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In The Matter Of The Will Of Ramchand Gurdasmal v. Mangharam Wadhwani
Factual and Procedural Background
The office placed the matter in Diary No. 15008 for decision on two points: (a) jurisdiction for admission of probate and (b) whether the affidavit of assets is not in the proper form and whether that affects jurisdiction and the levy of court-fee duty.
The deceased, Gurudasmal, had acquired a large fortune in South Africa and at the time of his death had settled in Poona. He married Putlibai according to Hindu rites (by whom he had no issue). In South Africa he lived with Frances Meyer and acknowledged two sons by her, Heman and Vivian. By his last will dated 9-1-1953 he appointed executors for his South African properties and five executors for his Indian properties.
The opinion concerns only the Indian properties. Under the will, besides charities and trusts, the testator bequeathed his Indian properties in the shape of maintenance for his wife Putlibai and his sons and daughters-in-law. The major portion of the assets were outside the State; the Madras assets consisted of three items: Rs. 3,00,000 due from Messrs Kewalram Chellaram (Bombay and Madras), Rs. 15,000 due from Messrs Rupchand and Sons (Madras), and Rs. 25,000 due from Messrs Hashmatrai and Sons (Madras), together with considerable accrued interest. The net assets sworn to were about Rs. 13,00,000.
The affidavit of assets stated that out of interest mentioned in an annexure a sum of Rs. 85,297-3-9 had been collected and was shown as not liable to duty. The petition for probate was filed by one of the Indian executors, Rai Bahadur Mangharam Wadhiwani.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the District Judge or Original Side Judge of the High Court has jurisdiction to grant probate under Sections 270 and 271 of the Indian Succession Act in respect of the deceased's Indian properties (specifically where the deceased's fixed place of abode was outside the State but he had property within the jurisdiction).
- Whether the affidavit of assets is not in proper form because it contains a paragraph excluding Rs. 85,297-3-9 collected after death and shown as not liable to duty, and whether that affects (i) the formality for admission (jurisdiction) and (ii) the levy of court-fee duty.
- Relatedly, what is the correct date for valuation for court-fee duty purposes — the date of application for probate or the date of the testator's death — and the effect of Section 227 (probate relating back to the testator's death) on duty calculation.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In re Mohendra Narain, 5 Cal WN 377 | Illustrates that the existence of any property within jurisdiction (even a watch and chain and an umbrella) may be sufficient to confer jurisdiction under S.270. | Used to support the proposition that minimal property within jurisdiction suffices to found jurisdiction. |
| Khubchand Bhai v. Motilbai, AIR 1936 Sind 150 | Debts payable under agreement to deceased or his heirs residing within jurisdiction can constitute property for jurisdictional purposes. | Adduced to show that debts due within jurisdiction count towards jurisdictional property. |
| F.G Stimpson v. E.M Bennett, AIR 1946 Oudh 73 | Provident fund monies within a court's jurisdiction may be subject of probate for that fund. | Accepted as authority that specific monetary assets within jurisdiction (even if limited in character) can be the subject of probate jurisdiction. |
| Mahomed Kasim v. Mt. Mazharbi, AIR 1949 Nag 90 | A testator's share in the assets of a predeceased son is property within the meaning of S.271. | Used to illustrate the breadth of "property" for jurisdictional purposes under S.271. |
| Bai Mancha v. Bai Ganga, 1 Bom LR 666 | Where the bulk of the property is elsewhere, the court may in its discretion refuse to exercise jurisdiction. | Relied upon to explain the discretionary refusal under S.271 when local property is trifling compared to the bulk being elsewhere. |
| Sm. Ashtbhuja Ratan Kuer v. Debi Baksh, AIR 1944 P.C. 29 | A grant by a District Judge not limited to property within his jurisdiction is not for that reason bad; possession of property at death is sufficient and title issues are foreign to a court of probate. | Invoked to show that a grant need not be limited to in-jurisdiction property and that questions of title need not be gone into by the probate court. |
| Run Bahadoor Singh v. Rairup Koer, 4 CLR 498 | Questions of title are foreign to the Court of Probate. | Used to support the principle that probate proceedings do not decide title to property. |
| Bhaurao v. Lakshmibai, 20 Bom 607 | The existence of property within jurisdiction suffices even if the testator was a foreigner residing abroad; discretion under S.271 still applies. | Referenced to indicate jurisdictional sufficiency despite foreign residence and to underscore discretionary considerations. |
| Golam Sobhan v. Mahomed Rouf, 20 Suth WR 286 | Authority indicating property within jurisdiction suffices even when the testator is resident abroad. | Cited alongside other authorities to support the same point about jurisdiction. |
| Ravji Ranchod Naik v. Vishnu Ranchod Naik, 9 Bom 241 | Another authority on jurisdiction when the testator is resident abroad. | Used as part of the body of precedents that show property within jurisdiction is the operative consideration. |
| Ananga Mohan v. Balaichand, AIR 1921 Cal 124 | Applicant as dominus litis may choose forum; discretion to refuse jurisdiction should not be lightly exercised. | Relied upon to stress the applicant's right to choose forum and the limited circumstances in which jurisdiction should be refused. |
| Debi Baksh Singh v. Ashtbhuja Ratan Kunwar, AIR 1937 All 670 | Further authority on the exercise of discretion and choice of forum by applicant. | Used to reinforce the discretion principles stated above. |
| Forbes v. Peterson, AIR 1942 Cal 283 | Where property within jurisdiction is trifling, the court may refuse the application. | Invoked to show circumstances under which discretion to refuse jurisdiction has been exercised. |
| Whitehead v. Taylor (1839) 10 A & E 210 | Probate relates back and the law recognizes no interval between death and vesting of rights in the representative. | Quoted for the principle that probate when granted relates back to the time of death and the immediate vesting of rights in the executor. |
| Wankford v. Wankford (1699) 1 Salk 299 | An executor can intermeddle with estate and do acts incidental to office before proving the will (except bring actions). | Used to support the proposition that an executor may perform many acts after the testator's death and before probate. |
| In Re Stevens; Cooke v. Stevens (1897) 1 Ch. 422 | Authority on an executor's powers to intermeddle and perform acts before proving the will. | Referenced to support the same executorial authority prior to probate. |
| Meyappa Chetty v. Subramanian Chetty, AIR 1916 PC 203 | An executor's title derives from the will, not from probate; probate is official evidence of authority. | Cited to explain that probate certifies but does not create the executor's title which vests at death. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two parts corresponding to the two points raised by the office note.
Jurisdiction (Point (a))
The court began by identifying Sections 270 and 271 of the Indian Succession Act as the statutory source of jurisdiction. Section 270 permits jurisdiction where the deceased had either (a) a fixed place of abode within the court's jurisdiction or (b) any property, movable or immovable, within the jurisdiction. Since the deceased's fixed place of abode was Poona (outside the State), the court confined its enquiry to clause (b) — the existence of property within the jurisdiction.
Drawing on a line of authorities, the court explained that the existence of any property within jurisdiction is sufficient to found jurisdiction (examples: small chattels, debts due within jurisdiction, provident fund, shares in predeceased son's assets). The court also treated Section 271 as conferring a discretionary power to refuse grant where matters would be more conveniently or justly disposed of elsewhere, especially where the bulk of property is remote or the in-jurisdiction property is trifling.
The court emphasized that the discretion under Section 271 must not be lightly exercised against the applicant, who is dominus litis and entitled to choose forum, unless there are sufficient grounds. Relevant considerations that may justify refusal include the bulk of the estate lying outside jurisdiction, expense and convenience of witnesses, and other hardships. Some matters (e.g., witnesses being outside jurisdiction) primarily concern the applicant and cannot be raised by an objector except in specific circumstances.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court found no present grounds to exercise its discretion to refuse jurisdiction: the movable properties in Madras were not trifling, and no other inhibiting circumstances were apparent. The court specifically held that the fact that the executor applying for probate is not residing in the State is not by itself a ground for refusal of jurisdiction.
Affidavit of Assets and Duty (Point (b))
The office had noted that the affidavit of assets did not conform to the prescribed form under the Court-fees Act Schedule III because it contained an additional paragraph stating that Rs. 85,297-3-9 had been collected after the deceased's death and was shown as not liable to duty.
The court reviewed authorities on executorial powers and the legal effect of probate, observing that an executor derives title from the will and that the personal property vests in him immediately upon the testator's death. Probate, when granted, relates back to the time of death and is official evidence of the executor's authority. Precedents were cited to show that executors can intermeddle with the estate (release debts, assent to legacies, distrain for rent, sell property) before proving the will, although some formal acts may require production of probate.
On that basis, the court concluded that the mere fact that the sum of Rs. 85,297-3-9 had been collected and excluded from the affidavit of assets did not by itself render the affidavit improper nor did it affect jurisdiction.
However, the court recognized that the exclusion has implications for the imposition of court-fee duty and identified two possible legal views:
- One view: valuation for court-fee duty purposes is at the date of application for probate; collections made before that date could possibly be deducted for duty calculation.
- Other view: under Section 227, probate relates back to the testator's death and validates intermediate acts of the executor; accordingly duty should be paid on the entire assets of the deceased at the time of death, and probate ordinarily cannot be granted in respect only of portions of the estate.
The court noted that, although probate can be limited in exceptional cases, questions that affect public revenue (levy of duty) require notice to the Government Pleader. Accordingly, the court directed that the Diary be taken on file (if otherwise in order) and that notice be given to the Government Pleader regarding the levy of duty, reserving the detailed decision on duty to that subsequent process.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that jurisdiction to entertain the probate petition exists under Sections 270 and 271 because there is property within the Madras jurisdiction that is not trifling; the fact that the applying executor is not resident in the State does not of itself defeat jurisdiction. The court also held that the affidavit's inclusion of a statement excluding Rs. 85,297-3-9 collected after death does not, by itself, make the affidavit improper nor does it affect jurisdiction. The question of the correct basis for levying court-fee duty (valuation date and effect of Section 227) requires separate determination with notice to the Government Pleader.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The probate petition may proceed in the Madras forum; the office is directed to take the diary on file if otherwise in order, and the Government Pleader is to be given notice regarding levy of duty. The procedural objection to jurisdiction based on the executor's non-residence is dismissed.
- On the affidavit/formality: The court did not invalidate the affidavit for the inclusion of the paragraph about the collected sum; instead it treated the issue as relevant to the duty question and referred the levy question for further procedure.
- On precedent-setting: The opinion applies established principles of probate jurisdiction and executorial powers; it does not purport to establish a new legal rule beyond those principles cited and applied to the facts. The court left the substantive question of duty (and any exceptional order limiting probate) to be decided after notice to the Government Pleader.
Final procedural directive: The Diary is to be taken on file (if otherwise in order) with notice to the Government Pleader regarding the levy of duty. Order accordingly.
1. These papers have been put up by the office in Diary No. 15008 for decision of two points viz. (a) jurisdiction for admission and (b) affidavit of assets not being in form and affecting jurisdiction and duty. The facts are: One Gurudasmal had acquired a large fortune in South Africa & had settled in Poona at the time of his death. He had married according to the Hindu rites one Putlibai and by her had no issue. In South Africa he seems to have been living with one Frances Meyer by whom he has two sons Heman and Vivian and whom he has acknowledged as his sons. Those sons have got married and have families of their own. Under his last will and testament dated 9-1-1953 this Gurudasmal appointed two sets of executors, one for the South African properties and five executors for his Indian properties.
2. In these proceedings we are concerned only with the Indian properties. It is enough for our present purpose to mention that under this will besides certain charities and trusts, etc., the testator has bequeathed all his properties in the shape of maintenance for his wife Putlibai and his sons and daughters-in-law. The major portion of the assets are outside this State and so far as Madras is concerned the assets here are three items viz. amount due from Messrs Kewalram Chellaram, Bombay and Madras, Rs. 3,00,000/-; Rs. 15,000/- due from Messrs Rupchand and Sons, Madras; and Rs. 25,000/- due from Messrs Hashmatrai and Sons, Madras, and considerable accrued interest thereon.
3. The net assets sworn to are Rs. 13,00,000/- odd. The affidavit of assets mentions at the end that out of the amount of interest mentioned in item 9 in Annexure ‘A’ from seven persons Rs. 85,297-3-9 have been collected. This amount is shown as not liable to duty. It is in these circumstances that the petition for probate has been made by one of the Indian executors Rai Bahadur Mangharam Wadhiwani.
4. Point (a): Jurisdiction: The jurisdiction to grant probate is contained in Sections 270 and 271 of the Indian Succession Act. Under S. 270 the conditions of the jurisdiction to the District Judge or the original side Judge of the High Court are that it should appear from the petition for the grant that the deceased had, at the time of his decease (a) a fixed place of abode; or (b) any property, movable or immovable, within the jurisdiction of the District Judge or the original side Judge of the High Court.
5. In this case the fixed place of abode of the testator was in Poona, outside this State and therefore we have to consider only cl. (b). In regard to this clause the settled case-law is as follows:— The existence of any property would be sufficient. Thus a watch and chain and an umbrella might be sufficient to give jurisdiction: In re Mohendra Narain, 5 Cal WN 377 (A). So also debts which are to be paid according to the terms of an agreement to the deceased or his heirs residing within the jurisdiction of the Court: Khubchand Bhai v. Motilbai, AIR 1936 Sind 150 (B).
6. Again the court within whose jurisdiction the once of the officer dealing with the provident fund due to a deceased railway servant lies can entertain the application for grant of probate for the provident fund money: F.G Stimpson v. E.M Bennett, AIR 1946 Oudh 73 (C). It has been held that the testator's share in the assets of predeceased son is property within the meaning of S. 271 and therefore the Court within whose jurisdiction such property lies has jurisdiction to entertain an application for grant of Probate: Mahomed Kasim v. Mt. Mazharbi AIR 1949 Nag 90 (D).
7. The question as to the adequacy of the property within jurisdiction might arise in considering the question of convenience under S. 271, so that if it appeared to the Court that the bulk of the property of the deceased was elsewhere the Court might in its discretion refuse to exercise jurisdiction: Bai Mancha v. Bai Ganga, 1 Bom LR 666 (E).
8. Where, however, in such a case a grant is made by the District Judge and the same is not limited to property within his jurisdiction, the grant is not for that reason bad: Sm. Ashtbhuja Ratan Kuer v. Debi Baksh, AIR 1944 P.C 29 (F). It is enough that the property in question was in the possession of the deceased at his death, the question of his title to it will not be considered, as questions of title are foreign to the Court of Probate. Run Bahadoor Singh v. Rairup Koer 4 CLR 498 (G).
9. The existence of property within jurisdiction would be sufficient even though the testator might of a foreigner residing abroad subject to the discretion of the Judge under S. 271: Bhaurao v. Lakshmibai, 20 Bom 607 (H); Golam Sobhan v. Mahomed Rouf, 20 Suth WR 286 (I) : Ravji Ranchod Naik v. Vishnu Ranchod Naik 9 Bom 241 (G). The question as to where the will was executed is immaterial on the question of jurisdiction under S. 270:
10. (For a lucid discussion of the scope of S. 270 see Basu, Indian Succession Act, Third Edn. 1946 (Eastern Law House, Calcutta) pp. 1014-1017; Sen Gupta, Indian Succession Act (1950) (N.Y Roy—Chowdry and Co. Calcutta) pp. 563-565).
11. But a discretion is vested both in the District Judge as well as in the Original Side Judge of the High Court under S. 271 to refuse an application for the grant of probate. This section totally excludes the discretion of the Judge where the deceased had fixed place of residence within his jurisdiction. In that case the District Judge cannot refuse the application but the High Court would have power under Sectio 24 of the CPC. transfer the case to another Court where superior convenience or hardship of the parties is established.
12. This is not the case however where jurisdiction is founded on the existence of property within the jurisdiction and then the Court can exercise its discretion only on the ground that the matter may be more justly or conveniently disposed of in another District or in another State. This discretion cannot, however, be lightly exercised against the applicant for grant, for he is the do-minus litis who can choose his own forum unless there are sufficient grounds for refusing jurisdiction. Ananga Mohan v. Balaichand, AIR 1921 Cal 124 (2) (K), Debi Baksh Singh v. Ashtbhuja Ratan Kunwar, AIR 1937 All 670 (L).
13. There can be no question that the fact of the bulk of the properties being at a great distance from the District or metropolis where the grant is sought would be a good ground for the exercise of discretion. For the Court has several functions to exercise in connection with the administration of estates and it would be inconvenient to exercise such functions if the properties were abroad. It has been held that where the property within jurisdiction was trifling the application may be refused: 1 Bom LR 666 (E); 20 Bom 607 (H); Forbes v. Peterson* AIR 1942 Cal 283 (M).
14. The section gives no definition or limitation of the word ‘convenient’. The Court has to determine after considering all circumstances whether it is convenient. The fact that most of the witnesses to the will are outside jurisdiction is a matter which only concerns the applicant and the objector cannot raise objection on that ground. AIR 1921 Cal 124 (2) (K).
15. But if the ground urged is that the witnesses for the objector are outside jurisdiction that would surely be an important matter for consideration. The expenses of the litigation are also to be considered. I need not point out that these are all matters which can only be considered after the objector comes forward and presses these points.
16. Bearing these principles in mind, if we examine the facts of the instant case there are no grounds to exercise our discretion at this stage because the movable properties in Madras State are not trifling and there is nothing to show that the other inhibiting circumstances from entertaining jurisdiction are evident in this case. Therefore, on the question of jurisdiction I hold that the mere fact that the executor applying for probate is not residing in this State is no ground at all for refusing jurisdiction.
17. Point (b): This arises from the following note of the office, that the affidavit of assets is not in proper form as given in Sen. Ill, Court-fees Act, for it contains an additional paragraph in which the petitioner states that he had collected after the death of the deceased and before the filing of the petition a sum of Rs. 85,297-3-9 which is not subject to duty.
18. That an executor when appointed by will derives his title from the will and the properties of the testator vest in him immediately after the death of the testator is well settled. Moreover, probate when granted relates back to the time of the testator's death. “The law knows no interval between the testator's death and the vesting of the right in his representative. As soon as he obtains probate, his right is considered as accruing from that period”: Per Lord Denman, C.J in Whitehead v. Taylor (1839) 10 A and E 210 at p. 212 (N).
19. It follows that any excutor who is of full age may, after his testator's death and before he proves the will, do any act incidental to his office except bring actions. “An executor is a complete executor as to every intent but bringing of actions before probate, so that he may release a debt due to the testator, assent to a legacy, intermeddle with the goods of the testator”: Per Powys, J. in Wankford v. Wankford (1699) 1 Salk 299 at p. 301 (O), see also In Re, Stevens; Cooke v. Stevens, (1897) 1 Ch. 422 at p. 430 (P).
20. He may even distrain for the rent due to the testator, and he may sell or otherwise dispose of the testator's real and personal estate, but he cannot prove his title to convey or assign the property sold except by producing the probate or other admission of the will in the court. Though an executor as such cannot maintain actions before probate, he may commence an action and continue it until such time as the production of the probate becomes necessary, but he must be ready to produce it then.
“It is quite clear that an executor derives his title and authority from the will of his testator and not from any grant of probate. The personal property of the testator, including all rights of action, vests in him upon the testator's death, and the consequence is that he can institute an action in the character of executor before he proves the will. He cannot, it is true, obtain a decree before probate, but this is not because his title depends on probate, but because the production of probate is the only way in which, by the rules of the court, he is allowed to prove his title”: Per Lord Parker in Meyappa Chetty v. Subramanian Chetty, AIR 1916 PC 203 at p. 204 (Q). Thus, probate is a document issued under the seal of the Court and is official evidence of the executor's authority.
21. A person, therefore, who has been nominated by will to act as executor, must obtain grant of probate before he can take any steps which require formal proof of his authority, though unlike an Administrator an executor derives his title from the will and probate does no more than certify the validity of the will and of his appointment and does not itself appoint him to his office or constitutes a condition precedent for his exercising many of his powers.
22. A probate copy constitutes a recognised legal evidence of the will and of the executor's title. When the will is Proved the Court has the legal optics through which to look at it. Ramamurti Law of Wills p. 439 et seq; Williams on Executors and Administrators 13th Edh. (1953) p. 57 and, foil; Bailey Law of Wills (Pitman) 1953 p. 7 Tristram and Coote's Probate Practice Nineteenth Edn. P. 77 and foil. Therefore the mere fact in the instant case that the sum of Rs. 85,297-3-9 has been collected and that this has been excluded from the affidavit of assets would not either make it not being in proper form or affect the question of jurisdiction.
23. This will, however, affect the question of imposition of duty concerning which there are two possible views. One is the date of valuation of the property of the deceased for the purpose of calculation of court-fee should be the date of application for probate and not the date of the death of the deceased and in which case collections made before the date of application for probate would possibly constitute deductions from levy of duty.
24. The other view is that under Section 227 of the Indian Succession Act a probate when produced relates back to the testator's death and is therefore of the same effect as if the will has been proved immediately after the death of the testator and as the property of the deceased vests in the executor from the time of his death and the law knows no interval between the testator's death and the vesting of the right in his executor and under S. 227 grant of probate has the effect of validating all the intermediate acts of the executor, the duty must be paid on the entire assets of the deceased at the time of his death and probate cannot ordinarily be granted for portions of the estate only.
25. In the latter case the executor is not without remedy because the grant of probate can be limited in exceptional cases. But this is a matter which has, however, to be decided separately after giving notice to the Government Pleader involving as this question does the revenues of the State. This Diary is directed to be taken on file if otherwise in order with notice to the G.P regarding the levy of duty.
V.S.B
26. Order accordingly.
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