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Dwarkin & Son Ltd. v. Hari Singh .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants were tenants of a large ground-floor shoproom (premises Nos. 11A and 11B, Esplanade Row, East) paying a monthly rent of Rs. 695-12. On 11 April 1953 the respondent served notice to quit and on 2 May 1953 sued for ejectment. The respondent's pleadings alleged that the tenants had defaulted in payment of two months' rent on three occasions within eighteen months (though the arrears had later been paid). Specific defaults arose for the months from September 1952 to February 1953 (each paid after the fifteenth day of the following month but before the next month's rent became due). A further allegation of non-payment for March and April 1953 was abandoned at trial. The appellants had also abandoned a pleaded understanding that rent would be paid only when the landlord's agent called for it.
No oral evidence was led and no factual issues were contested. The trial proceeded on two pure questions of law. The trial judge (Bose, J.) ruled for the respondent, holding (1) that clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) of the Rent Control Act did not require the two months' rent to remain unpaid until the date of the suit, and (2) that acceptance by the landlord of overdue rent did not estop or waive his right to rely on clause (i). The trial court decreed ejectment, and the tenants appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, for the purposes of clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) of the Rent Control Act of 1950, the phrase (in substance) "the amount of two months' rent ... is in arrears" requires that the two months' rent be outstanding (unpaid) at the date of the suit for ejectment.
- Whether a landlord who accepts rent paid after the due date is estopped or barred by waiver from relying on clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) to exclude the tenant from the Act's protection.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Meyer)
- Initially urged a textual argument based on the words "is in arrears", but before the court conceded that the present-tense verb could not bear the meaning pressed at trial. Instead he relied on the phrase "due from him" in clause (i), contending it required that the two months' rent remain due at the date of suit.
- Advanced a subsidiary contention that the two months referred to in clause (i) must be consecutive months and that there must be some point in time at which rent for both months remained due and unpaid (i.e., that the two months' arrears must coexist).
- Argued estoppel/waiver: because the landlord accepted overdue rent, the tenants had been prevented from validly depositing rent with the Rent Controller under section 19 and thereby avoided default; by accepting the rent the landlord should be precluded from relying on the earlier defaults.
Respondent / Trial Court Position
- Pleaded that tenants defaulted in payment on three occasions within eighteen months so as to fall outside the protection of the Rent Control Act and sought ejectment.
- At trial the respondent relied on clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) without needing the arrears to subsist to the date of suit; Bose, J. held that once defaults occurred the tenant's disqualification under the Act accrued and subsequent acceptance of arrears did not remove that disqualification.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| T.S.R. Sarma v. Nagendra Bala Debi (Full Bench) | The Full Bench majority held that clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) did not require the tenant to continue to be a defaulter up to the date of the suit. | The court treated this Full Bench decision as binding and concluded that it disposes of the primary textual contention that two months' rent must be outstanding at the date of suit; the present judgment follows that authority. |
| Jyotindra Nath Mitra v. Sourindra Nath Dutta (earlier case considered in Full Bench) | The Full Bench examined the correctness of that earlier decision in construing section 14(4) of the Act; the Full Bench's consideration required construction of clause (i) of section 12(1) proviso. | The opinion notes that in order to overrule or affirm the earlier decision the Full Bench necessarily construed clause (i), and the present court relies on that Full Bench construction. |
| Brojendra Coomar Banerjee v. Sirish Chandra Chatterjee (Chunder, J.) | Held (as summarized) that the two months contemplated by clause (i) are consecutive months; used in discussing the meaning of "on three occasions within a period of eighteen months". | The court agreed with Chunder, J. that the two months are consecutive, and treated that reasoning as persuasive on the consecutiveness point while distinguishing that case's facts as not deciding whether simultaneous arrears are required. |
| Kanto Mohan Mullick v. Jyotish Chandra Mukherjee (Gentle, J.) | Expressed the principle that when circumstances specified by statute have occurred, the special statutory protection (here the Rent Control Act) is displaced and cannot be re-erected by a party's subsequent conduct unless the statute provides for it. | The court cited this statement of principle to support the view that once the statutory circumstance excluding protection has occurred, the landlord need not be prevented by his subsequent actions from relying on that exclusion (subject to what the statute itself permits). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court conducted a textual and purposive analysis of clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1). The clause describes "the amount of two months' rent legally payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or ... by not having been validly deposited in accordance with section 19." The court parsed the relevant phrases and reached several linked conclusions, explained below in the order addressed in the opinion.
1) Construction of "is in arrears" and "due from him":
- The court rejected the contention that the present-tense verb "is in arrears" requires the arrears to continue up to the date of suit. Instead the qualifying language ("by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract ... or by not having been validly deposited in accordance with section 19") shows that "in arrears" is used in a limited sense: it denotes that the statutory fact of non-payment within the prescribed time has occurred. The clause thus contemplates that rent which became due and was not paid or validly deposited within the prescribed time is to be treated as "in arrears" for the clause's purposes, without requiring that the arrear remain outstanding until the date of the suit.
- The court further analysed "due from him" as an adjectival phrase functioning as a condition antecedent: it points to the time at which the rent became payable (the date when it fell due) and not to a later time (such as the date of the suit). If the drafter had intended a continuing arrear up to the date of suit, the clause would have been phrased differently; the placement of "due from him" shows it describes the rent when it fell due rather than requiring it to remain due later.
2) Consequences and avoidance of an absurd result:
- The court explained that construing clause (i) to require outstanding arrears at the time of making an order or decree would produce absurd consequences inconsistent with the statutory scheme. For example, a tenant who pays arrears just before the court makes an order could thereby frustrate the operation of section 14 and the penal consequences prescribed therefor; the clause would then defeat the stated penal/forfeiture mechanism in section 14(3). Such a construction would also produce anomalous results around orders made under section 14(1) and the dismissal/prosecution of suits, contrary to the legislative scheme.
3) Whether the two months must be consecutive and whether their arrears must coexist:
- The court agreed with the view (expressed by Chunder, J.) that the "two months" referred to in clause (i) are consecutive months; the reference in the proviso to section 14(3) to "default ... on three occasions" shows each occasion comprises two successive months. However, the court held that although the two months form a unit (an occasion), the clause does not require that the rent for those two consecutive months be simultaneously in arrear at any single later point in time (for example, at the date of the suit). It is sufficient that, when each month's due date passed, the rent for that month was not paid or validly deposited within the time prescribed.
4) Estoppel / deposit regime under sections 19 and 20:
- The court rejected the estoppel argument. It construed section 19(1) as permitting a deposit with the Rent Controller only when the landlord refuses a valid tender made within the time prescribed by law (i.e., at the contractual time or, absent contract, by the fifteenth day of the following month). The court relied on section 38 of the Contract Act to reason that a tender must be made at a "proper time" to be valid. Acceptance of belated payment by the landlord does not amount to a wrongful act that vitiates the tenant's rights because a valid tender (and hence a right to deposit on refusal) must be made in time. Section 20(1) and 20(3) were read consistently with section 19(1): section 20(3) deems a timely deposit to constitute payment if the amount deposited would have been a valid legal tender when the rent was due, but this does not remove the prior requirement of a proper timely tender before a valid deposit-right arises.
- Because in the present case the tenants' tenders were not made within the time when such tenders would have been valid, there was no right to deposit and the landlord's acceptance of late payments did not alter the tenants' legal position or give rise to estoppel. The court therefore held that estoppel and waiver were not available to the tenants to avoid the statutory disqualification.
5) Overarching statutory scheme:
- The court emphasised that non-payment of rent is not the landlord's cause of action for ejectment; rather non-payment is one statutory ground for withholding the Act's special protection. When the Act specifies circumstances in which the tenant loses protection, the landlord's subsequent conduct cannot, by itself and unless the statute so provides, re-create that protection. The court cited Gentle, J.'s formulation (Kanto Mohan Mullick) as the correct principle for this context.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL WITH COSTS.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The trial decree in favour of the respondent (ejectment) is upheld and the appellants' appeal fails; costs were awarded against the appellants.
- Statutory interpretation consequences (as stated by the court): Clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) does not require that the two months' rent remain unpaid up to the date of the suit; it is sufficient that the tenant failed to pay or validly deposit rent when it fell due (i.e., the statutory fact of non-payment within the prescribed time occurred). The two months are to be read as consecutive months for the purposes of identifying an occasion of default, but the clause does not demand that arrears for both months be simultaneously outstanding at a later time such as the date of suit.
- On estoppel/waiver: Acceptance by a landlord of overdue rent, when such tenders were not made in the time required to be valid tenders for the purpose of section 19, does not estop the landlord from relying on the statutory defaults to exclude the tenant from the Act's protection.
- Broader precedent-setting: The court applied and treated as binding the Full Bench decision in T.S.R. Sarma v. Nagendra Bala Debi for the principal textual question; the judgment does not purport to create a new departure from that authority.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Chakravartti, C.J:— An interesting and in a sense fundamental question under the Rent Control Act of 1950 is involved in this appeal. It is also a question of first impression in one of its aspects.
2. The facts are not in dispute. The Appellants are or, perhaps it would be more correct to say, were tenants under the Respondent in respect of a large shoproom on the ground floor of premises Nos. 11A and 11B, Esplanade Row, East. They paid a rent of Rs. 695-12 as per month. On the 11th April, 1953, the Respondent issued a notice to them to quit the premises on the expiry of the month and on the 2nd May, 1953, he brought a suit for their ejectment on the Original Side of this Court. In order to exclude the Appellants from the benefit of the Rent Control Act, he pleaded that they had made default in the due payment of two months' rent on three occasions within a period of eighteen months, though they had subsequently paid up that rent. The rent for September, 1952, had been paid on the 17th October following, that for October on the 19th November, that for November on the 17th December, that for December on the 19th January, 1953, that for January, 1953, on the 17th February following and that for February on the 17th March, 1953. The Respondent's further case was that the Appellants had not at all paid the rent for March and April, 1953, but that case was abandoned at the trial. In their written statement the Appellants took a plea of an understanding between the parties that the rent would be paid when an agent or servant of the Respondent would call for it, but that case was also abandoned.
3. The parties adduced no oral evidence and raised no issue of fact. It appears that no time for the payment of the rent was fixed by the contract and accordingly the rent for each month would be payable by the fifteenth day of the month next following. On that basis, the parties went to trial on two pure questions of law which were (a) whether it was contemplated by clause) (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) of the Act that ‘the amount of two months' rent’ referred to in it should be outstanding at the date of the suit for ejectment and (b) whether a landlord, who had accepted the rent paid to hint after the due date, was debarred by the principles of estoppel and waiver from relying on clause (i) of the proviso against the tenant.
Bose, J.:— Who heard the suit, decided both the questions in favour of the Respondent. He held that clause; (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) did not mean or imply that the amounts in respect of which default had been committed must remain unpaid till the date of the suit for ejectment. He held further that although by accepting the rent after the due date, the Respondent had made it impossible for the Appellants to deposit it with the Rent Controller under section 19 of the Act and thereby to avoid default, he was still not affected by either estoppel or waiver, since there could be no estoppel against a statute and since there was no obligation on a landlord to refuse to accept overdue rent. In the view of the learned Judge, as soon as defaults as contemplated by the Act occurred, the tenant's disability of his exclusion from the benefits of the Act accrued and a subsequent acceptance of the arrears by the landlord could not have the effect of removing the disability. In the result, the learned Judge decreed the suit and thereupon the present appeal was preferred.
4. Before us, the same two points as had been taken before Bose, J., were urged on behalf of the Appellants by Mr. Meyer, but he placed his contention on the first point on a new ground and added a branch to it. Before Bose, J., the Appellants had relied entirely on the words ‘is in arrears’, occurring in clause (i) of the proviso, and contended that the clear effect of those words was to desiderate that there must be present arrears at the point of time contemplated which was said to be the date of the suit. Mr. Meyer did not press that contention. He conceded that by reason of the qualifying words used in the clause, the expression ‘is in arrears’ could not be said to bear the meaning attributed to it on behalf of the Appellants before the trial court, but he contended that the same result followed from the words ‘due from him’ which were also to be found in the clause. In the second place he contested that even assuming that in order that clause (i) might apply, the ‘two months' rent’ contemplated by it need not be outstanding at the date of the suit, it was still essential that the two months should be consecutive months and that there should be some point of time at which the rent for both of them remained due and unpaid so that defaults in respect of two consecutive months co-existed. On the questions of estoppel and waiver, Mr. Meyer took the same line as learned Counsel in the trial court.
5. Since the argument on the first point was of a textual character, it will be convenient, before dealing with it, to set out the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 12 and of clause (i) of the proviso. They read as follows:
12(1). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other Act or law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant, including a tenant whose lease has expired:
Provided that nothing in the subsection shall apply to any suit for decree for such recovery of possession,—
(i) subject to the provisions of section 14, where the amount of two months' rent legally payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract by the fifteenth day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly deposited in accordance with section 19.
6. The facts of the present case, it will be recalled, are that although the rent for none of the months from September, 1952, to February, 1953, was paid by the fifteenth day of the next following month, yet it was paid before the rent for the next month fell due. At no date, therefore, was the rent for two consecutive months due at the same time and at the date of the suit, there were no arrears at all. It follows that if Clause (i) of the proviso requires that at the date of the suit for ejectment, the amount of the rent for two consecutive months should be outstanding; the clause does not apply in the present case. Even if it at least requires that the amounts of the rent for two consecutive months should be simultaneously in arrear at some point of time, it has no application.
7. Mr. Meyer's contention, as I have already stated, was that the first requirement was contained in the words ‘due from him’. His further contention was that the second requirement was contained in the words ‘the amount of two months' rent’ and also in the words ‘default in payment of the rent referred to in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 12 on three occasions within a period of eighteen months’, occurring in the proviso to section 14(3) of the Act.
8. As pointed out by Bose, J., the question whether for the application of clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) it is necessary that two months rent must be in arrear at the date of the suit for ejectment, is really concluded by the majority judgment in the Full Bench case of T.S.R Sarma v. Nagendra Bala Debi (1) (57 C.W.N 1), delivered by myself. At one stage of his argument Mr. Meyer submitted that although an opinion against his present contention had undoubtedly been expressed in the Full Bench case, it had really not been intended to decide the point and therefore his contention was still open to him. If I understood him aright, he subsequently modified that view. In any event, it appears to me that the opinion expressed in the Full Bench case cannot be treated as a mere obiter dictum. One of the questions referred to the Full Bench was whether the case of Jyotindra Nath Mitra…Defendant, v. Sourindra Nath Dutta…Plaintiff, Opposite Party.* (2) (55 C.W.N 123), so far as it construed section 14(4) of the Act, had been rightly decided. For overruling the decision as the Full, Bench did, it was necessary to construe section 14(4) and for construing section 14(4) and particularly the words “if any” therein on which the earlier decision had relied, it was necessary to construe clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1). In construing the clause, the majority of the Full Bench clearly held, as appears from p. 14 of the report, that it did not require that the tenant should continue to be a defaulter up to the date of the suit. The first contention of Mr. Meyer is thus concluded by an authority which is binding on all Benches of this Court, but I shall still consider it and examine the ground on which it was based.
9. Mr. Meyer did not rely on the words ‘is in arrears’ and conceded that since the clause had not used the words simpliciter, but only spoke of rent being in arrear ‘by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract…………..or by not having been validly deposited in accordance with section 19’, it must be taken to have used the word ‘arrears’ only in the limited sense indicated by the qualifying words. What the clause meant was that if the rent for two months was not paid or deposited within the time limited by law, that fact was sufficient to impress such rent with the character of ‘arrears’ for the purposes of the clause and the expression ‘is in arrears’ only meant that such a fact had happened. By itself, it did not mean further that the rent was continuing to remain in arrear. That view of the expression ‘is in arrears’ is plainly right, despite the use of the verb ‘to be’ in the present tense. Were the intended meaning otherwise and if the present existence of an outstanding amount was contemplated, there was no reason why the clause should have specified in what manner the rent should be in arrear and then said that it should be in arrear by not having been paid or deposited within the time limited by law, but not said that it should be in arrear by not having been paid or deposited up to the date of the suit. A requirement that rent for two months should be due and unpaid at the date of the suit cannot therefore be spelt out of the words ‘is in arrears’. Mr. Meyer, however, contended that such a requirement had been laid down by the words ‘due from him’. Those words, he said, must be given some meaning. If they did not mean that two months' rent must be still due, they added nothing to the words ‘legally payable by the tenant’ and to construe them as not bearing that meaning would be to convict the Legislature of either tautology or the enactment of an useless phrase.
10. I find myself wholly unable to accept the contention of Mr. Meyer. Like the words ‘legally payable by the tenant’, the words ‘due from him’ constitute an adjectival phrase and both are used to describe the two months' rent with respect to which it is subsequently said that it should be in arrear in the sense of not having been paid or deposited within the time limited by law. The words ‘due from him’ embody a condition antecedent and not a condition subsequent. It is rent already due from the tenant which, in the view of the clause, becomes rent in arrear in a certain sense and in a certain way. Clearly, the word ‘due’ in the phrase ‘due from him’ has reference to the point of time at which the rent concerned is payable and not being paid, becomes an amount in arrear. It has no reference to any subsequent point of time and, placed as it is, it cannot be read as laying down or carrying an implication that the rent must be in arrear even at the date of the suit. If the words in clause (i) had been ‘is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract………………or by not having been validly deposited in accordance with section 19 and is due from him’, the construction put forward by Mr. Meyer would have been a tenable one.
11. Apart from the true grammatical construction, of the language of clause (i) of the proviso, it appears to me that the view contended for by Mr. Meyer would lead to an extraordinary result. If it is to be held that the clause requires the rent contemplated by it to be unpaid and outstanding, it cannot be possible to stop at the date of the suit. Section 12(1), to which clause (i) is a proviso, does not say that no suit for recovery of possession shall be brought against a tenant, but that ‘no order or decree for recovery of possession’ shall be made against him. Then the proviso begins by saying that nothing in the sub-section shall apply in certain cases which means that the rule against making an order or decree for recovery of possession shall not apply. One of the cases contemplated by the proviso and mentioned in clause (i) thereof is that the amount of two months' rent is in arrear. If the clause means that the rent must be outstanding, the effect of the clause, read with the opening and operative words of the proviso, will be that the bar against making an order or decree for possession shall not apply and such an order or decree can be made only if, at the time of making the order or the decree, the rent is still due and unpaid. It is impossible to hold that such could be the intention of the clause. To read it in that way will be to create the re suit that even if the tenant fails to pay the rent directed to be paid by an order under section 14(1) within the time fixed by the order, the Court will still be unable to make an order or decree for possession against him if only he pays up the arrears so as not to leave two months' rent outstanding just as the Court is about to make the order or decree. The exception contained in clause (i) of the proviso will, in such a case, no longer apply and the bar imposed by the main provision of section 12(1) will come into operation. It is noticeable that while section 14(8) provides that the suit, so far as it is a suit for ejectment, shall be dismissed if the tenant makes the payment directed to be made under section 14(1), it says nothing as to what will happen if the tenant does not pay. Obviously, the whole suit will be proceeded with. It will appear further that, on the construction of clause (i) of the proviso suggested by Mr. Meyer, even a default on three occasions within a period of eighteen months will not disable the tenant altogether from availing himself of the protection of section 12(1), because if he pays up the arrears so as not to leave two months' rent outstanding even on the last date of the suit, the Court will be unable to make a decree or order for possession. The penalty provided for in the proviso to section 14(3) is only forfeiture of the protection ‘under this section’ and not forfeiture of the protection under section 12(1). I am entirely unable to accept a construction of clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) which will thus defeat altogether the provisions of section 14 to which it has expressly been made subject, the words ‘subject to the provisions of section 14’ with which the clause opens can only mean that although a tenant may be in default in the sense indicated in the clause, he may still escape the consequences of such default if he pays up in accordance with an order under section 14, whatever may be found due from him at the time. They can mean nothing more. In my view, the clause does not require that the two months' rent, referred to in it, should be actually outstanding at the date of the suit for ejectment and neither the phrase ‘is in arrears’, nor the phrase ‘due from him’ justifies a contrary conclusion. The latter words are not superfluous. While ‘legally payable by the tenant’ means ‘obligatory on him under the law to pay’, ‘due from him’ means ‘unpaid and outstanding at the date when it falls due for payment.’ Two months' rent may in a case be outstanding even at the date of the suit, but in order to constitute a default as contemplated by clause (i), it is not necessary that it must be so outstanding.
12. At one stage of his argument, Mr. Meyer referred also to the provisions of section 14(1) and contended that since that section required the court to determine the rent payable by the tenant and make an order for its payment, it implied that there must be an amount of two months' rent due at the date of the suit. Ultimately, he conceded that he could derive no assistance from the terms of section 14(1). It is clear that section 14(1) furnishes no guidance on the present question. A determination of the rent payable may be necessary under the section even if less than two months' rent was due at the date of the suit or even if arrears had accrued due since the institution of the suit, although at the date of its institution there were no arrears outstanding;.
13. It may seem somewhat strange that the landlord should be able to accept overdue rent and yet be able to rely on default in respect of the payment of the same rent for the purposes of the ejectment of the tenant. But a little reflection will show that there is no strangeness in such a pro-vision. The cause of action for the landlord's suit for ejectment is not non-payment of rent. He has to establish his right to eject on other grounds. Non-payment of rent is only a ground for refusing to the tenant the special protection provided for by the Rent Control Act and for withholding from him the special defence. If the Act has provided that in order that the tenant may forfeit the benefit of the Act, it is not necessary that he should be actually in arrear but it is sufficient if he is unpunctual in the payment of rent to the extent and degree specified, it cannot be said to have made an unjust or unintelligible provision.
14. The second branch of Mr. Meyer's argument on the first point was that, in any event, clause (i) required that the rent for two consecutive months should be simultaneously outstanding at some point of time. He contended that the Act regarded two months as making up a unit for the purposes of default, as appeared from the proviso to section 14(3) and as had been held by Chunder, J., in the case of Brojendra Coomar Banerjee v. Sirish Chandra Chatterjee (3) (58 C.W.N 225). The two months contemplated by clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) were therefore consecutive months and if they formed a single unit, it followed that the rent for both of them should be in arrear at the same time in order that a default as envisaged by the clause might occur.
15. For the purposes of the present case, it is not necessary to decide whether the two months referred to in clause (i) of the proviso are consecutive months, because the six months in respect of which default was committed were in fact all consecutive. I may, however, say that I agree entirely with Chunder, J., that the two months contemplated by the clause are consecutive months. The reference to the clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) in the proviso to section 14(3) is a kind of an elucidation of its meaning and the expression ‘default in payment of the rent referred to in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 12 on three occasions within a period of eighteen months’; does certainly imply that each occasion is constituted of two months and those two months are successive. As Chunder, J., very pertinently points out, if default in respect of any six months was intended, it would have been sufficient and more appropriate to say, ‘on six occasions within a period of eighteen months’. It cannot by any means be said that since clause (i) of the proviso does not speak of ‘two months' rent’, but only of ‘the amount of two months' rent’, even fractional arrears in respect of any number of months or of months separated from each other or one another would satisfy the clause, so long as the total of the arrears was equivalent to two months' rent. Such a construction would be fantastic. But because the two months in respect of which defaults should occur, are intended to be consecutive, it does not follow that the rent for two consecutive months should be in arrear at the same time. I find nothing in the clause to warrant such a view and Chunder, J., did not so hold in the case cited. He had no occasion to consider the point, because although, in the case before him, default in respect of six months had occurred, the last two of the months were not consecutive which was sufficient to enable him to hold that clause (i) of the proviso did not apply. In my view, while the effect of the expression ‘on three occasions’ in the proviso to section 14(3) is to indicate the two months contemplated by clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) to be consecutive, its effect is not also to indicate that the rent for two such consecutive months should be simultaneously in arrear. If two consecutive months are taken together, they make an occasion, the occasion being that for two consecutive months the tenant defaults in paying the rent on, the due date. More is not required to satisfy the expression, because the element of consecutiveness is sufficient to bind the two months together into a unit. Indeed, it seems to me that although two consecutive months are taken as a unit, they are not completely unified, because if they were, the rent for the two months would be a consolidated amount and it would be impossible to find a time fixed by the contract for its payment or for a valid deposit of it under section 19 to which reference has been made in clause (i).
16. The second point urged by Mr. Meyer was one of estoppel. He contended that if the Respondent had not accepted the rent when it was tendered to him, the Appellants could have de-posited it with the Rent Controller under section 19(1) and thereby avoided default, but by accepting the rent, the Respondent had prevented the Appellants from having recourse to the method of a deposit and therefore he was prevented from relying on the defaults for the purpose of invoking clause (i) of the proviso and excluding the Appellants from the benefit of section 12(1). In my view, no question of estoppel arises. Bose, J., held that by accepting the payment of the overdue rent, the Respondent had deprived the Appellants of the opportunity of depositing the rent with the Rent Controller. With great respect, I am unable to agree with him. Under section 19(1) of the Act, a tenant can make a deposit only when the landlord does not accept the rent tendered by him. A, deposit must therefore be preceded by a tender and a refusal to accept and it appears to me that if it is only the refusal of a tender which gives the tenant the right to deposit the rent, the tender must be a valid tender. A tenancy is held under a contract and therefore in order that a tender may be a valid tender, it must be made ‘at a proper time’, as required by section 38 of the Contract Act. The proper time to make a tender of rent must be the time fixed for its payment by the contract or the fifteenth day of the next following month when there is no contractual time, as the case may be. What the Rent Control Act provides, it appears to me, is that the tenant must first tender the rent to the landlord within the time by which it is payable to him under the law and only if he refuses to accept a tender so made, does a right arise in the tenant to deposit the rent with the Rent Controller. When the landlord refuses to accept a proper tender, the tenant gets an extension of time under section 20(1) for making a deposit up to a further fifteen days from the time of payment fixed by the contract or where there is no time fixed, up to the first day of the second month next following that for which the rent was payable. The landlord suffers for his perversity by the payment being delayed for some time and the tenant gets an accommodation for the inconvenience to which he is put. But it cannot be that the tenant may tender the rent to the landlord even after the due date has passed and if the landlord refuses to accept the belated tender, the tenant may yet deposit the rent with the Rent Controller and avoid a default. If such was the intention of the Act, there could be no meaning in making a provision for payment to the landlord by the time fixed by the contract or, in the absence of such a time, by the fifteenth day of the next month. It might well have been provided straightaway that the tenant would be entitled to pay the rent for any month within fifteen days of the time fixed by the contract or within the first day of the second month next following the month concerned. Nor could there be any meaning in interposing a tender to the landlord. It might well have been provided straightaway that a tenant would be entitled to pay the rent within the time prescribed either to the landlord or to the Rent Controller. It appears to me to be perfectly clear that the scheme of the Act is entirely different. It provides for both direct payment of the rent to the landlord and for its indirect payment to him through the Rent Controller, but lie-fore the method of indirect payment can be resorted to, it is necessary that a proper and valid attempt at a direct payment should be made. To confine ourselves to the present point, clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1) speaks of a valid deposit in accordance with section 19. Section 20(1) prescribes the time for a valid deposit for the purposes of the clause (i) of the proviso to section 12(1). In between occurs section 19 and that section provides that a deposit with the Rent Controller can be made only when the landlord has refused to accept the rent tendered by the tenant. For the reasons I have already given, such tender must be a tender made within the time by which the rent is payable to the landlord.
17. Mr. Meyer drew our attention to section 20(3) of the Act which provides that if the rent is deposited within the time mentioned in sub-section (1), ‘the deposit shall constitute payment of rent to the landlord if the amount deposited would have been valid legal tender of rent if tendered to the landlord on the date fixed by contract for payment of rent when there is such contract or in the absence of such contract on the fifteenth day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable.’ It was contended by Mr. Meyer that since the section spoke of the deposit itself constituting payment to the landlord, it implied that no prior tender to the landlord was necessary and that the same implication was to be found in the reference to the amount which ‘would have been valid legal tender of rent if tendered to the landlord.’ In my opinion, the contention is in direct conflict with the clear provision contained in section 19(1) and cannot be accepted. I must say, however, that taken by itself, the second of the expressions relied on by Mr. Meyer does lend some countenance to his contention, but it is unfortunately not always possible to take the draftsman of the Rent Control Act too literally as, in many respects, he appears to be disdainful of the rules of grammar, In any event, the involved and ambiguous language of section 20(3) cannot prevail over the direct provision of section 19(1). What the former section-means, I think, is that the deposit with the Rent Controller shall be deemed to be payment to the landlord and it shall be so deemed if it is made within the time laid down in section 20(1) and if the amount is such that it would be a sufficient tender at the date when the rent was payable to the landlord, the deposit with the Rent Controller being necessarily made at a later date.
18. In the view indicated above, there was no valid tender to the Respondent in the present case within the time by which such a tender could be made. On the dates in which the rent was tendered to the Respondent and accepted by him, there was no longer any right in the Appellants to make a deposit with the Rent Controller and therefore by the Respondent's acceptance of the rent, the Appellants were in no way made to alter their position and were not affected in regard to any of their rights. The plea of estoppel therefore fails.
19. Mr. Meyer did not address us separately on the question of waiver which he formulated at the beginning of his argument. Indeed, he conceded that if we did not accept his construction of sections 20(1) and 20(3), the grounds of estoppel and waiver would not be available to him. I do not think any question of waiver can possibly arise, seeing that non-payment of rent is not the cause of action for the landlord's suit for ejectment.
20. That suit is governed by the general law except that the Rent Control Act pro-vides a special protection to the tenant which is available to him on the conditions stated in the Act and not available in certain other circumstances specified. When one or other of the latter circumstances has occurred, the Rent Control Act is out of the landlord's way and no action of his can erect it again as a barrier, unless the Act itself has so provided. The correct principle applicable in such cases was laid down by Gentle, J., in the case of Kanto Mohan Mullick v. Jyotish Chandra Mukherjee (4) (49 C.W.N 433), with which I respectfully agree.
21. For the reasons given above, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Lahiri, J.:— I agree.
Solicitors: A.K Ghose for the Appellants; N.C Bural and Pyne for the Respondent,
A.K.D.G
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