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J. Chowdhury v. M.C. Banerjee
Judgment Summary — Mitter, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act to make absolute a rule nisi directing Respondent No. 1 to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not be issued to quash certain proceedings before him and why he should not be restrained from entering upon a reference and from making any award or adjudication.
The applicant is the proprietor of the Weekly Notes Printing Works and Editor of the Calcutta Weekly Notes. Respondent No. 1, M.C. Banerjee, is Chairman of a Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947) and the Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1947. Respondent No. 2, Mahendra Nath Banerjee, was for many years employed as a Linotype Operator at the applicant's printing works.
Relevant events (as stated in the opinion): in late 1949 Respondent No. 2 was found inefficient and was given notice of termination effective 30 November; he pleaded for retention and the applicant withdrew the notice by memo dated 27 November 1949. Thereafter the applicant alleges renewed negligence and tampering with the machine; Respondent No. 2 was given one month's salary in lieu of notice and removed from service. Respondent No. 2 treated the removal as wrongful, approached the Labour Commissioner and conciliatory proceedings were initiated; the applicant objected to the Labour Commissioner's jurisdiction. Subsequently the Government served notice appointing Respondent No. 1 as the Tribunal to settle an alleged industrial dispute arising from the dismissal and fixed a hearing under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act for 25 May 1950. Despite the applicant's protest, the Tribunal framed issues and the applicant moved this Court for certiorari and for an order in the nature of mandamus.
Solicitors for the parties were recorded in the opinion: M.K. Roy Choudhury & Co. for the Petitioner; M.N. Mitra & Co. for the Respondent.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the admitted facts, there exists an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, so as to confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal (Respondent No. 1) to adjudicate the dispute arising from the dismissal of Respondent No. 2.
- Whether Respondent No. 2 qualifies as a "workman" within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act for the purposes of proceedings in relation to an industrial dispute.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. H.N. Sanyal)
- The dispute is purely an individual dispute between the employer (applicant) and an individual employee (Respondent No. 2), and is not an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
- The correct construction of the definition in Section 2(k) must be informed by the scope and context of the whole Act; read in that context a dispute must be between employers on one side and employees (collectively) on the other—an individual dispute does not suffice.
- Respondent No. 2 is not a "workman" for the purposes of the Act because (the argument goes) there was no industrial dispute when he was dismissed; to be a "workman" within the definition one must either be in employment or be discharged during the pendency of an industrial dispute.
Respondent No. 2's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Biswas)
- On the ordinary meaning of the words in Section 2(k), a dispute between an employer and an individual employee falls within the definition of "industrial dispute".
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kandan Textiles, Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal, Madras (judgments of Rajamannar, C.J., and Mack, J.) | The Industrial Disputes Act was not intended to provide machinery for redress by a dismissed workman acting alone; an individual dismissal does not, by itself, create an industrial dispute. An industrial dispute implies a collective character — a dispute between an employer and the establishment or a part of it, normally taken up by a workers' union or a substantial body of employed workmen. The definition in Section 2(k) must be gleaned from the scope and context of the whole Act; references to Section 10(2) and Section 18 indicate the collective nature of such disputes. | The court adopted and followed these views. It relied on the reasoning in Kandan Textiles to hold that the dispute before the Tribunal was not an industrial dispute because it was an individual dispute not taken up by other employees or a substantial body of workmen. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the decisive question as whether, on the admitted facts, there was an "industrial dispute" within Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The court proceeded step-by-step as follows:
- The court noted the admitted factual position: the dispute was between an employer (the applicant) and an individual employee (Respondent No. 2). The court acknowledged that, by the literal wording of Section 2(k), such a dispute could prima facie fall within the definition.
- The court accepted the applicant's contention that interpretation of the definition must take into account the scheme, scope and context of the whole Act rather than relying solely on the ordinary meaning of the words. The court emphasized that other provisions (e.g., Section 10(2) and Section 18) and the statutory scheme suggest a collective character to an "industrial dispute".
- The court relied on the reasoning in Kandan Textiles (Madras High Court) — both Mack, J.'s observations and those of the learned Chief Justice — that the Act was not devised to furnish a remedy for an individual dismissed workman acting alone and that an industrial dispute ordinarily requires the involvement of a substantial body of workmen or a workers' union.
- Applying that principle to the present facts, the court observed there was no suggestion that other employees or any substantial number of them had joined or espoused the cause of Respondent No. 2. On this basis the court concluded the dispute remained essentially an individual dispute and did not possess the collective character required to be an "industrial dispute" under Section 2(k).
- The court separately considered the definition of "workman" in the Act and the applicant's assertion that Respondent No. 2 could not be a "workman" for the purposes of proceedings under the Act because there was no industrial dispute in existence when he was dismissed; a person is treated as a "workman" for those proceedings only if he is in employment or is discharged during the pendency of an industrial dispute. The court found this contention sound on the admitted facts.
- On these bases — (a) absence of the collective element required for an industrial dispute and (b) Respondent No. 2 not qualifying as a "workman" in the circumstances — the court concluded that the Tribunal (Respondent No. 1) had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference made to it by the Government.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court allowed the application and made the rule absolute. It held that the reference and the proceedings before Respondent No. 1 were without jurisdiction and must be quashed; Respondent No. 1 was directed to forbear from entering upon the reference and from making any award or adjudication thereupon.
Implications:
- The immediate effect is that the Tribunal's proceedings concerning the dismissal of Mahendra Nath Banerjee were quashed and the Tribunal was restrained from proceeding further or making any award in respect of that reference.
- The court recorded no order as to costs, expressly noting Respondent No. 2's long service under the applicant.
- The opinion applied and followed existing authority (Kandan Textiles) on the interpretation of "industrial dispute"; the decision addresses the application of the Act to the facts and does not purport to lay down a broader or novel principle beyond the interpretation adopted from the cited authority.
Mitter, J.:— This is an application to make absolute a rule nisi calling upon Respondent No. 1 to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not be issued to the end that certain proceedings before him be quashed as also to show cause why he should not forbear from entering upon a certain reference and from making any award or adjudication thereupon. The application is both under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act.
2. The applicant is the proprietor of the Weekly Notes Printing Works. He is also the Editor of the Calcutta Weekly Notes. Respondent No. 1 M.C Banerjee is the Chairman of the Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947) and Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1947, regarding an alleged industrial dispute between the parties herein. He has his office at No. 8, Lyons Range, Calcutta, within the jurisdiction of this Court. The second Respondent Mahendra Nath Banerjee worked for many years as a Lino Operator in the said Printing Works of the applicant. The facts which need be stated for the purpose of this application are these:
3. It is alleged on behalf of the applicant that in the latter part of 1949 the said Mahendra Nath Banerjee was found to be thoroughly inefficient and incompetent and in arrears with his work, whereupon he was given notice that his services would not be required after the 30th of November. Mahendra Nath Banerjee pleaded for the withdrawal of the notice and assured the applicant that he would perform his duties diligently and efficiently. The applicant accepted the said assurance and by a memo, dated November 27, 1949, withdrew the said notice. The said memo was as follows:—
“Shri Mahendra Nath Banerjee on assuring me that he will henceforth perform his duties as a Linotype Operator and printer diligently and efficiently, I hereby withdraw the notice I gave him for dispensing with his services after the 30th, November next.
(Sd.) J. Chaudhuri”.
4. According to the applicant, the said Respondent again fell into arrears with his work and was found to be negligent, whereupon he was threatened with the termination of his services. It is alleged on behalf of the applicant that the said Respondent Mahendra Nath Banerjee thereafter began to tamper with the machine on which he worked and that although such conduct of the Respondent warranted summary dismissal, he was given a month's salary in lieu of notice and removed from service. It appears that Mahendra Nath Banerjee treated this termination of his contract of service as wrongful dismissal and moved the Labour Commissioner, Government of West Bengal, whereupon certain conciliatory proceedings were commenced. On behalf of the applicant objection was taken to the said proceedings on the ground that the Labour Commissioner had no jurisdiction in the matter. It appears that thereafter a notice was served on the Weekly Notes Printing Press intimating the appointment of the first Respondent as the Tribunal to settle an alleged industrial dispute arising out of the second Respondent's dismissal. A further notice, dated May 17, 1950, was also served on the Weekly Notes Printing Press intimating that the said alleged dispute would be heard by the said Tribunal under sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. By the last-mentioned notice it was intimated that the hearing of the said alleged dispute under sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act would be heard on May 25, 1950.
5. It is the applicant's case that whatever dispute there may be between himself and Respondent No. 2, it is an individual dispute and not an “industrial dispute” and that accordingly the Respondent No. 1 has no jurisdiction to decide the matter. It is further alleged that the said Respondent No. 2 is not a “workman” within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. It appears that in spite of the applicant's protest the said Tribunal proceeded to frame issues. The applicant thereupon moved this Court for a rule nisi for a writ of certiorari and for an order in the nature of a mandamus.
6. The point which I have to decide, and which has been very ably argued by Mr. H.N Sanyal, is whether or not in the admitted facts and circumstances of this case there was or is an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of the Act; for, if there is no such dispute, the first Respondent cannot possibly have any jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any matter of difference between the applicant and his erstwhile employee and he must be restrained by one or other of the reliefs sought from entering upon the reference or from making any award or adjudication thereupon. sec. 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which defines an industrial dispute, runs as follows:—
“‘Industrial dispute’ means any dispute or difference between employers and employees, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person;”
7. It is admitted that in this case the dispute, if any, is between the employer on the one side and an individual employee on the other. Mr. Biswas on behalf of the second Respondent argues that such a dispute falls within the definition of an “industrial dispute”. I agree that that would be so according to the ordinary meaning of the words of the definition. But as Mr. Sanyal points out, the approach to a proper construction of the definition should be founded not only upon the language of the relative section but also upon the scheme of the several other provisions of the Act. Mr. Sanyal's argument is that having regard to the scope and context of the whole Act a dispute to be an “industrial dispute” has to be between the employers on one side and the employees on the other. A dispute which is between the employer on the one side and an individual employee on the other cannot come within the definition of an industrial dispute. A dispute which in origin is between the employer and an individual employee may develop into an industrial dispute if the rest of the employees or the majority of them take up the cause of the employee concerned. This argument of Mr. Sanyal is supported by the respective judgments of Rajamannar, C.J and Mack, J., of the Madras High Court in Kandan Textiles, Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal, Madras(1). It is nobody's case that the employees of the applicant or even some of them have joined in the dispute as to the second Respondent's dismissal. This is a matter which is solely concerned with the applicant on one side and the Respondent No. 2 on the other. The following observations of Mack, J., in the case referred to above are apposite to the facts before me:
“The Industrial Disputes Act was never intended to provide a machinery for redress by a dismissed workman or even by a group of workmen who may be simultaneously punished or dismissed. They cannot by joining in a demand for reinstatement create an industrial dispute after their dismissal. If such a dismissal, however, even of an individual workman is taken up by a Workers' Union or a substantial body of workmen who continue in employment and espouse his cause, then an industrial dispute may arise.
“The definition of ‘industrial dispute’ in sec. 2 (k) of the Act has to be gleaned from the scope and context of the whole Act, as interpreted by decisions to which the learned Chief Justice has referred. Under sec. 10 (2) of the Act which provides for a reference to a Court or Tribunal on the application of the parties to an industrial dispute the Government, if satisfied that the persons applying represent the majority of each party shall make the reference accordingly”.
8. In the same case, the learned Chief Justice dealing with the provisions of sec. 18 of the Act observed as follows:—
“The award is declared to be binding not only on all parties to the industrial dispute, but where a party is composed of workmen, on all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part. This undoubtedly suggests that something more than an individual dispute between a worker or a few workers and the employer is meant by an industrial dispute. It suggests that it must be a collective dispute, i.e, a dispute between the employer on the one hand and the entire establishment or a part of the establishment on the other hand in which case it is reasonable to presume that at least a substantial number of the employees in the establishment as a whole or in the concerned part of the establishment should be at dispute”.
9. As I respectfully agree with the views of the learned Chief Justice and Mack, J., of the Madras High Court as to the interpretation of sec. 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, I do not propose to deal with the matter any further. In my view, the dispute between the applicant on the one hand and the second Respondent on the other is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the said Act.
10. Mr. Sanyal further argues that the second Respondent is not a workman within the meaning of the Act. A “workman” is defined as follows:—
“‘Workman’ means any person employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during that dispute, but does not include any person employed in the naval, military or air force of the Crown.”
11. It is argued that there was no dispute when the second Respondent was dismissed. The individual dispute arose after the dismissal and after the second Respondent had failed to get him reinstated. In order to be a “workman” within the meaning of the Act, one must either be in employment or be discharged during the pendency of an industrial dispute. It is urged that according to this definition the second Respondent could not have been a workman.
12. In my view, both the contentions urged on behalf of the applicant are sound.
13. I hold that the first Respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain the reference made to him by Government. I hold further that the proceedings now pending before him are without jurisdiction and must be quashed and he be directed to forbear from entering upon the reference and from making any award or adjudication thereupon. This application must, therefore, succeed and is accordingly allowed. The rule is made absolute. In view of the second Respondent's long service under the applicant I make no order as to costs.
14. Solicitors: M.K Roy Choudhury & Co. for the Petitioner; M.N Mitra & Co. for the Respondent.
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