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Mohi Ram And Others v. Bansi Lal And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an application for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of this Court dated 16-8-1954 in Second Appeal No. 38 of 1952. The underlying suit was filed by Mohi Ram and others against Bansi Lal and others. The plaintiffs alleged that the suit lands had been purchased in 1950 Sambat for Rs. 155/8/- out of funds contributed by the villagers of Sangrah, but that Dhayan Singh's name alone was entered as Benamidar. After Dhayan Singh's death the defendants continued to hold the property in the capacity of Benamidars. The plaintiffs alleged that at the time of settlement Dhayan Singh misrepresented facts to get the lands entered in his exclusive name, and that the defendants prevented grazing and impounded cattle.
The plaintiffs sought a declaration that they, along with the defendants, were proprietors of the suit lands and an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their grazing and other rights; alternatively they claimed easement rights. The defendants pleaded that Dhayan Singh had purchased the lands out of his personal funds and that the plaintiffs had no proprietary or easement rights.
Procedurally, the Trial Court (Senior Sub-Judge, Nahan) dismissed the suit holding the lands belonged to the defendants as proprietors and that the plaintiffs had no easement rights. The District Judge allowed the plaintiffs' appeal and decreed the suit. On second appeal to this Court the Court concluded the Benami transaction and the easement claims were not proved, allowed the second appeal and non-suited the plaintiffs. The current petition seeks a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution to appeal to the Supreme Court against that decision.
During proceedings an issue arose as to the market value of the land. The Court directed the Senior Sub-Judge, Nahan, to enquire into and report the value. The Tehsildar (appointed Commissioner) gave a valuation which the Senior Sub-Judge reduced substantially; the Senior Sub-Judge reported a total value (land, grass and trees) of Rs. 16,490/6/6. Objections to that report were filed by the petitioners who challenged the reduction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution can be granted by this Court, which requires (A) that the value of the subject-matter of the suit is not less than Rs. 20,000 and (B) that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.
- Whether the valuation of the suit property (land, grass and particularly trees) as fixed by the Senior Sub-Judge is such that the value of the plaintiffs' share or interest meets the Rs. 20,000 threshold for a certificate.
- Whether, alternatively, the case involves any question of great public or general importance or exceptional features that would make it fit for appeal under Article 133(1)(c) (i.e., whether the Court should certify the case as fit for appeal despite the value criterion).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The valuation reported by the Tehsildar (appointed Commissioner) could not be disputed because the Commissioner had been appointed with the consent of the parties; his finding should stand.
- To support that contention the petitioners relied on precedent (Murli Mal-Dayal Chand v. Lachhman and Amrita Sundari v. Munshi Serajuddin) to assert that a commissioner's report accepted by the parties should not be lightly overruled.
- In the alternative, the petitioners contended that the case was a fit one for appeal under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution (i.e., that it involved a question of sufficient public or general importance to merit certification notwithstanding value).
Respondent No. 1's Arguments
- The respondent denied that the market value of the land in suit was Rs. 20,000 or more, prompting the Court to direct an inquiry into value.
- The respondent (through Mr. Dalip Singh) argued that the precedents relied upon by the petitioners were not applicable because the Senior Sub-Judge had given good and sufficient reasons for not accepting the Commissioner's valuation.
- The respondent further pointed out that what matters for certification is not the value of the entire land including trees and grass but the value of the plaintiffs' share or interest in it.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Murli Mal-Dayal Chand v. Lachhman, AIR 1914 Lah 339 | Principle that where parties and the court have treated a person as a Commissioner, a party cannot later challenge his proceedings under Section 99 CPC. | The Court noted the principle but held it was not applicable here because the Senior Sub-Judge had given good grounds for not accepting the Commissioner's valuation; therefore the petitioners could not rely on this precedent to prevent revision of the valuation. |
| Amrita Sundari v. Munshi Serajuddin, AIR 1924 Cal 620 | Principle cautioning courts against interfering with the result of a long and careful local investigation except on clearly defined and sufficient grounds; do not overrule a Commissioner's report unless justified. | The Court acknowledged the principle but concluded it did not apply because the Senior Sub-Judge provided clear reasons for revising the Commissioner's valuation. |
| Poosa Thorai v. Kanappa Chetty, AIR 1918 Mad 1099 | Authority cited for the proposition that "value" means the real market value of the property involved. | The Court relied on this principle (together with other cases) to assess the proper market value of the trees and to justify reduction of the Commissioner's valuation to reflect real market conditions. |
| Nawaz Ali v. Allu, AIR 1924 Lah 82 | Used to support the definition of "value" as real market value. | Applied together with Poosa Thorai and Rafi Uddin Ahmad to justify the Senior Sub-Judge's downward revision of the Commissioner's valuation of the trees. |
| Rafi Uddin Ahmad v. Rami Kaniz Abid, AIR 1939 Oudh 1 | Also cited for the proposition that value should be the real market value. | The Court cited this case in conjunction with the other authorities to uphold the Senior Sub-Judge's reduction of the valuation of the trees. |
| Shevantibai v. Janardhan Raghunath, AIR 1944 PC 65 | Principle that on appeal the value of the subject-matter in dispute must be taken as the value of the share of the joint family property which the plaintiff is claiming, not the whole joint family estate. | The Court applied this rule to determine that the relevant value for certification is the plaintiffs' share or interest in the property, not the total value of the entire property. |
| Arjunlal v. Hiralal, AIR 1952 Raj 11 | Held (following AIR 1944 PC 65) that the value relevant for leave/certificate is the plaintiff's share; an applicant is not entitled to certificate under the specified Articles if the share value is below the threshold even if the whole property's value exceeds it. | The Court referred to this case to support the proposition that the plaintiffs' share must be considered for the Rs. 20,000 threshold, and concluded the plaintiffs' share would be much less than Rs. 20,000. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court framed the statutory gateway for the certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution as requiring satisfaction of two conditions:
- (A) That the value of the subject-matter of the suit is not less than Rs. 20,000; and
- (B) That the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court (having regard to the fact this Court had reversed the District Judge).
On condition (A) the Court examined the valuation issue in detail. The petitioners argued that the Tehsildar's valuation (as Commissioner) could not be contested because he had been appointed with the consent of the parties and cited authority for the principle that a Commissioner's report should not be lightly overruled. The Court rejected the petitioners' reliance on those precedents because the Senior Sub-Judge had given "good grounds" for not accepting the Commissioner's valuation and was therefore entitled to revise it.
The Court noted there was no dispute as to the market value of the land alone (Rs. 393/10/6) and of the grass (Rs. 1591/12/-). The controversy concerned the valuation of the trees: the Commissioner valued the trees at Rs. 48,349/15/-, which the Senior Sub-Judge reduced to Rs. 14,505/-. The Senior Sub-Judge's reasons, accepted by this Court, included:
- The trees' location in a remote and inaccessible part of Tehsil Rainuka;
- Evidence that the trees (ban and brass) were useful only for fuel purposes;
- Evidence from witnesses that there was no nearby market for fuel;
- Transport difficulties: the only means to Dadahu (about 8 miles) was by mules and motor transport to Nahan (26 miles) was available only in good weather.
The Court emphasized the settled meaning of "value" as the real market value of the property (citing Poosa Thorai, Nawaz Ali, Rafi Uddin Ahmad) and concluded the Senior Sub-Judge's drastic reduction of the Commissioner's valuation was justified and not unreasonable.
The Court then considered that the plaintiffs did not claim exclusive proprietorship but only joint proprietorship along with defendants. It relied on Shevantibai (AIR 1944 PC 65) and Arjunlal (AIR 1952 Raj 11) to state that the relevant value for the purpose of certification is the value of the plaintiffs' share or interest in the property, not the value of the whole property. The Senior Sub-Judge's total valuation for land, grass and trees was Rs. 16,490/6/6; the Court reasoned the plaintiffs' share of that total would be "very much less" than Rs. 20,000.
The Court also recorded that S. Mela Ram, Advocate for the petitioners, admitted before the Court that the easement rights claimed were not of the value of Rs. 20,000. Therefore the plaintiffs could not establish the Rs. 20,000 threshold.
On condition (B) (fit for appeal), and the alternative submission under Article 133(1)(c), the petitioners argued the case was fit for appeal on account of exceptional features or public importance. The Court found that the dispute concerned a piece of mostly forest land situated in the interior of Rainuka Tehsil and that it did not involve any question of great public or general importance. The petitioners failed to demonstrate any exceptional features warranting certification under Article 133(1)(c).
On the combined basis that (i) the plaintiffs' share could not be shown to satisfy the Rs. 20,000 threshold and (ii) there was no question of great public or general importance or exceptional feature, the Court concluded that a certificate to appeal could not be granted.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court is refused. The Court's dispositive order states: The petition fails and is rejected with costs assessed at Rs. 30/-, payable to respondent No. 1. The Court further ordered that the costs of the Commissioner would be paid by the petitioners if not already paid, and concluded with the words "Petition dismissed."
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: No certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court is granted; the plaintiffs are non-suited and cannot appeal to the Supreme Court from this Court's decision by virtue of the refused certificate. The petitioners must pay costs of Rs. 30 to respondent No. 1 and bear the Commissioner's costs if unpaid.
- Broader precedent: The opinion applies established principles on (a) when a Court may revise a Commissioner's valuation where the Court gives reasons, (b) the meaning of "value" as real market value, and (c) that for joint-family or shared-property disputes the relevant value for certification is the claimant's share. The opinion itself does not purport to set a novel legal precedent beyond applying these principles; no new general rule was declared in the judgment.
Order Pronounced: Petition dismissed.
(D.R.R.)
1. This is an application for grant of certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of this Court dated 16-8-1954 in Second Appeal No. 38 of 1952 whereby the decision of the District Judge of Mahasu & Sirmur, was set aside and that of the Senior Sub-Judge, Nahan, dismissing the petitioners' suit, was restored. The above suit had been filed by Mohi Ram and others against Bansi Lal and others with the allegations that the lands in the suit had been purchased in 1950 Sambat for Rs. 155/8/- out of funds contributed by the villagers of Sangrah. For the sake of convenience, however, the name of Dhayan Singh alone was entered over it as Benamidar. After the death of Dhayan Singh, the defendants continued to hold the property in the same capacity, i.e as Benamidars.
2. At the time of the settlement Dhayan Singh managed to get the lands entered in his exclusive name by misrepresenting facts. The defendants prevented the plaintiffs from grazing their cattle on this land and also impounded their cattle.
3. Hence the plaintiffs sought a declaration that they, along with the defendants, were the proprietors of the suit lands as well as an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their grazing and other rights. In the alternative, the plaintiffs claimed easement rights over this land.
4. The defendants contested the suit on the grounds: firstly, that the suit lands had been purchased by Dhayan Singh out of his personal funds, secondly, that the plaintiffs had no proprietary rights in this land and thirdly that the plaintiffs had no rights of easement.
5. The Trial Court (Senior Sub-Judge Nahan) found that the suit lands belonged to the defendants and were in their possession as proprietors and not as Benamidars. It further held that the plaintiffs had no easement rights. Consequently it dismissed the suit.
6. The plaintiffs then went up in appeal to the learned District Judge who found in favour of the plaintiffs' case. Consequently he allowed the appeal and decreed the suit.
7. When the matter came up to this Court in second appeal, I came to the conclusion that the Benami transaction, alleged by the plaintiffs, was not made out and similarly, the easement rights claimed by them were not established. Consequently, I allowed the second appeal and non-suited the plaintiffs. Hence this petition for grant of certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court.
8. When this petition came up for hearing on 11-4-1955, the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 (Bansi Lal) denied that the market value of the land in suit came to Rs. 20,000/- or more. Thereupon an order was made by this Court directing the Senior Sub-Judge, Nahan, to enquire into and report the value of the land in suit.
9. In accordance with that order the Senior Sub-Judge has submitted his report to the effect that the total value of the land in suit, along with the grass and trees standing upon it, comes to Rs. 16,490/6/6. To this report objections have been filed by the petitioners who contend that the Senior Sub-Judge was not justified in imposing a cut of 70 per cent, on the valuation arrived at by the Commissioner (Tehsildar Nahan).
10. Arguments of the learned counsel were heard yesterday; I now proceed to deliver judgment.
11. The certificate sought for cannot be granted unless this Court holds: (vide Article 133 of the Constitution)
(A) That the value of the subject-matter of the suit is not less than Rs. 20,000/-;
(B) That the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court (This Court having reversed the decision of the learned District Judge).
12. As far as (A) is concerned, Mr. paras Ram, for the petitioners, argued that since the Tehsildar had been appointed Commissioner with the consent of the parties, his finding could not be disputed. He supported his contention by reference to two rulings:
(1) ‘Murli Mal-Dayal Chand v. Lachhman’, AIR 1914 Lah 339 (2) (A). There the facts were that one Sukh Dayal had been appointed to function both as a receiver and as a local commissioner although he was termed local commissioner only. Subsequently, the plaintiffs contended that Sukhdayal was only a receiver and his proceedings as a Commissioner were ultra vires. It was in that connection that a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court held that:
“Where the conduct of the parties, and the action of, and expressions used by them and by the Court, made it clear that all parties accepted S. as a Commissioner to examine accounts, neither party, in view of Section 99 of the CPC could be allowed in the Chief Court to go back upon this.”
(2) Amrita Sundari v. Munshi Serajuddin’, AIR 1924 Cal 620 (B), where a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court remarked that:
“Interference with the result of a long and careful local investigation except upon clearly defined and sufficient grounds is improper. It is not safe for a Court to act as an expert and to overrule the elaborate report of a Commissioner whose integrity is unquestioned, whose careful and laborious execution of his task is proved by his report, and who has not blindly adopted the assertions of either party.”
13. As Mr. Dalip Singh, for respondent No. 1, rightly pointed out, this ruling is not applicable to the facts of the present case, because the learned Senior Sub-Judge has given good grounds for not accepting the valuation arrived at by the Commissioner. In my opinion, the Senior Sub-Judge was certainly entitled to revise the valuation made by the Tehsildar Commissioner, if he felt that it was not correct.
14. There is no dispute regarding the market value of the land alone, which comes to Rs. 393/10/6 or of the grass which comes to Rs. 1591/12/-. It is the value of the trees standing upon the land, around which the controversy centres. The Commissioner valued the trees at Rs. 48349/15/-.
15. The Senior Sub-Judge was well within his rights in taking into consideration the fact that the trees in question are situated in a remote and inaccessible part of Tehsil Rainuka. He has also pointed out that according to the statement of Shri Nagar Mal, Divisional Forest Officer, Rajgarh, ban and brass trees could be used for fuel purposes Only and according to Jagmohan Singh, Mohar Singh and Kanthi Ram R. Ws., there was no market nearby for fuel.
16. The only means of transport from the land in suit upto Dadahu (a distance of about 8 miles) is by mules. From Dadahu to Nahan, a distance of 26 miles, motor transport is available in good weather. It is axiomatic that all these factors have to be taken into consideration in assessing the value of these trees.
17. Value means the real market value of the property involved, vide — ‘Poosa Thorai v. Kanappa Chetty’, AIR 1918 Mad 1099 (C); — ‘Nawaz Ali v. Allu, AIR 1924 Lah 82 (D) and — ‘Rafi Uddin Ahmad v. Rami Kaniz Abid’, AIR 1939 Oudh 1 (E). Under these circumstances I concur with the view of the Senior Sub-Judge that the valuation of the trees, as ascertained by the Commissioner, needed drastic reduction. It, therefore, follows that the valuation of the trees as fixed by the Senior Sub-Judge (Rs. 14,505/-) cannot be said to be unreasonable.
18. Mr. Dalip Singh, for the contesting respondents, further pointed out that we are concerned not with the value of the entire land in suit, including the trees and grass standing upon it, but only with the value of the plaintiffs' share or interest therein.
19. He supported his arguments by citing inter alia, — ‘Shevantibai v. Janardhan Raghunath’, AIR 1944 PC 65 (F), wherein their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out
“that the High Court was correct in holding that the value of the subject-matter in dispute, on appeal to His Majesty in Council, must be taken to be the value of the share of the joint family property in respect of…… which the plaintiff was claiming. The question as to the title of the plaintiff to the share, which he claimed in the joint property, did not become a question respecting the whole of the joint family estate, merely because if his title was established, it would result in the joint family estate being partitioned.”
20. In — ‘Arjunlal v. Hiralal, AIR 1952 Raj 11 (G), the facts were that the plaintiff sued for partition of his one third share in a joint-family house which was admittedly more than Rs. 20,000/- in value but the plaintiff's share was less than Rs. 2,000/-. The suit was dismissed in all the lower Courts. The plaintiff applied under Article 134(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
21. It was held by a Division Bench of the Rajas than High Court, following AIR 1944 PC 65 (F), that the applicant was not entitled to a certificate either under Cl. (a) or Cl. (b) of Article 133(1) as the value of the subject-matter of dispute in appeal will be the value of the plaintiff's share and not the value of the entire joint-family house.
22. Going back to the plaint, I may point out that the plaintiffs claimed not that they were the exclusive proprietors of the suit land but only that they were joint proprietors along with the defendants. As regards the easement rights claimed by the petitioners, Sbi Mela Ram, Advocate, for the petitioners, gave a statement before this Court on 11-4-55 admitting that the easement rights claimed by his clients were not of the value of Rs. 20,000/-.
23. The total value of the land in suit, including the grass and the trees, having been found by the Senior Sub-Judge to be Rs. 16490/6/6 (and that finding having been maintained by this Court) it follows that the value of the plaintiffs' share or interest there in would be very much less. Therefore, it is not possible to grant a certificate to the effect that the value of the subject-matter of the dispute is not less than Rs. 20,000/-.
24. In the alternative Mr. Paras Ram contended that the case was a fit one for appeal under Article 133(1)(c), Constitution of India. As already pointed out, the dispute is regarding a piece of land, mostly forest, situated in the interior of Rainuka Tehsil. I am unable to see that the case involves any question of great public or general importance.
25. Before I can certify that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court, it was incumbent upon the petitioners to show that the case involves any exceptional features. They have not succeeded in doing this.
26. ORDER: The petition fails and is rejected with costs assessed at Rs. 30/-, payable to the respondent No. 1. The costs of the Commissioner would also be paid by the petitioners, if not already paid.
D.R.R
27. Petition dismissed.
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