Rachamma v. Hyderabad State And Another

Deshpande, J.:— This is a petition for the issue of a writ of Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner asks this Court to quash the ostler of the Revenue Minister dated 26-11-1952, dismissing the petitioner's revision and conferring the succession on Rachotappa regarding his mali-pateli and patwarigiri of Selugunda, patwarigiri of Bhimanpali, Kotwali-pateli of Hengangira, Mali pateli of Narva and Hissedari in Mali and Kotwali pateli of Kadechura.

2. The dispute relates to the right of succession to one Sidrainappa, the original watandar, who died on 1st Amardad 1340F. (7-6-1931).

3. The competition was between three claimants, the present petitioner, Rachamma, who is the widow of the deceased, Sangam Basappa, the brother of the deceased, and Rachotappa, the respondent, who claimed to be an adopted sdh of the deceased. The course of litigation before the Revenue authorities was somewhat unusual. The Tehsildar, who was moved by Rachamma, held that Sangam Basappa was the best entitled, since according to him the deceased, Sidramappa, was a member of the joint Hindu family consisting of himself and his brother at the time of his death. The Deputy Collector, to whom the Teshildar submitted his recommendation for confirmation, disagreed with him and came to the conclusion that the family was a divided one. He held that the adoption was not satisfactorily proved and he, therefore, upheld the claim of Rachamma as the widow of the deceased. Both Rachotappa and Sangam Basappa appealed against the Deputy Collector's order to the Collector, who allowed the appeal of Rachotappa Oft 16th September 1938 (11-12-1347F.) and dismissed that of Sangam Basappa, granting succession the name of Rachotappa as an adopted son of deceased. The Subedar to whom Rachamma Sangam Basappas legal representative went up appeal after the death of Sangam Bassappa affirmed that decision, but it was reversed by the Revenue Minister on revision filed by Rachamma.

4. Rachotappa, however, filed a review petition ??? 2-11-1939, which was admitted on 26-6-1949 by ??? Director General of Revenue. It would seem ??? subsequently when the Board of Revenue was ??? powers were conferred on it to hear all the cases of appeals, revisions and reviews pending before the Director General of Revenue and in consequence of these powers the review filed by Rachotappa came up before the Board for decision and the Board allowed the review petition on 2-4-1949, upheld the claim of Rachotappa and set aside the judgment of the Revenue Minister. Against this judgment of the Board of Revenue a revision petition was filed before the Revenue Minister, who dismissed the same on 26-11-1952. Aggrieved by this dismissal the petitioner has come up in Writ to this Court.

5. The main argument of the petitioner is that the Minister's order dated 10-12-1348 F., was final and a review against that order was unauthorised and incompetent. It was also urged that there could be no review of a revisional order, that in any case the grounds upon which the review was granted were inadequate, and that the Revenue Courts had no right to decide the question of adoption.

6. These points were debated at the Bar at some length and several authorities cited on behalf of each party. We think it is unnecessary to enter into a detailed discussion on each of the points.

7. Under Article 226 of the Constitution a Writ of Certiorari can be issued only when a tribunal acts judicially in excess of its jurisdiction or fails to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it or in exercise of its jurisdiction contravenes the principles of natural justice. In the case before us the contention of blue petitioner is that there cannot be a review of the decision given by the Revenue Minister on 10-12-1348F. This contention of the petitioner is devoid of merit because in the revision filed by the petitioner before the Revenue Minister she did not raise this ground at all.

8. The order of the Revenue Minister indicates that the present petitioner only objected as regards the grounds of review. She argued that the grounds urged were not of the nature on which a review petition could be granted but she did not object to the jurisdiction of the Court. On the contrary she elected to argue the case on its merits and she must, therefore, be taken to have submitted herself to the review jurisdiction in the case. Obviously she cannot now be allowed to ??? the order by applying for Certiorari. We ??? supported in this view by — ‘Rex v. West ??? Compensation Authority’, (1919) 2 KB 374 (A); — ‘Rex v. Williams’, (1914) 1 KB 608 (B); — ‘Latchmanan Chettiar v. Commr., Corporation ??? Madras’, AIR 1927 Mad 130 (FB) (C) and — ‘Surya Rao v. The Board of Revenue’, AIR 1953 Mad 472 (D). The petitioner's contention regard ??? the absence of jurisdiction of the Revenue ??? to entertain a review must, therefore, ???. There is a further fatal objection to the ??? of this petition. The order ??? refers only to the extent of the appoint, ??? of a person to the posts of village officers, ??? is entirely within the jurisdiction of the ??? Court. As regards the watan property ??? parties have a right to go to a Civil Court ??? get their rights settled after full investigation. ??? in this connection — ‘Dandokore Sangmeshwar ??? v. Dandkore Venkateshwar Rao’. 28 Deccan 343 (E) and — ‘Jonnanla Raghavaredd ??? v. ??? Komatreddy’, 34 Deccan LR 740 (F). It would ??? that the decision of the Revenue ??? on the question of succession to the office also is liable to be altered if the petitioner succeeds in obtaining a recognition of her title to the watan from a Civil Court and the decision of the Revenue Officer is only tentative. We need hardly emphasise that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court will not be exercised where a more satisfactory and adequate remedy is available to a party by recourse to the ordinary law.

9. In view of what has been said above, we do not think it is necessary to examine the other contentions regarding the inadequacy of the grounds of the review or the incapacity of the Board to review an order passed on revision. We may only mention that sufficiency or insufficiency of the reasons for allowing a review is a question for the determination of the tribunal having seizin of the case and that Section 166(7) of the Land Revenue Act does not restrict the power of review to cases arising out of orders other than those passed on revision.

10. There is no force in this petition. We reject it with costs, which we assess at Rs. 50/-.

M.K.S

11. Petition rejected.