Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

B. Audhesh Singh Pltf. Applt. v. B. Rajeshwari Singh & Others Defts.-Resps

Allahabad High Court
Nov 23, 1950
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judicial Opinion Summary (Bind Basni Prasad, J.; concurring: Sankar Saran, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff's father and uncle executed a deed of sale on 13-10-1922 for Rs. 6,926 in favour of the defendants concerning zamindari property in several khata-khewats (Nos. 5, 8, 21, 33 & 35) of village Fatehpur, District Deoria. The plaintiff was born on 2-11-1922, 19 days after the sale. The plaintiff filed suit on 11-5-1943 seeking to set aside the sale on two grounds: (1) that the sale concerned ancestral property and was without consideration and legal necessity; and (2) that the sale in respect of the zamindari in Khata Khewat No. 8 contravened para. 11 of Schedule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and was therefore void.

Both courts below held that most parcels were non-ancestral except the share in Khata Khewat No. 8, and found that the sale in respect of Khata Khewat No. 8 was void under para. 11 of Sch. 3 CPC but dismissed the suit as time-barred under Article 126 of the Limitation Act. The plaintiff appealed, limiting his claim in this Court to the 3 pies share in Khata Khewat No. 8.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a child in the womb (in ventre sa mere) can take advantage of Sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act (i.e., whether the plaintiff, conceived but not born at the date of the sale, could claim the benefit of minority for limitation purposes).
  2. Whether the sale relating to the 3 pies share in Khata Khewat No. 8 is invalid under para. 11 of Schedule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code for lack of the Collector's written permission.
  3. If the sale is held void as to that share, whether the vendee-defendants are entitled to compensation under Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, and if so, in what amount.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff sought to set aside the sale primarily as to the 3 pies share in Khata Khewat No. 8 on the ground that the sale was void under para. 11 of Sch. 3 CPC (a legal incapacity of the zamindar/debt-holder to transfer without Collector's written permission).
  • The plaintiff contended that he was entitled to the benefit of Sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act since he was conceived at the time of the sale and born thereafter, and thus his period of limitation should be computed with reference to his minority arising from birth.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The courts below treated the suit as time-barred under Article 126 of the Limitation Act, relying on precedents to argue that Section 6 could not apply to someone not in existence (i.e., a child in embryo) on the date the cause of action accrued.
  • Respondents' counsel argued that a Collector's later action setting aside an auction sale and the payment of decretal amounts could be treated as implied permission by the Collector for the private sale; the Court rejected this contention as there was no record of any written permission sought or granted.
  • On compensation, respondents proposed an approach to quantify compensation proportionately by area: total area sold being 36 acres, disallowing claims in respect of 13 acres and allowing in respect of 23 acres, and assessing compensation on that pro rata basis. The Court found this approach inappropriate because lands vary in quality and other factors must be considered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Muhammad Khan v. Ahmad Khan, A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 254 (10 Lah. 713) Held that Section 6 of the Limitation Act was not available to a person who was in embryo when the cause of action accrued; reasoned that conception date cannot be ascertained for computing minority. The Court distinguished and respectfully disagreed with this decision, observing it did not consider Section 4 of the Majority Act and that the period of minority is computed from birth; the Court preferred other authorities which allowed the benefit for a child in womb.
Ranganatha Reddi v. Ramaswami Mudali, 58 Mad. 886; A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 839 (Full Bench) Held that a son in the womb can sue to set aside an alienation made by his father and is entitled to the benefit of Sections 6 & 8 of the Limitation Act; supported by English and Hindu law authorities recognizing a foetus as a person in certain contexts. The Court approved this Full Bench decision and adopted its reasoning to hold that the plaintiff (in ventre sa mere at the time of sale) was entitled to Sections 6 & 8; it formed a principal basis for allowing the plaintiff the benefit of minority.
Basayya Shivabasayya v. Baslingayya Channayya, A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 150; I.L.R. (1947) Bom. 750 Held that a son in womb at the date of an alienation by the father acquires the right from conception and is entitled to the benefit of Sections 6 & 8; minority computed from birth. The Court cited and agreed with this Bombay decision as supporting the applicability of Sections 6 & 8 to a child in utero; it reinforced the Court's conclusion that the suit was not time-barred.
Sabapathi v. Somasundaram, 16 Mad. 76; 2 M.L.J. 244 Referenced as authority recognizing that a child in ventre sa mere may be regarded as a person in existence for certain purposes under Hindu law. Used to support the broader proposition (drawn from Hindu law and some English authority) that a child in utero can have enforceable rights for certain legal purposes; contributed to reasoning on Sections 6 & 8.
Deo Narayan Singh v. Ganga Singh, 37 All. 162; A.I.R. 1915 All. 65 Held that a son subsequently born alive is competent to challenge an alienation made by his father when the son was in utero; under Mitakshara the son's interest is deemed to accrue from conception for certain purposes. The Court invoked this All-India decision as demonstrating Hindu law support for treating a foetus as capable of having rights that relate back to conception; it buttressed the conclusion that Section 6 applies.
Witmer's Trusts, In re; Moore v. Wingfield, (1903) 2 Ch. 411; 72 L.J. Ch. 670 English authority indicating that a foetus may be treated as a person in existence for some legal purposes (e.g., trusts, guardianship). Referential support from English jurisprudence used by the Court (via the Madras Full Bench) to show that English law sometimes treats a foetus as a legal person for particular purposes, aiding the Court's view on limitation benefits.
Hale v. Hale, (1692) 24 E.R. 25 Early English case recognizing a posthumous child as within the scope of certain trusts and allowing a bill on behalf of an infant in ventre sa mere to restrain waste. Quoted by the Court (through other authorities) as historical support for treating a child in utero as having legal protection or capacity in specified contexts; contributed to the weight of authority in favour of the plaintiff.
Villar (Vitlar) v. Gilbey, (1907) A.C. 139; 76 L.J. Ch. 339 Held that a child in utero may be a party to an action and can be treated as born for some legal purposes. Referenced in the comparative discussion of English law to support the proposition that a foetus can be regarded as a person for certain legal consequences; used as supporting authority for Sections 6 & 8 application.
Ranodip Singh v. Parmeshwar Prasad, 47 All. 165; A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 33 Dealt with sons born after a sale; concerned limitations where some sons were in existence at sale date and others born years later — cited by respondents below. The Court observed the facts of that Privy Council case were distinguishable because in that case the later-born sons were not in utero at the date of sale; therefore its principle was not applicable to the present facts.
Gauri Shankar v. Chinnumiya, A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 168; 46 Cal. 183 Judicial Committee decision laying down that while property is under the regime of the Collector the zamindar is incompetent to transfer it. Cited in support of the proposition that transfers made without the Collector's written permission (para. 11 Sch. 3 CPC) are void; used to reinforce the Court's conclusion that the 3 pies transfer was void.
Mohan Manucha v. Manzoor Ahmad Khan, A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 29; 18 Luck. 130 Held that where a contract is avoided because the foundational capacity is lacking under para. 11 Sch. 3, the receiving party may seek restitution under Section 65 of the Contract Act; lender may avoid an unsecured advance and then claim restitution. The Court followed this Judicial Committee decision to hold that vendees are entitled to compensation under Section 65 when the sale is void under para. 11; the Court relied on it to reject contrary regional decisions and to order compensation be assessed.
Mt. Nathibai v. Wailaji, A.I.R. 1937 Nag. 330; I.L.R. (1937) Nag. 111 Held that a transfer in contravention of para. 11 Sch. 3 is void and compared the incapacity to that of a minor or lunatic, and thus money paid could not be refunded under Section 65 (regional Nagpur decision). The Court held that the Judicial Committee decision in Mohan Manucha effectively overruled the view in Mt. Nathibai as to non-availability of Section 65 restitution; thus Mt. Nathibai was not followed on the Section 65 point.
Mt. Salu Bai v. Bajat Khan, A.I.R. 1917 Nag. 215; 13 N.L.E. 130 (Full Bench) Discussed the incapacity of a zamindar under para. 11; used in historic discussions of transfers during Collector's regime. Referred to as part of the line of authorities considered in relation to collector's incapacity; the Court noted that Gauri Shankar approved this Full Bench principle concerning the incapacity.
Kalidas Das v. Krishna Chander Das, 2 Beng. L.R. 103; 11 W.B. 11 (Full Bench) Referenced in Deo Narayan Singh judgment as illustrative of Hindu law treating a son in utero as in esse for partition and succession purposes. Used indirectly (via Deo Narayan Singh) to support the proposition that Hindu law recognizes rights in a child in utero relevant to the Court's view about Sections 6 & 8.
Blasson v. Blasson, (1864) 2 De G.J. & S. 665; 46 E.R. 534 English decision considered in discussions of whether a child in utero is included among children "born & living" for distribution or participation in gifts; illustrates that inclusion is sometimes allowed when for the child's benefit. Quoted in the comparative discussion of English authorities to show that the law sometimes includes a foetus for the child's benefit; assisted in framing the Court's cautious approach to such inclusions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each of the three central issues sequentially and relied only on the textual materials and authorities cited in the opinion.

  1. On Sections 6 & 8 of the Limitation Act: The Court examined the statutory language of Section 6(1) and Section 8 and the effect of the Majority Act (Section 4) for computation of age. It considered conflicting authorities — notably the Lahore decision in Muhammad Khan (which denied Section 6 to a person in embryo) and Full Bench/Bombay decisions (which allowed Section 6 to a child in utero). The Court found that the Lahore decision failed to consider Section 4 of the Majority Act and that neither the Limitation Act nor the law expressly excludes the time spent in the womb from being part of minority for rights that accrue from conception. The Court also relied on Hindu law principles and English authorities recognizing that a foetus may be treated as a person for certain purposes. On this basis the Court held that the plaintiff, conceived at the time of the sale and born thereafter, was entitled to the benefits of Sections 6 and 8 and therefore the suit was not time-barred.
  2. On para. 11 of Schedule 3 CPC and validity of the sale: The Court analysed para. 11(1) of Sch. 3 CPC which makes alienation of a zamindar's property subject to the Collector's written permission while the Collector exercises powers over the property. The Court found the sale of the 3 pies share to be effected without such permission. The respondent's contention that the Collector's later act of setting aside an auction sale and the payment of decretal amounts constituted implied permission was rejected because there was no evidence that the Collector's permission had been asked for or that the Collector had applied his mind. The Court therefore concluded the transfer was void under the plain language of para. 11, relying also on prior Judicial Committee authority (Gauri Shankar and Mohan Manucha) to support the principle that transfers without Collector's permission are void.
  3. On entitlement to compensation under Section 65 of the Contract Act: The Court examined Section 65, which requires restitution or compensation where an agreement is discovered to be void. It followed the Judicial Committee decision in Mohan Manucha which applied restitution principles when a contract is avoided due to incapacity under para. 11 Sch. 3 and held that the vendee (who received an advantage under the void contract) is entitled to restitution. The Court concluded that the vendees are entitled to compensation under Section 65 when the sale as to the 3 pies share is set aside.
  4. On assessment of the quantum of compensation: The Court rejected the respondents' proposal to assess compensation merely on a proportionate area basis (36 acres total; 13 acres disallowed; 23 acres allowed) because land quality varies. Instead, it determined that compensation should be assessed by the trial court considering all relevant factors (soil quality, area, irrigation facilities, etc.) and therefore remanded the case for assessment of compensation in respect of the 23 acres in Khata Khewat No. 8.

Holding and Implications

Holding: By the Court — the appeal is allowed in part. The decree of the lower appellate court is modified. The plaintiff's suit to set aside the sale in respect of the three pies share in Khata-Khewat No. 8, village Fatehpur, Dist. Deoria, is decreed on the condition that the plaintiff pays such compensation to the vendee-defendants as may be assessed by the trial court within the time fixed by that court. If the plaintiff fails to pay the assessed compensation within the fixed time, the appeal shall stand dismissed with costs.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The transfer of the specific 3 pies share is declared void for want of the Collector's written permission under para. 11 Sch. 3 CPC.
  • The plaintiff must pay compensation to the vendees under Section 65 of the Contract Act; the amount will be assessed by the trial court (remanded). The Court instructed that compensation assessment should consider land quality, area, irrigation and other relevant factors rather than a mechanical pro rata area calculation.
  • Costs: the parties will bear their costs throughout.
  • Conditional provision: failure by the plaintiff to pay the assessed compensation within the time fixed by the trial court will result in dismissal of the appeal with costs.

Broader precedent note: The Court expressly approved Full Bench and Judicial Committee authorities that treat a child in utero as capable of taking the benefit of Sections 6 & 8 of the Limitation Act in appropriate circumstances and followed the Judicial Committee in Mohan Manucha on Section 65 restitution. The opinion modifies the approach taken in at least one regional decision (Mt. Nathibai) on restitution by treating Mohan Manucha as prevailing authority on Section 65. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel, sweeping principle beyond the application of these authorities to the facts before it.

Disposition

The appeal is allowed in part, the sale in respect of the three pies share in Khata-Khewat No. 8 is set aside subject to the plaintiff paying such compensation as may be assessed by the trial court within time to be fixed by that court; the matter is remanded to the trial court to assess compensation; parties to bear their costs throughout; failure by plaintiff to pay compensation in time will result in dismissal of the appeal with costs.

Show all summary ...

Bind Basni Prasad, J.:— The following three points arise for determination in this appeal: (1) Whether a child in womb can take advantage of the provisions of SS. 6 & 8, Limitation Act? (2) Whether the sale in dispute in respect of 3 pies share in Khata khewat No. 8 is invalid, having regard to the provisions of para. 11 of Sch. 3, Civil P.C? & (3) Whether the defts. vendees are entitled to any compensation under Section 65 of the Contract Act, if the sale is held to be void in regard to 3 pies share of khata khewat No. 8? If so, to what amount?

2. The material facts are as follows: On 13-10-1922, the pltf.'s father & uncle executed a deed of sale for Rs. 6,926 in favour of the defts. in regard to zamindari property situated in khata knew at Nos. 5, 8, 21, 33 & 33 of village Fatehpur in the district of Deoria. The pltf. was born 19 days later on 2-11-1922. We brought the suit from which this appeal arises on 11-5-1943, for the setting aside of the sale on two grounds: (1) that the sale was of ancestral property & was without consideration & legal necessity; (2) that so far as the zamindari in Khata Khewat No. 8 was concerned the sale was void because it was in contravention of para. 8 of Sch. 3, Civil P.C

3. Both the Cts. below have held that the sale was for consideration & legal necessity, that the property in khata khewat Nos. 5, 21, 33 & 35 was non-ancestral but that in khata khewat No. 8 was ancestral. They further held that the sale in respect of khata khewat No. 8 was void because of para. 11 of Sch. 3 of the CPC, but the pltf. could not avoid it because the suit was time barred under Article 126, Limitation Act. The suit was accordingly dismissed by both the Cts. below. The pltf. comes in appeal.

4. It may be stated at the outset that the applt confines his claim in this Ct. as he did in the lower appellate Ct., only to the 3 pies share in khata khewat No. 8.

5. The first point for consideration is as to whether the claim in regard to this portion of the zamindari in suit is time barred. The pltf.'s case was that he was entitled to the benefits of Sections 6 & 8 of the Limitation Act. The relevant portion of S. 6(1) is as follows:

“Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an appln. for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned, a minor… he may institute the suit or make the appln. within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time prescribed therefor in the third column of the first Schedule.”

6. The relevant portion of S. 8 provides:

“nothing in S. 6 ……………shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability, ……………the period within which any suit must be instituted………………”

7. The lower appellate Ct. has relied upon Muhammad Khan v. Ahmad Khan, A.I.R(16) 1929 Lah. 254 : (10 Lah. 713) in support of its view that S. 6 is not available to the pltf.-applt because he was not born on the date on which the disputed sale took place. The learned Judges held in this case that where a cause of action accrues to a person when he is in embryo, he cannot get the advantage of S. 6 as he cannot be deemed to be a minor in existence on the date of the conception.

8. Their Lordships observed:

“If a son in embryo is deemed to be a minor in existence on the date of the conception, the period of 18 years, which would determine his disability, would run from that date. But it is clear that date can never be ascertained with any degree of certainty, & the contention urged by the learned counsel would lead to the absurd result that the pltf. would attain the age of majority, for the purposes of the law of limitation when he was only 17 years & a few months old, though he would be a minor at that time for all other purposes.”

9. With greatest respect I may point out that their Lordships did not take into consideration the provisions of Section 4 of the Majority Act 1875, which provides for the computation of the age of majority in the following words:

“In computing the age of any person, the day on which he was born is to be included as a whole day, & he shall be deemed to have attained majority, if he falls within the first para, of S. 3, at the beginning of the twenty-first anniversary of that day, & if he falls within the second para, of S. 3, at the beginning of the eighteenth anniversary of that day.”

10. The term “minor” has nowhere been defined. The position as I see is that for the computation of age the starting point is the date of birth; but the law nowhere provides that the period spent by a child in the womb is not to be regarded as a period of minority. A child in the mother's womb has been recognised by law to possess certain right, for instance, in a Hindu family the right to the joint Hindu family property accrues to a son from the date of his conception & he is entitled to challenge the alienations made by the Karta during the period that he was in the womb.

11. As against this decision of the Lahore H.C there is the F.B case of Madras H.C, Ranganatha Reddi v. Ramaswami Mudali, 58 Mad. 886 : (A.I.R(22) 1935 Mad. 839 F.B) & that of the Bombay H.C Basayya Shivabasayya v. Baslingayya Channayya, A.I.R(35) 1948 Bom. 150 : (I.L.R (1947) Bom. 750) in which a contrary view was expressed.

12. In the Madras case English cases were also referred to. Ramesam J., in his referring judgment observed:

“But the law does recognize that in certain cases a child in the womb of his mother should be regarded as a person in existence: vide Sabapathi v. Somasundaram, 16 Mad. 76 : (2 M.L.J 244), where all the authorities are referred to, & Deo Narayan Singh v. Ganga Singh, 37 All. 162 : (A.I.R(2) 1915 All. 65). It seems to us that this view is not peculiar to the Hindu Law, but for some purposes a similar doctrine seems to prevail in the English Law. In Witmer's Trusts, In re; Moore v. Wingtield, (1903) 2 Ch. 411 : (72 L.J Ch. 670), Williams L.J points out that, though there cannot be the murder of a foetus, foetus can be a person in existence for other purposes & he relies on Blackstone's Commentaries where it was observed that a guardian can be appointed of a child in the womb of his mother. In Hale v. Hale, (1692) 24 E.R 25, mention was made of an earlier case where a bill was filed on behalf of an infant in ventre sa mere for the purpose of restraining waste. Similar view was also adverted to in Villar v. Gilbey, (1907) A.C 139 at p. 144 : (76 L.J Ch. 339) where it was observed that a child in ventre sa mere may be a party to an action. Therefore the net result of these authorities seems to be this: while for certain purposes a child in the womb of his mother cannot be regarded as a person in existence, for certain other purposes he may be regarded as a person in existence.”

13. The F.B held in this case that a son in womb, horn subsequent to the alienation made by his father, can sue for setting it aside before the three years' period of limitation from the date of his attaining majority has expired & that Section 6 of the Limitation Act, was applicable to him. The F.B referred to several other English cases in which it was held that a posthumous illegitimate child of a workman was a deft, within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906.

14. In the Bombay case also which has been referred to above it was held:

“A son of a Hindu father who was in womb of his mother at the date of the alienation of the joint Hindu family property by the father can sue to set aside the alienation as such a right accrues to him from the date of his conception & he is entitled to the benefit of Sections 6 & 8 of the Limitation Act. The period of the minority of such a son, i.e, 18 years is to be computed from the date of his birth & not from the date of his conception.”

15. I respectfully agree with the view taken in Ranganatha Reddi v. Ramaswami Mudali, 58 Mad. 886 : (A.I.R(22) 1935 Mad. 839 F.B) & Basayya v. Baslingayya, A.I.R(35) 1948 Bom. 150 : (I.L.R (1947) Bom 750) & with the greatest respect differ from the view taken in Muhammad Khan v. Ahmad Khan, A.I.R(16) 1929 Lah. 254 : (10 Lah. 713).

16. The pltf. is entitled to the benefits of Sections 6 & 8 of the Limitation Act. The view taken by the Cts. below that the suit was time barred was wrong. The suit is within time.

17. Before I leave this point I may refer to Ranodip Singh v. Parmeshwar Prasad 47 All. 165 : (A.I.R(12) 1925 P.C 33), relied upon by the learned counsel for the resps. The facts of that case are distinguishable. The sale sought to be set aside in that case was made in 1893. Four sons of the alienor brought the suit for sitting aside the sale. Two of them were already in existence on the date of the sale. The third was born four years later and the fourth seven years later. The last two sons were, therefore, not in womb when the disputed sale was made. The principle laid down in the case is, therefore, not applicable to the present case.

18. Para. 11(1) of Sch. 3 of the CPC, provides:

“So long as the Collector can exercise or perform in respect of the J.D's immovable property, or any part thereof, any of the powers or duties conferred or imposed on him by paras. 1 to 10, the J.D or his representative in interest shall be incompetent to mtge. charge, lease or alienate such property or part except with the written permission of the Collector ……”

19. The provision is positive & mandatory. It is undisputed that, so far as the 3 pies share in khata khewat No. 8 is concerned, it was on sale before the Ct. In fact the auction sale had already taken place & an appln. for setting it aside had been made to the Collector when the sale in dispute was effected. It is true that one of the items of the sale consideration was to satisfy the decree in the execution of which the auction sale before the Collector took place; but the essential point remains that the disputed sale did not take place after obtaining “the written permission of the Collector”. Learned counsel for the resps. points out to the circumstance that after the execution of the sale deed the decretal amount was paid to the D.H & then the Collector set aside the auction sale. He interprets this order of the Collector as an implied permission for making the disputed sale. I am unable to agree with this contention. There is nothing on the record to show that the collector's permission for sale was asked for or that he ever applied his mind to the question whether or not the permission for the sale should be granted. When the D.H certified satisfaction of the decree, there was no alternative for the Collector but to set the sale aside. A transfer made in these circumstances without the permission of the Collector is void according to the plain language of para. 11. I may refer also in this connection to two cases of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee reported in Gauri Shankar v. Chinnumiya, A.I.R(5) 1918 P.C 168 : (46 Cal. 183) and Mohan Manucha v. Manzoor Ahmad, Khan, A.I.R(30) 1943 P.C 29 : (18 Luck. 130).

20. The transfer of 3 pies share in khata khewat No. 8 being prohibited by law must be held as void. Though the pltf's claim for the setting aside of the sale on the ground of want of legal necessity failed, it is open to him under the law to assail it on the ground that it was void being in contravention of para. 11 of Sch. 3 to the Civil P.C

21. The question then remains whether the pltf. should be required to pay any compensation under Section 65 of the Contract Act. It runs as follows:

“When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it.”

22. On the plain language of this section, I have no doubt in my mind that the vendees are entitled to compensation when the contract of sale in respect of the 3 pies share of khata khewat No. 8 falls to the ground. The case is, however, covered by authorities. In Mohan Manucha v. Manzoor Ahmed, A.I.R(30) 1943 P.C 29 : (18 Luck 130), their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed:

“The principle underlying S. 65 is that a right to restitution may arise out of the failure of a contract though the right be not itself a matter of contractual obligation. If it be settled law that the incapacity imposed on a J.D by para. 11 of Sch. 3 is an incapacity to affect his property & not a general incapacity to contract, it follows that the covenant to repay is not made void by the mere operation of the para. But the lender who has agreed to make a loan upon security & has paid the money, is not obliged to continue the lean as an unsecured advance. The bottom has fallen out of the contract & he may avoid it. If he does so avoid the contract, he brings himself within the terms of S. 65 & within the principal of restitution of which it is an expression.”

23. The principle laid down in this case is on all fours with the present case.

24. Learned counsel for the applt. has relied upon Mt. Nathibai v. Wailaji, A.I.R(24) 1937 Nag. 330 : (I.L.R (1937) Nag. 111) in which it was held that

“a transfer made in contravention of the provisions of para 11 of Sch. 3 is void & of no legal effect whatsoever. A person who is incompetent to transfer property under para. 11 of Sch. 3 stands on the same footing as a minor or lunatic & therefore money paid under such contract cannot be refunded under Section 65 of the Contract Act.”

25. Their Lordships relied upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Gauri Shanlcar v. Chinnumiya, A.I.R(5) 1918 P.C 168 : (46 Cal. 183). That case does not deal with the question of compensation under Section 65 of the Contract Act. All that sit lays down is that so long as a property is under the regime of the Collector the J.D has no power to transfer it & it was in the discussion of this principle that their Lordships approved of the F.B decision in Mt. Salu Bai v. Bajat Khan, A.I.R(4) 1917 Nag. 215 : (13 N.L.E 130 F.B). The decision of their Lordships of the P.C in Mohan Manucha v. Manzoor Ahmad Khan, A.I.R(30) 1943 P.C 29 : (18 Luck 130) has the effect of overruling the view taken in Mt. Nathi Bai v. Wailaji, A.I.R(24) 1937 Nag. 330 : (I.L.R (1937) Nag. 111). So far as the question of compensation under Section 65 of the Contract Act, is concerned, I hold that the vendees are entitled to compensation under Section 65 of the Contract Act.

26. The question then remains as to what amount of compensation should be paid to the vendees. Learned counsel for the resps. contended that the total area sold was 36 acres out of which the claim will be disallowed in respect of 13 acres, will be allowed in regard to 23 acres. So on the basis of the proportionate area the compensation may be assessed. I am of opinion that it is not possible to assess the compensation in this manner, as lands vary in quality from plot to plot. The compensation should be assessed taking into consideration all the relevant factors such as the quality of the soil, the area & facilities for irrigation, etc. The proper course is to remand the case to the trial Ct. to assess the compensation in regard to the 23 acres in khata khewat No. 8.

27. I would, therefore, allow the appeal & set aside the sale in regard to 3 pies share in khata khewat No. 8 of village Fatehpur on the condition that the pltf. pays to the vendees such compensation, in regard to this zamindari, as may be assessed, within such time as may be fixed by the trial Ct. & would remand the case to the trial Ct. for this purpose. In view of all the circumstances of the case I would let the parties bear their costa throughout.

Sankar Saran, J.:— I agree. The short point that we have to consider is whether an infant in ventre sa mere is a person in existence & can take advantage of Section 6 of the Limitation Act. A large volume of judicial opinion has been expressed on this question & at times reliance has been placed on the principles laid down by English jurists & Judges & at other times upon the Hindu law. The position so far as the English jurists are concerned has been authoritatively laid down by Blackstone in his Commentaries wherein he says:

“An infant in ventre sa mere is supposed to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy or a surrender of a copy-hold estate made to it. It may have an estate assigned to it, & it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use & to take afterwards by such limitation as if it were then actually born” (1 Comm., 130).

28. Another jurist Domat has expressed himself as follows:

“The children not yet born when their fathers die are reckoned in the number of children who succeed. Although not born when the succession which they are to inherit falls to them by the death of father or mother or other relations, yet they belong to them upon condition that they shall be born alive, & they are considered as heirs already before their birth” (Civil Law, Part II, Book II, s.i para. 2797).

29. Subsequently the same principle was referred to with approval in Hale v. Hale, a case decided in the year 1692 & reported in (1692-24 E.R 25). This was a case where A conveyed certain property to J.S upon trust to raise £1500 for such child or children of A as should be living at the time of his death. A died leaving no child, his wife ensient with a daughter, which was afterwards born. It was held that this posthumous daughter was a child living at the death of A within the meaning of that trust & that a direction of a trust is not to be strictly construed. Another case was referred to in Hale v. Hale, (1692-24 E.R 25) where a bill was exhibited on behalf of an infant in ventre sa mere to stay waste, & an injunction was granted upon it. In Vitlar v. Gilbey, (1907) A.B 139 : (76 L.J Ch. 339) it was held:

A testator by his will devised real estate in strict settlement to his brother's first & second sons (who were alive at the date of the will) successively for life, with remainder to their first & other sons in tail, with remainder to his brother's third, fourth, & other sons successively in tail tut declared his intention to be that any third or other son born in the testator's lifetime should not take a larger interest than for life only, with remainder to his issue in tail male. The brother's third son was bora three weeks after the testator's death. The first & second sons died without issue:

Held, that the third son took an estate tail, not having teen bun in the testator's lifetime.”

30. Lord Loreburn L.C, expressed himself thus:

“It is certain that a child in ventre sa mere is protected by the law, & may even be party to an action-Again, in computing lives for the purpose of the rule against perpetuities, a child in ventre sa mere is taken as if it were actually living. And under the old law, which treated a will made before marriage as revoked by marriage & the subsequent birth of a child, it made no difference whether the child was actually born before the father's death or was still in ventre sa mere at that time. All this is quite true……”

31. His Lordship further expressed himself thus:

“I agree with Mr. Warmington that it may be difficult at times to say when a particular construction is for the benefit of a child. But I am not on that account to extend to all cases a construction which has throughout been applied only to a particular class. Authority may compel us to do violence to the English language, & to say that in some cases a child is born weeks or months before it is brought forth. But in my opinion we ought not to say so, knowing that it is not the fact, unless we are constrained by authority. And we are not so constrained, except where it is for the child's benefit.”

32. It wo aid thus appear that his Lordship was not giving assent to the general proposition that the law is always in favour of the child in ventre sa mere & it is only where the child's benefit is involved that this principle should be conceded. Lord Atkinson while discussing a case decided by Lord Westbury, Blasson v. Blasson, (1864) 2 De G.J & S. 665 : (46 E.R 534), expressed as follows:

“In my opinion it is a direct decision that, for the purpose of ascertaining the period of distribution of a fund, the words ‘born & living at the time of my decease’ do not include a child in utero, but that for the purpose of ascertaining who is to participate in the gift they do include such a child, since it is for its benefit to be included.”

33. The view of the English authorities that I have referred to above is on similar lines as the Hindu law. In Deo Narayan Singh v. Ganga Prasad, A.I.R(2) 1915 All. 65 : (37 All. 162), a Bench of this Ct. held:

“A Hindu son subsequently born alive is competent to contest an alienation made by the father when the son was in his mother's womb …… Under the Mitakshara a son acquires an interest in ancestral property by birth, the reason for the rule being, as pointed out by Mr. Gopal Chandra Sarkar in his work on Hindu Law p. 210, Edn. 4, that the father & other ancestors are reproduced in the son. The question is whether birth relates back to the period when the child was in its mother's womb. Under other systems of law, such as the Civil Law & the English Law, a child is deemed for some purposes to be born when it is in its mother's womb. This rule is in several instances recognised by the Hindu law. In the case of succession by a posthumous son, he takes a share in his father's property from the date of his father's death & he is regarded as being in existence, though he is only in his mother's womb & not actually born until afterwards. Again, in the case of partition, a son in utero at the time of partition is deemed to be in existence & the partition may either be postponed or a share should be set apart for him. (See Strange's Hindu Law, p. 182, Jolly's Tagore Law Leotures, p. 132, Kalidas Das v. Krishna Chander Das, 2 Beng. L.R 103 : (11 W.B 11 F.B) It has also been held that the ‘rights of a son in the womb could not be defeated by a Will made by the father’ …… So that in the cases of succession, partition & will, a son in the womb has been regarded as one in esse. There is nothing to show that in the case of an alienation by sale a different rule obtains. Our attention has not been called to any text of Hindu law in which an alienation has been excluded from what is deemed to be the general rule …… Both on authority & on principle we are of opinion that a son subsequently born alive is competent to contest an alienation made by the father when the son was in the womb.”

34. The F.B case of the Madras H.C, Renganatha Reddi v. Ramaswami Mudali, 58 Mad. 886 : (A.I.R(22) 1935 Mad. 839 F.B) has been dealt with by my brother at lengh & it is hardly necessary for me to add anything to what he has said about that case. My brother has also dealt with the Bombay case, Basayya v. Baslingayya, A.I.R(35) 1948 Bom. 150 : (I.L.R (1947) Bom. 750). I am in agreement with the views expressed by him about these cases.

35. By the Court.— The appeal is allowed in part, the decree of the lower appellate Ct. is modified & the pltf.'s suit for the setting aside of the sale in respect of the three pies share in khata-khewat No. 8 in village Fatehpur, Dist. Deoria, is decreed on payment by him of such compensation in respect of that property as may be assessed by the trial Ct. within such time as may be fixed by it. In the event of the failure in payment of the compensation by the pltf.-applt within the time fixed by the trial Ct. this appeal shall stand dismissed with costs. The case is remanded to the trial Ct. for the determination of the compensation payable to the vendee-defts by the pltf.-applt within the time fixed by the trial Ct. the parties will bear their costs throughout.

D.H

36. Order accordingly.