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Deochand v. Mt. Parwatibai

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Oct 8, 1951

JUDGMENT

1. This is a defendants' second appeal from the concurrent decision of the Courts below decreeing the plaintiff's suit for the specific performance of a contract of lease and for possession.

2. The plaintiff based her claim on an unregistered agreement to lease the property in dispute, which was proprietors' ‘khudkasht’ land; and the document dated the 26th December 1941 was signed by the 3rd defendant on behalf of himself and his brothers, defendants 1 and 2. The annual rent fixed was Rs. 45-12-0 and the settlement was on a premium of Rs. 250-0-0 which was paid partly in cash and partly by passing a note of credit in favour of the grantors. Possession was delivered in pursuance of the said agreement. The plaintiff therefore claimed that she had acquired occupancy rights in the lands thus leased out to her she claimed to have paid the remaining amount of the premium in January 1942. She alleged further that the other defendants, namely, defendants 1 and 2, who constituted the joint family along with the 3rd defendant, had accepted the agreement and had assured her that they would execute a registered lease shortly; but instead of executing and registering the deed of lease, as promised, they set up a bogus tenant in defendant No. 4 with the false story that the land had already been leased out to the said defendant No. 4. On such a false allegation the defendants dispossessed the plaintiff. Hence the suit for the specific performance of the contract and for possession. The relief claimed in the plaint was primarily for a declaration that she was an occupancy tenant of the lands in question and for possession on that basis; but subsequently the plaint was amended by adding the alternative prayer that if the Court for any reasons found that the claim for possession could not be entertained, the defendants 1 to 3 should be directed to execute and register a deed of lease in respect of the land which was the subject-matter of the suit, and if they failed to execute the deed the Court might do so.

3. Three written statements were filed, one on behalf of the first two defendants, the second on behalf of the 3rd defendant, the last on behalf of the 4th defendant. The first two defendants pleaded that the 1st defendant being the ‘Lambaruar’ of the ‘patti’ and the ‘karta’ of the family the 3rd defendant had no authority to deal with the property and thus to bind them. They denied having received any portion of the premium said to have been paid by the plaintiff or to have accepted the transaction as binding upon them. They admitted having executed an unregistered deed of lease, in respect of the lands in dispute in favour of the 4th defendant who, they admitted, is their maternal uncle. They denied that there was any valid tenancy created in favour of the plaintiff or that she had any cause of action for the suit.

4. The 3rd defendant alleged that the 1st defendant was the ‘karta’ of the family and the Lambardar' and as such was in charge of the management of the village where the land in dispute is situate. He admitted that the land in question was the ‘khudkasht’ land of the defendants 1 to 3. He denied that he acted with authority on behalf of the first two defendants and asserted that the plaintiff took the lease on the distinct understanding that it was subject to ratification by the first two defendants. He also alleged that when the first two defendants disapproved of the lease to the plaintiff he tried to refund the amount of premium paid to him, but the plaintiff would not accept the same. He supported the first two defendants' case that they had all agreed to grant a lease in favour of the 4th defendant by an unregistered document dated the 15th June 1941. He denied that the plaintiff was dispossessed. Thus he generally supported the written statement of the ??? two defendants.

5. The written statement of the 4th defendant is similar to that of the other defendants. He alleged further that the defendants 1 to 3 had no right to create any tenancy in favour of the plaintiff after the transaction in his favour of an earner date, namely, the 15th June 1941, for valuable consideration lie claimed to have obtained possession on the basis of that transaction and to have continued in possession ever since. He denied that the plaintiff ever came in possession in pursuance of the aneged agreement of lease in her favour. Thus he joined the other defendants in denying the plaintiff's title and me validity of the transaction in her favour. All the defendants pleaded that the document in favour of the plaintiff, being un-registered, was inadmissible in evidence for any purpose whatsoever.

6. Both the Courts below have agreed in finding that the 3rd defendant acted not only on his own behalf but on behalf of his brothers, defendants 1 and 2, in entering into the agreement of lease relied upon by the plaintiff; that the amount of premium paid was received by him or his agent on behalf of the defendants 1 to 3; that the plaintiff was given possession of the suit property in pursuance of that agreement; and that the so-called lease in favour of the 4th defendant was a bogus transaction, brought into existence after the transaction in favour of the plaintiff, with a view to shield the property from any claims on behalf of the plaintiff or others. It was also found by the Courts below that the 3rd defendant was in sole charge of the management of the village where the suit land is situate and had authority on behalf of the joint family to enter into the transaction though the 1st defendant, being the eldest member, was in theory the ‘karta’ of the family. He was in sole charge of another business even as the 2nd defendant was in charge of a third kind of business in which the family was interested.

7. It was further found by both the Courts below that the plaintiff had been delivered possession of the property by the lessors and that she continued in possession until she was dispossessed by the first three defendants in the name of the 4th defendant in May 1942. On those findings the Courts below have agreed in decreeing the suit for specific performance of the agreement of lease, holding that though the document Ex. P-1, whose counterpart was Ex. P-2, was not registered, it was admissible in evidence under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act read with Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act.

8. In second appeal it was argued that the plaintiff could not get a declaration of title as a tenant and be entitled to recovery of possession on that footing unless he proved her title. Her title she could not prove because the document in her favour, Ex. P-1, is not registered. The material portions of Ex. P-1 are as under;

“We have sold the ‘khudkasht’ land belonging to us, the numbers of which are given below for a sum of Rs. 250/0/0 as mentioned below. On account of the earnest money, thereof we have received Rs. 177-0-0 in cash. The balance of Rs. 73-0-0 is to be taken in respect of the same, a receipt has been obtained from you separately. In the above way we have received the amount in full and with effect from this day we have already delivered possession to you. And the rent has been settled as Rs. 45-12-0. (The purchasers) shall pay the same to us in two instalments in accordance with the village practice.”

9. Then follows the description of the lands dealt With and then the following significant sentence occurs:

“The land has been given in occupancy rights.” This document is signed by Harischand Mal (Defendant No. 3), by the scribe and by two witnesses. It was impounded as being a perpetual lease requiring a stamp of Rs. 12-8-0 and a penalty of Rs. 125-0-0. Exhibit P-2, a counterpart of Ex. P-1, is in these terms:

“This day dated the 26-12-1941. I have taken from Seth Nemichand. Harischand and Deochand, the ‘Khudkasht’ land belonging to them, Nos. 140/1 Ka and 140/1 Ga, total area 27 acres and 83 decimals in occupancy rights for a ‘nazrana’ of Rs. 250-0-0. Out of the same, this day, I have paid Rs. 177-0-0 in cash. The balance is Rs. 73-0-0. Hence I have executed the receipt and the same is genuine. The rent of the land has been settled at Rs. 45-12-0.”

10. It is signed by the plaintiff and by two witnesses who figure as witnesses on Ex. P-1 also.

11. There can be no doubt that Ex. P-1 is a present demise which, on the findings of the Courts below, was given effect to by putting the plaintiff in possession of the property. Hence, though it is only an agreement to lease, it comes within the mischief of the definition of “lease” as given in Section 2(7) of the Registration Act. Not being registered, it is not admissible as a document of title. Hence the plaintiff has been rightly held by the Courts below to be not entitled to a declaration of her rights as a lessee on the basis of this document. She could not therefore recover possession on the basis of a title which she cannot prove for want of registration; but in this Court as also in the Courts below, the plaintiff has concentrated on the alternative claim which was added by way of amendment, as indicated above, namely, for specific performance of the agreement to lease and for possession on that basis.

12. It has been argued on behalf of the appellants in the first instance that these two claims, though in the alternative, are destructive of each other. But it is too late in the day now to contend that it is not open to a plaintiff to pray for alternative reliefs which may be inconsistent with one another. The plaintiff was not sure of her position. At first she appears to have been advised that Ex. P-1 was only a “receipt”, as the heading put upon the document indicates. If that view were correct the document would be admissible in evidence as corroboration of her case of tenancy. Later on it was realised by her legal advisers that the document, though in form said to be a receipt, was in substance a present demise of which registration was compulsory. But no authority has been cited by the learned counsel for the appellants in favour of the contention that if the plaintiff's principal claim for a declaration of title and recovery of possession failed on account of the defect for want of registration of the document, she could not fall back upon her alternative claim for specific performance of the contract of lease and for possession on that basis. It must therefore be held that there is no such defect in the pleadings as would completely bar the plaintiff from pursuing her alternative claim for specific performance of the contract.

13. But the main controversy between the parties in this Court has centred round the question whether Exhibits P. 1 and P. 2 could be admitted in evidence for the purpose of proving the contract so as to attract the provisions of Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act. We know that certain provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, particularly those of section 53-A, the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act and Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act were parts of the same scheme of legislation which, to a certain extent, gave effect to the Indian decisions based on English cases recognising certain equities which would supply the lacuna in proof of legal title. While Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act would include a case of lease also, it stops short after providing an effective defence to a claim for possession where the defendant in possession has not taken care to clothe his title in legal form. On the other hand, Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act arms such a person with a weapon of offence also, in the sense that such a person may claim specific performance of the contract which, for want of registration, may not afford a basis for a claim of title.

14. But it was contended on behalf of the appellants that Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act is not available to the plaintiff for two particular reasons, namely, (1) that the contract in writing in this case is not signed by the parties thereto and (2) that the plaintiff, is not in possession of the property in respect of which she is seeking specific performance.

15. In support of the first contention raised on behalf of the appellants it has been argued that Exhibit P. 1 has been signed only by the 3rd defendant, and even assuming that he did so on behalf of the other defendants 1 and 2, it is a signature of the grantor only; and unless it contained the signature of the plaintiff also, she failed to bring the case within the effective provisions of Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that Exhibit P. 2, though it may be a counterpart of Exhibit P. 1, which is signed by the plaintiff, cannot be treated as bringing the case within the terms of the section. No authority has been cited in favour of this contention, but certain observations made in the cases of ‘Hari Prasad v. Hanumant Rao’, ILR (1936) Nag 115; ‘Samsher Khan v. Vtthaldas’, ILR (1946) Nag 278; ‘Balram v. Mahadeo’, ILR (1949) Nag 849: as also ‘Meri Mal v. Mt. Sharifan’, AIR (36) 1949 All 194, have been referred to as supporting generally the contention that the same document should have been signed by both the parties to the transaction. None of the cases referred to above and relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is an exact authority in favour of the proposition contended for, because in none of them the contract was contained in more than one document. In the present case, Exs. P-1 and P. 2, quoted above in ex tenso', constitute the contract between the parties; and if these two documents are treated as parts of the same transaction, there is no difficulty in holding that the contract in writing has been signed by the parties thereto, as required by the section.

16. It is true that it has been held by a Bench the Patna High Court in the case of ‘Budhan Mahton v. Ramanugrah Singh’, AIR (34) 1947 Pat 78, that a ‘patta’ executed by the lessor alone and a ‘kabuliat’ executed by the lessee alone would not constitute a valid lease within the meaning of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act; but that is not the same thing as saying that the two documents cannot be treaed as a valid contract of lease to support an action for specific performance of the contract under Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act. Action under Section 27-A of the Act is necessitated by the lacuna in the plaintiff's title for want of registration and also for want of signature of both the parties to the contract in the writing creating the lease. In the event of such a suit being decreed, the decree has to provide for the execution of a regular deed of lease by the parties to be duly registered and, if the defendants fail to carry out the orders of the Court, the Court itself has to do that which should have been done by the parties.

17. It should be noted that Section 27-A does not in terms insist upon a single document evidencing the contract to lease or upon the same document being signed by both the parties unlike Section 107 of the ??? of Property Act which insists upon the document or, if there are more documents than one creating the lease, all those documents, being executed both by the lessor and by the lessee. Hence, if the legislature had intended any such result as is contended for by the learned Counsel for the appellants it would have said so in clear terms.

18. On the other hand, it has been held that a contract of lease may be evidenced by a number of documents in the shape of correspondence exchanged between the parties: see for instance the decision in the case of ‘Ramjoo Mahomad v. Haridas Mullick’, 52 Cal 695. Hence it must be held that the first condition requisite to be proved under Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act, namely, that the contract to lease should have been made in writing signed by the parties thereto, has been fulfilled in this case, treating Exhibits P-1 and P-2 as both forming parts of the same transaction, evidencing the contract to lease and bearing the signatures of the parties or their agents or both. As already indicated, no decided case which has held to the contrary has been brought to our notice by Counsel for the appellants.

19. It remains to consider the contention on behalf of the appellants that in a suit like the present by the lessee seeking to enforce a specific performance of the contract of lease, the lessee should have taken possession of the property in part performance of the contract relied upon by him. In this connection it has been argued on behalf of the appellants that the plaintiff was not in possession at the date of the suit. That is so, but the section does not make it incumbent on the plaintiff that she should have continued in possession, nor is there any provision to the effect that a disturbance in the possession given in pursuance of the contract shall deprive the plaintiff of the right recognised by Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act. It is certainly true that if possession has not passed from the transferor to the transferee in pursuance of the contract of lease in the first instance, one of the essential ingredients of Section 27-A will not have been fulfilled; but it has been found by both the Courts below that the plaintiff was put in possession of the property on the date the contract of lease was entered into, and further it has been held that the lessee had paid up the unpaid portion of the premium to the lessors in furtherance of that contract. Hence, the plaintiff has done all that was necessary to have been done in furtherance of the contract namely, she had taken possession and had paid the remaining portion of the premium. Now the question is whether the fact that the defendants have succeeded in dispossessing the plaintiff about a year after the contract had been entered into should stand in the way of the plaintiff getting the statutory relief under Section 27-A of the Act. Again no authority has been cited by the learned counsel for the appellants in support of this contention. The words of Clause (b) of Section 27-A do not, in terms, provide that the plaintiff should have continued in possession in order to be entitled to the relief contemplated in that section. That could not have been the law, because it would amount to putting a premium upon unlawful acts of parties who have entered into a bargain and who may later on have good reasons to attempt to back out of the bargain. In the present case the defendants 1 to 3 realised perhaps that they had entered into a losing bargain and therefore thought of taking the law into their own hands by dispossessing the plaintiff. Should that unlawful act give them an advantage over the plaintiff so as to defeat the intentions of Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act? In our opinion, that was not the intention of the Legislature, and there is neither principle nor precedent in favour of such a contention. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be held that, the plaintiff has satisfied the conditions laid down in Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act for getting the relief contemplated by that section. It must, therefore, be held that the decision of the Courts below is entirely correct in law. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed With costs.

20. Appeal dismissed.