- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Krishnarao Jagoba Parkhi v. Firm Radhakisan Ramsahai
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit by plaintiffs (a registered firm — plaintiff No. 1 — and two servants: plaintiff No. 2 the accountant and plaintiff No. 3 the godown-keeper) against the defendant for damages alleged to arise from a false report made by the defendant to the police. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant orally and in writing reported that the firm was secretly selling cloth on the black market, named plaintiffs No. 2 and No. 3 as directly concerned, and induced customers to support his report. On the defendant's report the police raided the firm's shop, seized goods and account-books, and a challan was put up against plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 on 24-5-1945. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 were tried in Criminal Case No. 287 of 1945 and were acquitted on 20-3-1946 after about 20 hearings. The plaintiffs also alleged that Civil Supplies officers started proceedings to cancel the firm's licence, which was avoided with difficulty.
The plaint set out particulars of claimed damages (Rs. 300 for criminal defence expenses; Rs. 500 for mental worry/damages to plaintiffs 2 and 3; Rs. 4,400 for the partners of plaintiff No. 1 — total Rs. 5,200). The trial Court framed eight issues (including whether plaintiff 1 had no cause of action, whether defendant maliciously made a false report, whether plaintiffs suffered damages, and whether plaintiff 3 refused to show the list of articles). The trial Court held that plaintiff No. 1 was entitled to Rs. 500 for defamation, held that the defendant had maliciously made a false report against plaintiffs 1 and 3 and acted without reasonable and probable cause, and awarded Rs. 50 to plaintiff No. 3 for malicious prosecution. No damages were awarded to plaintiff No. 2. The suit was decreed for Rs. 550 with proportionate costs in favour of plaintiffs 1 and 3.
The defendant appealed against that decree. The appellate court considered the appeal and ultimately allowed it, dismissing the plaintiffs' suit and granting costs to the defendant; the cross-objection was dismissed with costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial Court could award damages for defamation in favour of plaintiff No. 1 on the pleadings and evidence before it.
- Whether plaintiff No. 1 had a cause of action for malicious prosecution where criminal proceedings (as per the record) were instituted only against plaintiffs No. 2 and No. 3.
- Whether the defendant maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause made a report leading to prosecution of plaintiff No. 3 (i.e., whether the elements of malicious prosecution were established against the defendant).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Case (as advanced in the plaint and at trial)
- The defendant made false oral and written reports to the police, alleging the firm was selling cloth in the black market and naming plaintiffs 2 and 3 as directly concerned.
- The defendant induced customers to support his report.
- As a result of the report, the police raided the shop, seized goods and account-books, and the firm suffered humiliation and damage to its reputation among traders and the public.
- Plaintiffs 2 and 3 were prosecuted (challan dated 24-5-1945) and later acquitted (20-3-1946) after trial.
- Civil Supplies proceedings were initiated against the firm threatening cancellation of its licence (which would have caused substantial monthly loss) but cancellation was avoided with difficulty.
- Particulars of claimed damages were specified in the plaint: Rs. 300 (criminal defence expenses), Rs. 500 (mental worry/damages to P2 and P3), and Rs. 4,400 (partners' losses).
Defendant's Case (as presented in defence and on appeal)
- The defendant (with other dealers) sought entry to the firm's shop but was prevented by plaintiff No. 3, who refused to allow them in and refused to show the stock list or any cloth; plaintiff No. 3 told them he did not wish to sell to them.
- The defendant and others made a report to the police after being so refused; the report was not false, malicious, or made to cause harm.
- The defendant had no hand in the subsequent prosecution beyond making the report; the police initiated prosecution after their own investigation.
- The defendant contended (on appeal) that the trial Court erred in awarding damages for defamation to plaintiff No. 1 because the case tried was for malicious prosecution, not defamation; that plaintiff No. 1 was not prosecuted and hence had no cause of action for malicious prosecution; and that the necessary ingredients for malicious prosecution had not been established against the defendant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Brijlal Prasad v. Mahant Laldas, 1940 Nag 125 (AIR V 27) | In a suit for defamation the plaint must allege publication, set out the actual words used, state that they were published or spoken to named individuals, and specify the time and place of publication. | The court applied this requirement to hold that plaintiff No. 1's plaint did not plead the necessary particulars for a defamation claim and therefore no defamation case had been made out. |
| Sheikh Mehtab v. Balaji, 1946 Nag 46 (AIR V 33) | Identifying elements required to prove an action for malicious prosecution (used with Laxmichand). | The court cited this case as authority for the list of elements that a plaintiff must prove in an action for malicious prosecution. |
| Laxmichand v. The Dominion of India, 1955 Nag 265 (AIR V 42) | Identifying elements required to prove an action for malicious prosecution (used with Sheikh Mehtab). | The court cited this case together with Sheikh Mehtab to set out the four ingredients a plaintiff must establish for malicious prosecution. |
| Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh, 30 All 525 (Privy Council) | Principle on who can be sued for malicious prosecution: mere giving of information to police not ordinarily actionable; liability arises where complainant knowingly makes false charges, misleads the police, suborns witnesses or otherwise induces the police to prosecute. | The court relied on this Privy Council passage to analyse whether the defendant's conduct went beyond honest reporting. Applying the test, the court found no evidence that the defendant misled the police, produced false witnesses, or unduly influenced the police; accordingly, defendant was not liable for malicious prosecution. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The appellate court proceeded in stages:
- Defamation claim: The court first considered whether a defamation claim had been properly pleaded and proved for plaintiff No. 1. Relying on the principle from Brijlal Prasad v. Mahant Laldas, it held that a defamation plaint must allege publication, the actual words, the persons to whom they were published, and the time and place. The plaint in this case contained none of those particulars. Consequently the appellate court concluded that no case of defamation had been made out by plaintiff No. 1.
-
Malicious prosecution — threshold elements: The court then set out the established elements that a plaintiff must prove in an action for malicious prosecution:
- that he was prosecuted by the defendant;
- that the proceedings terminated in his favour (if so capable of termination);
- that the prosecution was instituted without reasonable and probable cause; and
- that it was due to malicious intention of the defendant rather than an intention to carry the law into effect (citing Sheikh Mehtab v. Balaji and Laxmichand v. The Dominion of India).
- Malicious prosecution claim by plaintiff No. 3: The court examined whether plaintiff No. 3 had established that the defendant prosecuted him in the requisite sense. The court relied on the Privy Council's analysis in Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh which distinguishes between a complainant who merely gives honest information to the police and one who procures or improperly influences prosecution (e.g., by false charges, suborned witnesses, or misleading the police).
- Application of Privy Council test to facts: The court found that the defendant had not gone beyond giving an account of his honest suspicion to the police and that the police launched prosecution without further interference by the defendant. The court noted evidence (Radhakisan, P.W.2) showing dealings by the plaintiffs' servants that could have given outsiders cause for suspicion. There was no evidence that the defendant produced false witnesses or did anything more than give honest assistance required of him. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not prove that the defendant effectively prosecuted them in the sense required for malicious prosecution liability.
- Conclusion of analysis: On the basis of the foregoing, particularly the lack of evidence of improper conduct by the defendant beyond reporting, the appellate court concluded that the claim of plaintiff No. 3 for malicious prosecution must fail. Because plaintiff No. 1 had no cause of action for malicious prosecution and plaintiff No. 3's claim failed, the court held that the plaintiffs' suit as a whole failed.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED; PLAINTIFFS' SUIT DISMISSED.
Consequences and immediate effects:
- The trial Court's decree in favour of plaintiffs (awarding Rs. 550 and proportionate costs) was set aside.
- The appellate court allowed the defendant's appeal with costs throughout.
- The cross-objection was dismissed with costs.
The opinion does not assert that it establishes any new legal precedent; it applies existing authorities to the facts and reverses the trial Court's findings on both defamation and malicious prosecution as pleaded and proved in the case.
1. This is a defendant's appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court awarding Rs. 550/- to the respondents-plaintiffs as damages for malicious prosecution and defamation.
2. Plaintiff No. 1 is a registered firm with Sheobhagwan Laxminarayan Marwadi as its managing-partner and plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 are its servants-accountant and godown-keeper respectively. The firm is a wholesale dealer in cloth and yarn and was at the relevant time a quota holder of the mills at Nagpur and other places. It alleged that the defendant made a false report to the police, both orally as well as in writing, alleging that it was secretly selling a lot of cloth in the black-market by making the defendant wait outside and insinuating that genuine purchasers were not getting goods from the shop and that it refused to sell cloth to him. It is alleged that the defendant in his report to the police named plaintiffs 2 and 3 as the persons directly concerned in this. It further alleged that in order to support this false accusation the defendant called some customers who were taking their turn in the queue and induced them to support him in his report.
3. On the said report, it is said, the police raided the shop of plaintiff No. 1, seized certain goods, account-books and other articles and subjected the plaintiff-firm to humiliation and lowered it in the estimation of the fellow-traders and the public. A challan was also put up against plaintiffs 2 and 3 on 24-5-1945 and they were subsequently tried by Shri B.W Ratnaparkhee, Magistrate First Class, Nagpur, in Criminal Case No. 287 of 1945 which was decided on 20-3-1946 after about 20 hearings and ended in the acquittal of these two plaintiffs.
4. It was also alleged that the officers of the Civil Supplies Department started proceedings against the plaintiff-firm for cancellation of its licence for its alleged refusal to sell and that it was with great difficulty that the cancellation of the licence, which would have involved it in a loss of about Rs. 3,000/- per month, could be avoided. Particulars of the claim for damages were given in paragraph 12 of the plaint in these terms;
(a) Rs. 300 for the expenses of defending the criminal case including the fees of counsel; (b) Rs. 500 for the mental worry and other damages to plaintiffs 2 and 3; and (c) Rs. 4,400 for the partners of the plaintiff No. 1. Rs. 5,200 Total.
5. The defence was that the defendant along with other dealers had tried to get into the, shop of plaintiff No. 1 but was prevented from doing so by plaintiff No. 3 who was standing near the gate and was not allowing them in. It was contended that this defendant and other dealers represented to plaintiff No. 3 that he had already started sales before the declared time and the might say later that the stock, was exhausted. They asked him to show the list of variety and quantity of cloth received in the shop for sale, so that they might wait outside if they thought fit to do so.
6. Plaintiff No. 3 refused to show the list or show any cloth to the defendant and other customers. He further asked them to do as they liked and said that he did not wish to sell cloth to any one of them. They therefore made a report to the police. It was denied that the said report to the police was false or was made on account of any malice or with a view to causing harm to the plaintiffs. It was contended that the defendant had no hand in the prosecution which was started by the police after due investigation and such enquiry as the police thought fit.
7. It was denied that the said report was without any reasonable or probable cause as alleged. It was pointed out that plaintiff No. 1 was not prosecuted by the police at all and hence no question of its being lowered in the estimation of others arose. It was thus contended that the plaintiff No. 1 had no cause of action against the defendant.
8. The trial Court framed the following 8 issues:
“(1). Whether plaintiff 1 has no cause of action?
(2) Whether plaintiff 1 is a registered firm?
(3) A. Whether the defendant maliciously made a false report on 26-4-1945 against the plaintiffs?
B. Whether the defendant acted without any reasonable and probable cause?
(4) Whether the plaintiffs suffered damages as pleaded?
(5) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such damages from the defendant?
(6) Whether the plaintiff 3 refused to show the list of articles and refused to sell any cloth to the defendant and others on 26-4-1945?
(7) Whether the defendant merely reported these facts to the police?
(8) Relief and costs”
9. And held that plaintiff No. 1 was entitled to damages to the extent of Rs. 500 on account of defamation, that the defendant had maliciously made a false report against plaintiffs 1 and 3 on 26-4-1945 and that in making the said report the defendant acted without any reasonable and probable cause, and that plaintiff No. 3 was entitled to Rs. 50 as damages for malicious prosecution. No damages were awarded to plaintiff No. 2. The suit was thus decreed for Rs. 550 with proportionate costs in favour of plaintiffs 1 and 3.
10. The defendant has appealed against the said decree and he contends:
(i) that there could not be a decree for damages for defamation in favour of plaintiff No. 1 because the case as laid in the plaint and tried by the Court was not that damages should be awarded for defamation but was that damages should be awarded for malicious prosecution;
(ii) that there was no criminal prosecution as against plaintiff No. 1 and therefore it had no case for damages for malicious prosecution; and
(iii) that none of the ingredients necessary for awarding damages for malicious prosecution have been established in the present case.
11. On the first point, it is clear that the contention of the appellant-defendant is well-founded. A claim for damages for malicious prosecution is quite a separate species of tort from a claim for damages for defamation. The plaint allegations only make out a case for malicious prosecution and not one for defamation.
12. We may point out that in a suit for damages for defamation the law requires that the plaint, ought to allege the publication of the defamatory statement, set out the actual words used and also state that they were published or spoken to some named individuals and specify the time and place when and where they were published (vide ‘Brijlal Prasad v. Mahant Laldas’, 1940 Nag 125 (AIR V 27) (A)). Nothing of the kind is to be found in the plaint. Under the circumstances we hold that no case of defamation has been made out by the plaintiff No. 1.
13. Coming now to the question of damages for malicious prosecution, it is now well-settled that in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff has to prove:
(i) that he was prosecuted by the defendant;
(ii) that the proceedings terminated in favour of the plaintiff if from their nature they were so capable of terminating;
(iii) that the prosecution was instituted against him without reasonable and probable cause; and
(iv) that it was due to malicious intention of the defendant and not with the intention of carrying the law into effect vide ‘Sheikh Mehtab v. Balaji’, 1946 Nag 46 (AIR V 33) (B) and ‘Laxmichand v. The Dominion of India’, 1955 Nag 265 ((S) AIR V 42) (C). The prosecution which started on the report of the defendant was against plaintiffs 2 and 3 alone, but not against plaintiff No. 1. The latter has therefore no cause of action to claim damages for malicious prosecution.
14. We must then consider the claim of plaintiff No. 3 for damages for malicious prosecution. The first question is whether plaintiff No. 3 has proved that he was prosecuted by the defendant. In ‘Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh’, 30 All 525 (533-534) (PC) (D) their Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down;
“It will be convenient to refer at once to the decision of the Madras High Court (‘ubi supra) which the learned Judicial Commissioner appears to have followed with some reluctance. The judgment is in these terms;
‘The only person who can be sued in an action for malicious prosecution is the person who prosecutes. In this case, though the first defendant may have instituted criminal proceedings before the police, he certainly did not prosecute the plaintiff. He merely gave information to the police, and the police, after investigation, appear to have thought fit to prosecute the plaintiff. The defendant is not responsible for their act, and no action lies against him for malicious prosecution’. “The principle here laid down is sound enough if properly understood, and its application to the particular case was no doubt justified; but in the opinion of their Lordships, it is not universal application. In India the police have special powers in regard to the investigation of criminal charges, and it depends very much on the result of their investigation whether or not further proceedings are taken against the person accused.
If, therefore, a complainant does not go beyond giving what he believes to be correct information to the police, and the police without further interference on his part (except giving such honest assistance as they may require), think fit to prosecute, it would be improper to make him responsible in damages for the failure of the prosecution.
But if the charge is false to the knowledge of the complainant; if he misleads the police by bringing suborned witnesses to support it; if he influences the police to assist him in sending an innocent man for trial before the magistrate — it would be equally improper to allow him to escape-liability because the prosecution has not, technically been conducted by him.
The question in all cases of this kind must be — Who was the prosecutor? — and the answer must depend upon the whole circumstances of the case. The mere setting of the law in motion is not the criterion; the conduct of the complainant before and after making the charge, must also be taken into consideration.”
15. It is quite plain here that the defendant has not gone beyond giving an account of his honest suspicion about the plaintiffs to the police, who launched the prosecution without any further interference on his part. On the other hand, the evidence of Radhakisan (P.W 2). clearly showed that there were admittedly dealings by the plaintiff's servants which to an outsider might well give an impression that everything was not fair and aboveboard.
16. Further, there is no evidence that the defendant produced false witnesses to support the prosecution or did anything more to help the prosecution (except giving such honest assistance as was required of him). The plaintiffs have thus failed to prove that it was the defendant who, in 1 effect, prosecuted them. We are therefore of the opinion that the claim of plaintiff No. 3 for damages for malicious prosecution must fail. The plaintiffs' suit therefore completely fails and is hereby dismissed. The appeal is allowed with costs throughout, and the cross-objection is dismissed with costs.
17. Appeal allowed.
Alert