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C.V.R.M Ramaswami Chettiar And Others v. P. Jeevarathnammal

Madras High Court
Aug 1, 1956
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Judgment (Delivered by Govinda Menon, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit arose from a dispute over sums alleged to be due to the plaintiff from the defendants — members of a Nattukottai Chettiar Hindu joint family who conducted banking business through the C.V.R.M. firm at Rangoon and elsewhere. The plaintiff asserted that, while resident in Burma (from about 1920 to 1933), she was a customer of the Rangoon C.V.R.M. bank and maintained a deposit account into which she deposited savings from time to time. The plaintiff claimed a balance of Rs. 23,689-4-3 due under the deposit account with interest.

Documentary material in the record included a passbook (Ex. A-1) showing transactions from 1 Feb 1921 to 14 Feb 1932 and entries indicating consolidation by a pronote for Rs. 22,200 and deposit of title deeds as security (Ex. A-24). Later documents (including a deposit letter dated 23 Apr 1941 and subsequent payments in 1941 and 1944) and additional pronotes were produced by the plaintiff. The plaintiff made demand for payment (demand dated 16 Sep 1949) and, when unsatisfied, filed suit in the Subordinate Court at Devakottai for recovery, asserting jurisdiction because the defendants resided and had business headquarters at Kanadukathan.

The defendants denied the existence of the alleged deposit account and contended that transactions were closed in Feb 1932 by a cash payment and the execution of a promissory note (Rs. 22,200) with deposit of title deeds as equitable mortgage — i.e., that the relationship was of loan/mortgage rather than depositor/depositee and that remedies asserted by the plaintiff were time-barred.

The Subordinate Judge framed eleven issues (including whether the relationship was a deposit payable on demand; whether pronotes/mortgage were collateral or independent loans; and limitation and jurisdiction questions). The Subordinate Judge found for the plaintiff on the key issues: that the transaction was a deposit payable on demand; that pronotes and the mortgage had been taken merely as collateral; and that the suit was not barred by limitation. The suit was decreed with costs and the defendants appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the transactions between the plaintiff and the defendants' C.V.R.M. firm constituted a deposit payable on demand (i.e., relationship of depositor and depositee).
  2. Whether the promissory notes and the equitable mortgage (deposit of title deeds) were collateral securities for the deposit account or represented independent loans (and thus a change of juridical relationship to mortgagor/mortgagee and debtor/creditor).
  3. Whether the promissory note for Rs. 22,200 was executed only as collateral security for the mortgage amount or extinguished/altered the original deposit liability.
  4. Whether the suit was barred by limitation, having regard to the dates of demand and the application of Articles 59 and 60 of the Limitation Act.
  5. Whether the Sub Court at Devakottai had jurisdiction to try the suit and whether there was a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction.
  6. Whether, alternatively, the plaintiff was required to exhaust remedies on the mortgage (S.68(2), Transfer of Property Act) before suing personally on the deposit account.
  7. Whether demand for payment had to be made at the branch/place of deposit (Rangoon) to be effective under Article 60.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • Once the amount due was consolidated by execution of a promissory note and title deeds were deposited as collateral, the jural relationship of depositor and depositee ceased and became that of mortgagor and mortgagee (or debtor and creditor). Consequently, personal liability of the defendants should not be enforced as for a demand deposit.
  • Article 59 of the Limitation Act (for money lent when payable on demand) should apply from the date of the promissory note (23 Apr 1941), yielding a shorter limitation period, so the suit is time-barred.
  • Authorities such as the decisions summarized in Suleman Haje Ahmed Umar v. Abdulla Haje Rahimtulla indicate the test for distinguishing between deposit and loan and the presence of promissory notes and deposit of title deeds point to a loan/mortgage character.
  • Demand should have been made at the place where the account was kept (i.e., Rangoon) as indicated in Delhi Cloth and Gen. Mills v. Harnam Singh; no effective demand was made at Rangoon.
  • The plaintiff should have exhausted remedies against the mortgaged property (as per S.68(2) Transfer of Property Act) before suing personally for the debt.
  • They suggested the Rangoon firm might still be functioning there and implied procedural or forum problems, arguing that the plaintiff ought not to maintain the present suit in Madras.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff relied on established authority that a promisee under a negotiable instrument (a promissory note) may fall back upon the original cause of action for monies due and need not be confined to remedies under the promissory note itself (citing Sheik Akbar v. Sheikh Khan and related authorities).
  • The execution of a negotiable instrument or taking of collateral security operates prima facie as a conditional payment only and does not extinguish the original debt unless the parties clearly agree; therefore the original deposit relationship remains enforceable.
  • Ex. B-11 (letter of 7 Apr 1944) was not an unqualified demand for the entire amount; the proper, unconditional demand relied upon by the plaintiff was Ex. B-10 (dated 10 Feb 1947), and the suit was filed within three years of that demand, so not barred by Article 60.
  • The plaintiff had offered to receive payment in Rangoon and therefore the defendants' contention that demand must be directly at the Rangoon branch is without substance given the defendants' residence and business headquarters in Madras State.
  • S.68(2) Transfer of Property Act did not compel the plaintiff to first sue upon the mortgage in Rangoon because (a) there was no showing that such a suit could be maintained in the Madras courts and (b) the applicability of the Transfer of Property Act to Burma at the relevant time was uncertain.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suleman Haje Ahmed Umar v. Abdulla Haje Rahimtulla Test to distinguish loan from deposit: whether bailee had duty to seek out and repay bailor (deposit governed by Art.60); loans attended by securities, receipts, promissory notes or agreed interest. The Court considered this test in the appellants' favor but concluded that, on the facts and documents before it, the original deposit character was not conclusively altered by subsequent pronotes and security.
Sheik Akbar v. Sheikh Khan Principle that a plaintiff may sue on the original cause of action apart from a negotiable instrument; distinction between cases where original cause pre-exists the note and where it is the note itself. The Court relied on this decision to support the respondent's position that execution of pronotes did not preclude falling back upon the original deposit claim.
Jambu Chetty v. Palaniappan Chettiar Authority that execution of a promissory note does not necessarily extinguish the original relationship/claim. Cited among several cases to reinforce that pronotes taken as security leave the original liability intact.
Yarlagadda Veeraraghavayya v. Gorantla Ramayya Support for the proposition that a promissory note does not extinguish the antecedent liability. Used as supporting authority in the Court's assessment that the original deposit relationship persisted.
Mallayya v. Ramayya Authority for the same principle regarding pronotes and antecedent liabilities. Cited in support of the respondent's contention and the Court's conclusion about collateral nature of pronotes.
Sundararamayya v. Sitamma Further authority that a negotiable instrument taken for an antecedent debt is prima facie conditional payment only. Relied upon to support the conditional-payment principle and the plaintiff's right to pursue the original cause of action.
Jyoti Prosad v. Jahor Lal Biswas, J.'s observation that a promissory note given for an existing liability does not wipe out the original implied promise to repay. Cited to emphasize that the note does not extinguish the antecedent obligation; used in reasoning that the deposit relationship survived the pronote.
Abdul Majid v. M/s. Ganesh Das Kalooram Dictum affirming that a negotiable security does not necessarily extinguish the original claim. Referred to as consistent authority supporting the respondent's claim to the original cause of action.
Maung Chit v. Roshan N.M.A. Kareem Comer & Co. (Full Bench) Full Bench proposition: negotiable security given by a debtor operates prima facie as a conditional payment only and not as satisfaction unless parties so agree. The Court cited the Full Bench to conclude pronotes executed in 1941 amounted only to conditional payment and therefore did not extinguish the deposit claim.
Ward v. Evans English law authority (Lord Holt, Holt C.J.) that acceptance of a note is not actual payment; notes/bills operate as conditional payment absent express agreement. Used (via text-book citations) to support the conditional-payment rule that a note is not necessarily satisfaction of antecedent debt.
Romer v. Haslam Lord Esher, M.R.'s observation that negotiable securities operate as conditional payment only and are defeasible if the instrument is dishonoured. Cited to reinforce the commercial law principle that pronotes are conditional security and do not ipso facto extinguish original claims.
Bottomley v. Nuttall; Alien v. Royal Bank of Canada English authorities cited in the discussion of negotiable securities as conditional payments. Referred to in support of the proposition that a promissory note taken for a debt is a conditional payment only.
Ramaswami Chettiar v. Manickam Chettiar Local decision illustrating that among Nattukottai Chettiars the taking of security does not alter the nature of an original deposit. The Court expressly relied on this decision to hold that in similar Chettiar deposit transactions the nature of deposit is not altered by taking security; this supported the conclusion that the deposit relationship endured.
Subbiah Chetti v. Visolakshi Achi Authority that a demand must be an unqualified demand for the entire amount to attract Article 60. The Court relied on this principle to hold that Ex. B-11 was not an unconditional demand for the entire balance and that the operative demand was Ex. B-10 (10 Feb 1947).
Annamalai v. Veerappa Supreme Court observations relevant to the character of a demand under Article 60. Referred to in support of the finding that an unconditional demand had not earlier been made and that the suit was within three years of the operative demand.
Delhi Cloth and General Mills v. Harnam Singh Observation that demand should be made at the branch where the account is kept. The Court considered this authority but distinguished it on the facts (plaintiff offered to receive payment at Rangoon and defendants resided in Madras), thereby rejecting the strict application urged by the appellants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from an examination of the documentary record and legal principles established in the cited authorities:

  1. Documentary foundation: The passbook (Ex. A-1) and day book entries (Ex. A-24) showed deposits made by the plaintiff from 1 Feb 1921 to 14 Feb 1932 and later entries evidencing a pronote for Rs. 22,200 and deposit of title deeds as security. The Court regarded these records as establishing an original deposit relationship.
  2. Effect of pronotes and collateral security: The Court reviewed competing principles — appellants' reliance on the proposition that consolidation by pronote and deposit of title deeds converts a deposit into a loan/mortgage; respondent's reliance on authorities holding negotiable securities prima facie operate as conditional payments and do not extinguish antecedent liabilities.
  3. Application of authorities: After surveying case-law (including the Full Bench in Maung Chit, English authorities such as Ward v. Evans and Romer v. Haslam, and local decisions), the Court concluded that pronotes and mortgage security were, on the material before it, collateral/conditional and did not conclusively demonstrate a waiver of depositor/depositee rights by the plaintiff. The Court also relied upon Ramaswami Chettiar v. Manickam Chettiar to underscore that in transactions among Nattukottai Chettiars the taking of security did not alter the deposit's nature.
  4. Limitation analysis: The Court examined documentary demands (Exs. B-8, B-11, B-10). Applying the principle from Subbiah Chetti and relevant authorities, the Court found Ex. B-11 (7 Apr 1944) was not an unqualified demand for the entire sum. It identified Ex. B-10 (10 Feb 1947) as constituting the effective demand under Column 3 of Article 60 (deposit payable on demand), and therefore the suit filed within three years of that demand was not barred by limitation.
  5. Place of demand and jurisdictional objections: The Court considered the contention that demand had to be made at the Rangoon branch (Delhi Cloth & Gen. Mills), but noted (a) the plaintiff had expressed willingness to receive payment at Rangoon (Ex. A-14), and (b) the defendants resided in Madras and had their business headquarters there. On those facts the Court rejected the strict application of the Rangoon-demand rule and sustained jurisdiction of the Devakottai Sub Court.
  6. Transfer of Property Act argument (S.68(2)): The appellants contended the plaintiff should first have exhausted remedies against the mortgaged property. The Court rejected this argument because (a) a suit on the mortgage could not evidently be maintained in the Madras courts where the plaintiff sued, and (b) the applicability of the Transfer of Property Act in Burma at the relevant time was uncertain; consequently S.68(2) did not operate to bar the plaintiff's claim in Madras.
  7. Conclusion on merits: Bringing these strands together, the Court found the Subordinate Judge had rightly held (i) the relationship remained one of depositor and depositee, (ii) pronotes and mortgage were collateral and did not extinguish the original deposit claim, (iii) the suit was within the statutory period after an effective demand, and (iv) jurisdiction in Devakottai was proper. Accordingly, the lower court's decree was affirmed.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding (direct effect): The judgment and decree of the Subordinate Court at Devakottai in favour of the plaintiff were affirmed. The Court held that (a) the transactions constituted a deposit payable on demand and the depositor/depositee relationship subsisted despite the taking of pronotes and deposit of title deeds as collateral, (b) pronotes and the equitable mortgage amounted to collateral/conditional security and did not extinguish the original deposit claim, (c) the operative demand for limitation purposes was dated 10 Feb 1947 and the suit was therefore within three years under Article 60, and (d) jurisdiction of the Devakottai Sub Court was proper. The appeal therefore failed and was dismissed.

Consequences and implications: The immediate consequence is that the plaintiff's decree for recovery (previously entered in the lower court) stands. The appellate Court ordered that, in the circumstances, the parties would bear their own costs both in this Court and in the lower Court. The judgment affirms the settled commercial-law principle applied by the Court here — that a negotiable instrument or collateral security taken for an antecedent debt operates prima facie as a conditional payment and does not, without more, extinguish the antecedent obligation — but the opinion does not purport to lay down novel law beyond its application to the facts of this case.

V.C.S
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JUDGMENT

(Delivered by Govinda Menon, J.)

Defendants in O.S No. 182 of 1949 on the file of the Sub Court ot Devakottai are members of a Hindu Joint family belonging to the Nattukottai Chettiar community, being the sons of one Venkatachalam Chettiar who was doing banking business in Kanadukathan, Ramanathapuram district as well as in various other places in Burma. The suit against them was for recovery of a sum of Rs. 23,689-4-3 being the amount due under an alleged deposit account with interest thereon. The plaintiff alleged that she was residing in Burma with her husband from about 1920 till she left it in 1933 and that during the period of her residence there, she became a customer of the C.V.R.M Bank at Burma which was the defendants' family firm doing banking business and opened a deposit account, depositing for interest all the moneys she had been saving from time to time. All the amounts deposited by her were entered in a pass book and the total of the amounts in deposit was ascertained to be Rs. 22,000 in all in February 1932 and the deposit account was continued, the same being credited in the accounts as a fresh deposit carrying Rangoon Nadappu rate of interest repayable to the plaintiff whenever demanded. While such a relationship of depositor and depositee was subsisting, collateral to it by way of further security without detriment to such relationship, the defendants' family bank created a mortgage of certain specific immovable properties in Burma by deposit of title deeds in Rangoon in 1932. It is alleged that the properties belonged to the said business in Rangoon and the said collateral mortgage security is still subsisting and continuing. The bank had also been executing from time to time by way of additional collateral security periodically, pronotes for some round figures signed by any one of the defendants or by the agent of the firm at Rangoon and the last of the security documents was a deposit letter executed by the third defendant on behalf of the family firm in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 25,000 on 23rd April 1941. Subsequently a fresh deposit agreement as shown by the statement of account up to 12th April 1941 was also created for a sum of Rs. 25654-2-0 bearing Rangoon Nadappu rate of interest. Subsequent to this the following amounts were paid, viz., Rs. 2,154-20 on 23rd April 1941, Rs. 1000 on 2nd July 1941 and Rs. 500 on 7th March 1944. After this no further payments were made. Demand was made on the defendants for the balance of the amount due on 16th September 1949 but the defendants sent a reply notice dated 20th September 1949 setting out false defences. The plaintiff also expressed her willingness to receive payment in Rangoon if the defendants would name the agent if any appointed by them to make payment there. To this notice of demand the defendants sent an evasive and false reply. The cause of action arose at Rangoon where the deposit argeements had been made and concluded from February 1949 when the demand was made but as the defendants are permanently residing in Kanadukathan and as the headquarters of their business also exists there, the suit has been filed in the Devakottai Sub Court.

The defendants in their written statement denied the existence of any deposit account as alleged by the plaintiff but stated that there were certain transactions between the plaintiff and the defendants' C.V.R.M firm at Rangoon and that those transactions were finally closed on 14th February 1932 by payment to the plaintiff of a sum of Rs. 924-8-3 in cash. It was further averred that as a result of subsequent dealings between the plaintiff and their firm at Rangoon, the firm's agent had executed a promissory note in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 22,200 on 14th February 1932 and by way of collateral security for the said sum an equitable mortgage was created in respect of certain properties situate in Burma on 24th February 1932 by deposit of title deeds with the plaintiff. In these circumstances it was contended that there was no relationship of depositor and depositee existing between the plaintiff and the defendants and the claim on the basis of the promissory note as well as the right to enforce payment for the mortgage amount personally against the defendants would be barred by limitation. It was further alleged that it is because the remedy on the basis of the promissory note is no longer enforceable that the plaintiff has invented the story of of deposit for the purpose of filing a vexatious suit against the defendants.

On these pleadings the learned Subordinate Judge framed as many as eleven issues the first of which was whether the transaction with the defendants' C.V.R.M business was one of deposit payable on demand. The second issue was: were the promissory notes or the mortgage on deposit of title deeds made merely collaterally for the deposit account or were they independent loans of Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 5000 respectively. The third issue related to the question whether the promissory note for Rs. 22,200 in consolidation thereof was executed as collateral security only for the mortgage amount of Rs. 22,200. On these issues the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the transaction with the defendants' firm C.V.R.M was one of deposit payable on demand, that the promissory notes or the mortgage on deposit of title deeds were made merely collaterally for the deposit made by the plaintiff from time to time extending for a period of over twenty years. It was further found that they were not either independent loans of Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 5000 and that the promissory note for Rs. 22,200 was not executed as collaterally for the mortgage for Rs. 22,200. On the question covered by issues 8 and 9 whether the Sub Court at Devakottai had jurisdiction to try the suit and whether the plaintiff had cause of action for filing the suit the learned Judge held in favour of the plaintiff. Issue No. 7 was whether the suit was barred by limitation. The finding of the learned Subordinate Judge on this issue was that for the reasons given by him while discussing issue 1 to 3 the plaintiff's suit was not barred by limitation.

On these findings the suit was decreed with costs and aggrieved by that judgment the defendants have preferred the present appeal.

The main contention on behalf of the appellants is with regard to the question whether the plaintiff was a depositor with the defendants' (Appellant's) firm. It is not disputed that the transactions between the parties orginated as deposit by a constituent in a banking firm. Ex. A-1 is the pass book issued to the plaintiff by the Rangoon C.V.R.M firm. The transactions commenced on 1st February 1921 and closed on 14th February 1932. From the several entries noted there, it is found that various amounts were deposited by the plaintiff during the relevant period of eleven years. The entry against the date 14th February 1932 is to the effect that there was a credit of Rs. 24-8-3 and a debit of Rs. 924-8-3. There can therefore, be no doubt that the transactions were as deposit. Ex. A-24 relates to entries at pages 116 and 117 in the day book No. 5 of the C.V.R.M firm on 13th February 1932 and 14th February 1932. There is a credit entry in favour of the plaintiff, Jeevarathanammal, for one pronote executed by ‘K’ with interest at the Nadappu rate for Rs. 22,200. In addition to this entry it is noted that as security for the pronote of Rs. 22,200 various title deeds in respect of properties in Burma and other places have been handed over to Jeevarathanammal. Obviously the intention was to create an equitable mortgage. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyarngar's argument for the appellants is that when once the amount is consolidated and a promossory note is executed for that and along with it, title deeds are deposited as collateral security the jural relationship of depositor and depositee ceases to exist and thereafter the parties stand in the roles of mortgagor and mortgagee with the result that the plaintiff has to use for recovery of the amount due by enforcement of the mortgage or after relinquishing the security, sue for the amount due if the personal remedy is not barred. In any event learned Counsel contends that the defendants cannot be made liable personally for the sum due. He invokes the application of Art. 59 of the Limitation Act where it is provided that for money lent under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand the period of limitation is three years from the time when the loan is made. Contrast is made with the language of Art. 60 which states that for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand including money of a customer tn hands of his banker so payable, the period of limitation is three years from the time when the demand is made. Comparing the provisions of these two Articles learned Counsel contends that in the instant case Art. 59 would apply because from the date, viz., 23rd April 1941 when Ex. A12 was executed the plaintiff has become a promisse under the promissory note and a lender so far as the loan is concerned in which case the period of limitation will be only three years from the 7th of March 1944 when the endorsement of payment was made. The observations of the Judicial Committee in Suleman Haje Ahmed Umar v. Abdulla Haje Rahimtulla(1) where their Lordships have laid down that the test in deciding whether a transaction is a loan or a deposit is by ascertainment from the facts whether there was an obligation on the bailee to seek out the bailer and repay him and whether he was to keep the moneys till the bailor asked for them and held that where there is no duty on the bailee of the moneys to seek out his bailor and repay him but only a duty to repay if and when the bailor requested payment the bailment was a deposit and a suit to recover the moneys will be governed by Art. 60 of the Limitation Act and if the bailment were a loan it would be reasonable to expect it to be attended by one or other of the things, viz., any security for the alleged loan, any receipt in writing, any promissory note or any agreement as to what rate of interest the loan thereto should carry, were called in aid to support the contention that when the promissory note was executed and later on collateral security by deposit of title deeds was also given the transaction had got transformed into that of a loan and the original character of deposit had ceased to exist.

On the other hand Mr. T. Venkatadri for the respondent invited our attention to a large body of case-law to the effect that it is competent for a promisee under a negotiable instrument such as a promissory note to fall back upon the original cause of action and institute a suit on that basis without having recourse to any rights and liabilities under the promissory note. Our attention was invited to the leading case in Sheik Akbar v. Sheikh Khan where the learned Judges laid down that a suit can be laid on the original cause of action apart from the cause of action on the promissory note or any other negotiable instrument. A distinction is made between a case where the cause of action for money is complete before the execution of the bill or the note itself and where the original cause of action is bill or note itself. In the former case it is open to the plaintiff to fall back upon the original cause of action. When a promissory note is executed in consideration of the money due under an earlier transaction contenmporaneous with the advent of the note itself the execution of the note operates only as a conditional discharge and it is always open to the creditor to fall back upon the original cause of action. See the decisions in Jambu Chetty v. Palaniappan Chettiar (2). Yarlagadda Veeraraghavayya v. Gorantla Ramayya (3), Mallayya v. Ramayya(4) and Sundararamayya v. Sitamma(5) all of which are authorities for the position that the mere fact that a promissory note was executed will not extinguish the original relationship that exists between the parties under the earlier transaction. The observations of Biswas, J., in Jyoti Prosad v. Jahor Lal(6) to the effect that when a promissory note is executed in consideration of an already existing liability the note containing as it does an express promise to repay cannot wipe out the promise to repay which is implied in the loan itself, were stressed, it is, therefore, contended that there can be no question of any merger of the original consideration in the promissory note so as to make the promissory note the only available cause of action. The liability under the original loan being quite independent of the promissory note can no more be extinguished by the execution of a fresh promissory note than an original debt is by substitution of a new security. A dictum similar to the above is contained in Abdul Majid v. M/s. Ganesh Das Kalooram (7). A Full Bench of five Judges in Maung, Chit v. Roshan N.M.A Kareem Comer and Co.(8) after discussing a large body of case-law has laid down that the giving of a negotiable security by a debtor to his creditor operates prima facie as a conditional payment only and not as a satisfaction of the debt unless the parties agree to treat it as such—Such a conditional payment is liable to be defeated on non-payment of the negotiable instrument at maturity. The learned Chief Justice formulates various propositions after discussing the case law at pages 506 and 507 of the judgment. The observations contained in well known text books as well as in various cases decided in England were also cited at the Bar. In Holdem's History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law, page 85 there is a citation from the judgment of Holt, C.J, and Powell, J., in Ward v. Evans to the effect that the acceptance of such a note is not actual payment. The discussion at pages 109 and 110 are instructive, on the question whether the note operates as a conditional payment or not. Holt, C.J, is quoted as laying down that it is a firmly established principle that a note or bill given operates in the absence of an express agreement as a conditional payment only. Various cases are cited at page 110.

In Byles on Bills of Exchange (21st Edn) at page 315 paragraph relating to bill as collateral security states that a creditor who takes from his debtor as collateral security only, a bill does not give up his original cause of action. The paragraph runs as follows:

“A creditor may agree to take for a debt already due a bill as a collateral security without affecting his present right to sue for that debt. A creditor who takes from his debtor as a collateral security only a bill, endorsed by his debtor, as he is the trustee of the right, so he is bound by the duties of a holder and if he neglects to present or give notice of dishonour to his debtor, the debtor is discharged; for no one but the actual holder can perform these duties.”

The American Law on the subject is contained in the well known treatise, by Daniel on Negotiable Instruments (6th Edn.), Vol. II. In paragraphs 1259 and 1260 at page 1418 of the book it is stated that with regard to the question whether a bill or note taken for and on account of a debt operates as a complete merger or simply as a collateral security or any suspension of the debt during its currency the controlling element is the intention of the parties. It is a general principle of law that one simple executory contract does not extinguish another for which it it substituted and negotiable accurities form no exception and by the general commercial law as well of England as of the United States a bill of exchange drawn or promissory note made by the debtor does not discharge the precedent debt for which it was given unless such be the agreement of the parties. The creditor may return the bill or note when dishonoured by non-acceptance or nonpayment and proceed upon the original debt. Then follows the quotation from Lord Holt which we have already considered. Another text book where the same subject-matter is dealt with is Foundations of Legal liability by Street Vol. II, Contract. At page 389 of this book there is a discussion regarding a note or bill given for a precedent debt treated at a conditional payment. Quoting from Ward v. Evans , the learned author says that it operates only as a conditional payment of debt, The foundation of all these discussions is the judgment or Lord Holt, C.J The observations of Lord Esher, M.R In re Romer v. Haslam , at p. 296 may also be noted and they are to the following effect:

It is perfectly well-known law, which is acted upon in every form of mercantitle business that the giving of a negotiable security by a debtor to his creditor operates as a conditional payment only and not as a satisfaction of the debt unless the parties agree so to treat it. Such a conditional payment is liable to be defeated on non-payment of the negotiable instrument at maturity and it is surprising that there can be at present day any doubt as to the business result of such a transaction.”

Bower L.J at page 300 agrees with the Master of the Rolls in the following words:

“It has been established by a series of authorities which it would be ridiculous to go through seriatim that a bill of exchange given for a debt amounts to a conditional payment of that debt and is only conditional payment so long as it is running; the payment is liable to be defeated when the bill is dishonoured.

We may also refer in Bottomley v. Nuttall and Alien v. Royal Bank of Canada , so far as the English law is concerned.

In a recent Edition of the Negotiable Instruments Act by Bashyam and Adiga (10th Edn. 1956) in Appendix C from page 597 onwards the matter is considered at great length and all case-law on the subject has been referred. From these above cases there can be no doubt that the pronotes executed in 1941 would amount only to conditional payment.

The application of the doctrines enunciated in the case-law discussed above would reveal that even though the plaintiff took a promissory note as security for the moneys due under the deposit and also became a mortgagee under an equitable mortgage there is no overt act of her's from which it can be conclusively held that she has waived her legal rights that would enure in her favour because of the relationship of the depositor and depositee. In transactions among Nattukottai Chettiars where such deposits are made, the nature of the deposit is not altered by taking of security can be seen from the decision in Ramaswami Chettiar v. Manickam Chettiar . In that case Ex. A, an agreement had as its foundation the moneys given from time to time to a bridegroom from the bride's family as deposit and when a suit was brought more than three years after the date of the document, a plea was put forward that it was barred by limitation. Pandrang Row, J. answered that contention in the following words:

“The original deposit of the money at the time of Valliammal Achi's marriage was undoubtedly a deposit with a banker and this position has not been disputed before us. It is, however, contended, that after the execution of Ex. A, the position was radically changed and the money was no longer a deposit with a banker. We fail to see how this transformation can be said to have been effected by Ex. A.

On the other hand Ex. A clearly says that the portion of the money that was to go to the first plaintiff was payable to the order of the second plaintiff by the firm with whom the money was lying. The original deposit itself was in the name of the first plaintiff and the arrangement came to nothing more than that a portion of what was deposited should be paid for the benefit of the first plaintiff and to the order of the second plaintiff. In other words that money still remains as a deposit payable on demand to the order of the second plaintiff.”

These observations are particularly apt in regard to the point now for decision. We do not think that by the execution of subsequent documents the character of the original deposit has in any way been altered.

Such being the case it should be held that the relationship of the depositor and depositee between the plaintiff and the defendants' banking firm continues to exist.

The next argument streneously put forward on behalf of the appellants is that even if the transaction can be viewed as a deposit in 1944, still the suit having been brought more than three years after the demand took place is barred by limitation. Exs. B-8 and B-11 are referred to in this connection. In Ex. B-8 dated 2nd January 1943 plaintiff writes to P.W 2 complaining that she has not received any amount for the principal and interest due to her from the defendants' family. She, therefore, asks P.W 2 to remit to her at once the entire principal and interest payable thereon up-to-date and requests him to forward her letter to the defendants' firm and to expedite the payment of the amount. Ex. B-11 dated 7th April 1944 written by the plaintiff to the defendants' firm contains a request for the payment of the amount. In this the plaintiff says that she is hard pressed for money and that she wants the entire amount, and that she cannot wait any longer. She further states that the firm's agent assured her that he would send a sum of Rs. 1000 but that only a sum of Rs. 500 was sent towards the endorsement of payment on the promissory note. So she claims the full amount to be paid to her immediately. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar relies on Ex. B-11 as a demdnd as contemplated in Col. 3 of Article 60 of the Limitation Act and contends that the suit not having been laid within three years from 7th April 1944 is barred by limitation. In this connection our attention was also invited to Ex. B-10 dated 10th February 1947.

Mr. Venkatadri answers the above argument by relying upon the observations contained in Subbiah Chetti v. Visolakshi Achi for the position that the demand should be an unqualified one and for the entire amount. It may be mentioned in this connection that even though Ex. B-11 may be construed as a demand it was not an unconditional one because the plaintiff wanted Rs. 500 which had not been paid to her to be paid immediately.

Though there are words in the earlier portion of the document stating that she (the plaintiff) was not willing to wait any longer we find it difficult to interpret Ex. B-11 as an unconditional demand for the amount due. Moreover from Ex. B-10 it is clear that till that date the parties were proceeding on the footing that the relationship of depositor and depositee existed between them. The demand contained in Ex. B-10 is for the payment of the balance amount due up to 28th February 1947. The observations of the Supreme Court in a recent decision in Annamalai v. Veerappa were also called in aid in support of the contention of the respondent that no unconditional demand was made. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the demand necessary to attract the provisions of Col. 3 of Article 60 of the Limitation Act was made only by Ex. B-10 and the suit having been filed within three years from that date is not barred by limitation.

The next argument of Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar is that the demand should be at the place of deposit, namely, in Rangoon and since there has been no demand made on the defendants' firm in Rangoon the suit is not sustainable. He relied on the decision in Delhi Cloth and Gen. Mills v. Harnam Singh . In paragraph 43-A of their Lordships' judgment there are observations to the effect that the demand should be made at the branch where the account is kept. In this connection reference has to be made to Ex. A-14 the registered notice sent by the plaintiff to the defendants wherein it is stated that the plaintiff is prepared to make arrangements to receive payments at Rangoon at the appointed place and time. That being the case there is no substance in the argument that the demand for payment should have been made in Rangoon. Further the defendants are residing in the State of Madras and the plaintiff has already expressed her willingness to receive payment at Rangoon. The venue of the defendants' banking business is now in the Madras State though they transact business in Rangoon and that firm is only part and parcel of their Indian concern. It cannot be said that these Nattukottai Chettiars who are carrying on business in money lending are bankers in the strict sense of the term in order to attract the observations of their Lordships in Delhi Cloth and Gen. Mills v. Harnam Singh case . In any event if the defendants are willing to pay the money in Rangoon there would be no difficulty for the plaintiff to receive the payment as stated in her letter, Ex. A-14.

Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar then raised a question as a subsidiary point to the main contention that the firm of the defendants is still functioning in Rangoon. But there is no satisfactory evidence to show that it is still functioning there. We do not think that the plaintiff can be non-suited by raising such a plea.

Learned Counsel's further argument based upon S. 68(2) of the Transfer of Property Act which lays down that for the money due on a mortgage a suit cannot be brought until the mortgagee has exhausted all his available remedies against the mortgaged property or what remains of it unless the mortgagee abandons his security and if, necessary, retransfers the mortgaged property, has now to be considered.

What is argued is that when there has been an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds in Rangoon as is seen from Ex. A-24 it was obligatory upon the plaintiff to file a suit on foot of that mortgage in Rangoon and exhaust that remedy and then only can she avail herself of the remedy under the deposit. The difficulty in accepting this argument is that the plaintiff cannot bring a suit in the State of Madras when there is no equitable mortgage on which a suit can be filed. Whether such an equitable mortgage exists in Burma need not be considered for this reason that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act now in force in our country may or may not be applicable in Burma at the present time. The prohibition contained in S. 68(2) of the Transfer of Property Act will apply only if the suit could be laid in the Madras State and admittedly such a suit cannot be filed. We do not think that this argument is acceptable.

In the result the decision of the lower Court is correct and this appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances, the parties will bear their costs here and in the lower Court.

V.C.S