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Maragatham Alias Lakshmi v. State
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment arises from connected criminal appeals by Velu (Accused No. 1) and Maragatham alias Lakshmi (Accused No. 2), husband and wife, in Sessions Case No. 8 of 1959 (learned Sessions Judge of Vellore). At trial they were convicted of murder of their female infant, Rani (about 1½ months old), under S. 302 I.P.C. read with S. 34 I.P.C and sentenced to life imprisonment; both were also convicted under S. 309 I.P.C (attempt to commit suicide) and sentenced to six months' simple imprisonment, the sentences to run concurrently.
The undisputed facts: the accused were starving for about ten days and decided to end their lives and that of their infant. On 7.1.1959 at about 5:30 p.m. they went to a village well, had tied themselves together with a rope, and jumped into it carrying the child. A passer-by (P.W.1) saw them struggling, jumped in, loosened/pulled the rope and aided them out. He recorded an extra-judicial statement by Accused 1 that they jumped in with the child and "in that act the child fell into the well." The body of the infant was later recovered when the well was bailed out; autopsy (P.W.2) confirmed death by drowning. Both accused made judicial confessions before the Sub-Magistrate. At committal they admitted the facts, citing starvation as the motive. At trial Accused 1 advanced a new explanation that the child had slipped from Accused 2's hands and fallen into the well before they jumped, and that they then jumped in to save the child; Accused 2 did not adopt this plea and consistently admitted the facts.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the accused are guilty of the completed homicide (murder) of the infant (S. 300 / S. 302 I.P.C.) or only guilty of an attempt to murder (S. 307 I.P.C.), given the factual sequence that an accident (the child slipping) intervened during their jump into the well.
- How causation should be treated in criminal law where the accused intended and took steps to kill but an intervening accidental event produced the death — i.e., whether the accused's acts can be treated as the direct cause of death or only as an attempt.
- Whether the facts go beyond preparation and locus penitentiae — particularly whether the accused's tying together and jumping into the well constituted an actus reus sufficient to amount to attempt (or the completed offence) under applicable principles of attempt law.
Arguments of the Parties
Accused 1 (Velu) — Trial Plea / Explanation
- At trial Accused 1 contended that Accused 2 was carrying the child and the child slipped and fell into the well even before they jumped in; their entry into the well was an effort to save the child, not to cause its death. If true, this explanation would keep them at the stage of preparation and negate criminal liability for the death.
- Earlier (extra-judicial and judicial statements) Accused 1 had admitted jumping into the well with the child and said the child "slipped out of the hand, and drowned in the well." The trial explanation that the slip occurred before jumping was advanced only at trial.
Accused 2 (Maragatham alias Lakshmi)
- Consistently admitted the facts: that they had tied themselves together and jumped into the well with the child intending to end all their lives; she did not adopt Accused 1's trial explanation that the child slipped prior to jumping.
Prosecution / Trial Court Position
- Prosecution relied on the extra-judicial and judicial confessions and on the autopsy evidence to establish that the child drowned and that the accused jumped into the well with the child.
- The learned Sessions Judge accepted the prosecution case and convicted both accused of murder (S. 302 I.P.C.) and attempt to commit suicide (S. 309 I.P.C.).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R. v. Macpherson | Authority on attempts and "impossibility" (noted as doubtful by Kenny). | Referred to in discussing whether older authorities on impossibility remain good law; court notes Kenny's doubt about Macpherson. |
| R. v. Ramakka | Illustrates a case where acts did not go beyond preparation; actus reus was not established and locus penitentiae remained. | Distinguished from the present facts: Ramakka showed only preparation; here the court found the accused went beyond preparation. |
| Flynns - 16 W.R. 319 (cited in Ratan's "Culpable Homicide") | Explains that if after an injurious act a distinct set of circumstances causes a new mischief, the new mischief may be the causa causans (i.e., breaks causal chain). | Used to illustrate how an intervening event can become the operative cause of death, undermining attribution of the death to the accused's original act. |
| R. v. Osborn | Rowlatt J.'s dictum that the ordinary person finds it easy to say what is an "attempt" but analysis reveals difficulty. | Quoted to introduce the analytical difficulty of defining attempt. |
| R. v. Scofield | Lord Mansfield's 1784 decision noted as seminal in forming modern concept of attempt. | Cited as historical foundation for modern law of attempt. |
| R. v. Higgins | Early follow-up authority in development of attempt doctrine. | Referred to as part of the historical line establishing modern attempt doctrine. |
| Gardner v. Aceroyd | Sets out that prosecution must prove (i) actus reus (an act marking commission) and (ii) mens rea (serious intention) for attempt. | Used to state the burden on prosecution in attempt cases and to frame the required elements. |
| Regina v. Chessman | Leading English decision on attempts (used to illustrate principles). | Listed among leading cases supporting the court's exposition of attempt law. |
| R. v. Ring | English authority on attempt; used to compare law in India and England. | Referred to as an authority aligning with the tests applied in India for attempt. |
| R. v. Collins | Another leading English decision on attempt doctrine. | Included among leading cases illustrating the tests for attempt. |
| R. v. Linnekar | Authority regarding attempts to do what is impossible. | Cited in support of the proposition that tests for attempt apply also where the commission is impossible. |
| R. v. Whybrone | Authority regarding attempts to do what is impossible. | Cited as part of a group of cases on attempts that are impossible of performance. |
| R. v. Miskell | Authority regarding attempts to do what is impossible. | Cited along with other cases on impossible attempts. |
| R. v. Moran | Authority regarding attempts to do what is impossible. | Cited to illustrate English case-law on attempts. |
| 21 Pat. 667 (Jain Lal); 3 Madras 4 (Padala); 52 Crl. L.J. 37 (Tulsipada); 15 All. 173 (Mac Rea) | Indian cases cited to show that the Code leaves assessment of attempt vs preparation to judicial common sense. | Quoted to support that magistrates/judges determine whether the stage reached is preparation or attempt. |
| R. V Cassidy (1867) 4 B.H.C.R Crl. 17 | Discussed in relation to the proposition that intention precedes the act and must be proved independently of consequences. | Quoted (with note that it was dissented from in a subsequent Indian case) in discussion of intent and act in attempts. |
| Vasudeo Balwant Gogte, A.I.R. 1932 Bom. 279 (noted as dissenting to Cassidy) | Indian authority referenced in relation to R.V. Cassidy's view on intent. | Referenced to show variance in authority on proving intent in relation to attempts. |
| Bharat Duke, A.I.R. Pat. 51 | Indian citation referenced alongside others on intent/act relationship. | Listed as part of authorities regarding intention and overt act. |
| Musa Amadasa Nadar v. Emper, 1937 M.W.N. 536 | Indian authority cited in the same context as other cases on intent and attempt. | Mentioned by the court while discussing the relation of intent to act in attempt cases. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully weighed the factual record (extra-judicial and judicial confessions, eyewitness rescue account, and autopsy) and legal principles governing attempt and causation. The analysis proceeded in these principal steps:
- Factual determination: the court accepted the confessions and probabilities that the accused tied themselves, jumped into the well while holding the child, and that the child slipped from the woman's hands and drowned. The court rejected Accused 1's trial-only explanation that the slip occurred before they jumped but accepted the version that the slip occurred in the act of jumping.
- Identification of the legal problem: whether the accused's mental element (mens rea) and physical element (actus reus) in respect of the infant were established so as to sustain a conviction for murder, or whether the death was caused by an intervening accident that broke the chain of causation and reduced liability to attempt.
-
Discussion of attempt doctrine: the court reviewed authoritative texts (Kenny, Ratan, Mayne, Huda), English, American and Indian authorities, and the classical tests for attempt:
- Actus reus of attempt requires an overt act in furtherance of the intended crime that cannot reasonably be regarded as having any other purpose.
- Mens rea requires the specific intention to commit the crime, which may be proved by circumstances and confessions.
- The prosecution must prove both elements; preparation must be distinguished from attempt and the line drawn by judicial assessment of facts.
- Causation analysis: the court explored how intervening events affect culpability. Using the text of S. 299/300 and authorities (including Flynn's Explanation 2), the court held that where a distinct intervening circumstance causes a new mischief, that new mischief may be regarded as the operative cause, breaking causal responsibility for the original act. The court illustrated with hypotheticals (missed shot causing dizziness and fall; thrown child striking an unforeseen ledge).
- Application to facts: although the accused had the mens rea to cause death and had performed acts directly in furtherance of that intention (tying, carrying the child, jumping), the actual death of the child was produced by an accidental slip that intervened before the accused's acts directly caused the death. Consequently, the acts of the accused were not the direct cause of death in law; the chain of causation, as required for murder, was broken by the intervening accident.
- Conclusion of law: on these facts the accused were guilty of attempt to murder (S.307 I.P.C.) because the acts and intention met the tests for attempt, but not guilty of the completed offence of murder (S.300/302 I.P.C.) because causation to the degree required for murder was not established.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The convictions for murder were modified to convictions for attempt to murder under S. 307 I.P.C.; the convictions and sentences under S. 309 I.P.C. (attempt to commit suicide) were affirmed.
Sentencing consequence: each accused was sentenced to 18 months' rigorous imprisonment under S. 307 I.P.C., the sentence to run concurrently with the sentences already imposed and confirmed under S. 309 I.P.C.
Broader implications: the court emphasised doctrinal points about attempt, actus reus, mens rea, the difficulty of drawing lines between preparation and attempt, and the role of causation where an intervening accidental event produces the death. The judgment contains an extensive exposition of the law of attempt with reference to English, American and Indian authorities, but the court explicitly applied existing principles to the facts rather than announcing a novel rule of law. The direct effect is the substitution of convictions for attempt to murder and imposition of concurrent prison terms; no new binding precedent was announced beyond the court's detailed analysis and application of established authorities.
This summary is limited to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or rulings beyond that text.
JUDGMENT
Anantanarayanan, J.— These are connected criminal appeals by Velu (Accused No. 1) and Maragatham alias Lakshmi (Accused No. 2) in Sessions Case No. 8 of 1959 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge of Vellore. The two accused, who are husband and wife, having been convicted of the murder of their female infant, Rani aged about 1½ months under S. 302 I.P.C read with S. 34 I.P.C and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life in each case. They were further each convicted of the offence of attempt to commit suicide (S. 309 I.P.C) and each sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months; the sentences to run concurrently.
The facts are simple and tragic, and not in dispute. The two accused were starving for about ten days previous to this offence, and could find neither work nor any one to give them food. They determined to put an end to their lives, and also to put an end to the life of their female infant, Rani, probably feeling that none could look to the child after them. On 7-1-1959 at about 5-30 p.m they proceeded to a well in their village, Narayanakuppam, and jumped into it, carrying the female infant. The evidence makes it clear that they had tied themselves together with a rope, before jumping into this well.
Rajagopal (P.W 1) was passing that way and heard a sound from the well, and peeped into it. He saw the two accused inside the well, apparently spasmodically struggling for life. He jumped into the well, and while in the water was able to get at the rope that had bound these unfortunate people together. He pulled the rope, and swam towards the steps leading into the well. By these means he was able to drag both accused 1 and accused 2 towards the steps. The wife (Accused 2) was somewhat unconscious. P.W 1 had to carry her out of the well. The husband (accused 1) was sufficiently restored to be able to climb up the steps. He (P.W 1) questioned accused 1 who told him that, finding no work and unable to bear the pangs of hunger, both the accused had determined to put an end to their lives, and jumped into the well with the child. P.W 1 states:
“He (A-1) also told me that they placed their child in their hands and jumped into the well, and in that act the child fell into the well.”
This extra-judicial confession is of significance in determining the precise nature of the offences committed by the two accused.
Rajagopal (P.W 1) then went and informed his father, the village Munsif (P.W 3). Accused 2 was still a little unconscious even when P.W 3 came to the spot. When P.W 3 questioned the husband (Accused 1), he repeated the extra-judicial confession set forth above. P.W 3 then sent his Yadasts to the police and Magistracy (Ex. P. 2, P. 3). The police came in the evening, but the body of the infant could not be traced, as the well was very deep. Actually, a Fire Engine was brought the next day, and the water was baled out, when alone the body of the infant floated to the surface and could be recovered.
The autopsy held by Dr. Gopala Goundar (P.W 2) leaves us in no doubt that the child was drowned, and that death was in consequence of asphyxia due to drowning (Ex. P. 1). The classical signs and symptoms of both asphyxia and drowning were present, such as water in the stomach, palms and soles presenting a sodden appearance, lividity of mucosa, chambers of the heart empty, injected with blood smears, etc.
It only remains to add that both the accused made confessions judicially recorded by the Sub-Magistrate (J) of Arkonam (Exs. P. 4 and P. 5). Accused 1 admitted the facts set out above, and stated
“The child slipped out of the hand, and drowned in the well.”
Accused 2 admitted that both of them tied themselves with a rope and jumped into the well with the child, in order to put an end to the lives of all the three. The child was drowned in the well.
In the committal Court, both the accused merely admitted the facts, and stated that they did what they did, unable to bear the pangs of starvation. At the trial, accused 1 came forward with an explanation which, if true, would not render the accused liable for any offence at all because it would not take them beyond the stage of preparation, in respect of either offence. According to him, accused 2 was carrying the child, and the child slipped and fell into the well, even before they jumped in. This was by sheer accident, and they got into the well to save the child. Accused 2 made no such plea, but merely admitted the facts.
The learned Sessions Judge was justified in rejecting the plea of accused 1 at the trial, because it is opposed to the extra-judicial confessions of accused 1, the judicial confessions of accused 1 and 2, to the statements of accused 2 throughout and the facts and probabilities. But in holding that both the accused were guilty of the completed act of murder he was merely “cutting the Gordian Knot.” His solution evades the true difficulties of the case, and is not legitimate, as it does scant justice to the material of the evidence.
In holding that he does not believe that the child slipped and fell into the well, just when the accused jumped into the well tying themselves together, in order to put an end to their lives, the learned Judge forgets that he must proceed upon legal evidence and cannot surmise. There is nothing in the extra-judicial confessions to render this defence improbable. The extra-judicial confession of accused 1 to P.W 1 suggests this. If the learned Judge was proceeding upon circumstantial evidence, this hypothesis must be ruled out on the probabilities. On the contrary, it is perfectly probable; it is consistent with every known fact. We do reject the further plea of accused 1, put forward at the trial and at no earlier stage, that both the accused got into the well only after the child slipped in, in order to save it. But we accept the story in the confession, and hold that the child slipped and fell in and was drowned, when the two accused jumped into the well. The very difficult question upon the facts is, what is the offence thereby committed, with regard to the death of the infant?
My learned brother, whose judgment I have had the advantage of reading, has, if I may say so with respect, laid under contribution Indian, English, American and even Russian sources of law, in order to elucidate the history of the concept of “attempt” in Criminal Jurisprudence. Upon the present facts, we have both the elements of mens rea and the actus reus. Kenny indeed goes so far as to state (Edition by Cecil Turner: 1958; page 90) that the criminality in attempt “is constituted more by the mens rea than the actus reus”. The fact that the line between preparation and attempt is misty, is really not a true difficulty, though it may appear such. When the principle is applied to given facts, it will be almost invariably found that the true solution is evident. As Kenny states (the same Turner Edition, page 91)
“The deed must be one performed in actual furtherance of the crime intended, (italics of text) And, in addition, the deed must be such that it raises a presumption that the accused was aiming at the crime in question.”
Earlier cases upon attempts to commit crimes which are “impossible of performance,” discussed lucidly in Syed Shamsul Huda's Principles of the Law of Crimes (Tagore Law Lectures), upon this particular aspect are probably out of date. R. v. Macpherson(1), is doubted by Kenny to be good law, since there cannot be degrees of “impossibility”. “In all cases the prosecution must prove the actus reus and the mens rea, and the point is really one of evidence” (Kenny, page 94).
In R v. Ramakka(2) also referred to by my learned brother, the facts did not proceed beyond preparation, and the actus reus was not established. In the present case, the situation would have been precisely similar or identical, if both the accused had merely gone towards the well, or peered into it with the intention of jumping in, when the infant had slipped from the hands of the woman. That might conceivably be so, even if they had tied themselves together with a rope, in order to drown themselves along with the infant. But the evidence is that the accused jumped into the well, and that as they were doing so, the child slipped from the hands of the woman and fell in; that is the evidence of the facts and probabilities, and of the judicial and extra-judicial confessions. That establishes the actus reus, and the mens rea, with regard to the infant. It goes beyond preparation, and locus penitentiae hence ceases to exist; that is available only prior to the actus reus, and not once that element is established.
But the true difficulty still remains, a matter upon which we have been able to discover hardly any light in the authorities and text-books. Most cases of “attempt” are cases in which the object of the offender is frustrated, and there is no successful culmination. Otherwise, the “attempt” would merge in the crime, and would no longer retain its essential character of an ‘inchoate offence’, which my learned brother has stressed. But what happens when some intervening circumstance does prevent the “attempt” from being successful, but nevertheless brings about the same end desired by the offender through an accident? The offender cannot be convicted of the offence itself, for the chain of causation has snapped. This can be very simply shown in the present case, upon the facts of the record accepted by us. S. 299 I.P.C applies to him who “caused death by doing an act with the intention of causing death” etc. S. 300 I.P.C specifies that culpable homicide is murder, “if the act by which death is caused is done”, etc. In the present case, before the actus reus caused death, an accident intervened, the child slipped and was drowned; and hence it cannot be said that the acts of the accused were the direct cause of the death of the child. But how far can indirect causation to be recognised as operative, in Criminal jurisprudence? A glimmer of light is thrown upon this problem in the case-law relating to Explanation 2 to S. 299 I.P.C If, after the blow or act of injury impugned as homicidal, a distinct set of circumstances arises causing a new mischief, “then the new mischief will be regarded as the cause causus and not the original blow.” (Flynns - 16 W.R 319 cited in Ratan's “Culpable Homicide”, page 8) But the question is hardly free from subtle difficulties, as the following examples will show.
If A shoots at B, who is standing near a balustrade in a tall building, and the shot misses, and B in consequence of the explosion turns giddy and falls over the balustrade into the street below and is killed, would A be guilty of the murder of B? Hardly, for it is not his act that has caused the death; it is a circumstance given that the shot missed its aim. actus reus is certainly established, and A would be guilty of attempt at murder. If a child is thrown into a well, and in falling it strikes a ledge, the existence of which the murderer does not: suspect, and dies of a frac- tured skull before it strikes the water, could the offence of murder be held proved against the criminal in question? Clearly, only the attempt can be held ettablished on these facts, since it was not the act of the accused which caused its death. But degrees of causation can vary, and give rise to difficulties. In the first instance, if the shot missed its aim, but struck a pillar and “recochetted” back to the victim, killing him thereby, it would be difficult to argue that the completed offence was not established.
Even in English Criminal jurisprudence which has a long history of growth by juristic analysis and judicial interpretation, the difficulty would appear to remain unsolved. The following passage in “Russel on Crime” (Turner's 1958 Edition) page 466, is highly significant:
“A distinction has been drawn between proximate and remote consequences of a man's conduct. As stated previously, there has so far been no authoritative test for deciding exactly where the line should be drawn between these two classes.”
Some light will be found thrown upon this difficult problem of indirect causation, with specific reference to philosophical definition as “the necessary connection of events in the time-series”, in Betrand Russell's “On the notion of causes” (“Mysticim and Logic” 1950 Edition, page 180). The problem is not merely metaphysical but actual in criminal jurisprudence, and has been found so in English law.
Giving our best consideration to the matter, we are of the view that both accused 1 and accused 2 can be found guilty only of attempt to murder, and we modify the convictions accordingly (S. 307 I.P.C) We confirm the convictions under S. 309 I.P.C as well as the sentences imposed upon that count.
The case is a tragic and pitiable one, and the death of the child was really due to economic insecurity, to the fact that both the accused felt themselves slipping from the ledge into destruction, due to sheer want. Hence we sentence each of the accused under S. 307 I.P.C to 18 months' rigorous imprisonment, the sentences to run concurrently with those imposed by the learned Sessions Judge under S. 309 I.P.C already, and confirmed by us.
Ramaswami, J. I agree with my learned brother that accused 1 and 2 can be convicted only of attempt to commit murder. On account of the importance of the topic I wish to add the following.
The law relating to “attempt” punishable in criminal law is practically the same in England, United States of America and India.
This branch of criminal law has been the subject of detailed study in the standard English Text-book, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edition (1958) by J.W.C Turner, pages 89 to 93; the Amercial Classic 22 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 138 and following; and so far as India is concerned, J.D Mayne's Criminal Law of India, Third Edition, Chapter IV, page 925 and following and two valuable monographs, Sri N. Arunachalam's “Treatise on the Law of Crimes”, Chapter IX, page 142 and following; and S.K.L Ratan's “Culpable Homicide” Chapter XIII. (Attempt to Murder), page 109 and following. The Tagore Law Lecture by Sir Syed Shamsul Huda on “Attempts” Inchoate Crimes Lecture III of the Tagore Law Lectures - 1902 published as the Principles of the law of Crimes in B. India though out of date still remains the outstanding contribution on the subject.
Attempt to commit a crime and the abetment of the commission of that crime belong to the category of incomplete crimes or inchoate crimes injurious rather in tendency than in fact. These are also classified as crimes in the interests of social security and well-being. In civil law the attempted doing of an act which when completed is actionable, is not actionable at all. On the other hand the attempted commission of an offence is taken serious note of by the Criminal Law and attempts are also punished with great severity.
Four stages are passed through in doing an act. The first stage or origin of an act is in the contemplation of a human being who is capable of acting. This stage is not dealt with by any system of criminal jurisprudence in English speaking countries, “The Devil himself knoweth not the thought of man” and so it is absolutely difficult to divine the contemplation in the mind of an individual and punish him for the idea in his head. The will is not to be taken for the deed. Juries as has been said cannot look into the breast of Criminals. But if a person goes past the stage of contemplation and reaches the stage of preparation, he brings himself within the clutches of the law. According to Mayne, preparation consists in devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of the offence. It often happens that in a series of acts culminating in an offence each step is preparation for the next. In such cases it would be unduly restricting the meaning of the word to say that an attempt must preclude all stages of preparation and be the last proximate act to that which would complete the offence or to say that it must be the one immediately preceding that with which the acts constituting the offence began — Huda, Page 86. Preparations are punished under the various sections of the Penal Code, the notable examples being Ss. 122, 126, 399 etc. The next stage is attempt or the direct movement towards the commission after the preparations have been made.
In actual practice it has always been found difficult to draw a line between preparation and attempt. It cannot be stated with any degree of accuracy where the former stage ends and the latter stage begins. The Code has not sought to define either contemplation or preparation or attempt “This is probably due to the fact that the word “attempt” is not used in any technical sense” (Huda supra at page 49). It is left to the common sense of the Magistrate and Judge to determine whether the stage reached by the accused is preparation or attempt: 21 Pat. 667 (Jain Lal); 3 Madras 4 (Padala); 52 Crl. L.J 37 (Tulsipada); 15 All. 173 (Mac Rea).
There are three ways in which the Code has dealt with attempt to commit offences, (a) The offence and the attempt to commit it are dealt with in the same section and the extent of punishment for both is the same, e.g, S. 196 I.P.C (b) The second head is attempt at committing specific offences dealt with side by side with the offences themselves separately and with separate punishments as illustrated by Ss. 307, 308 I.P.C (c) With respect to cases not provided for in any of the two clauses mentioned above, the general S. 511 I.P.C applies. In order that a person may be guilty of an attempt at the commission of an offence under S. 511 of the Code, the offence itself if completed should be punishable with imprisonment for life or for a lesser period; and secondly, in such attempt the culprit must do an act towards the commission of the offence, e.g, if the offence which is attempted at is punishable with fine alone, the attempt at the commission of the same cannot be punished under S. 511 I.P.C To these three categories may also be added a fourth category of an attempt comprised in S. 309, I.P.C dealing with an attempt to commit suicide. S. 309 I.P.C, takes in the words of S. 511 I.P.C in regard to what would constitute an attempt and according to these sections, the persons attempting must do an act towards the commission of offence. “The language of the section seems to me somewhat redundant. The very essence of the idea of an attempt is something done, towards the act attempted to be done” — Huda, p. 50.
To draw a line between preparation and attempt, as just now mentioned, is really difficult but still it must be drawn. The law allows locus penitentiae to every person before he brings himself within the grips of the Criminal Law. This is the stage to which he can go and beyond which he cannot. I make this reference to the locus penitentiae because in the appeal memorandum it is pleaded that accused 2 has not become culpable because of the doctrine of locus penitentiae. In R. v. Ramakka a woman on account of a quarrel with her father and brother ran towards a well shouting that she would fall into it. In a prosecution for attempt at suicide, it was held that she could not be found guilty. Her running towards the well merely amounted to a preparation and no more. She must have reached the well and must also have done something so that she may fall into it, e.g, tried to jump from the parapet wall of the well. It was held that she had not gone past the locus penitentiae allowed to her by the law. From the facts set out in the judgment of my learned brother, it will be seen how the act of accused went beyond the stage of preparation.
In order to find out whether the act of accused in this case amounted to the inchoate crime of attempt or the completed crime of murder of the infant, we must discuss the definitions of “attempt” in the English, American and Indian Law. This discussion recalls the dictum of Rowlatt, J. in R. v. Osborn(3)“ Now people in the street” said Rowlatt, J. “before they began to think about it, think it is very easy thing to say what amounts to an ‘attempt’, but when you come to analyse, it becomes a little difficult”. In fact this concept of attempt to commit crimes did not take its modern comprehensive form until the judgment of Lord Mansfied in 1784 in R. v. Scofield(4) which was followed a few years later in R. v. Higgins(5). In English law there are three elements of liability in an attempt: (a) There must be evidence of some overt act (b) the evidence of mens rea and (c) an interruption to the series of acts or omission which but for that interruption would have culminat- ed in the completion of the offence. That interruption may be due to a voluntary determination of the offender not to complete the offence or by some extraneous intervention. The burden is therefore on the prosecution to show that (i) the actus reus that the accused had done something which in point of law marked the commission of the offence, and (ii) the mens rea that in taking this step he was inspired by the serious intention to go in to reach a definite objective which would constitute a specific felony or misdemeanour. Gardner v. Aceroyd(6). In regard to the series of acts or omissions which if uninterrupted would have culminated in the commission of the offence, there have been unnecessarily narrow and unnecessarily wide tests — regarding the sufficiency of the actus reus. But the required test has been formulated by J.W.C Turner in Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law (Ibid) and in a valuable article which he has contributed on “Attempts to commit crimes” in the “Modern Approach to Criminal Law” Volume IV of “English Studies in Criminal Science” (page 273 and following). “The actus reus of an attempt to commit a specific crime is constituted when the accused person does an act which is a step towards the commission of that specific crime, and the doing of such act cannot reasonably be regarded as having any other purpose than the commission of a specific crime”. See also Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice 33rd Edn. 1954, p. 1489; Russell on Crimes 11th Edn. by J.W.C Turner (1958) Chapter 6.
This formula may be amplified as follows: An act which does nor contribute to the commission of the crime, cannot be counted part of the actus reus, even though it may be excellent evidence of mens rea. If the acts of the accused, taken by themselves, are unambiguous, and cannot, in reason, be regarded as pointing to any other end than the commission of the specific crime in question, then they constitute a sufficient actus reus. In other words, his acts must be unequivocally referable to the commission of the specific crime. They must speak for themselves. It would be of assistance to the proper solution of difficult cases of alleged attempts, if no extrinsic evidence of the mens rea of the accused, e.g, such as a confession, were to be considered unless and until a sufficient actus reus has first been established. There is of course no such rule or practice operating in our Courts in cases of attempt but Magistrates and Judges would be well-advised to apply their minds in this way to cases offered for their consideration. So long as a sufficient actus reus of an attempt has been done, it does not matter what happens afterwards. The attempt may be successful or unsuccessful. If successful the offence may merge in the greater crime but that does not alter its nature Thus, the tests to be applied is the same in all cases of attempt, whether the accused has attempted what is possible or impossible. If the acts of the accused beyond reasonable doubt indicate and indicate only that he intended to commit a certain definite crime, then he has performed a sufficient actus reus to support a charge of attempting to commit that crime.
The leading English decisions are: Regina v. Chessman(7), R. v. Ring(8), R. v. Collins(9). Illustration, (a) (b) to S. 511 I.P.C show that the law in India is the same as R. v. Ring, R. v. Linnekar(10), R. v. Whybrone(11) R. v. Miskell(12) and R. v. Moran(13), discussed in Russell at p. 994 regarding attempts to do what is impossible.
Turning to America, 23 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 139 etc. has the following to say: Generally speaking, whether there has been an attempt to commit a crime depends on the state of mind and the conduct of the accused in the attempted consummation of his design. More specifically, an attempt to commit a crime consists of the following elements; (1) The intent (Intention is the direction of conduct towards the object chosen upon considering the motives which suggests the choice — Stephen's general view of the Criminal Law of England p. 69 (2nd Edition).) to commit the crime; (2) Performance of some act towards the commission of the crime. (3) The failure to consummate its commission, or, as sometimes stated, the intent to commit a crime, and a direct ineffectual act done towards the commission. No degree of intent will of itself suffice to constitute an indictable attempt to commit a crime, no matter how evil or malignant it may be; nor can an act alone constitute an attempt, no matter how well adapted it may be to effect a criminal result, unless coupled with an intent. So a failure to consummate the crime is usually held to be as much an element of an attempt to commit it as the intent and the performance of an overt act towards its commission.
An overt act in part execution of an intent to commit a crime, but, under most authorities, falling short of the completed crime, is an essential element of an attempt to commit a crime. While the sufficiency of a particular act depends on the facts of the particular case, the act must always amount to more than mere preparation, and move directly towards the commission of the crime.
An actual intent to commit the particular crime towards which the act moves is a necessary element of an attempt to commit a crime. The intent must be one in fact, not merely in law, but may be inferred from the circumstances.
Voluntary abandonment of an attempt which has proceeded beyond preparation will not bar a conviction therefor. However, voluntary abandonment may be urged by accused to show his intent.
To constitute an indictable attempt to commit a crime, its consummation must be apparently possible, or in other words, there must be at least an apparent ability to commit it. If the means employed are so clearly unsuitable that it is obvious that the crime cannot be committed, or, it has been held, if its consummation is dependent on the conduct of a third-person-principal who has an opportunity to frustrate it, the attempt is not indictable. On the other hand, if there is an apparent ability to commit the crime in the way attempted, the attempt is indictable, although unknown to the person making the attempt, the crime cannot be committed, because the means employed are in fact unsuitable or because of extrinsic facts, such as the non-existence of some essential object, or an obstruction by the intended victim, or by a third person.
The law in India in regard to attempts contemplated by S. 511 I.P.C is the same as set out above. (1)* In regard to an attempt to commit murder (s. 307 I.P.C) the correct position has been envisaged in S.K.L Ratan's “Culpable Homicide” pages 113 to 115 as follows:
“An intention to cause death is not punishable. If the intention is translated into action, and an act is done in pursuance of such intention which results in the death of the victim, the act amounts to murder. But mere intention alone or the harbouring of an evil design is not by itself punishable. There must be a manifestation of that intention by an overt act. The conditions or circumstances under which the accused sets out on his adventure may be such that whilst he may manifest his intention to cause death by doing an act he may fail to carry out his intention and his victim may escape unhurt. In the first case the author of the act is guilty of murder. In the second, he is guilty of an attempt to murder; there having been a manifestation of the intention by an overt act done in pursuance of that intention, the act becomes punishable as an attempt. An intention and a manifestation of that intention by an overt act amounts to an attempt. It is a question of fact for the jury to decide with what intention or knowledge was the act done. But the mere fact that the circumstances were not so favourable for a successful termination of the act of the accused, no qualification as to the nature of the act should be imposed in deciding the question, whether the act itself amounts to an attempt. If the act is an attempt and the intention was to commit murder, the act amounts to an attempt to commit murder. The ‘under such circumstances’ in S. 306 mean no more than the conditions under which the act is done; they could never have been intended to qualify the nature of the act.
“The section clearly contemplates an act which is done with the intention of causing death but which fails to “bring about the intended consequences. A separate punishment is provided for in case where hurt is caused as a result of the act of the accused which implies that it is possible to conceive of attempts at murder where no hurt is caused at all. The nature of the act is immaterial if an intention to cause death is established.
“The intention precedes the act and is to be proved independently of the act, and not merely gathered from the consequences that ensue”. (R.V Cassidy (1867) 4 B.H.C.R Crl. 17 dissented from in Vasudeo Balwant gogte A.I.R 1932 Bom. 279; Bharat Duke A.I.R Pat. 51; Musa Amadasa Nadar v. Emper 1937 M.W.N 536);
It is interesting in this connection to note that in the U.S.S.R attempts are treated by the Criminal Code as being equivalent to completed crimes in danger, and full penalties are meted out (Art. 19). At the same time the Courts seem to appreciate that there is a problem of proof in an attempt. The Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R has said because of the problem of proof when action has not been completed, penalties should be applied only when preparatory acts have been manifested in a definite concrete form. The Court had no difficulty in convicting a nineteen year old youth who set fire to a hay field, hoping to burn down a collective farm which occupied a farm formerly owned by his family. The fire had been put out quickly by the members of the farm so that no harm resulted, but the act was classified as destruction with counter-evolutionary intent by fire of public property, and the lad was sentenced to five years of hard labour with loss of political and civil rights: Case of Shmakov, 982 (1931) 8 Sud. Prak. RSFSR. 9 (Law and Social Change in the U.S.S.R by Prof. John N. Hazard of Columbia University published by the London Institute of World Affairs, page 103).
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