C 198) which was cited on behalf of the applt. In that case, the Lahore & Allahabad decisions were distinguished & it was held that a wife who refused to live with her husband because the latter did not pay the prompt dower despite demand & also refused to maintain her for a period of two years, was entitled to a dissolution of marriage. This case is quite distinguishable from the present & is not an authority in support of the proposition contended for on behalf of the applt. With great respect I agree with the view taken by the Allahabad & Lahore High Courts as well as in the recent decision of the Peshawar Judicial Comr.'s Ct. in preference to that taken by Tyabji, C.J In the circumstances, agreeing with the lower appellate Ct., I hold that the applt. having voluntarily & without justifiable cause refused to live with her husband, the resp., even though the latter was willing to maintain her in his house, is not entitled to claim a divorce. Accordingly, I affirm the decree of the lower appellate Ct. & dismiss the appeal with costs.

22. Appeal dismissed.