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Kalakoti Somireddi And Others v. State .
1. These appeals arise out of the Judgment of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Vijayawada, in Sessions Case No. 14 of 1957, convicting all the five accused in the case under section 120-B(1) Indian Penal Code and accused 2 and 4, in addition, under section 489-D, Indian Penal Code. The charge under section 120-B(1), Indian Penal Code was that in or about November, 1955, at Vijayawada, the five accused and the late Muddana Kannayya agreed to do or cause to be done the criminal act of counterfeiting hundred rupee currency notes. The charges under section 439-D, Indian Penal Code were that on or about 14-3-1956, the 2nd accused, at Vijayawada, had in his possession the blocks, M.Os 2 to 5, for the purpose of counterfeiting hundred rupee currency notes and that on or about 19-3-1956, the 4th accused, at Kuthukalur, had in his possession the tredle parts, M.O 6, the state emblem M.O 7 and the inks etc. M.Os 8 to 19 for the same purpose. For the offence under Section 120-B(1) Indian Penal Code, all the five accused were each sentenced to rigourous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 100/-. For the offence under section 489-D, Indian Penal Code, the 2nd accused was sentenced to rigourous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs. 100/- and the 4th accused was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 100/-, these sentences being ordered to run concurrently with the sentence under section 120-B(1). Accused, 1, 4 and 5 have preferred appeal No. 171 of 1957. The second accused has separately preferred Appeal No. 173 of 1957 but is absent and not represented by counsel. There is no appeal by the 3rd accused and this judgment is not concerned with his conviction and sentence.
2. The facts put forward by the prosecution are briefly these: The 1st accused, Somireddi, is a ryot in the village of Kunderu and was a friend and a former neighbour of Muddana Kannayya at Vijayawada. This Kannayya was an ex-convict for counter-feiting currency notes and was working in the village Swarajya Press and living at Chuttugunta in Vijayawada. The 2nd accused, Muddana Venkayya who is his younger brother was also living at Chuttugunta. The 3rd accused, Veerabhadram, was a shopkeeper at Rajahmundry. The 4th accused Ramireddi and the 5th accused Brahmanandarao were natives of Kuthukalur in East Godavari District and Kovvuru in West Godavari District respectively. In November 1955, accused 1 and 3 to 5 used to meet in Kannayya's house at Chuttugunta and to conspire about counterfeiting ten rupee and hundred rupee currency notes. This was observed by P.Ws 2 and 6, besides the hostile witnesses P.Ws 3 to 5 who are Kannayya's wife, nephew and brother respectively. On 9-1-1956, the 4th accused went to Gudivada accompanied by the 1st accused and Kannayya and purchased a printing treadle from P.W 7. But Kannayya, who was the main architect of the conspiracy, died on 16-2-56. The 4th accused wrote a post card Ex. P-18 on 25-2-1956 to the 5th accused, informing the latter of Kannayya's death, enquiring whether any other competent person was available and asking the 5th accused to have a talk with the 3rd accused. In pursuance of Ex. P-18, the 3rd accused wrote a post card Ex. P-2 on 3-3-1956 to Kannayya's widow P.W 3 and received in reply a post-card Ex. P-11 dated 10-3-1956 asking him to contact the 2nd accused. On 14-3-1956, as a result of information received, P.W 18 the Crime Branch Circle Inspector arrested the 1st accused at about 4 P.M near the Ryves Canal at Vijayawada. The 1st accused made a statement Ex. P-1 and took P.W 18's party to the 2nd accused's house. M.Os 2 to 5 were unearthed there in the presence of 2nd accused, who was immediately arrested. P.W 18 registered the case Ex. P-25 and secured the post-card Ex. P. 2 from Kannayya's wife P.W 3. On the morning of 19-3-1956, P.W 18 arrested the 3rd accused at the latter's shop at Rajahmundry and recovered the post-cards Exs. P-11 and P. 18 from him. On the same evening, he arrested the 4th accused at the latter's house at Kuthukalur and the 4th accused made a statement Ex. P-19 leading to the recovery of M.Os 6 to 19 from his possession. On 10-4-1956, accused 3 and 4 were identified by the direct witnesses to the conspiracy at the identification parades conducted by the Magistrate P.W 16. On 4-9-1956, after the charge-sheet had been laid, the C.I.D Circle Inspector, P.W 19, arrested the 5th accused, who had been absconding.
3. M.Os 2 and 3 are blocks with the front side designs of a hundred rupee currency note. M.O 2 contains the letters in English ‘Reserve Bank of India’ and ‘One hundred rupees’ and M.O 3 contains the design of the lions. M.Os 4 and 5 are blocks with the back side designs of a hundred rupee currency note. M.O 4 contains the design of the tuskers and M.O 5 contains the English letters ‘One hundred rupees’. M.O 7 contains the state emblem. The evidence of the Coin and Currency Expert, P.W 17, is the M.Os 2 to 5 can be used in the process of printing counterfeit hundred rupee notes, and that M.O 7 can be used for printing the water mark on such notes. With regard to the inks M.Os 8 to 19, he said that they can be used as colours for printing counterfeit currency notes, as also for other purposes like printing pictures and are easily available in the market. There can be no doubt, therefore, that M.Os 2 to 5 and 7 are instruments for counterfeiting hundred rupee currency notes, although, it is seen from P.W 17's evidence that one more block containing the part side design is necessary to complete the outfit.
4. The defence of the accused consisted of a denial of all connection with Exs. P-2, P-11 and P. 18 and M.Os 2 to 5 and 7 and the alleged conspiracy. They examined a number of witnesses to show that the Police apprehended the 1st accused not at the Ryves Canal but at Kunderu; that the 2nd accused was arrested at his house at night time,; that the 3rd accused was arrested at midnight on 18-3-1956; that the 4th accused's uncle Mulaswami and not the 4th accused was living in the house at Kuthukalur which was searched by the Police in his absence; and that the 5th accused, who lives at Mandapeta, did not abscond. The learned Sessions Judge found their testimony to be unworthy of credit and his appreciation of the evidence is not assailed except as to D.Ws 3 and 4. He based the convictions on the direct evidence of P.Ws 2 and 6 regarding the conspiracy, on Exs. P-2, P-11 and P-18 connecting accused to 5 with it and on the evidence relating to the recovery of M.Os 2 to 5 from the 2nd accused and of M.O 7 from the 4th accused.
5. Sri K. Jayachandra Reddy, the learned counsel for the appellants did not dispute that M.Os 2 to 5 are instruments for counterfeiting one hundred rupee currency notes. With regard to M.O 7, however, he suggested that it may be useful for other purposes such as manufacturing letter paper. This suggestion has no bearing on the defence, because it is not the 4th accused's case that he was doing or contemplated any business in letter paper.
6. The first question that arises for consideration is the reliance to be placed on the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 6. P.W 2 who is a washerman at Vijayawada said,
“Kannayya and accused 1, 3 and 4 used to talk that they would print hundred and ten rupee notes. I heard them like-wise four or five times, four months before Kannayya's death. I used to go there for getting clothes for washing. I did not tell any body of the above talk except to Y. Apparao (P.W 6)”.
7. P.W 6, who is a shop employee at Vijayawada said:
“I used to go to Kannayya's house often. There I used to see accused 1 and 3 to 5. Accused 1 and 3 to 5 and Kannayya used to talk till late in night i.e, till I am and stop the talk after my arrival. This was about two months prior to Kannayya's death. They used to talk when the blocks for ten rupee and hundred rupee notes would be brought. P.W 2 was washerman of Kannayya. He told me that Kannayya and accused 1 and 3 to 5 always were talking of preparing counterfeit notes.”
8. As P.Ws 3 to 5 were hostile, there is no force in the contention based on their evidence that P.W 2 was not a washerman for Kannayya at all. The next criticism by Sri K. Jayachandra Reddy is that both P.Ws 2 and 6 are belated witnesses, as they were examined by the Police only on 7-4-1956, about three weeks after the searches and recoveries. But so far as P.W 2 is concerned, he had no motive to falsely implicate any of the accused. The criticism is material only in respect of P.W 6. The evidence of P.W 6 is that he used to frequent Kannayya's house because Kannayya's nephew, P.W 4, seduced and took away his wife there and Kannayya promised to effect a compromise. In the committing Court, he was hostile to the prosecution and deposed that what he told the police was due to indignation at Kannayya having not effected a compromise. (Ex. D-10). No doubt he made an earlier statement, Ex. D-9, on 30-4-1956 under Section 164, Criminal Procedure Code, which supports his evidence at the trial. The prosecution rely on Ex. D-9 to show that his evidence at the trial should be preferred to his evidence Ex. D-10 in the committing Court. But in view of Ex. D-10, it is manifest that he has no regard for truth. Although P.W 2 does not speak to as having seen the 5th accused at Kannayya's house, P.W 6's version is that P.W 2 told him that the 5th accused also was one of the conspirators. It is quite possible that because of his indignation against Kannayya's family who were harbouring P.W 4, he came out with a false story on 7-4-1956 that suited the Police and stuck to it on 30-4-1956 before the Magistrate. The learned trial Judge did not take into consideration Ex. D-10 in appraising P.W 6's evidence. It appears to me that P.W 6 is unworthy of credit altogether, but there are no valid grounds to disbelieve P.W 2. However P.W 2's evidence by itself would be insufficient to establish the charge under Section 120-B(1), Indian Penal Code. It does not implicate accused 2 and 5 at all and even as to the remaining accused, it is vague and indefinite. The essence of a Criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons for one of the unlawful purposes specified in Section 120-A. No doubt the formulation of the agreement may be established either by direct evidence or by inference from other facts which are proved. It need not be formed at the same time as between all the parties to the conspiracy. But there should be a consensus or a meeting of the minds and each person alleged to be a party to the conspiracy must be proved to have shared the criminal intention. P.W 2 does not say what exactly each of the four persons mentioned by him said or did by way of assenting to the plot to counterfeit currency notes. His evidence is not inconsistent with the view that Kannayya alone planned to print the notes and that the other three persons took part in the conversation without intending to join in implementing the plan. No doubt it would constitute ‘reasonable ground to believe,’ within the meaning of section 10 of the Evidence Act, that all the four persons hatched a conspiracy. As observed in Niamat Singh v. State I.L.R 1953-II All. 250 @ 285, Section 10 contemplates something short of actual proof and means prima facie evidence in support of the existence of the conspiracy. For substantiating the charge under Section 120-B(1), however, further evidence is necessary, proving that accused 2 and 5 joined the conspiracy and that accused 1, 3 and 4 shared the criminal intention, which might have been possibly entertained by Kannayya alone.
9. It may be mentioned at this stage that the hostile witness P.W 5 who is Kannayya's brother, in a statement Ex. P-15 recorded under Section 164, Criminal Procedure Code, implicated accused 1 to 4 in more definite terms. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge in questioning these accused under Section 342, Crl. Procedure Code, seems to have treated Ex. P-15 as substantive evidence. But P.W 5's evidence at the trial with regard to Ex. P-15 was conflicting. When he was cross-examined by the prosecution, he said, ‘what is stated in Ex. P-15 is all true’ and admitted Ex. P-15 which was read over to him to be correct. But his very first answer during the cross-examination by the defence was, ‘All the contents of Ex. P-15 are false’. After he gave this answer, it was not incumbant on the defence to question him with reference to the incriminating facts set out in Ex. P-15, as he had not spoken to these facts either in his examination-in-chief or in his cross-examination by the prosecution. The use that can be made of such statements has been elucidated by the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Singh v. State Of Punjab (I) . A.I.R 1952 S.C 214 @ 217 & 218. The former statements of a witness who is examined at a trial, whether they be oral or were reduced to writing, can never be substantive evidence. Only the evidence actually given by the witness at the trial and his evidence admitted under Section 288, Criminal Procedure Code would be substantive evidence. His former statement can be used only as corroboration thereof under Section 157 or to contradict him under Section 145 or to test his veracity or shake his credit under Section 146 of the Evidence Act. In the case of Ex. P-15, section 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not and could not be called in aid, as it was not made at the preliminary inquiry. The learned Public Prosecutor did not dispute this position. All that he says is that Ex. P-15 was not ultimately treated as substantive evidence, as is manifest from the judgment of the lower Court, throughout which no reliance is placed on any portion of the evidence of P.W 5.
10. The next question to be considered is the effect of Exs. P-2, P-11 and P. 18. The earliest of them in point of time is the post-card Ex. P-18 dated 25-2-1956 purporting to have been sent by the 4th accused to the 5th accused. P.W 14, the Secretary of the Co-operative Marketing Society of Kuthukalur, has identified the 4th accused's hand-writing and signature in Ex. P-18. The witness was not cross-examined at all and hence there is no substance in the 4th accused's denial of having written it. Then comes the post-card Ex. P-2 dated 3-3-1956, purporting to have been sent by the 3rd accused to Kannayya's wife, P.W 3. Although the 3rd accused disowns it, P.W 11, who is a cinema employee at Rajahmundry, says that he wrote it at the request of the 3rd accused and that the 3rd accused signed it. The comment against P.W 11 is that he has no property, that he was once caught with the 3rd accused and others by the Police for gambling and was fined for the offence and that he was not the scribe for any other letter of the 3rd accused. The post-marks in Ex. P-2 guarantee its genuineness and there are no reasons to suppose that P.W 11 would have foisted it on the 3rd accused. The third post-card is Ex. P-11 dated 10-3-1956 purporting to have been sent by P.W 3 in reply to the 3rd accused. P.W 3 disowns it and the prosecution have not adduced any evidence as to the author thereof. As P.W 3 is an illiterate woman, Ex. P-11 naturally does not contain even her signature. The prosecution rely on the contents of Ex. P-11 as intrinsically showing that it was P.W 3's reply to Ex. P-2.
11. The material portion of Ex. P-18 reads thus:
“Our friend Kannayya died. I informed the said matter to Bhadram and asked him to come to Kuthukulur on 23rd. He has not come so far. Reason is not known. It appears that the efforts put forth by us so far have become futile. As soon as you are in receipt of this letter, please write whether you have got anybody in your view who can finish the said work. Otherwise, we can stop with this. Do not unnecessarily put yourself into loss. Please reply urgently for all the matters.
(Sd/Pulagu Ramarao, (in Telugu)
It is very strange that Bhadram did not turn up so far. If you meet him, please have a talk with him.
Address:— Puiagam Pedda Reddy alias Ram Reddy Kuthukulur, Ramachandrapuram taluq”.
12. It will be seen that although the 4th accused signed in it as ‘Pulagu Ramarao’, he has given him correct name in the portion containing his address. A perusal of Ex. P-18 shows that on Kannayya's death the 4th accused might have required the assistance of the 5th accused and of the 3rd accused. But such a construction of Ex. P-18 would ignore P.W 2's evidence that Kannayya, and accused 1, 3 and 4 used to talk of printing currency notes. No doubt the 5th accused who is not proved to have attended their meetings at Kannayya's house may have been ignorant of the plot. But so far as accused 3 and 4 are concerned the proper construction of Ex. P-18 is that it referred to the dislocation of their plot on account of Kannayya's death.
13. In this connection, the events that followed Ex. P-18 are also significant. Ex. P-18 seems to have been handed over to the 3rd accused by the addressee, who was asked by it to meet and have a talk with the 3rd accused. Hence the Police found it in the possession of the 3rd accussed on 19-3-1956. Within a few days of Ex. P-18, the 3rd accused sends the post-card Ex. P-2 to P.W 3 in the following terms:
“Knowing that Kannayya Mama garu died, I felt very much. Reddy garu also felt very much. He thought in many ways as to what should happen next. Therefore I told Reddy that I would write a card to you regarding what should happen and that I would ascertain the full matters. Therefore if you inform me of your opinion, I shall come, meet you and discuss all matters regarding your future. Therefore, please reply immediately”.
14. The reference in Ex. P-2 to ‘Reddy’ is to the 4th accused, by which name he was known among the conspirators. The natural construction of Ex. P-2 is that, at the instance of the 4th accused, the 3rd accused contacted Kannayya's widow in order to review their situation. That it was so understood appears from Ex. P-11 which was the reply sent in P.W 3's name to the 4th accused and reads thus:—
“We are all safe. Please write about your welfare often. Your letter to hand. We understood the contents therein. If you come to the office and enquire my Maridi (husband's younger brother), he can make all arrangements for you. As soon as you go through this letter, please come to the village Swarajya Press. Please let me know whether you would come immediately or not”.
15. A few days later the Police recovered Ex. P-2 from P.W 3 and Ex. P-11 from the 3rd accused. In the circumstances, the natural inference is that P.W 3 caused Ex. P-11 to be sent as a reply to Ex. P-2 and instructed the 3rd accused to contact Kannayya's younger brother for pursuing their purpose. According to the prosecution, the blocks M.Os 2 to 5 had been in Kannayya's possession and were made over to his younger brother, the 2nd accused, after Kannayya's death. But there is no evidence at all as to these movements of M.Os 2 to 5. It is only sought to be inferred from Ex. P-11 and from the recovery of M.Os 2 to 5 from the 2nd accused's possession on 14-3-1956. Reliance is placed for this purpose and for proving the 5th accused's complicity on the provisions of Section 10 of the Evidence Act.
16. The principle and scope of section 10 of the Evidence Act were explained by the Supreme Court in Sardul Singh v. State of Bombay A.I.R 1957 S.C 747 @ 760, 764, 765.
“Section 10, Evidence Act must be construed in accordance with the principle that the thing done, written, or spoken, was something done in carrying out the conspiracy and was receivable as a step in the proof of the conspiracy.”
What is sought to be admitted in such a case is something said, or done, or written by any one of the co-conspirators behind the backs of the others as being in law attributable to the others and what is sought to be proved by such evidence taken by itself is the existence of the conspiracy as between the alleged conspirators and the fact that a particular person was a party to the conspiracy.
It is such evidence that is inadmissible otherwise than under Section 10 of the Evidence Act. Quite clearly, in the normal class of cases, such evidence is admissible as against himself and not against others, excepting where there is relationship of agency or representative character or joint interest. (See Section 18 of the Evidence Act).
The principle underlying the reception of evidence under Section 10 of the Evidence Act of the statements, acts and writings of one co-conspirator as against the other is on the theory of agency.
The rule in Section 10 of the Evidence Act, confines that principle of Agency in criminal matters to the acts of the co-conspirators within the period during which it can be said that the acts were ‘in reference to their common intention’ that is to say, things said, done, or written, while the conspiracy was on foot and in carrying out the conspiracy. The object of Section 10 is to make the acts and declarations of a conspirator during the subsistence of the conspiracy, evidence against his co-conspirators. Normally the acts and declarations of an accused would make him alone criminally liable for them and not his co-accused unless they were instigated or made with the knowledge of consent of the co-accused or the law imposes vicarious liability. But conspiracies are perpetrated in secrecy and it is not reasonable to expect direct evidence of participation in them. To meet this situation Section 10 of the Evidence Act has been enacted, and is based on the principle that every conspirator is an agent of his co-conspirators as long as the conspiracy exists.”
17. Applying these principles there can be no question that Exs. P-2 and P-12 are evidence against accused 3 and 4 themselves who are the authors thereof. But so far as Ex. P-11 is concerned there is no proof that P.W 3 was its author and even assuming in to be so, it would not be admissible under Section 10, as P.W 3 is not alleged to be a member of the conspiracy. The learned counsel has pointed out that the reference to Kannayya's younger brother in Ex. P-11 cannot be construed as being to the 2nd accused, because Kannayya has another younger brother P.W 5. But P.W 5 was employed in Mulukala Press, while Ex. P-11 advised the 4th accused to meet the younger brother in the village Swarajya Press. The probabilities are therefore that the 2nd accused was the younger brother mentioned in Ex. P-11. But as it is not the prosecution case that the 2nd accused was himself the author of Ex. P-11, it cannot be taken to show that the 2nd accused became a member of the conspiracy.
18. With regard to Ex. P-16, it is true that if there were proof that Ex. P-18 was delivered to the 5th accused, that fact taken along with the 3rd accused's possession of Ex. P-18 would have constituted reasonable ground to believe that the 5th accused joined the conspiracy. But the Postman, who delivered Ex. P-11 to the addressee at Kovvur, was not called as a witness. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge did not disbelieve D.W's 6 and 7, who said that the 5th accused lived at Mandapeta and did not abscond, but merely regarded their evidence as immaterial. The possibility of some other person taking delivery of letters addressed to the 5th accused at Kovvur cannot be ignored, in which case the person would have passed it on to the 3rd accused. Except the evidence of P.W 6, who is unworthy of credit there is no prima facie evidence besides Ex. P-18, implicating the 5th accused in the conspiracy. As I have already indicated the terms of Ex. P-18 are not inconsistent with the addressee being ignorant of the plot to counterfeit currency notes. It follows that even if Ex. P-18 had been delivered to the 5th accused and he had a talk with the 3rd accused in pursuance thereof, this would not be inconsistent with the 5th accused's innocence. The learned Public Prosecutor has fairly conceded at the hearing that the 5th accused is entitled to an acquittal, as there is no evidence against him.
19. Finally the evidence relating to the recovery of M.Os 2 to 5 and 7 remains to be considered. The recovery of M.Os 2 to 5 is spoken to by the Circle Inspector P.W 18, by P.W 1 who was one of the attestors to Ex. P-1 and by the other attestor Rattayya whose evidence in the committing court was marked as Ex. P-26, as he died before the trial. This evidence establishes that at about 4 p.m on 14-3-1958, M.Os 2 to 5 were unearthed in the 2nd accused's presence, by digging the ground at a spot under the window at the eastern wall of the 2nd accused's house. Nothing was suggested against the veracity of Rattayya. Against P.W 1, the criticism is that he was a habitual witness for the police as he said in the committing court that he did not remember how many times he came to assist the Police (See Ex. D-4) and that he was unable to say in the committing court the material with which the wall of the 2nd accused's house is constructed (See Ex. D-5). I do not think that his failure to recall to his memory these details affects his credit. There is also no substance in the criticism that P.W 18 did not call the residents of Chuttugunta as witnesses. Thus there are no reasons to disbelieve P.W 1 and Rattayya.
20. The recovery of M.Os 6 to 19 on 19-3-1956 from the possession of the 4th accused is spoken to by the Circle Inspector P.W 18 and by P.Ws 12 and 13 who were two of the four attestors to Ex. P-19. The incriminating article is M.O 7. The evidence is that it was in the 4th accused's house and was shown by him. P.W 13 the Village Munsif of Kuthukalur said that the 4th accused's paternal uncle was the owner of the house and that the 4th accused was living in it. As against this, D.W 3 another attestor to Ex. P-19 and D.W 4, the President of the Panchayat Board, Kuthukulur said that the 4th accused's uncle and not the 4th accused was residing at the house and that the 4th accused was not present when the house was searched. The learned trial Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses has given proper reasons in paragraph 14 of his judgment for believing P.W 13 in preference to D.Ws 3 and 4 and I see no grounds to differ from his appreciation of the evidence. There can be no doubt that M.Os 2 to 5 were in the possession of the 2nd accused and M.O 7 in the possession of the 2nd accused and M.O 7 in the possession of the 4th accused.
21. The prosecution case is that the 1st accused gave the information which has been recorded in Ex. P-1, leading to the recovery of M.Os 3 to 5. The 1st accused's knowledge of M.Os 2 to 5 is relied on as further evidence besides P.W 2's direct evidence, to prove the charge under section 120-B(1), Indian Penal Code against him. It has to be mentioned that the trial Judge did not believe the evidence as to the 1st accused having accompanied the 4th accused and Kannayya for the purchase of the printing treadle M.O 6 at Gudivada on 9-1-1956 and his appreciation of the evidence in this respect is not assailed by the learned Public Prosecutor. The question that arises for consideration is whether the information contained in Ex. P-1, said to have been given by the 1st accused is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, P.W 18 said:
“On 14-3-1956, on information that a batch in Chuttugunta were making preparation for counterfeiting currency notes and that late M. Kannayya was connected with it and that his brother the and accused worked in Grama Swarajya Press and was connected with the batch, I took the Sub-Inspector and staff, proceeded and picked up mediators Rattayya and P.W 1 and proceeded to a college. The 1st accused came opposite to us near Ryves Canal and he was arrested by me. When questioned about preparation for counterfeiting currency notes the 1st accused made a statement and it was recorded Ex. P. 1 is the relevant portion of his statement”.
22. It is clear from the first sentence quoted that he already received information that the 2nd accused was one of the persons preparing to counterfeit currency notes. He took the two mediators in advance which shows that he proposed to proceed to make a search. The story is that while the party were on their way the 1st accused providentially met them, gave them information incriminating himself and led them to the 2nd accused's house. The story is extremely artificial, although it is corroborated by P.W 1 and Rattayya. It points to a strong suspicion that the alleged meeting of the 1st accused by chance must have been stage-managed by P.W 18, although P.W 1 and Rattayya might have been ignorant of it.
23. There can be no doubt that P.W 18 was going out to make a search of the place, with which Kannayya and the 2nd accused were connected. Otherwise there would have been no purpose in his assembling the Police party and mediators in advance. The provisions of section 165(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code require him to record his grounds and other particulars before making the search. Under Section 165(2), he has to send copies of records made under section 165(1) to the Magistrate having jurisdiction. These statutory safeguards in the interests of the citizen are mandatory as held in Emperor v. Mohammad Shah A.I.R 1946 Lah. 456. It is not disputed that there was no attempt at all by P.W 18 to comply with them. If he had made a record under Section 165(1), one would have been in a position to know whether he intended to search the 2nd accused's house independently of the chance information said to have been furnished by the 1st accused. An adverse inference has to be drawn from his failure to comply with the statutory requirements and such an inference is strengthened by the extremely artificial character of the story of the intervention of the 1st accused's information. Having regard to the first sentence quoted from P.W 18's evidence, it is impossible to believe that he was not proceeding to search the 2nd accused's house. The search and the discovery of M.Os 2 to 5 cannot therefore be regarded as having been in consequence of the information furnished by the 1st accused, within the meaning of section 27 of the Evidence Act. Ex. P-1 itself was prepared after the incriminating articles were successfully discovered. It does not intrinsically show that P.W 18 would not have proceeded to the 2nd accused's house but for the information providentially given by the 1st accused. The 1st accused's version that the police took him earlier from his village Kunderu itself is supported by D.Ws 2 and 5, the village Officers of Kunderu. The only criticism of the Assistant Sessions Judge was that it was easy to get witnesses like D.Ws 2 and 5. Having regard to all the circumstances, I have no doubt in my mind that the 1st accused's intervention with the convenient information was a stage-managed affair. In my opinion, P.W 18 had already adequate information about the counterfeiting instruments in the 2nd accused's house and that the recovery of M.Os 2 to 5 was not in consequence of the information furnished by the 1st accused as per Ex. P-1. It follows that Ex. P-1 is inadmissible against the 1st accused under section 27 of the Evidence Act.
24. Thus the only evidence against the 1st accused is the vague evidence of P.W 2, which is insufficient to establish the charge under section 120-B(1) of the Indian Penal Code. There is no evidence against the 5th accused except that of P.W 6, who is unworthy of credit. Accused 1 and 5 are therefore entitled to an acquittal.
25. Against the 2nd accused, the only evidence is his possession of M.Os 2 to 5 on 14-3-1956 for which he has no explanation except a bare denial. The learned counsel pointed out that mere possession without proof of mens rea would not be sufficient to substantiate a charge under Section 489-D, Indian Penal Code. See-Khadim Hussain v. King Emperor A.I.R 1925 Lahore 22 and In Re Morsan A.I.R 1958 Madras 392. But the question whether the 2nd accused knew or had reason to believe that M.Os 2 to 5 were intended to be used for counterfeiting is a matter of inference from the particular facts and circumstances. It is not necessary that the outfit for counterfeiting should be perfect or complete. Possession unaccounted for may itself lead to an inference of guilty knowledge or intention. In the present case, the 2nd accused was keeping M.Os 2 to 5 buried under the ground at his house and has no explanation for doing so. The mens rea is sufficiently established by the circumstances and his conviction under section 489-D Indian Penal Code is therefore right. There is however no evidence to show that he was a member of the conspiracy and he is acquitted of the charge under section 120-B(1), Indian Penal Code.
26. With regard to the 4th accused, Exs. P-2 and P. 18 taken along with P.W 2's evidence and his possession of M.O 7 are sufficient to prove both the charges against him. The sentences awarded by the learned Sessions Judge are not excessive and do not call for interference.
27. In the result appeal No. 171 of 1957 is allowed as regards accused 1 and 5 and dismissed so far as the 4th accused is concerned. The convictions and sentences on accused 1 and 5 are set aside and they are acquitted. The conviction and sentence of the 4th accused are confirmed.
28. In Appeal No. 173 of 1957 the conviction and sentence of the 2nd accused under section 120-B(1), Indian Penal Code are set aside and he is acquitted of that charge. The conviction and sentence under Section 489-D, Indian Penal Code are confirmed.
29. The fines paid, if any, under the sentences which have been set aside above will be refunded to the respective appellants.
30. The lower Court ordered the confiscation of the printing treadle M.O 6. But M.O 6 is not necessarily an instrument for counterfeiting, nor is there anything to suggest that it was used for the commission of any offence. In these circumstances as contended by Sri K. Jayachandra Reddy, there is no justification for the order of confiscation. The order is set aside and M.O 6 will be returned to the 4th accused.
K.J.R
31. A-1 and 5 acquitted.
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