Sinha, J.:— The facts of this case are, briefly, as follows:—

Premises No. 9, Esplanade East, belonged to Messrs. T.E Thompson and Company Limited. Sometime in 1939, the petitioner became a tenant under the said Company. It is stated in the petition that the tenancy was in respect of a shop room; but in reality, a road-side space in front of the east side gate was let out to the petitioner. It is the kind of space which is occupied by hawkers, abutting the pavements of Calcutta. The company issued rent bills to the petitioner. The subject matter of the tenancy was at first described as— “East side gate of 9, Esplanade East.” This description has from time to time changed, together with the rent. In June, 1940, I find the description to be “front portion of east side gate” and the rent is Rs. 100. It is alleged by the respondents that in October, 1942, the Central Government took a verbal lease of the front portion of the premises. In October, 1943, the property was purchased by Ram Gopal Shaw Estates. It further appears that by this time the property had been divided into two parts, namely, 9-A and 9-B and the rent bill issued by Ram Gopal Shaw Estates to the petitioner is in respect of 9-B, Esplanade Row East, “Outside Stall”. In March, 1946, I find the rent to be Rs. 80. In August, 1948, the description has been changed into “one side stall”, and the rent is Rs. 70. In December, 1948, I find that the rental of Rs. 105 has been charged. From March, 1951, the receipts mention 9-B, Esplanade Row East only. This description has continued even in 1953 together with the rental of Rs. 105 per month. It is stated in the affidavit of P.N Khanna, the Estate Manager of the Government of India Estates at Calcutta, affirmed on the 6th May, 1954, that in or about November, 1952, the Deputy Secretary of the Government of India, Department of Supply, 6, Esplanade East, Calcutta, hired the front portion of Premises No. 9, Esplanade East, now known as 9-B, Esplanade East, from Messrs. T.E Thompson and Company Limited, at a rent of Rs. 1,700 per month. It was further agreed that the Government would pay the occupier's share of Municipal taxes and all costs of repair. Rent Bills have been disclosed showing that the Ram Gopal Shaw Estates Limited, Calcutta, were issuing receipts to the Manager, Government of India Estates, 6, Esplanade East, Calcutta, in respect of 9-B, Esplanade Row East, at the rate of Rs. 1,700 per month. On the 21st January, 1952, the Deputy Superintendent, Census Operations, West Bengal, then situate in 9-B, Esplanade East, Calcutta, wrote a letter to the Estate Manager, Government of India, as follows:—

“It appears that some hawkers have occupied the pavements of the ground-floor of 9-B, Esplanade East, Calcutta, without any permission from this office. You are requested to take necessary action.”

2. This was followed by another letter on the 5th March, 1952, complaining that several hawkers were occupying the road front of premises No. 9.B, Esplanade East, without any permission, and had of late set up wooden platforms on the road flank portion without any permission or intimation to Government. Immediate action was requested to remove the unauthorised intruders. 9(B, Esplanade Row East, was used during the War years for the of purpose of godown accommodation of the several offices of the Government of India situate in Calcutta, and the front gates of the premises were kept closed by baffle-walls. It appears that the petitioner occupied the space between the baffle-wall and the road front and at some stage or other had built a wooden platform. Such hawkers' platforms are by now a common sight in this particular part of the city. No one took any notice as long as the baffle-walls were in existence. It is now proposed to dismantle the baffle-walls and to clear the entrances. Hence the trouble has started. On 8th October, 1953, the following letter was issued by the Manager, Government of India Es-states, as the “competent authority”, to the petitioner, under section 3 of the Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950 (No. XXVII of 1950), hereinafter referred to as the “Act”:

“Whereas, I, the undersigned, am satisfied that you are in possession of the Government premises described in the Schedule in contravention of the provisions of section 3 of the Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950 (No. XXVII of 1950), I hereby call upon you to vacate the said premises within 15 days from the date of the service of this notice. I am to warn you that in case you fail to vacate the said premises within the period specified above, you will be liable to be forcibly evicted therefrom.”

3. This Rule was issued on the 2nd October, 1953, calling upon the respondents to show cause why a Writ in the nature of Mandamus should not be made directing them to forbear from giving effect to the notice dated 8th October, 1953, and evicting the petitioner by force or otherwise and also to withdraw and/or cancel the said notice, and why an order in the nature of a Certiorari should not be made. At the first hearing of the application, the point was taken on behalf of the petitioner that the alleged verbal lease, even if it was ever entered into, was contrary to law, and in violation of the provisions of section 175 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The matter was then adjourned for further affidavits. It was also found that M. Shaukat Ali who was on record as a respondent, was no longer acting as the manager of the Government of India Estates at Calcutta, and had been replaced by P.N Khanna, who was accordingly brought on the record. Thereafter, P.N Khanna has affirmed a second affidavit on the 6th May, 1954, and annexed thereto a letter from the Secretary, Minister of Works, Housing and Supply, purporting to act on behalf of the President of India, ratifying “all acts done from time to time by officers including the Manager of the Government of India Estates, Calcutta, in the employment of the Union of India in connection with negotiation and taking on hire and payments made by reason of such hiring in the shape of monthly rent now known as 9-B, Esplanade East (formerly used to be the front portion of 9, Esplanade East), are hereby ratified inasmuch as the same is for the benefit of the Union of India.” No concealment is made of the fact that this undated ratification has come into existence as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court. Chatturbhuj Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram (1) [(1954) S.C.A 373].

4. Mr. A.K Sen appearing on behalf of the petitioner has taken five points which are as follows:—

(1) That the Act is ultra vires inasmuch as it infringes the fundamental rights of the petitioner granted under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

(2) That alleged oral lease is invalid, and was not saved by the alleged ratification.

(3) Assuming that there was an oral lease in 1942, no right, title and, interest devolved under the Indian In-dependence (Rights and Liabilities) Order, 1947, on the Government of India, and consequently there could be no ratification.

(4) That even if the lease was valid; it was subject to the petitioner's tenancy rights.

(5) That the affidavits of P.N Khanna should be rejected as not having been verified according to law.

The first point is one ot general importance and must be carefully considered. The “Act” is entitled the Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950, and is stated to be “an Act to provide for the eviction of certain persons from Government premises and for certain matters connected therewith.”

5. Mr. Kar appearing on behalf of the respondents has drawn my attention to the objects and reasons for promulgating this particular enactment. It appears that Government was faced with the fact that many of its properties came to be in the occupation of unauthorised persons. It was found that if the ordinary legal remedies were to be pursued, there would be inordinate delay and Government in the meantime would have to go on paying the rent (where such rent was payable) while it could not enjoy the benefits. It was, therefore, found necessary to promulgate this Act. It is a matter of dispute as to whether it was permissible to refer to the Objects and Reasons for the purposes of interpretation of a Statute. In Heydon's case (2) [(1584) 3 Rep. 7b], it was laid down that when a Statute has to be construed, it is necessary to consider what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide, and the remedy provided by Statute to cure that mischief. In other words, to arrive at the real meaning of a Statute, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act; to consider (1) what was the law before the Act was passed; (2) what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (3) what remedy Parliament has, provided; and (4) the reason of the remedy (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes—9th Edition, p. 22; Crais on Statute Law, 5th Edition, pp. 118 to 121).

6. These Rules of English Law are, however, subject to one overriding qualification so far as India is concerned. All laws in India are subservient to the Constitution. Any law which infringes the fundamental rights conferred under Part. III of the Constitution, becomes to that extent void [Article 13(1)(ii)]. Under Article 19(1)(f), a citizen has the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. This is subject to sub-clause (5) which validates any law imposing reasonable restrictions. That the Act interferes with the right of acquiring and holding property on the part of a citizen has not been disputed. The question is whether the provisions of the Act can be classed as a reasonable restriction upon such rights. It will be necessary, therefore, to consider the provisions of the Act. The title; of the Act itself shows that it was intended to evict certain persons from “Government premises” which has been defined to be “any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by the Central Government”. “Competent authority” has been defined to mean any person authorised by the Central Government, by Notification in the Official Gazette, to perform the functions of the competent authority under the Act for such area as may be specified in the Notification. Section 3 of the Act is important, and is set out below:—

“Power to evict certain persons from Government premises (1) if the competent authority is satisfied—

(a) that the person authorised to occupy any Government premises has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act,—

(i) sublet, without the permission of the Central Government or of the competent authority, the whole or any part of such premises, or

(ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms, express or implied, under which he is authorised to occupy such premises, or

(b) that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any Government premises.

The competent authority may, by notice served by post or otherwise, order that the person as well as any other person, who may be in occupation of the whole or any part of the premises, shall vacate them within fifteen days of the date of the service of the notice.

(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (1), the competent authority may evict that person from, and take possession of, the premises, and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.”

7. Under section 4, the competent authority may in the prescribed manner assess damages on account of use and occupation as it may deem fit and may by notice served by post or otherwise order a person to pay such damages within such time as may be specified in the notice. If any person refuses or fails to pay damages within the time specified, the damages might be recovered as arrears of land Revenue Under section 5 an appeal has been allowed from an order of the competent authority to the Central Government, which has to be made within 10 days of the date of service of the notice under section 3 or section 4. Under section 6, no order made by the Central Government or competent authority was to be called in question in any Court and no injunction was to be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under the Act. Under section 9, any contravention of the provisions of the Act or obstruction of the lawful exercise of any power conferred by it was punishable with fine extending to Rs. 1,000.

8. Regard being had to the express objects of the enactment; it does not seem unreasonable to make some provision so that proceedings to evict persons who are in unauthorised occupation of Government premises should be speedy and effective. The question is whether this Act as framed is within the permissible limits. Firstly, we find that the “competent authority” can be any person, whether such person has the necessary qualifications for evaluating title to immovable property or not. Mr. Kar has pointed out that this form of discretion has been granted to Government in many other Statutes. For example, under section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code, any person can be appointed as a Special Magistrate. Similar powers are to be found in the Requisitioning and Acquisitioning of Immovable Properties Act (Act XXX of 1952). Reference must, however, be made to the case of Khagendra Nath De v. District Magistrate of West Dinajpur (2) (55 C.W.N 53), where it was held that section 38 of the West Bengal Security Act, 1950, which entitled Government to delegate its power to officers subordinate to it irrespective of whether that officer was fit to make such order, was a procedure which was wholly unreasonable and, therefore ultra vires and void. Harries, C.J, said there as follows:—

“One of the powers conferred by the Act is the power of making an externment order and clearly by section 38 of the Security Act Government can delegate that power to any officer or authority subordinate to the State Government, Officers or authorities subordinate to the State Government may be officers or authorities of a high standing or they may be officers or authorities of a comparatively lowly kind. The order before us was made by a District Magistrate who, of course, is the senior executive officer in a District. He is clearly an officer of Government, but so would be Sub-Deputy Collector,………….

In any event it seems to me that section 38 is framed in such a manner as would permit Government to delegate their powers to officers who, I think, would be fully unfitted to be trusted with the power of making such orders. Mr. Chandra Sekhar Sen on behalf of the State has recognised this, but he has referred to another observation of Kania, C.J, in Br. Khare case. At pages 264–265 the learned Chief Justice observed:—

Moreover, this whole argument is based on the assumption that the Provincial Government when making the order will not perform its duty and may abuse the provisions of the section. In my opinion it is improper to start with such an assumption and decide the legality of an Act on that basis. Abuse of the power given by a law sometimes occurs; but the validity of the law cannot be contested because of such an apprehension.

What Mr. Sen has contended is that we must not assume that Government would delegate their powers to some humble officer or authority who or which could not be regarded as fitted to exercise such powers. However, this Court is not presuming that the Government would abuse its powers by appointing some one not fitted to make the order. If the Government by a Notification had delegated its powers to the humblest class of officers subordinate to the Government, it would not be abusing its authority. It would be exercising a right which the Act actually gave it. It would not be doing something to circumvent the Act. On the contrary it would be doing something which it was entitled to do under the Act.”

9. In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh (4) [(1954) S.C.A 204], it has been held that a power granted under a Statute whereby the District Magistrate or any other person empowered by him could grant, withhold or cancel licences, was bad because such power of delegation was too wide. In the present case, the competent authority is the Manager, Government of India Estates. He is a mere administrative officer and I do not see how he can possibly decide complicated questions of title such as arise in this case. But the provisions of the Act put him in the fortunate position of not having to go into any complicated questions at all, which brings me to the most glaring injustice that is inherent in the Act. Suppose a person was claiming to have the legal right of occupying Government premises; he is given no opportunity of defending his title. In fact, there is no provision in the Act of giving any notice, or calling for any proof. All that happens is that the competent authority (who may be a person utterly ignorant of investigating title to immovable property) by some means or other arrives at a subjective satisfaction that a person was in unauthorised occupation of Government premises, and he can at once order such a person to vacate the pre-mises within 15 days of the service of the notice. If he does not comply with the notice, he can be forcibly evicted and made to pay damages. So far as damages for use and occupation are concerned, it is the competent authority again who is to assess the damages in the “Prescribed manner”. No manner has, however, yet been prescribed and as the law stands, there is no reason why such assessment should not be ex parte. No Statute can be called reasonable by any stretch of imagination which purports to take away property from an individual citizen who claims a legal right to it without affording him an opportunity of defending his title. In this instant case, the injustice is more than apparent. While coming to the conclusion that the petitioner had no legal right, the only evidence upon which the competent authority acted was a letter of complaint by some other Government department enumerating facts which are strongly contested. He never called for any evidence of the petitioner's title, never looked at any rent receipts, never consulted the landlord, never gave an opportunity to the petitioner to challenge the title of Government itself, but by a process which is inscrutable, came to the conclusion that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation of Government premises and asked him peremptorily to vacate the portion of the premises in which he had been in continued occupation upon payment of rent for the last 15 years.

10. I next come to the provision of appeal. Mr. Kar argues that from the notice there is a direct appeal to the Central Government who might, if it is so willing, stay the operation of the order. This, however, is no mitigation of the illegality of the Statute If the foundation of the eviction is the subjective satisfaction of competent authority, then I do not see that the Central Government in appeal, is in any better position to decide upon the title of the complaining citizen. The Central Government may depend upon the report of the complaining authority or may make such further enquiry as it may think necessary. The Central Government however is not bound to take any evidence or make any enquiry unless it is pleased to do so. Finally, I find that the order of competent authority and that of the Central Government is made final, barring the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. In other words, the title of a citizen to property is to be decided upon the subjective satisfaction of a person who may have no competence whatsoever to decide such a question, and behind the citizen's back, without giving him any opportunity of vindicating his title, and the jurisdiction of Civil Courts are barred. In my opinion, the provisions of the Act constitute a wholly unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right granted to a citizen of acquiring and holding property, and as such are void under Article 13 of the Constitution.

11. In view of my finding on the first point it is unnecessary to decide the other points raised. I shall, however, briefly indicate my views upon them. It is admitted that the lease taken in 1942 by the Central Government was an oral lease. In fact, it is not a lease for any term of years but appears to be an ordinary monthly tenancy. It is argued that a contract of tenancy cannot be entered into by Government save and except in conformity with certain statutory obligations, e.g, section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, corresponding to Art, 299(1) of the Constitution. These provisions of law lay down the formalities which must be complied with when a contract is being made by Government, the Union or a State, as the case may be. Obviously a verbal agreement will not comply with such provisions. The latest pronouncement upon the subject is contained in the Supreme Court decision Chatturbhuj V. Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram (4) [(1954) S.C.A 204] Bose, J., states as follows:

“It would in our opinion, be disastrous to hold that the hundreds of Government officers who have daily to enter into a variety of contracts, often of a petty nature, and sometimes in an emergency, cannot contract orally or through correspondence and that every petty contract must be effected by a ponderous legal document couched in a particular form. It may be that Government will not be bound by the contract in that case, but that is a very different thing from saying that the contracts as such are void and of no effect. It only means that the principal cannot be sued. But we take it there would be nothing to prevent ratification especially if that was for the benefit of Government.”

12. In the present case there is a written ratification, but as I have stated above, that ratification has come during the pendency of this application. There certainly was no ratification at the time when notice under section 3 of the Act was served upon the petitioner. If, however, ratification saves the contract, then, it appears to me that the very fact that Government continued to pay the rent, month by month, ever since 1942, constitutes a sufficient ratification. Mr. Sen has argued that there is nothing before, me to show that the Government paid the rent, because the rent, receipts disclosed are in favour of the Manager, Government of India Estates, Calcutta. This, to my mind, is stretching the argument a little too far. It is not suggested that the Manager paid out of his own pocket. It is quite clear on the facts that the rent was being continuously paid and is still being paid by Government. The point No. 3 is really an off-shoot of point No. 2. It is argued that if there was an oral lease in 1942, such a lease did not create any right in Government and under the Independence (Rights and Liabilities) Order, 1947, it is only the existing rights of the Indian Government that passed on to the Indian Union. This argument, however, assumes two things. Firstly, that no right had been created in Government and secondly that the only ratification is the written ratification which came into existence pending this application. As I have stated above, payment of rent was a sufficient ratification, and, there fore, the Government prior to the declaration of Independence had become properly constituted tenants. Such tenancy right thereafter devolved on the Indian Union.

13. Proceeding on the footing that the Central Government acquired a valid tenancy right, I think the fourth point raised by Mr. Sen is of substance. The petitioner became a tenant under Messrs, T.E Thompson & Co., Ltd., in the year 1939. Upon Ramgopal Shaw Estates becoming the landlord, he became the tenant of the transferee. If the Central Government took a monthly tenancy of the premises No. 9, Esplanade East, or the front portion thereof subsequently re-numbered as as 9.B, Esplanade East (also mentioned as Esplanade Row East), it must have done so subject to the existing tenancy of the petitioners. I do not see how the fact that the Central Government became a tenant of the premises in 1942 automatically got rid of the tenancy of the petitioners. So far as the portion occupied by the petitioner is concerned the only transfer that could be made was of the landlord's right to the reversion, and the right to receive rent during the subsistence of the tenancy. There is nothing to show that the Central Government acquired the right to receive rent which was continued to be paid to the owners of the premises and accepted by them. Therefore, when the Central Government took lease of the premises, they did so subject to the tenancy rights of the petitioner. Mr. Kar argues that the copies of the rent bills which have been disclosed show that the Government was the tenant in respect of the entirety of premises No. 9.B, Esplanade Row East, and it was paying a very substantial rent, namely, Rs. 1,700 per month. In my opinion, no inference can be drawn from these rent receipts. Both the petitioner and the Central Government are producing rent receipts and the inference must be that the Central Government became the tenant of premises No. 9.B, Esplanade Row East, but not of that portion which was occupied by the petitioner. It is next said that the petitioner has not been occupying the particular space for which he became tenant, but has been shifting or enlarging his space and that the wooden platforms, etc., are recent additions which have been surreptitiously put in and are unauthorised. These are questions of fact which it is not possible to decide in an application of this description. If the petitioner has encroached upon any portion of the premises, the possession of which right fully belongs to the Central Government, it is at liberty to take action under the ordinary law. The question before me is as to whether it is permissible to evict the petitioner summarily under the provisions of the impugned Act.

14. Lastly, I come to the point that the affidavits of P.N Khanna were not properly verified. It is quite true that P.N Khanna was not on the scene when the premises was taken by the Central Government on lease in 1942, nor was he the officer responsible for issuing notice under section 3 of the impugned Act. As a matter of fact, he came in, pending the application. The first affidavit affirmed on the 12th of January, 1954, was verified as true to his knowledge based on information derived from the records and believed to be true. The second affidavit affirmed on the 6th of May, 1954, was similarly verified. Mr. Sen draws my attention to the provisions of Order 19, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is provided therein that affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, in which, statements of his belief may be admitted provided the grounds thereof are stated. Mr. Sen argues that these proceedings are not interlocutory proceedings and consequently affidavits not based on personal knowledge are to be excluded. He has also relied on the case of Gilbert v. Endean (5) (9 Ch.D page 259 at 260). I do not think that in an application under article 226 it is possible to enforce the provisions of Order 19, rule 3(1) by considering the proceedings as a full fledged suit. These proceedings are entirely decided upon affidavits and to a certain extent take on the characteristics of interlocutory applications. In the case of State of Bombay v. Purusottam Jognaik (6) [(1953) S.C.A 893], the Supreme Court held that the provisions of Order 19, rule 3, applied. The learned Chief Justice however said as follows:—

“Verification should invariably be modelled on the lines of Order 19, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, whether the Code applied in terms or not. And when the matter deposed to is not based on personal knowledge the sources of information should be clearly disclosed. We draw attention to the remarks of Jenkins, C.J, and Wood-roffe J., in Padmavati Dasi v. Rasiklal Dhar (7) (I.L.R 37 Cal. 259), and endorse the learned Judges observations.”

15. It is thus clear that in affidavits used for the purposes of application under Art. 226, it is not necessary that everything must be true to the persona] knowledge of the deponent, as would be necessary if evidence was being taken in a suit by affidavits. Evidence based on information is admissible, provided however the sources of information are disclosed. From that point of view the verification is somewhat defective inasmuch as it refers to records but does not specify the same. The affidavits taken as a whole, however, dis-close the sources of information and copies of the relevant documents have been annexed. While holding that there is no such defect as would justify the throwing out of the affidavits concerned, I must pronounce a word of caution. Although in such proceedings as this, affidavits need not be based on personal knowledge in every case, it must be borne in mind that like all other legal proceedings the Court is entitled to have the best evidence placed before it. Where there exists evidence which is first hand, it would be most unsatisfactory to place before the Court evidence of any other description. That, however, goes to the weight of evidence rather than admissibility.

16. This application is directed towards avoiding a notice served under section 3 of the impugned Act. Since I have held the Act as invalid, the proceedings have consequently become illegal. This will, of course, not affect the right of the respondents or the Central Government to proceed against the petitioner according to the ordinary-law or affect proceedings under any other law or statute.

17. For the reasons given above, this rule must be made absolute. I declare the Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950, Act No. XXVII of 1950, as ultra vires and void as infringing the provisions of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The notice dated the 8th of October, 1953, is set aside; and/or quashed and a writ in the nature of mandamus is issued directing the respondents to withdraw or cancel the said notice and to forbear from giving effect to and evicting the petitioner from the portion occupied by him as alleged in the petition, or from taking any steps in furtherance of the said notice. This, however, is without prejudice to the rights of the respondents to take any proceedings warranted by law and not based on the impugned Act. There will be no order as to costs.

Civil Rule 3465 of 1953.

Sinha, J.:— In this case the short facts are as follows: Plot No. 2254 is a plot of land which is situated outside the boundary walls of the Gun and Shell Factory, Cossipore. It appears that it belonged to the Central Government but was being looked after by the State Government of West Bengal. In 1946, there was a notification by the Government of West Bengal whereby it was made over to the Military Estates Officer. Nothing happened until 1949, when upon inspection the Military Estates Officer found that many people including the petitioner were in occupation of portions of that plot. It is said that in order to regularise the position, the Military Estates Officer started taking rents from the) persons in occupation including the petitioner, and rent was paid and received until 3rd December, 1952. According to the Gun and Shell Factory authorities, the land was made over to them as far back as 1941. It was in 1953, that upon inspection it was found that there were many people, including the petitioner, in occupation of the land. It is said that the land was intended for the expansion of the; Gun and Shell Factory, and apparently it is in 1953 that something tangible took place in that behalf. Correspondence passed between the Military Estates Officer and the Factory Authorities, copies whereof are annexed to the petition. It seems that the Factory authorities were alleging that the Military Estates Officer had no business to let out the land, and the Military Estates Officer took up the position that it was land outside the visible boundary of the factory and as such the Military-Authorities were justified in thinking that they should be in possession, and in fact they took over possession from the State of West Bengal. On the 21st May, 1953, a letter was written to the petitioner to vacate the land. In the meanwhile, I might add that the petitioner had erected certain structures upon it. He says that he has spent a considerable amount of money, but this is a point of dispute. On the 14th October, 1953, notice to quit was given and this was followed on the 9th November, 1953, by another notice under section 3 of the Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950, stating that in the view of the competent authority the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation and must leave by the 24th November, 1953, otherwise he would be forcibly evicted.

18. This Rule was taken out on the 25th November, 1953, calling upon the Opposite Party to show cause why a Writ in the nature of Mandamus should not issue directing him not to give effect to the order, dated the 9th November, 1953, or why such further or other order or orders should not be made as to this Court may seem fit and proper.

19. The point that has been agitated in this application is as to whether the provisions of the Government Premises (Eviction) Act of 1950 were ultra vires, as offending against Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, and therefore void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution. This identical point has been dealt with in detail by me in a case in which I have delivered my judgment today (Matter No. 99 of 1953 — Jagu Singh… v. M. Shaukat Ali & Anr.…). In that case, I have declared the Act to be ultra vires, as infringing the provisions of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

20. On behalf of the respondent, Mr. Mookerjee argued the matter very fairly, and besides relying on the points that have already been made, in the matter that I have mentioned above, he advanced a new argument which is as follows. He relied on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (8) [(1954) S.C.A 65, 74 : A.I.R 1954 S.C 92, 95-96] where Patanjali Sastri, C.J, held that Article 19(1)(f) deals only with the natural rights inherent in a citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property in the abstract, without reference to) his rights to any particular property, whereas, Article 31 deals with concrete rights of property. I have not been able to appreciate how this dicta applies to the facts of this case. Here there was no compulsory acquisition of property at all. What is being sought; to be done is to recover possession of property. In any event, this dicta has been explained in a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Swamiar (9) [(1954) S.C.A 415 : A.I.R 1954 S.C 282]. In that case Mukherjea, J., said as follows:—

“A point was suggested by the learned Attorney-General that as Article 19(1)(f) deals only with the natural rights inherent in a citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property in the abstract without reference to rights to any particular property, it can be of no real assistance to the respondent in the present case and Article 31 of the Constitution, which deals with deprivation of property, has no application here. In the case of The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (8) an opinion was expressed by Patanjali Sastri, C.J, that Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution is concerned only with the abstract right and capacity to acquire, hold and dispose of property and that it has no relation to concrete property rights. This, it may be noted, was an expression of opinion by the learned Chief Justice alone and it was not the decision of the Court; for out of the other four learned Judges who together with the Chief Justice constituted the Bench, two did not definitely agree with this view, while the remaining two did not express any opinion one way or the other.”

21. As a matter of fact, Das, J., in Subodh Gopal Bose's case (8) expressly held that Article 19(1)(f) dealt, not merely with abstract rights but also with concrete rights. If Article 19(1)(f) deals with merely abstract rights, these are nonetheless fundamental rights and according to the spirit and tenor of the Constitution, such rights cannot be taken away except in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, A law which infringes these provisions must be declared void. Therefore, the real point is as to whether the provisions of the impugned Act constitute reasonable restrictions on the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f), whether such right be abstract or concrete.

22. For the reasons that I have given at Jagu Singh's case mentioned above, I am of the opinion that the Act is ultra vires as infringing the fundamental rights of the petitioner under; Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and as such is void under Article 13 of the Constitution.

23. For the reasons stated, this Rule must be made absolute and there will be a Writ in the nature of Mandamus and]or Certiorari setting aside and/or quashing the notice under the impugned Act, dated the 9th November, 1953, and directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect thereto.

24. This order however will in no way affect the notice to quit that has been served upon the petitioner or any other steps that the respondents might take in accordance with law.

25. There will be no order for costs.

A.K.D.G