Manager Ganapathi Ram Naik v. Kumta Shri Venkatraman Dev

Somnath Iyer, J.:— This revision petition which involves a question of some importance touching the interpretation of Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 is before us since it was referred to a Bench by Govinda Bhat, J. under the proviso to section 8 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1961.

There is a temple in the District of North Canara at Kumta known as the temple of Sri Venkatraman Dev. On behalf of the idol of that temple, a suit was brought by a certain Yeshwant Annappa Pai claiming to be the manager of the temple for the recovery of rent from the defendant and for his eviction. The suit was brought under section 12 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The defendant who was the tenant resisted the suit on many grounds one of which is, that Yeshwant Annappa Pai who brought the suit was not the manager; the other was that the suit brought without the consent of the Charity Commissioner prescribed by Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act was incompetent.

The Civil Judge made a decree against the defendant. He made a decree for rent although not for the entire amount claimed in the plaint and he also made a decree for possession. The defendant appealed to the District Judge only from that part of the decree by which a decree for possession was made. The decree for rent remained unquestioned. That appeal was dismissed.

So it was that the defendant presented this revision petition to this Court. When it came up before Govinda Bhat J. the main argument advanced before his Lordship was that the institution of the suit which was not prescribed by the obtaining of the consent of the Charity Commissioner required by Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act was impermissible and sustence for that submission was sought to be derived from Shri Marikamba Temple and Shri Hanumant Temple v. Family Manager, Subraya Venkataramanappa Barkur(1) in which was explained that suit for possession brought by a temple registered as a public trust for recovery of possession of the properties belonging to it could not be brought except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by section 50 of the Act. Govinda Bhat, J. felt hesitant to subscribe to any such proposition. In the order by which he made a reference of this revision petition to a Bench this is what he observed:

“If the statement of the law in the above decision is correct the petitioners in this case must succeed. But I am unable to persuade myself to accept the proposition as laid down in that decision.”

Harving proceeded to mention the reasons for his taking that view, he referred this revision petition to a Bench which he had the library to do under the proviso to section 8 of the Mysore High Court Act.

Before proceeding to decide whether the institution of the suit in this case should have conformed to the requirements of Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act the other submissions made by Mr. Bhatta appearing for the defendant could be conveniently noticed. It was said that Yeshwant Annappa Pai who brought the suit on behalf of the idol was not the manager and that there were other trustees who had been appointed to be in charge of the management of the temple and that the suit brought by Pai and not by all the trustees was, therefore, incompetent. Mr. Ramachandra for the plaintiff submitted to us that this plea could not be raised by the defendant in this revision petition since that part of the decree by which the defendant was directed to pay the rents for the shop in his occupation, to the idol, in the suit brought by Pai which was not appealed against, incorporated by implication an adjudication that Pai had the competence to bring the suit and on a principle analogous to that of res judicata the defendant could not be properly permitted to challenge the competence of Pai to bring the suit for eviction.

It seems to me that we need not proceed to consider whether Mr. Ramachandra is right in asking us to take that view as the short ground on which Mr. Batta's contention has to fail is that when the appeal was argued before the District Judge, the contention which Mr. Bhatta now urges was never presented. The only submission made on behalf of the defendant in that appeal was that there is something in Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act which made it impossible for Pai to represent the idol in the suit, or to bring one on its behalf. If, therefore, the competence of Pai to institute a suit was not challenged on any other ground before the District Judge even if any such contention was available to the defendant, that contention must be deemed to have been abandoned.

One more equally unsustainable argument which was advanced by Mr. Batta was that the notice issued to the defendant before the suit was instituted, was a defective notice not conforming to the requirements of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. Mr. Bhatta had to admit that this defect in the notice was never relied upon at any stage of the litigation and that it is for the first time in this court that defect was discovered. We intimated Mr. Bhatta that we are not permitting him to advance any argument in that context at this extremely belated stage.

Now I must proceed to advert to the argument based on Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. Before I do so, it should be mentioned that it is undisputed that the temple of Sri Venkataramana Dev is a public temple registered as a Public Trusts under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The plaintiff who has been held to be the manager of the temple must be understood to be its manager within the meaning of the definition occurring in section 2(8) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act which reads:—

“2(8) ‘Manager’ means any person other than a trustee who for the time being either alone or in association with some other person or persons administers the trust property of any public trust and Includes….”

The definition of the word ‘trustee’ which occurs in clause (18) of that section reads:—

“(18) ‘trustee’ means a person in whom either alone or in association with other persons, the trust property is vested and includes a manager;

Section 50 on which the contention for the defendant is founded Reads:—

“50. In any case—

(i) where it is alleged that there is a breach of a public trust,

(ii) where a declaration is necessary that a particular property is a property belonging to a public trust or where a direction is required to ???temple, or who is entitled to partake or in that habit of partaking in the distribution of gifts thereof.

(b) in the case of a math, a disciple of the math or a person of the religious persuasion to which the math belongs.

(c) in the Case of wakf a person who is entitled to receive any pecuniary or other benefit from the wakf and includes a person who has a right to worship or to perform any religious rite in a mosque, adgah, imambara, dargah, maqbara or other religious institution connected with the wakf or to participate in any religious or charitable institution under the wakf.

(d) in the case of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, any member of such society and

(e) in the case of any other public trust, any beneficiary;”

If it can be said that clause (ii) of Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is applicable to the suit brought by the idol represented by its manager in the present case, there would be very little difficulty in acceding to the contention urged by Mr. Bhatta on behalf of the defendant that the suit brought by the Manager which is not permitted by section 50 was not maintainable. The suit was not brought by the Charity Commissioner, nor by two or more persons having an interest in the trust with the consent of the Charity Commissioner. The suit was brought by the idol represented by its manager. If the only suit which could be brought for recovery of property belonging to an idol is the suit permitted by section 50 it should follow that neither the idol nor its manager as manager can sue any one for recovery of possession of the property belonging to the idol. The emphasis of the argument for the defendant was on the words “where a declaration is necessary that a particular property is a property belonging to a public trust or where a direction is required to recover possession of such property” occurring in clause (ii) of section 50. There being no dispute that the property belongs to a public trust and it being clear that the suit was for recovery of such property, it was asserted that no other than the Charity Commissioner or two or more persons permitted by him could have brought the suit.

It seems to me that this argument suffers from more than one infirmity. The first, I think, is, that section 50 as its language makes it plain is not an exhaustive provision regulating all suits which may be brought for recovery of property belonging to a public trust and has no higher status than a mere enabling section authorising the Charity Commissioner or two or more persons having an interest in the trust, to institute a suit for the recovery of property belonging to a public trust. The section does not say that the only suit which could be brought for recovery of possession of a property belonging to a public trust is a suit brought by the Charity Commissioner or by two or more persons having an interest in the trust but merely declares that a suit of the description contained in the section may be brought, either the Charity Commissioner or two or more persons permitted by him. The words ‘may institute’ occurring in the paragraph appearing under clause (iii) make that position abundantly clear.

Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is of the pattern of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure although the structure of the one is a little different from that of the other. But it is, to mind, quite plain that notwithstanding the variation in the phraseology, the object of both the statutory provisions is the same. The aim of Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act and that of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to empower a Charity Commissioner in one case and the Advocate General in the other and in the alternative, two or more persons having an interest in the trust in both cases, to institute a suit for suitable reliefs if the person having an interest in it is exposed to prejudice or injury by inaction, neglect or mismanagement by those charged with its administration. But there can be no such occasion when a trustee or the manager of a temple who occupies a position analogous to that of a trustee brings, in the discharge of his obligations as trustee or manager, a suit for the recovery of the property of the idol and that suit clearly protects the trust and those having an interest in it. The acceptance of the argument that even that suit could be brought only by the Charity Commissioner or by two or more persons having an interest in the trust, would lead to the strange consequence that in no circumstances could the idol or its trustee or manager sue for its property.

There is no rule which is better settled than this, that an idol is a juristic person and if a property is dedicated to an idol, the property belongs to it and is held by it and that the idol can not only sue, but could also be sued. In Pramatha Natha Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumara Mullick*(1) Lord Shaw at page 250 said this:—

“A Hindu idol is, according to long established Authority, founded upon the religious customs of the Hindus, and the recognition thereof by Courts of law a “juristic entity.” It has a juridical status with the power or sung and being sued. Its interests are attended to by the person who has the deity in his charge and who is in law its manager with all the powers which would in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the manager of the estate of an infant heir. It is unnecessary to quote the authorities; for this doctrine, thus simply stated, is firmly established.”

In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar Mr. Amir Ali observed:—

“Under the Hindu law the image of a deity of the Hindu pantheon is, as has been aptly called, a “juristic entity,” vested with the capacity of receiving gifts and holding property. Religious institutions, known under different names, are regarded as possessing the same “juristic” capacity and gifts are made to them co-nominee.”

One other rule which has equally held the field during all these many years is that although a Hindu idol is a juristic entity it is a juristic entity only in an ideal sense of the term and that it speaks through human agency such as its manager. So it is that in a long line of decisions it has been pointed out that a suit for recovery of property belonging to the idol which could be brought in the name of the idol which is a juristic entity could also be brought in the name of the manager. As early as in Prosunng Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo(2) Sir Montague E. Smith remarked:—

“It is only in an ideal sense that property can be said to belong to an idol; and the possession and management of it must in the nature of things be entrusted to some person as sebait, or manager. It would seem to follow that the person so entrusted must of necessity be empowered to do whatever may be required for the service of the idol and for the benefit and preservation of its property, at least to as great a degree as the manager of an infant heir. If this were not so, the estate of the idol might be destroyed or wasted, and its worship discontinued, for want of the necessary funds to preserve and maintain them.”

It being thus clear beyond out that a suit for the recovery of property belonging to the idol as in the present case could be brought either by the idol represented by the manager or by the manager himself, the question is whether there is anything in Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trust Act which brings about a deprivation of that right to sue in that way. It may be that the temple in this case has been declared to be a public trust under the provisions of the Bombay Trust Act and it may also be that the Act contains provisions enabling the appointment of trustees for the management of the temple. But so long as no appointment of a trustee has been made and Yeswantha Annappa Pai who is the manager is not displaced from his position as manager, the ordinary right of the manager to sue on behalf of the idol or in his own name is a right which does not disappear unless the disappearance of that right is caused by law. Although Mr. Bhatta appearing for the defendant on more than one occasion asserted that when the plaintiff temple was registered as a public trust under the provisions of the Act, some trustees must have been appointed, he had to admit that mere registration of the temple as a public trust does not, under the provisions of the Act, displace a manager, if one exists, and that there was no evidence produced by any one that in addition to Yeswantha Annappa Pai any one else was appointed a trustee. Although in this context Mr. Bhatta asks us to say that there was some admission made by the plaintiff to that effect, we were unable to find any such admission.

It is clear that although the manager of a temple is a trustee in one sense of the term, he is not a trustee with obligations annexed to the ownership of property for the benefit of another and that his status cannot be equiparated with the status of a trustee in that way in every sense of the term. But what has been recognized during a long period of time is that a manager of a temple by whatever name he is called whether he is known as a sebait in one part of the country or a dharma karta or manager in another, there is a right in him to bring a suit either in the name of the temple or in his own name for the recovery of property belonging to the idol. It does not appear to me that there is anything in the Bombay Public Trusts Act which causes a divestiture of that right. I do not find anything in Section 50 causing its deprivation.

The reasons why we should, in my opinion, come to that conclusion are quite a few. In the first place, as already indicated, Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is not an exhaustive Code regulating a suit which can be brought for the recovery of property belonging to a public trust but is only a statutory provision enabling suits which may be brought by a person other than those who can bring that suit either as the owner of the property which an idol is or as the manager of the temple to the idol of which the property belongs. Any other view would lead to the incongruous position/that a person who can himself bring a suit cannot bring it and that suit could be brought only by a designated instrumentality like the Charity Commissioner or by two or more persons who do not own the property but who have only an interest in the trust. We should in my opinion, be extremely reluctant to take a view which recognizes the rights of a person other than the owner of the property to bring the suit and which forbids the institution of a suit by the owner himself. That view, in my opinion we should not take unless the language of Section 50 makes any other view impossible and in my opinion, it does not. In Section 51 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act there is something which should persuade us to repel the view that the only persons who can bring a suit for recovery of property belonging to the trust are those specified in Section 50. Section 51 reads:

“51(1) If the persons having an interest in any public trust intend to file a suit of the nature specified in Section 50, they shall apply to the Charity Commissioner in writing for his consent. The Charity Commissioner, after hearing the parties and after making such enquiry as he thinks fit, may within a period of six months from the date on which the applicant on is made, grant or refuse his consent to the institution of such suit. The order of the Charity Commissioner refusing his consent shall be in writing and shall state the reasons for the refusal.

(2) If the Charity Commissioner refuses his consent to the institution of the suit under sub-section (1) the persons applying for such consent may file an appeal to the Bombay Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1939, in the manner provided by this Act.

(3) In every suit filed by persons having interest in any trust under Section 50, the Charity Commissioner shall be a necessary party.

(4) Subject to the decision of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal in appeal under Section 71, the decision of the Charity Commissioner under sub-section (1) shall be final and conclusive.”

It becomes clear from the provisions of this section that Section 50 created and regulated a right to institute a suit by Charity Commissioner or by two or more persons interested in the trust, in the form of supplementary statutory provisions without making any defeasance of the right of the manager or a trustee of a trust or the right of an idol in a case like the present one to bring a suit either on behalf of the trust or on its own behalf as the case may be. The purpose of regulating the suit in that way is to arrest frivolous litigation which may be thoughtlessly commenced by persons professing to have an interest in the trust.

It was, however, said a manager or a trustee who was also a person having an interest in the trust could sue with the consent of the Charity Commissioner. But this argument which overlooks the impossibility of a suit in that way when there is a sole trustee or manager also misses the distinction between “a person having an interest in the trust” and one who administers it. No one can say that a person who is charged with the administration of the trust such as the manager of the temple in this case is a person having only an interest in the trust. A person who has an interest in the trust is a person who would be prejudiced in some way, though not directly, if the trust is not properly administered. To say that a person who administers a trust is also a person having an interest in the trust would be to put upon the phrase ‘having an interest the trust’ an interpretation which its language does not admit. Indeed, the definition in Section 2(10) of the phrase ‘person having an interest’, although it is an inclusive definition, makes it clear that he is a person whose interest is something distinct from the duty with which a manager or a trustee is charged to properly administer or manage the trust, such as the right which every person belonging to the Hindu community has, to offer worship in a Hindu public temple.

One of the reasons why we should say that Section 50 could not be given the construction which Mr. Bhatta wants to place upon it is that its acceptance would make, in a case like this, a suit by the idol which owns the property impossible. It would also make a suit by a manager, if there is only one manager, equally difficult. The word ‘Manager’ is defined by Section 2(8) and a trustee is likewise defined by Section 2(18). Section 2(10) as it originally stood before it was amended by Bombay Act XXIII of 1953 defined a person having an interest as:

“Person having interest” means:

(a) in the case of a temple, a person who is entitled to attend at or is in the habit of attending the performance of worship or service in the temple, or who is entitled to partake or is in that habit of part king in the distribution of gifts thereof…………”

By the amendment, for the word ‘means’ which existed in that part of Section 2, the word ‘includes’ was substituted. But it does not appear to me that such substitution can justify the view that a manager and trustee whose duties are to administer the trust for the benefit of those who have an interest in the trust also fall within the definition. That is what we should say notwithstanding the familiar canon of construction that an inclusive definition includes in the definition what it would normally not have incorporated but for such inclusion.

It may be that a manager of a temple or a trustee in whom the trust property is vested may also have an interest in the trust if for example he is also a worshipper. But, that, is not an interest which he has in his capacity as manager or trustee. A trustee in whom the property vests, although he is subject to obligations annexed to such ownership, is the owner of the property although such ownership is annexed an obligation. But that right which he has in the trust property is superior to a mere interest such as that of a worshipper. That would also be the position in the case of the manager of a temple who in a sense is also a trustee although the property belonging to the temple does not vest with him. The ‘person having an interest’ in a public trust, is, therefore, one whose interest is inferior to that of a trustee or manager and it is by reason of the existence of that inferior and smaller interest that Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act like section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorises the institution of a suit and regulates it in the manner specified in it. But, that section, does not govern the institution of a suit by a person possessing a larger and a higher interest which is not regulated by it.

Now in the case of a public trust which may be governed by the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act at least three kinds of suits are possible. A suit by a manager on behalf of the temple or the idol consecrated in it is the first. A suit by a worshipper or a person having an interest in the trust is the second and a suit by a trustee for the recovery of possession of the property belonging to the trust is the third.

Now, it is clear that although a public temple can be registered as a public trust, such registration does not divest from the idol or the temple the property of which it is the owner. Likewise, a trustee of a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act is the person in whom the property belonging to the trust vests and therefore can sue or be sued. Now among these three categories of suits which can be brought on behalf of the public trust registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act and governed by it, the only category which is governed by Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is the second which comprise suits which may be brought by persons having an interest in the trust, which interest, is, as I have already observed, not as large or as great as the interest which the idol has in its own property or the manager has in the protection and recovery of the property belong to the trust or an interest which the trustee has as the person in whom the property vests, and it is to this category of suits that we should, in my opinion, restrict the operation of Section 50, there being nothing in it to extend its application to the remaining two categories.

Any other view may lead to very inconvenient results. As can be seen from Section 51 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act a suit which is regulated by Section 50, if it is not brought by the Charity Commissioner, has to wait until the persons who wish to bring a suit, secure the consent of the Charity Commissioner who is granted a period of six months by that section to accord his sanction. If a suit is about get barred by limitation and if that suit cannot be instituted at once without restoring to the procedure prescribed by Section 50, and if it cannot be instituted by the idol or manager or trustee if there be only one manager or trustee, the alarming consequence which would ensure if we should consider the provisions of Section 50 as exhaustive would be that the property belonging to the trust would be lost by the trust. Then again, if the Charity Commissioner refuses his consent to the institution of the suit and therefore the persons who apply for such consent have to appeal to the tribunal specified in Section 51(2) and the suit gets barred by limitation before the tribunal accords its sanction to the same, the trust would be exposed to the same injurious consequence. Sub-section (4) of Section 51 makes the decision of the appellate tribunal and the Charity Commissioner as the case may be final and conclusive and in a case in which both the tribunal and the Charity Commissioner erroneously refuse to accord consent, no one would be able to recover the trust property belonging to it. An interpretation which results in consequences so prejudicial to the trust should not commend itself to us. It is, in my opinion, right to say that Section 50 leaves unimpaired the right of the idol or the manager or a trustee as the case may be to bring a suit for the recovery of the trust property in the usual way and that all that it does is to regulate suits for the recovery of trust property or for the other reliefs enumerated in Section 50 for the protection of an interest other than that which the idol, trustee or manager wishes to protect.

It seems to me that there is also another reason why we should refuse to make Section 50 applicable to any other suit. It will be seen from Section 50 that, section authorises the institution of a suit by the Charity Commissioner or two or more persons interested in the trust, in the ‘court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction of the whole pt part of the subject matter of the suit is situate.’ The world court’ occurring in this part of Section 50 is defined by Section 2(4) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act which reads:

“(4) ‘Court’ means in the Greater Bombay, the City Civil Court and elsewhere, the District Court;”

The acceptance of, the interpretation proposed by the defendant would make it necessary for the plaintiffs to institute the suit only in the District Court having jurisdiction to try it and that court would become the only forum to try the suit however small may be its. Subject matter.

I am of the view that we should discard the interpretation suggested for the plaintiff notwithstanding the expression ‘in any case’ occurring in section 50. That phrase does not mean that all suite which may be instituted on behalf of a public trust should be instituted only by the adoption of the precedure prescribed by section 50. That section enumerates the suits to which it is applicable and in so far as it concerns itself with the institution of a suit for recovery of property belonging to a public trust it operates only in respect of a suit ‘where a direction is required to recover the possession of such property belonging to the trust’. I must say that I find great difficulty in understanding this expression. Neither Mr. Ramachandra nor Mr. Bhatta nor the other learned Advocates who appear in the companion matters were able to explain the exact connotation or meaning of these words. The word ‘direction’ cannot be said to be the legal equipollent of the word ‘degree’ for, the word ‘decree’ is to be found employed in the paragraph appearing under clause (iii) of the section. There is surely a great difference between a direction and a decree and the authors of the Code, I am certain, would not have used the word ‘direction’ in places where they intended to employ the word ‘decree’. On an analysis of clause (ii), it becomes clear that, that clause envisages only those suits for the recovery of property belonging to a trust in which a direction is required to recover such possession. I have not been able to find in the Bombay Public Trusts Act any express provision which insists upon a direction by any one for the recovery of possession of property belonging to a trust. If the property belongs to an idol in the temple declared as a public trust or even if for the recovery of possession of such property a manager institutes a suit, either in his own name or on behalf of the idol, or if the property is vested in a trustee who is defined by section 2(18), ordinarily, no direction from any one would be necessary for the idol or manager or a trustee as the case may be, for the institution of a suit for recovery of property belonging to the trust. No provision of the Bombay Public Trusts Act requiring such direction was shown to us. So, to whatever category of cases clause (ii) of section 50 might apply, it does not apply to a suit which can be brought without any such direction and the suit by the plaintiff in this case is one of the suits which could be so brought. Clause (ii) can have therefore no other meaning than that the consent of the Charity Commissioner is necessary only in cases in which the suit it instituted by some one who has only an interest in the trust which falls short of an interest possessed by the idol or the manager or the trustee as the case may be. That, is the only way in which it would be possible to give some meaning to the word ‘direction’ occurring in clause (ii).

On two occasions, me High Court of Bombay did not consider section 50 as concerning itself with a suit for recovery of property belonging to a trust by a trustee. In Gurusiddappa Tipanna Mugeri v. Miraj Education Society, Miraj*, Miraj, the suit was by the Miraj Education Society through its President for a declaration that the trust was entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 25,000 kept in fixed deposit by a certain Mugeri in the Belgaum Bank. Defendant 1 was the son and defendant 2, the widow of Mugeri. The defendants denied that sum of money belonged to the trust and claimed it as belonging to themselves. One of the questions was whether the suit brought by the society was governed by Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. Naik J. had no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that section 50 was quite inapplicable to a suit brought by the society and that the acceptance of the contention to the contrary would lead to a ‘starting result’, namely, that in respect of all charities spread over the vast territories of the Bombay State, it is open to the Charity Commissioner to file suits on behalf of the trusts against trespassers or third persons. The learned Judge was of the view that section 50 regulated suits other than those which could bring them on behalf of the trust and that its provisions are applicable only to the distinct category of suits which could be instituted by persons having only an interest in the trust.

In Khemchand Gorumal v. Parmanand Deepchand Hinduja Datar, J. assumed that a suit brought by a trustee against the other trustees of a public trust did not fall within the ambit of Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. In Karyappa Parasappa Pujari v. Ramappa Parasappa Pujari(3) the suit was for an injunction to restrain the defendant from disturbing his possession of the property. Plaintiff claimed that he and his brother were in joint possession of a land which belonged to a temple which was a public trust and that although he was in possession of the property in the exercise of that right as the person who was performing pooja in the temple, the defendant was disturbing his possession. The question was whether a suit brought in that way was within the meaning of Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act and Tukol, J. thought that it was not. He thought that the decision in Shri Marikamba Temple and Sri Hanumant Temple v. Subraya Venkataramanappa Barkur did not lend support to the view that the suit in the case before him was incompetent.

It will be seen that while in Gurusiddappa's case the subject matter of the suit was property belonging to the trust, the suit in Karyappa's case also related to the property belonging to a trust. But those suits were outside the purview of Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act was what was decided, the necessary implication of which is that the provisions of Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act are by no means exhaustive.

In my opinion, the courts below were right in taking the view that section were right in taking the view that Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act did not govern the suit brought by the plaintiff in the case before us. We should, in my opinion, therefore, dissent from the decision in Marikamba Temple and Sri Hanumant Temple v. Subbaraya Venkataramanappa Barkur.

This revision petition should, therefore be dismissed with costs. Mr. Bhatta asks for time to vacate and Mr. Ramachandra consents to grant of three months' time. Time granted accordingly.